Thesis (B.A.) -- Haverford College, Dept. of History, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references.

When the Judiciary Committee initiated its impeachment inquiry of Richard Nixon for his complicity in Watergate, it was the first time that the House of Representatives had commenced such a proceeding against a president since Andrew Johnson in 1868. Johnson’s impeachment and subsequent Senate acquittal was widely regarded as an example of Congress run amok, its partisanship so blatant and its failure so grand that many Americans assumed that presidential impeachment had become obsolete. But impeachment, by its nature, is political, and each Congress defines the bounds of high crimes and misdemeanors in light of the current political climate. For the House in October 1973, Nixon’s Watergate scandal threatened to breach those limits. From the outset, Judiciary Chairman Peter Rodino recognized that if his Committee were to recommend impeaching President Nixon without bipartisan support, the American public would interpret it as another Johnson-like fiasco, and a threat to the constitutional system of government. To thwart suspicion that the Democratic majority would impeach Nixon exclusively for its own political gain, Rodino preached fairness to the President, even as Nixon refused to comply with the Committee’s investigation. Despite Rodino’s assurances, however, his procedural proposals—designed in consultation with the Committee’s Special Counsel, John Doar—did not always seem fair enough to many Republicans. At the same time, many Democrats believed that Rodino and Doar had already accorded Nixon too many rights, which encroached upon the House’s constitutionally guaranteed “sole power of impeachment.” Ultimately, Rodino conceded that he could not marshal a bipartisan majority without making compromises with members who expected more fairness than he and Doar had initially offered. Despite pressure from their congressional leadership, constituents, and the White House, seven southern Democrats and moderate Republicans formed a “Fragile Coalition” to vote their conscience in favor of three articles of impeachment. In doing so, they convinced a fearful and cynical American public that impeachment could be just, and in the case of Richard Nixon, necessary. / text

This thesis aims to make feminist theory an integral part of hospital ethics committee ("HEC") decisionmaking. Specifically, the feminist theories discussed in this thesis prioritize an awareness of social context. The small-scale study conducted for this thesis found that HECs already consider social context to some extent but that they may also be open to more systematic integration. As opposed to courts, HECs provide a space where innovative alternatives (e.g., feminist approaches) to principalist bioethical decisionmaking can be tested. In order to encourage the development of such alternatives, this thesis has proposed a framework for the relationship between courts and HECs so that patients can benefit from the strengths of both entities in ways that have not been possible in the past.

<p>The aim of this research is to ask questions as to why child right laws for the protection of child soldiers have failed to protect children in the Darfur region of Sudan despite the<br /> fact that Sudan is a member to many of these children&rsquo / s rights instruments. Can conflict transformation therefore be of any help? This is research seeks to address the question posed above.</p>

In the past decade, public scrutiny surrounding rising levels of executive compensation has led to more stringent independence requirements for compensation committees. However, there is little research studying the effects of compensation committees on executive pay from the time these new requirements were implemented. My paper studies the effects of compensation committee chair personal ties to the CEO, economic interests, and group committee characteristics on both the level and structure of CEO compensation. My findings suggest that certain committee chair personal ties to the CEO are associated with both a higher level of CEO compensation and a higher percentage of CEO salary compensation. I also find that the more compensation committee chairs are paid, the less likely they are to create CEO pay plans with strong incentive provisions, but the more likely they are to increase the level of total CEO compensation. The higher the committee chair’s ownership percentage is in the company, the less likely they are to create low-risk CEO pay plans, and the more likely they are to increase the level of total CEO compensation.

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