While clientelism has been intensively studied in comparative politics from very different theoretical perspectives and angles, scholars typically emphasize the importance of organized networks and long-term relations for sustaining electoral clientelism. However, electoral clientelism continues to be widespread in many countries despite the absence of organized parties or electoral machines. In order to account for this puzzle, I propose an informational approach that stresses the indirect effects that investments in electoral clientelism have on vote intentions. By distributing minor consumer goods, politicians buy the participation of poor voters at rallies and different sorts of campaign events. I argue that this particular subtype of electoral clientelism -- "campaign clientelism" -- helps politicians improvise political organizations, influence indifferent clients, and signal their electoral viability to strategic actors. Thus, by influencing competition and the dynamics of the race, campaign clientelism shapes vote choices and electoral outcomes. Campaign clientelism affects vote choices through two causal mechanisms. First, this subtype of electoral clientelism can help establish candidates' electoral viability, especially where alternative signals provided by well-organized parties are weak. By turning out large numbers of people at rallies, candidates establish and demonstrate their electoral prospects to the media, donors, rent-seeking activists, and voters. In this way, politicians induce more and more voters to support them strategically. Second, campaign clientelism can convince unattached rally participants of the candidates' electoral desirability. While providing different sorts of information at campaign events, politicians help campaign clients make choices. Other things being equal, viable and desirable candidates have better chances of actually achieving office. Qualitative, quantitative, and experimental evidence from Peru, a democracy without parties, supports the informational theory's expectations. / text

In the past decade, party systems have collapsed in Venezuela and Peru. Scholars have suggested that Colombia may be following a similar fate. I argue it is not. Despite loosing national elections the Liberal Party still wins subnationally. Regional clientelistic networks, based on goods that do not depend upon the central state, help provide votes to those candidates who have been in politics the longest. The latter are likely to be liberal politicians, with privileged positions within the party. They get nominated, thus, they have no reason to defect. Because they distribute goods that are independent from the national state, they also have little incentive to promote national candidates. Consequently, the LP wins within the regions but is unable to attain control of national offices. As long as it keeps doing so this party is unlikely to disappear. / text

Over the last four decades, many developing countries transitioned to democracy with populations aspiring to break from authoritarian tradition for more representative government. While this wave of democratization was encouraging initially, observers came to realize that the break from tradition was anything but complete. The traditional clientelistic relations that pervaded political systems during authoritarian periods have been eroded by democratization in some countries, while in other countries, clientelism is thriving and continuing to impact political participation, primarily through vote-buying between patrons and clients. Therefore, the extent to which democratization erodes clientelism as widely expected, could not be assumed. The questions of what are the causal effects of clientelism on political participation, how does the vote-buying process unfold, how effective are the efforts to combat vote-buying, and what is the debate over the ethics of vote-buying motivate this dissertation; I draw on the experiences of Thai provinces to answer them. The objective of this dissertation is to examine the impact of clientelism, measured by vote-buying, on political participation using a multi-method approach. Using new primary and secondary data sources, I make several important original contributions with this study. First, I answer the question regarding the causal effects of clientelism on political participation by testing the resource theory and the theory of clientelism. I find that the poor, who are most likely to be enmeshed in clientelistic networks, voted just as often as the rich in two of the three general elections and both the national and local level elections. People in the countryside, the poor, vote more than their urban counterparts in both the national and local level elections. The poor also participate in the other forms of politics just as much as the rich. I find those with less education vote just as much as those with more education in all three general elections and the national level election, however, those with higher education voted more in the local level election. Those with higher education also boycott, demonstrate, and sign petitions more than those with lower education. I find that clientelism is the reason lower socioeconomic status rural individuals participate in politics as without clientelism, they would not be expected to participate as much as their richer and more educated urban counterparts. Second, I answer the question regarding how the vote-buying process unfolds by exploring original primary interview data collected by the author of elite and mass views of vote-buyers, sellers, intermediaries, and the vote-buying process. I find that all the actors involved have their own reasons and motivations for participating in the vote-buying process: vote-sellers are predominantly poor and poverty drives their need for the compensation provided through vote-buying, while vote-buyers and their intermediaries are very much aware of the needs of potential vote-sellers and they intentionally exploit these needs. Even though the poor are driven to become vote-sellers, we cannot readily assume that vote-buying is successful for vote-buyers, or in other words, we cannot assume that vote-buying results in votes for the vote-buyer. Prior to my study, scholars have made such an assumption, whether directly stated or inferred, which may lead to erroneous conclusions about the effectiveness of vote-buying resulting in votes for the vote-buyer. To overcome this, I developed a model of the vote-buying process where vote-buying is divided into specific steps: the offer to buy votes, the acceptance of the offer, the compensation, the showing up at the polls, and the casting of a vote for the vote-buyer. By employing my model of the vote-buying process, we see that sometimes voters act in a manner that is consistent with the vote-buyer's demands and others times they do not at virtually all the steps of the vote-buying process for very specific reasons, including poverty. Third, I answer the question regarding the effectiveness of efforts to combat vote-buying by exploring elite and mass views of the effectiveness of institutional constraints and civic education in combating vote-buying. My findings suggest that institutional constraints, namely the Election Commission, have some impact on reducing vote-buying, though the Election Commission is plagued with far-reaching limitations. I find attempts at civic education, however, are not really measurable. Even if these attempts at civic education were measurable, I do not believe there is any reason to suspect they would be effective considering they do not address the poverty issue. Finally, I answer the question regarding the debate over the ethics of vote-buying by exploring elite and mass views of the justifications for vote-buying. I then analyze the impact of vote-buying on the legitimacy of the Thai political system. I find that some Thais perceive vote-buying as unethical because it is illegal and dishonest, while others do not necessarily perceive vote-buying as unethical because of poverty and vote-buying norms Thais use to justify selling their votes. Moreover, I find that poverty and vote-buying norms impact the legitimacy of the Thai political system, especially for the rural poor, to the point where I argue that vote-buying does not necessarily negatively impact legitimacy of the Thai political system. Overall, this dissertation has answered the important questions about clientelism and the vote-buying measure. This study is important because clientelism is one of the most important informal institutional obstacles to free and fair elections and the findings in this study offer clarity of the impact of clientelism, and the vote-buying measure, on political participation in the Thai context.

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This dissertation combines ethnography and history to study the co-evolution of participatory governance and clientelism in a context of urban poverty and re-democratization in the city of Fortaleza, capital of the Northeastern state of Ceará, Brazil. Government sponsored participatory governance mechanisms have been employed in Brazil since the 1980s to re-incorporate civil society into such processes of government as budgeting and city planning. With an emphasis on citizen participation, participatory governance represents a new form of mediation between the state and society, one that provides an alternative to traditional forms of state-society relationships such as clientelism, a mainstay of Brazilian politics. Despite a large body of research on Brazil’s participatory programs, little attention has been paid to the use of participatory social policy by the military regime (1964-1985) and the impacts of participation’s authoritarian origins on contemporary state-society relations. Three inter-related questions guide the analysis. First, how has participatory governance, originally employed in Fortaleza by the military government, shaped how the urban poor organize and exercise their political citizenship today? Second, how has clientelism adapted to participatory institutions? Do participatory mechanisms aid the urban poor in overcoming existing societal and political power structures? Finally, how have grassroots (non-state sponsored) participatory organizations shaped local conceptions of politics and civic engagement? The main contribution of this dissertation is to bring anthropological discussions on participatory governance in Brazil to bear on discussions surrounding political clientelism and political participation, in a context of democratization in poor urban communities. The analysis, developed in three appended articles, is based on data from twelve months of ethnographic fieldwork in Fortaleza involving participant observation, in-depth interviews, and a review of archival data from city participatory planning offices and local universities. The data provides evidence that the institutionalization of civil society’s engagement with the state led to new expressions of and limitations to citizenship among Fortaleza’s urban poor. I argue that the authoritarian origins of participatory social policy in Fortaleza led to the fragmentation of strong civic mobilization in the 1980s and consolidated new forms of urban clientelism. Contemporary participatory governance programs have diversified urban political networks, which lessons the power of traditional clientelist patrons, but some patrons have adapted by institutionalizing methods of exchange within participatory programs and local organizations. Recent informal participatory mechanisms have emerged to assert localized or alternate governmentalities. These grassroots forms respond to the paradoxical and contested nature of participation in participatory programs in Fortaleza’s peripheries; that they often fail to achieve long-term solutions to local issues through sustained civic mobilization.

This dissertation studies how organized crime and corruption can penetrate the legal economy. In the first chapter I document the infiltration of organized crime in public procurement auctions in the aftermath of natural disasters. I focus on recent earthquakes that occurred in Italy between 2008 and 2016 and I utilize investigative data on participation in procurement auctions of firms associated with the mafia (in short, "mafia firms''). I show that criminal firms increase their participation in public procurement auctions in emergency-designated municipalities, particularly after relief status is declared over. Emergency status leads to a temporary increase in monitoring efforts, but a permanent positive shock to affected municipalities' reconstruction budgets, thus explaining the lagged effect. Using information on awarding procedures, I show that after the emergency the participation of mafia firms increases only in auctions with minimum discretion, suggesting it is not the result of collusion with local administrators. In Chapter 2, I investigate whether windfalls from natural resources increase corruption and how this varies across countries with different institutions. I utilize leaked information on the beneficiaries of secret offshore entities to construct a measure of malfeasance. I find that countries respond to a rise in the price of the commodities they export with increased incorporation of offshore entities in tax havens. However, such a relationship exists only for autocratic regimes. In Chapter 3, I develop a theoretical model to explain the role of political brokers in mediating clientelistic transactions between parties and voters. Brokers enjoy an informative advantage over parties: they observe the electorate's political preferences as well as their need for a private good (hospital beds) provided by the government. A party hires the broker to make a deal with the voters. The broker insures them against the risk of not receiving the private good when in need (sick) in exchange for their vote. The presence of the broker reduces aggregate welfare if parties focus on the electoral benefits coming from the provision of the private good and thus reduces the amount of public good (schools) below the optimal level. On the other hand welfare increases if private goods are delivered to citizens in need who would have not received them, had the broker not been present.

This study aims to explore the relationship between clientelistic economies and systemic corruption under the framework of Economic Norms Theory. Pointedly, it examines the evolution of contractual mortgage credit as a percentage of GDP (representing the growth of a non-self-enforcing contract market) compared to both actual and perceived levels of corruption in Brazil in order to assess whether Brazil is exemplary of a transitioning economy under the theory of Economic Norms. The hypothesis of this paper is two-fold. First, I expect that as mortgage credit as a percentage of GDP generally increases, actual corruption will decrease. Secondly, I expect that as perceptions of corruption worsen, actual corruption will improve. The results corroborated the hypothesis: as mortgage contracts occupy a larger percentage of national GDP, perceptions of corruption worsened while actual corruption has slightly improved. These findings suggest a shifting set of public values away from clientelistic norms and towards norms associated with contract-intensive economies.

京都大学 / 新制・論文博士 / 博士(地域研究) / 乙第13549号 / 論地博第32号 / 新制||地||123(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院法学研究科 / (主査)教授 玉田 芳史, 教授 岡本 正明, 准教授 中西 嘉宏 / 学位規則第4条第2項該当 / Doctor of Area Studies / Kyoto University / DGAM

O presente estudo busca problematizar a visão tradicional de democracia, a partir da análise do papel do dissenso na sociedade moderna hipercomplexa. Para tanto, utiliza-se como cânone teórico a teoria dos sistemas de Niklas Luhmann, a qual parte da diferenciação funcional para a identificação da sociedade moderna. A partir desta perspectiva de observação a democracia é compreendida como resultado da diferenciação funcional entre o sistema político e o sistema jurídico, os quais se fecham operativamente, trabalhando com seus próprios códigos. Em razão da diferenciação funcional, marcada pela autopoiese dos sistemas parciais sociais, a legitimação da tomada de decisão dos sistemas político e jurídico já não pode se embasar em uma cosmovisão devendo, portanto, partir de uma característica interna, ou seja, deve-se autolegitimar. Para tanto, são criados procedimentos que buscam justificar as escolhas realizadas pelos sistemas jurídico e político, controlando o dissenso e permitindo que suas decisões sejam tomadas como padrões de comportamento social. Contudo, em relação ao caso brasileiro, vê-se que o clientelismo, personalismo e exclusão social aparecem como óbice à estabilização da democracia como conquista evolutiva, na medida em que dificultam a realização das funções desses dois sistemas funcionais. Por fim, a leitura imagética do cinema é utilizada como forma problematização do caso brasileiro, a partir da busca da identidade desta sociedade pela via mais autêntica de expressão, qual seja, a cultura de um povo, evitando-se, assim, a crítica dos problemas sociais por meio da utilização de paradigmas evolutivos dos denominados países desenvolvidos, notadamente o padrão europeu. / This study seeks to question the traditional view of democracy, from the analysis of the role of dissent in hypercomplex modern society. For this purpose, we used as a theoretical canon Niklas Luhmanns systems theory, which draws on the functional differentiation for identification of modern society. From this observation perspective, democracy is understood as the result of functional differentiation between political and legal systems, which are operatively locked, working with their own codes. Because of the functional differentiation, marked by partial autopoiesis of partial social systems, the legitimacy of the decision making of legal and political systems can no longer be grounded in a worldview, and therefore from a built-in feature, that is, it should self-legitimate. To that end, procedures are created that seek to justify the choices made by the legal and political systems, controlling dissent and allowing decisions to be taken as patterns of social behavior. However, for the Brazilian case, we see that clientelism, personalism and social exclusion appear as an obstacle to the stabilization of democracy as an evolutionary achievement, in as much as they limit the realization of the functional roles of these two systems. Finally, the reading of film imagery is used as a questioning of the Brazilian case, from the search for identity in this society by the most authentic expression, namely the culture of a people, avoiding thus the criticism of social problems, using evolutionary paradigms of the so-called developed countries, notably the European standard.

This thesis is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the issue that in a political environment wherein the development of a political career may encompass frequent transitions between offices, it is usually unclear how winning a given position may ultimately affect subsequent electoral performances and career formation. We exploit regression discontinuity designs in Brazilian elections to estimate the electoral advantage derived by incumbents of various positions both when running for reelection to the same held position, and when trying to win a different elective office. Then, we document that incumbency in legislative offices at state and federal levels is associated with a strong positive effect on the probability of winning the same position in the following election, whereas officeholders in diverse branches of local government do not appear to benefit electorally from their incumbency status and may even be harmed by it when they have relatively little political experience. Moreover, we find that state deputies also receive an incumbency advantage when running for the position of federal deputy, and that such a cross-office effect, along with all incumbency effects on winning the same position, is not due to selection into candidacy. Aside from the transition from state deputy to federal deputy, however, incumbents of any position tend to be less likely than their defeated counterparts to run for, and win, other positions. In the second part, we investigate whether incentive-compatible clientelistic transactions may be sustained through the observation of voters\' party-affiliation status by politicians. We argue that since affiliation consists of an instance of public demonstration of support for a given party, vote-buying attempts by parties may be made more effective by targeting voters that are (or in order for them to become) affiliated to them. Using electoral and demographic data on Brazilian municipalities, we find that voters affiliated to parties in the municipal coalition of the Workers\' Party are significantly more likely to start receiving benefits from the Bolsa Família program upon the incumbency of a party in that coalition. We also investigate political determinants of party affiliation and find that while partisan incumbency at the local level appears to affect affiliation only in restricted situations, the provision of payments from the Bolsa Família has a robust positive effect on affiliation. Lastly, the third part investigates the extent to which teachers with strong partisan stances are capable of influencing electoral outcomes through shaping their students\' voting behavior. We address this question by exploiting unique datasets on party-affiliated voters and on public high school teachers in the state of São Paulo, Brazil---through which we are able to identify teachers\' political affiliations. Along with such information, we also make use of very rich datasets on election results and voter characteristics to explore the relationship between the density of affiliated teachers in a given region and electoral outcomes observed for that region. To overcome endogeneity issues such as that of selection in the assignment of teachers to schools and of voters to polling places, for instance, we explore the varying intensity of the hypothesized effect according to electorate characteristics at the polling station level, a very specific site within the polling district to which voters and teachers are suggested not to be able to select themselves. Our results are suggestive of a positive and significant effect of the presence of affiliated teachers on the electoral performance of the corresponding party, especially in elections based on plurality voting systems. However, our evidence also indicates that such an effect is more relevant for (and possibly restricted to) teachers affiliated to the Workers\' Party, and that these teachers appear to be altering political / Esta tese se divide em três partes. A primeira parte lida com a questão de que, em um ambiente político em que o desenvolvimento de uma carreira política possa envolver frequentes transições entre cargos, não se tem claro como a ocupação de uma dada posição eletiva pode fundamentalmente influenciar o desempenho eleitoral subsequente e a formação de uma carreira pelos políticos. São exploradas regressões descontínuas baseadas em eleições brasileiras com o intuito de se estimar o impacto eleitoral de ser o mandatário experimentado por políticos tanto ao concorrerem à reeleição ao cargo que ocupam, quanto ao disputarem outro cargo eletivo. Documenta-se, então, que a incumbência de cargos legislativos aos níveis estadual e federal encontra-se associada a um expressivo efeito positivo sobre a probabilidade de vitória da disputa seguinte pelo mesmo cargo, ao passo que mandatários de governos locais não aparentam ser eleitoralmente beneficiados por tal status, podendo ainda ser prejudicados por tal condição no caso de exibirem pouca experiência política. Além disso, verifica-se que deputados estaduais também usufruem de uma vantagem eleitoral da incumbência ao disputarem o cargo de deputado federal, e rejeita-se que tal efeito, bem como os impactos sobre a probabilidade de ser reeleito a um mesmo cargo, seja devido à seleção em novas candidaturas. À exceção da transição do cargo de deputado estadual para o de deputado federal, no entanto, mandatários de qualquer cargo tendem a ser menos propensos do que seus homólogos derrotados a se candidatar e a vencer eleições para outros cargos. Na segunda parte, investigamos se transações clientelistas podem ser sustentadas através da observação, por parte de partidos políticos e candidatos, do status de filiação partidária dos eleitores. Argumenta-se que, sendo tal filiação um exemplo de demonstração pública de apoio a um partido, tentativas de compra de voto por partidos podem se tornar mais eficazes quando direcionadas a eleitores que sejam filiados, ou no intuito de que venham a sê-lo. Por meio do emprego de dados eleitorais e demográficos acerca de municípios brasileiros, observa-se que eleitores filiados a partidos das coligações municipais do Partido dos Trabalhadores são significativamente mais propensos (relativamente a eleitores em geral) a passar a receber benefícios do Programa Bolsa Família quando da eleição de tais partidos. Investigam-se também determinantes políticos da filiação partidária, e encontra-se que o simples fato de ser o mandatário de governos locais afeta os níveis de filiação ao partido correspondente apenas em situações específicas; por outro lado, a provisão de pagamentos do Bolsa Família apresenta um efeito positivo e robusto sobre a evolução dos índices de filiação. Por fim, a terceira parte investiga o potencial exibido por professores com elevada participação política de influenciar resultados eleitorais ao induzirem os votos de seus alunos. Explora-se tal questão através da utilização de dados sobre filiação partidária e sobre professores de ensino médio de escolas estaduais no estado de São Paulo, Brasil. Combinando-se informações sobre o status de filiação partidária de tais professores com dados sobre resultados eleitorais e características do eleitorado, investiga-se especificamente a relação entre a densidade de professores filiados e o desempenho eleitoral dos partidos em uma dada região. Problemas de endogeneidade, como os possivelmente decorrentes da alocação de professores a escolas, são evitados por meio da exploração de variação na intensidade do efeito proposto de acordo com características do eleitorado em um nível ao qual eleitores (e professores) não são capazes de se selecionar. Os resultados relacionados sugerem um efeito positivo e significante da presença de professores filiados sobre o desempenho eleitoral dos partidos, particularmente em eleições majoritárias. No entanto, a evidência apresentada indica que tal efeito é aparentemente restrito a professores filiados ao Partido dos Trabalhadores, e que tais professores são capazes de alterar as preferências políticas de alunos que compareceriam à votação independentemente de sua influência. .