This study investigates the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance, the asymmetric nature of pay-performance sensitivity, and the effect of CEO participation on the pay-setting process, for publicly-listed New Zealand firms during 1997 to 2002. The research is conducted using a unique hand-collected panel data set containing information about executive compensation, firm performance, ownership, firm governance and CEO participation in the pay-setting process. The sample covers the six-year period following the introduction of mandatory disclosure requirements that were imposed on executive and director compensation in 1997. An initial descriptive analysis of the data reveals a large pay difference between worker and CEO pay. In addition, pay-performance indexes for the highest and lowest paid CEOs document differences between the change in pay relative to real shareholder returns. An examination of the sensitivity between growth in CEO pay, and contemporaneous and lagged firm performance using a firm fixed-effects model, shows that not only is pay significantly related to firm size and performance but also board size, compensation risk and director share ownership. Models of the relationship between growth in CEO compensation and firm performance indicate the pay-performance sensitivity generated by cash and the change in the value of stock option holdings is reported to be three-times the magnitude of the sensitivity due to salary and bonus payments alone. In addition, growth in CEO compensation is asymmetrically related to changes in firm performance. CEO cash compensation is positively related to increases in firm value only. Total compensation is related to contemporaneous returns and positive lagged returns. Change in CEO wealth is positively related to contemporaneous returns but is more sensitive to losses. However, change in wealth also increases when lagged returns are positive and negative, implying that CEOs are able to extract pay in excess of that which is optimal under the contracting view of executive compensation. Furthermore, firms in which CEOs demonstrate a low level of participation in the pay-setting process earn higher levels of pay, which also grows at significantly greater rates than their high-participation counterparts. In particular, growth in low-participation wealth is more sensitive to positive and negative contemporaneous returns as well as being negatively related to negative lagged excess returns. This finding is opposite to theoretical predictions and can be explained by the tightly held nature of the high-participation firms which typically have fewer directors, are exposed to higher return volatility and have greater director and CEO beneficial share ownership. Consistent with the trickle-down effect, there is a positive relationship between growth in the non-performance related cash compensation awarded to CEOs and the growth in pay earned by their executive directors and employees. In addition, growth in non-CEO executive pay is not related to firm performance when there is an overpayment effect and CEOs exercise a high level of participation in the pay-setting process. Consistent with the contracting view, growth in non-CEO executive pay is positively related to firm performance with no benefits from CEO overpayments when stock option awards are included in the CEO pay contract.

<p>The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which culture, in six European and two North-American countries, affects CEO compensation. If differences in culture between countries can provide an explanation for cross-national differences in CEO compensation, it may increase multinational corporations understanding of how to design CEO compensations in the countries where they operate. Acquiring such knowledge would maximize the effect of their compensation plans. The study relates cultural dimensions to total CEO compensation and the ratio between variable compensation and total CEO compensation.</p><p>Cultural data, which comprises the study’s theoretical foundation, is based on the GLOBE study (House et al., 2004). Of the GLOBE study’s nine cultural dimensions, the study examines the five dimensions found most relevant to CEO compensation practices; performance orientation, uncertainty avoidance, institutional collectivism, future orientation and power distance. The research has been conducted through a regression analysis of 240, both private and publically listed companies. Companies with a turnover above €49 million or at least 250 employees were randomly chosen in Sweden, Germany, Netherlands, United States, Canada, France, Ireland and United Kingdom.</p><p>The study’s results shows that the cultural dimensions examined, to different extent do affect CEO compensation. The results show total CEO compensation to be negatively related to institutional collectivism, power distance and performance orientation. Further, total CEO compensation is positively related to future orientation. The proportion of variable compensation to total CEO compensation is negatively related to institutional collectivism and uncertainty avoidance. The proportion of variable compensation to total CEO compensation is positively related with future orientation. Thus we conclude that culture can contribute to understand cross-national differences in CEO compensation.</p>

This paper investigates whether CEO supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs) are associated with firm risk. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) show that CEOs manage their firms more conservatively as their debt incentives increase. Using new executive compensation disclosures mandated by the SEC, I find a negative association between CEO SERPs and firm risk but only for unsheltered SERPs. I find that when a CEO SERP is protected by a lump sum payment or by a trust (i.e. sheltered), the negative association between SERPs and firm risk is greatly diminished and even eliminated in some models. Furthermore, I show that having a greater proportion of outside CEOs on a compensation committee when a new CEO is hired is associated with a higher likelihood of the new CEO having a SERP. These findings have implications for the method in which executives are compensated with retirement pay and address the SEC’s growing concern about the link between compensation and firm risk management practices.

<p>Chief executive officer’s (CEO) compensation and its optimal level is an interesting and important topic. How successful and skilled are shareholders monitoring and making changes in its level and its mix? Ownership dispersion is an important determinant of it. In this study we try to answer this question from the perspective of institutional shareholders as they hold a substantial part of equity in firms. The paper sheds light on institutional ownership dispersion effect on CEO total and cash compensation in Sweden.</p><p>Analysing data from the 26 largest companies listed on Stockholm Stock Exchange over the time period 2004 - 2008 we find that institutional ownership concentration decreases top executive officer’s total and cash compensation. We also find that small institutional shareholdings are positively associated with chief executive officer’s total and cash compensation. Overall this relationship suggests that institutions are powerful monitors of corporate governance.</p>

The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which culture, in six European and two North-American countries, affects CEO compensation. If differences in culture between countries can provide an explanation for cross-national differences in CEO compensation, it may increase multinational corporations understanding of how to design CEO compensations in the countries where they operate. Acquiring such knowledge would maximize the effect of their compensation plans. The study relates cultural dimensions to total CEO compensation and the ratio between variable compensation and total CEO compensation. Cultural data, which comprises the study’s theoretical foundation, is based on the GLOBE study (House et al., 2004). Of the GLOBE study’s nine cultural dimensions, the study examines the five dimensions found most relevant to CEO compensation practices; performance orientation, uncertainty avoidance, institutional collectivism, future orientation and power distance. The research has been conducted through a regression analysis of 240, both private and publically listed companies. Companies with a turnover above €49 million or at least 250 employees were randomly chosen in Sweden, Germany, Netherlands, United States, Canada, France, Ireland and United Kingdom. The study’s results shows that the cultural dimensions examined, to different extent do affect CEO compensation. The results show total CEO compensation to be negatively related to institutional collectivism, power distance and performance orientation. Further, total CEO compensation is positively related to future orientation. The proportion of variable compensation to total CEO compensation is negatively related to institutional collectivism and uncertainty avoidance. The proportion of variable compensation to total CEO compensation is positively related with future orientation. Thus we conclude that culture can contribute to understand cross-national differences in CEO compensation.

This thesis researches to which extent companies use earnings management in times of CEO turnover, which is a continuing, complex and rather complicated issue. Earnings management was tested on different attribute such as: firm industry, firm size, CEO’s age, and the CEO’s origin (internal or external). The data was gathered through a quantitative study based on public companies’ financial reports. The sample includes 252 firms listed on Nasdaq OMX Stockholm and have been subject of a CEO change at some occasion during 2005-2011. The statistical result from the mixed-model ANOVA tests showed in general significant result of upward earnings management the year of CEO change, but not the following year. While there are many explanations to the findings of how earnings management is used on the Swedish market, the analysis and conclusion elaborate the reason that ought to be the blueprint of reality.

Industrialiseringen de senaste århundrandena har medfört att välståndet i många länder har ökat oerhört. Dock har utvecklingen också medfört att ekosystem, mark, luft och vatten har tagit skada. Företag som blir tillräckligt stora och mäktiga kan även skada sin sociala omgivning genom att ignorera frågor som gäller till exempel anställningsförhållanden, mänskliga rättigheter, samhällsansvar och produktansvar. Krav har därför kommit från omgivningen att företagen bör arbeta för att minimera sin skadliga inverkan på miljön och samhället. I och med detta har CSR-redovisning kommit att bli aktuellt. Syftet med denna studie är att förklara hur VD-relaterade faktorer påverkar företags CSR-redovisning. En deduktiv ansats och en kvantitativ metod har valts. Med hjälp av befintlig teori har tolv hypoteser tagits fram för att testas empiriskt. Hypoteserna berör hur VD-variablerna ålder, besittningstid, branscherfarenhet, ägande, bonus och kön påverkar CSR-redovisningen i ett företag. Studien slår fast att det finns ett negativt samband mellan VD-ägande och CSR-redovisning men att det inte finns något stöd för att VD-besittningstid, VD-branscherfarenhet, VD-ålder, VD-bonus eller VD-kön påverkar CSR-redovisningen. Faktumet att VD-ägande och CSR-redovisning var negativt korrelerade var inte i linje med de teorier som användes i studien vilka föreslog att sambandet skulle vara positivt. Studien har således uppdagat att befintliga teorier behöver utvecklas ytterligare för att förklara hur VD-ägande påverkar CSR-redovisning. / The industrialization of the society the last centuries has led to a great increase of wealth in many countries. However, the progress has also brought damage upon ecosystems, land, air and water. Organizations that become big and powerful enough can also damage their social environment by ignoring issues concerning labor practices, human rights, society and product responsibility. Demands have risen for the companies to minimize their bad influence on the environment and the society. Because of this, CSR-disclosure has become a hot topic. The purpose of this study is to explain how the CEO affects CSR-disclosure. A deductive approach and a quantitative method has been used. Twelve hypothesis were developed from existing theory and then tested empirically. The hypothesis consider how the CEO-variables age, tenure, experience of the industry, ownership, bonus and gender affects CSR-disclosure. The study concludes that CEO-ownership is negatively correlated with CSR-disclosure and that CEO-tenure, CEO´s experience of the industry, age of CEO, CEO-bonus and CEO-gender does not affect CSR-disclosure. Even though theory proposed that CEO-ownership would be positively correlated with CSR-disclosure, the study finds that the correlation is negative. The study has discovered that the existing theories have to be further developed in order to explain how the CEO affects CSR-disclosure.

Nowadays financial fraud scheme become more and more prevalent in public-traded companies in western and oriental countries. Many finance-related literatures realize and put stress on the importance of corporate governance. In this study, we would like to explore the relationship between audit committee and CEO compensation and equity incentives. We use multiple regression as methodology, take the public companies in technological field in Taiwan as sample from 2005 to 2010. We discover that, there is a positive relationship between the ratio of the number of independent directors divided by the audit committee members and the CEO compensation; there is no significant relationship between the ratio of the number of independent directors also serve as CEO directors in other firms divided by the audit committee members and the CEO compensation; there is a negative relationship between the ratio of the number of financial-accounting expertise divided by the audit committee members and the CEO compensation. And with regard to the equity incentives, there is no significant relationship between the ratio of the number of independent directors divided by the audit committee members, the ratio of the number of independent directors also serve as CEO directors in other firms divided by the audit committee members, the ratio of the number of financial-accounting expertise divided by the audit committee members and equity incentives.

This paper investigates the impact of accounting earnings on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation by examining how the valuation role and the contracting role of accounting earnings jointly determine the value of CEO total compensation. Current earnings are informative about the firms future cash flows and hence affect stock price, and the resulting price movement affects the value of CEO equity-based compensation. Thus, accounting earnings not only have a direct impact on CEO cash compensation, but also an indirect impact on CEO equity-based compensation due to earnings valuation role. To my knowledge, this paper is the first to provide empirical evidence that because of earnings valuation role, accounting earnings are an economically significant determinant of CEO total compensation. Prior accounting research testing predictions of agent theory has focused on CEO cash compensation even though total compensation is a more relevant measure. Thus, the significant result of earnings in CEO total compensation enables re-examination of agency predictions. I provide evidence that earnings (but not stock returns) are used in CEO total compensation consistent with the sensitivity vs. precision hypothesis. That is, accounting earnings receive less weight when earnings are relatively more volatile and when firms have significant growth opportunities.

Current research in corporate governance focuses primarily upon minimization of agency costs in the shareholder-management relationship. In this dissertation, I examine a complimentary perspective based upon stewardship theory. The model developed herein leverages past research on socioemotional wealth to identify CEO attributes associated with stewardship behavior. I examine whether these attributes lead to positive firm performance. Moreover, I examine how family ownership and board of director characteristics influences the CEO stewardship – firm performance relationship. A 3-year unbalanced panel dataset using 268 S&P 1500 firms is analyzed using generalized least squares regression. All covariates lag the dependent variable by 1-year; constructs are included to control for popular agency prescriptions used to monitor, control, and incentivize executives. I find no relationship between the hypothesized constructs related to CEO stewardship (board memberships, organizational identity, and board tenure) and firm performance (Tobin’s Q). However, results reveal family ownership positively moderates the relationship between the quantity of CEO board memberships and firm performance. Additionally, the presence of affiliated directors and community influential directors positively moderates the CEO board memberships-firm performance relationship. The presence of community influential directors also positively moderates the relationship between CEO organizational identity and firm performance. Results from this dissertation provide moderate support for stewardship theory as a compliment to agency theory in corporate governance literature. There is evidence that family ownership and board of director attributes strengthen the relationship between those CEO stewardship constructs and firm performance. However, lack of a direct relationship between the CEO stewardship constructs and firm performance suggest a need more fine-grained constructs that measure stewardship. A substantial amount of research exists in corporate governance using the principal-agent model. The research herein extends this research by using stewardship theory to compliment the dominant agency model. I hope this research encourages scholars to take an integrative approach by (1) taking a renewed look at alternate theories of corporate governance such as stewardship theory, and (2) continue work that focuses upon firm performance maximization through CEO stewardship as well as agency loss mitigation through monitoring and control of the CEO.