This study investigates the personal experience of newly appointed chief executives in transitioning into the CEO role. Adopting an exploratory qualitative design, data was obtained from two semi-structured interviews with 19 newly appointed chief executives, for a total of 38 interviews. The main contribution of this thesis to the extant literature is to show the ways in which CEOs go through an identity construction process when transitioning into the role, which is characterized in two ways. First, there exists a bi-directionality of influence between the personal identity of the CEO and the organizational identity. Second, this process comprises strong identity demands (lack of specificity of the role and weak situation) and identity tensions (personal identity intrusion and identity transparency) that dispose new CEOs towards an unbalance that promotes individuality. This disequilibrium might hinder the integration of new chief executives into the organization, since the data suggests that new CEOs are responsible for fostering their own integration by connecting aspects of their personal identity with the identity and culture of the organization. The thesis offers a theoretical model of the CEO identity construction process and concludes with a series of propositions that address the ramifications of these findings to our understanding of CEO succession.

在企業中擔任領導者的CEO，對於公司決策之執行具有重大影響力，對於擁有不同權力型態之CEO，在公司面臨外部資金需求時，是否因其自身的條件因素，而影響其作出不同的融資決策。本研究之CEO權力乃參考Finkelstein(1992)與Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia(2002)之定義，將CEO權力分類為專家知識權力、聲望權力、結構權力與所有權權力四種型態，以2006至2015年的台灣上市公司為樣本，探討CEO之權力型態如何影響公司外部融資偏好。研究結果顯示，具備不同權力之CEO會因其權力指標不同而作出不同的融資決策，高聲望權力與高所有權之CEO傾向權益融資為主，高專家知識權力與高結構權力的CEO則選擇優先採取負債融資之方式。 / CEO plays a key role in forming a variety of business strategies. This study investigates the relation between CEO power type and preference on financing instruments when company needs external funds. Based on Finkelstein(1992), Grabke-Rundell and Gomez-Mejia’s(2002), the CEO power is classified as four types: expert knowledge power, reputation power, structure power and ownership power. In addressing how CEO power type influences her/his preference on financing instruments, this sample consists of all listed companies in Taiwan for the period for 2006 to 2015. The empirical result indicated that CEO power type does matter in choosing financing instrument. CEO with high reputation power or high ownership power prefers equity financing while those with high expert knowledge power or high structure power prefer liability financing.

<p>The position of the subsidiary CEO is characterized by its complexity in terms of the level of independence and control that s/he possesses. The subsidiary CEO is not only con-trolled by the parent company in certain aspects but in some cases also by the board of directors of the subsidiary. This raises questions about what the subsidiary CEO is left to decide by him/herself and if it is possible to infact categorize him/her as a middle manager? In order to gain more insight into these intriguing questions we formulated our purpose as follows: The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the subsidiary CEO controls the subsidiary consider-ing the dual role perspective. In addition, four research questions were formulated to support us in the search for answers to the amount of control that the subsidiary CEO has. The research questions were intended to the highlight the control aspect from different angles, and to discover what the parent company and board of directors controlled. In addition, we were also curious about whether it was possible for the subsidiary CEO to influence his/her superiors.</p><p>To enlighten us of the situation of the subsidiary CEO we made seven semi-structured interviews, whereof four with subsidiary CEOs. The three additional interviews were made with co-workers to the subsidiary CEOs. This was done to get a different perspective on the role of the subsidiary CEO. With the purpose and research questions as a base we asked questions on these topics and the answers were recorded and transcribed in order to give us a stable foundation to stand on before moving on to the analysis.</p><p>The findings confirmed our view that the CEOs in some cases, especially when it comes to larger financial decisions, are controlled by the parent company. Further, reports are sent regularly and the overall organizational vision has to be adopted by the subsidiary. On the other hand the subsidiary CEOs regards themselves as very independent when it comes to the management of the subsidiary. Indeed, we were able to see some general characteristics of the job of a subsidiary CEO, such as the freedom of formulating and implementing strategies for the subsidiary. In addition, they solely decide how to run the daily operations as well as deciding on questions concerning the personnel. Further, we conclude that the subsidiary CEOs can neither be categorized as merely a CEO or a middle manager, since our study shows that they are a combination of both. It is their level of independence which decides how to perceive their role and this varies from case to case. Finally, the level of control much depends on their relationship with the parent company as well as the sub-sidiary board of directors.</p>

No description available.

No description available.

The position of the subsidiary CEO is characterized by its complexity in terms of the level of independence and control that s/he possesses. The subsidiary CEO is not only con-trolled by the parent company in certain aspects but in some cases also by the board of directors of the subsidiary. This raises questions about what the subsidiary CEO is left to decide by him/herself and if it is possible to infact categorize him/her as a middle manager? In order to gain more insight into these intriguing questions we formulated our purpose as follows: The purpose of this thesis is to examine how the subsidiary CEO controls the subsidiary consider-ing the dual role perspective. In addition, four research questions were formulated to support us in the search for answers to the amount of control that the subsidiary CEO has. The research questions were intended to the highlight the control aspect from different angles, and to discover what the parent company and board of directors controlled. In addition, we were also curious about whether it was possible for the subsidiary CEO to influence his/her superiors. To enlighten us of the situation of the subsidiary CEO we made seven semi-structured interviews, whereof four with subsidiary CEOs. The three additional interviews were made with co-workers to the subsidiary CEOs. This was done to get a different perspective on the role of the subsidiary CEO. With the purpose and research questions as a base we asked questions on these topics and the answers were recorded and transcribed in order to give us a stable foundation to stand on before moving on to the analysis. The findings confirmed our view that the CEOs in some cases, especially when it comes to larger financial decisions, are controlled by the parent company. Further, reports are sent regularly and the overall organizational vision has to be adopted by the subsidiary. On the other hand the subsidiary CEOs regards themselves as very independent when it comes to the management of the subsidiary. Indeed, we were able to see some general characteristics of the job of a subsidiary CEO, such as the freedom of formulating and implementing strategies for the subsidiary. In addition, they solely decide how to run the daily operations as well as deciding on questions concerning the personnel. Further, we conclude that the subsidiary CEOs can neither be categorized as merely a CEO or a middle manager, since our study shows that they are a combination of both. It is their level of independence which decides how to perceive their role and this varies from case to case. Finally, the level of control much depends on their relationship with the parent company as well as the sub-sidiary board of directors.

My dissertation focuses on foreign entrepreneurs—individuals who establish firms outside of their native countries. Despite the prevalence of foreign entrepreneurs, their strategic choices have received little attention in the research literature. For example, when starting a firm, an entrepreneur must decide whether to manage the business personally or hire a local manager, yet we know little about how this choice affects firm performance. To examine this issue, in the first study I use a novel dataset of foreign entrepreneurial firms in Russia and a visa policy change as an instrument for the owner-manager choice. Contrary to the expectation that foreign entrepreneurs would underperform local managers due to the liability of foreignness, I find that foreign owner-managers can benefit their firms: Exogenous assignment of a local manager in place of a foreign owner-manager reduces profits. Foreign owner-managers benefit their firms by hiring cheap native-country labor as well as through reduced agency costs. The second study examines how private benefits of occupying a managerial position affect an entrepreneur’s choice between owner-management and hiring an agent. I show that foreign entrepreneurs with a strong desire to reside in a host country are more likely to become owner-managers. These results are consistent with the idea that entrepreneurs expecting to gain private benefits from managing their firms are more likely to become owner-managers. Moreover, I demonstrate that entrepreneurs are willing to substitute the non-pecuniary benefits associated with relocation for firm profit. These findings add to a growing literature exploring the role of personal preferences in entrepreneurs’ strategic decisions, such as location choice and ownership structure. The third study examines the impact of media coverage on the location choices of foreign firms. Publicly available media information has largely been ignored by the location literature, perhaps because its impact on location choice is expected to be trivial. This study challenges this assumption: Using a new instrument for media coverage (a major anniversary of a city’s establishment date), I show that extensive foreign media coverage of a city increases the number of foreign entrants. Moreover, this effect is strongest for socially and geographically distant firms and entrepreneurs.

Background: A debated subject in today’s society is CEO compensation. Companies which give the CEO compensation mean that it motivates them to maximize the company’s return. The compensations are based on various types of variables, such as financial measures and financial ratio. Despite the various reasons given by the company as to why high compensations are paid out and what it is based on, the Media, shareholders and other privies have questioned this phenomenon. This is because most of the companies that use this type of compensation system show a financial downturn and negative financial ratio. Purpose: The purpose with this thesis is by evaluating annual report’s examining the relation between bonus compensations and company size. Also, to revise if there is a relation between profitability and dividends of the CEO compensation for the companies that has the aim for compensation. Method: This thesis is based on a quantitative study where the empiric consists of secondary data collected from annual reports for companies listed on the stock exchange. Empirical: The empirical data is presented in tables and graphs. The result shows that some companies give compensation despite negative financial ratio. Conclusion: The study shows that companies that are most prone to the compensation payout to the CEO are mostly larger companies, their numbers regarding compensation exceeds substantially the dividends shown in the medium-sized businesses. The study also shows that the relationship between compensation and profitability varies between the companies which are analyzed in the study. It has been difficult to draw a clear parallel between profitability and dividends, since the majority of the companies have negative financial ratio but have a dividend that can be compared to companies that have profitable numbers.

This study of Taiwanese managers in overseas subsidiaries, the appointment of high thinking, because the layout of Taiwan businessmen in the world of enterprise, both in Europe and the United States or in mainland China and other places, almost all of its subsidiaries responsible for the nationals, rather than local nationals, and this practice with European and American foreign just the opposite. Taiwanese firms such practices, what reaction to what Taiwanese thinking. This study uses the case interview, a total of three Taiwanese high-end interview with a foreign manager, general manager for content analysis. The results showed that Taiwanese business culture heritage importance, that have a common intellectual culture can communicate seamlessly. Second, is the head of Taiwan to overseas subsidiaries as a reward for a job, people who have contributed to the company to get this position, the third, a complete financial system, local Taiwanese that if appointments to subsidiary responsible person, then the completeness of the financial system is essential, however, that this problem of foreign production, but also Taiwan's accounting system is the result of lack of transparency. Finally, Taiwan's Pan-Familism and views on human nature as "human nature is evil," the basic assumption that all is to allow Taiwan businessmen in overseas subsidiaries, the appointment of responsible persons, who take the nationality of the reasons for this appointment.

In the near future several Swedish family firms will face a need for succession. Many times there is no available successor within the family firm. Hiring a non-family CEO (NFC) is thus a solution to keep the firm within the family. Using a multiple case study with 6 participating family firms, we have identified how clashing logics between family business owners and NFCs, on the role of the NFC, influence their expectations and relationships. Clashing logics were often a source of disagreements and conflicts, leading to failure in the owner-NFC relationship. Furthermore, we have identified that the two parties often perceived the non-family CEO to offer more professional management which was a motive why family firms in this study hired NFCs. This perceived professionalism was also a reason for conflicting expectations. Adding to previous studies we also identified a series of influencing factors impacting the family business owner-NFC relationship. To conclude this study provides new insights for further research and practical recommendations for family firms in the process of hiring NFCs.