Despite growing racial inequality in access to selective colleges, popular beliefs abound that college admissions practices are advantaging racial minorities over White students. Because racial minorities face numerous forms of inequality prior to applying college, there are two assumptions held about college admissions. First, people assume that colleges utilize affirmative action based admission practices to help students of color gain admittance and to increase racial diversity on-campus. Second, people assume that most people, particularly Whites, are opposed to all forms of affirmative action. In my dissertation, I challenge both assumptions. I consider how college admissions practice may disadvantage students of color and contribute to racial gaps in access to selective colleges. I ask how organizational and racial processes influence which racialized factors a college considers and how the factors a college considers influence enrollments for specific racial groups. In addition, I ask how the admission factors a college considers influence public sentiment. I find that an increase in racial minority enrollments results in colleges desisting in the consideration of factors known to increase racial minority enrollments. I argue that what a college considers when making admission decisions may be a mechanism for protecting the often-invisible White culture at selective colleges. In addition, I uncover how different racialized admission factors are associated with the representation of different racial groups—indicating that because the meaning of diversity is malleable, the criteria colleges use to admit students may be associated with divergent forms of diversity. Taken together my findings challenge the idea that college admission practices always advantage racial minorities and indicate that in some instances they can disadvantage students of color. Finally, I also discover that Americans, regardless of racial identity, tend to be opposed to admission practices that are perceived to be un-meritocratic like advantaging legacy students or explicitly considering race; but they do not oppose all attempts to increase racial minority representation—indicating that there are some forms of affirmative action that may have wider support in the general public than typically acknowledged<br>

Thesis (D.M.A.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / 2031-01-01

This paper extends respectively Gale-Shapley¡¦s model and Balinski-Sonmez¡¦s model to analyze the college admission problem and the student placement problem in the case of Taiwan. Given the assumption that time is not considered as a critical dimension of this issue, it is argued that Taiwan¡¦s admission mechanism is in accordance with the criterion of the student optimal stable mechanism with number restriction. As well, the outcome of Taiwan¡¦s admission mechanism exhibits features which are similar to that of the student optimal stable matching with number restriction. However, with regard to Taiwan¡¦s student placement mechanism, it is demonstrated that inefficiency may prevail.

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Thesis advisor: Stephanie Greene / Thesis advisor: Richard McGowan / The competition among American colleges and universities for top students is now more fierce than ever. As the population of U.S. high school seniors has grown in recent years and the Common Application has facilitated the college application process, American institutions of higher education have scrambled to find new ways to encourage prospective students to apply and compel admitted students to matriculate. Among other factors that influence prospective students’ decisions during the college search and selection process, the existence of intercollegiate athletic programs may have a significant impact on students’ decisions to apply to or enroll at a particular university. However, many high-ranking officials within the realm of higher education seem to support the notion that athletics detract from academic prestige. Therefore, the purpose of this study was to test these two claims. An analysis of the data from U.S. News and World Report’s rankings of America’s Best National Universities for the past five years revealed that athletics did not detract from academic prestige, as there was no relationship discovered between existence of big-time intercollegiate athletic programs at an institution and that institution’s peer assessment score. A survey of 173 undergraduate students at Boston College supported the claim that the existence of intercollegiate athletic programs significantly impacted students’ decisions to apply to or enroll at Boston College. Furthermore, these survey results suggested that application numbers and yield at Boston College would decline if its big-time intercollegiate athletic programs were eliminated. / Thesis (BS) — Boston College, 2010. / Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management. / Discipline: College Honors Program.

This thesis consists of three independent essays on the design of matching markets, with a primary goal to understand how information interacts with matching mechanisms especially in the applications to school choice and college admissions. The first chapter compares theoretically the non-strategyproof Boston mechanism and the strategy-proof deferred acceptance mechanism when taking into account that students may face uncertainty about their own priorities when submitting preferences, one important variation from the complete information assumption. The second chapter evaluates the effectiveness of a strategy-proof mechanism when students have to submit preferences before knowing their priorities using both theory and data. The third chapter turns attention to a new mechanism that is sequentially implemented and can encourage truth-telling. Nevertheless, such implementation often faces time constraint. This chapter therefore offers an inquiry of the pros and cons of the time-constrained sequential mechanism. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

abstract: In this paper, I study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the following features: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market over time, each agent is restricted by a quota, and agents are perfectly patient. A form of strategic behavior in such markets emerges: The side with many slots can manipulate the subsequent matching market in their favor via earlier matchings. In such a setting, a natural question arises: Is it possible to analyze a dynamic many-to-one matching market as if it were either a static many-to-one or a dynamic one-to-one market? First, I provide sufficient conditions under which the answer is yes. Second, I show that if these conditions are not met, then the early matchings are "inferior" to the subsequent matchings. Lastly, I extend the model to allow agents on one side to endogenously decide when to join the market. Using this extension, I provide a rationale for the small amount of unraveling observed in the United States (US) medical residency matching market compared to the US college-admissions system. Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs) are designed to improve the welfare of the poor. Group lending with joint liability is the standard contract used by these institutions. Such a contract performs two roles: it affects the composition of the groups that form, and determines the properties of risk-sharing among their members. Even though the literature suggests that groups consist of members with similar characteristics, there is evidence also of groups with heterogeneous agents. The underlying reason is that the literature lacked the risk-sharing behavior of the agents within a group. This paper develops a model of group lending where agents form groups, obtain capital from the MFI, and share risks among themselves. First, I show that joint liability introduces inefficiency for risk-averse agents. Moreover, the composition of the groups is not always homogeneous once risk-sharing is on the table. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Economics 2020

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Today's focus on high-stakes standardized tests has had a massive impact on education throughout America, and standardized test preparation is one of the ugly, open secrets of education. Ever since 2001 when President Bush signed into law No Child Left Behind (NCLB), a bipartisan reauthorization of Johnson's landmark Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, students have been bombarded with standardized tests from the earliest grades. Politicians believe these measures are the only way to remedy the perceived weaknesses in the education system because "stringent accountability mandates… [provide] vital levers of change, inclusiveness, and transparency of results" (Education Week, 2011, para. 15). Yet as time progresses, the quantity and importance of the exams increase to such proportions that, by the time students are in high school, their performance dictates whether they will graduate or attend college. While proponents of such exams say that they only test the skills that students ought to be learning anyway, the reality tends to be that teachers start to focus only on the specific questions the test will cover, and thereby lose the ability to provide full, comprehensive education. "Teaching to the test" is the much-maligned experience of most high schools. In order to combat the pressure students feel to perform and teachers feel to shortchange the learning experience, a "Build Your Own Adventure" manual designed around research-based principles demonstrated to improve student learning gains will allow students to focus on the key areas needed to improve test performance, demystify the test itself, and thus help students obtain score improvement. In so doing, students will not only perform better on standardized assessments, but ultimately be able to attend more elite colleges.

Thesis advisor: M. Utku Ünver / Thesis advisor: Tayfun Sönmez / This thesis is a collection of three essays in market design concerning designs of matching markets with aggregate constraints, affirmative action schemes, and investigating boundaries of simultaneous efficiency-stability relaxation for one-to-one matching mechanisms.In Chapter 1, I establish and propose a possible solution for a college housing crisis, a severe ongoing problem taking place in many countries. Every year many colleges provide housing for admitted students. However, there is no college admissions process that considers applicants’ housing needs, which often results in college housing shortages. In this chapter, I formally introduce housing quotas to the college admissions problem and solve it for centralized admissions with common dormitories. The proposed setting is inspired by college admissions where applicants apply directly to college departments, and colleges are endowed with common residence halls. Such setting has many real-life applications: hospital/residents matching in Japan (Kamada and Kojima, 2011, 2012, 2015), college admissions with scholarships in Hungary (Biró, 2012), etc. A simple example shows that there may not be a stable allocation for the proposed setting. Therefore, I construct two mechanisms that always produce some weakened versions of a stable matching: a Take-House-from-Applicant-stable and incentive compatible cumulative offer mechanism that respects improvements, and a Not-Compromised-Request-from-One-Agent-stable (stronger version of stability) cutoff minimising mechanism. Finally, I propose an integer programming solution for detecting a blocking-undominated Not-Compromised-Request-from-One-Agent-stable matching. Building on these results, I argue that presented procedures could serve as a helpful tool for solving the college housing crisis. In Chapter 2, I propose a number of solutions to resource allocation problems in an affirmative action agenda. Quotas are introduced as a way to promote members of minority groups. In addition, reserves may overlap: any candidate can belong to many minority groups, or, in other words, have more than one trait. Moreover, once selected, each candidate fills one reserve position for each of her traits, rather than just one position for one of her traits. This makes the entire decision process more transparent for applicants and allows them to potentially utilize all their traits. I extend the approach of Sönmez and Yenmez (2019) who proposed a paired-admissions choice correspondence that works under no more than two traits. In turn, I allow for any number of traits focusing on extracting the best possible agents, such that the chosen set is non-wasteful, the most diverse, and eliminates collective justified envy. Two new, lower- and upper-dominant choice rules and a class of sum-minimizing choice correspondences are introduced and characterized. In Chapter 3, I implement optimization techniques for detecting the efficient trade off between ex-post Pareto efficiency (for one side of a two-sided matching market) and ex-ante stability for small one-to-one matching markets. Neat example (Roth, 1982) proves that there is no matching mechanism that achieves both efficiency (for one side of the one-to-one matching market) and stability. As representative mechanisms I choose deferred-acceptance for stability, and top trading cycles for Pareto efficiency (both of them are strategy-proof for one side of the market). I compare performances of a randomized matching mechanism that simultaneously relaxes efficiency and stability, and a convex combination of two representative mechanisms. Results show that the constructed mechanism significantly improves efficiency and stability in comparison to mentioned convex combination of the benchmark mechanisms. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2023. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.