Proefschrift. / Met lit. opg., reg. - Met samenvatting in het Nederlands.

This thesis attempts to identify the philosophy, key questions and priorities behind the trust laws of Jersey and Malta. By wide accord, the Jersey law has served as a model in many ways to its later Maltese counterpart. This affinity is placed against the similar background of either jurisdiction, which embraced, to varying degrees, both the Civil Law tradition and Common Law influence. The analysis is advanced through the different moments of the trust, from its creation to termination. Nevertheless, the underpinning focus and thrust is on the civilian identity of either trust. It considers whether, and how far, the fundamental Civil Law concepts and language play a defining role in their civilian configuration. The question is asked whether the creation of the trust and the duties of a trustee can possibly be classified as obligational or contractual, or maybe something else. The nature and character of the beneficiary’s rights are also reviewed. The overarching role of good faith and civil responsibility, along with their extent of interaction with traditional Equity fiduciary duties, are weighed, an assessment naturally following from the civilian flavour attributed to the trusts. The conceptual overlapping between the Roman-Civil law fiducia, and related figures such as the mandat prêt-nom, with the Equity fiduciary duties, is assessed. The role, even if subsidiary, of civilian unjustified enrichment, remains an ever-present relevant factor. Sham trusts and simulatio, the Pauline fraud and legitim are considered in the context of the civilian identity of these trusts. The discussion then engages with the other strand of the thesis, being the role of the governing law, as the ‘mind’ behind the trust legislations assessed. The discussion engages with the question whether the trusts fall on the side of respect for the ‘autonomie de la volonté des parties’ or on other policy determinants behind the law.

Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-01T23:39:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese_9101_RIBEIRO, J. C. M. 2015.pdf: 974014 bytes, checksum: 44865db61db9b1e4401c6b26fda4f866 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-07-08 / O presente trabalho investiga as origens históricas das tradições jurídicas common law e civillaw, com o objetivo de identificar os traços peculiares da tradição híbrida que conforma o sistema jurídico brasileiro, apontando as deficiências democráticas decorrentes da ausência de uma cultura de precedentes judiciais e alertando para a necessidade de readequação da postura do Superior Tribunal de Justiça. Com o enfoque direcionado ao direito infraconstitucional brasileiro, especificamente em relação ao Superior Tribunal de Justiça, buscou-se demonstrar que na transição do Estado Legislativo para o Estado Constitucional a inserção da segurança jurídica como fundamento da república exige a reconstrução da finalidade do processo civil como meio para a tutela de direitos, o que implica tanto a concessão de decisões justas, quanto a prolação de precedentes para conferir unidade, previsibilidade e estabilidade ao direito. Não obstante no marco do Estado Democrático Constitucional a unidade do direito corresponda a um dos discursos necessários para conferir legitimidade à atuação jurisdicional, o Superior Tribunal de Justiça permanece atuando como Corte Superior, de controle de decisões judiciais incorretas e de uniformidade da jurisprudência, o que ocasiona a grave patologia denominada jurisprudência lotérica, consistente na adoção de decisões completamente distintas para casos estritamente semelhantes. Palavras-chave: Common law; Teoria dos Precedentes Judiciais; Civil law; Ideologia liberal; Corte Suprema; Superior Tribunal de Justiça; Processo Civil.

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate to what extent the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 (CPA) influences the common law of sale in South Africa. “Common law of sale” refers to the essentialia of sale (the minimum characteristics that parties must have consensus on to conclude a valid sale). The parties must have consensus on the intention to buy and sell, the things sold and the purchase price. The common law of sale also refers to the common law duties of the parties, the duties of the seller in particular (conversely therefore the rights of the buyer). The primary duties of the seller which will be investigated are: a. the duty of safe-keeping (including and investigation into the passing of benefit and risk doctrine); b. the duty of delivery and transfer of ownership; c. the warranty against eviction; and d. the warranty against latent defects. The primary common law duties of the buyer to pay the purchase price and accept the thing sold are included in the investigation as well. The formalities required in certain sale agreements, that wording must be in plain language as well as the buyer’s cooling-off rights are also investigated. An investigation into the influence of the CPA on the common law of sale in South Africa warrants a systematic framework and modus operandi which are: a. an investigation into the historical background of the common law of sale and its principles in the Roman law and Roman-Dutch law; b. a critical analysis of the position where the CPA is not applicable (the common law position); c. an extensive analysis and critical evaluation of the relevant provisions of the CPA and the influence thereof on the common law of sale; d. a comparative analysis of the appropriate provisions in Scotland and Belgium; e. a conclusion of the influence of the CPA on the common law of sale (whether the particular common law of sale principle is confirmed, amended or excluded in terms of the Act); and f. recommendations (taking into account the comparative analysis) regarding the rectification of uncertainties and ambiguities that arose as a result of the investigation. It is also important to remember that the existing principles of the common law of sale will still be applicable for transactions and agreements which fall outside the application of the Act. The golden rule to keep in mind when investigating the influence of the CPA on the common law of sale is to determine which approach and interpretation will be most beneficial to the consumer. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / gm2013 / Mercantile Law / Unrestricted

No abstract available. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Mercantile Law / unrestricted

No abstract available / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Mercantile Law / unrestricted

O controle judicial de constitucionalidade moderno nasceu nos Estados Unidos, a partir da decisão do caso Marbury v. Madison, em 1803. Desde então pode-se dizer que as atenções do meio acadêmico jurídico, especialmente no campo do direito contitucional, foram progressivamente voltando-se a essa prática, com vistas a melhor compreendê-la. A partir da segunda metade do século XX, o controle de constitucionalidade foi amplamente difundido e hoje está presente na grande maioria dos países democráticos. Mais recentemente, os debates sobre o tema convergiram para os excessos cometidos pelos órgãos incumbidos, em cada Estado, da tarefa de revisar a constitucionalidade da legislação. Foram colocados no centro das discussões não apenas o modo por meio do qual os órgãos de controle atuam, especialmente o Poder Judiciário, mas também a própria legitimidade do exercício dessa função, tendo em vista as tensões existentes entre o controle de constitucionalidade das leis por órgãos não representativos e os princípios democrático e do Estado de Direito. Dessa forma, a tese inicia-se buscando compreender as origens do judicial review na tradição do common law inglês; em seguida, procura desvendar como a tradição do direito inglês foi incorporada aos Estados Unidos e compatibilizada à sua constituição escrita; passa, então, a descrever as dificuldades que os autores modernos encontraram para justificar o exercício do controle judicial de constitucionalidade, tendo em vista a dificuldade contramajoritária que enfrenta; expõe, assim, algumas críticas ao que se convencionou chamar de supremacia judicial, tese que afirma competir ao Poder Judiciário proferir a última palavra sobre o significado da Constituição; e, por fim, reinserindo o debate no plano do constitucionalismo político, a tese explicita a noção de diálogo institucional e tenta imaginar os papéis institucionais que Cortes e Parlamentos exercem ou devem exercer nesse debate, com foco especialmente no Brasil e na relação entre o Supremo Tribunal Federal e o Congresso Nacional relativamente à interpretação da Constituição. / This thesis focuses on the problems of the contemporary constitutional review in Brazil. It is widely recognised that constitutional review was established in 1803 with the landmark case Marbury v Madison. By the second half of the 20th century some form of constitutional review had been adopted by most western democracies. More recently the excesses of such a form of control of the legislative function have shifted the experts attention to the phenomenon of judicial supremacy. Because it is most frequently performed by unelected officials, the procedures of judicial review have been put under scrutiny and its very legitimacy has been questioned. This tension between the majoritarian principle and the judicial function of constitutional review became known as the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Although our main focus is on the Brazilian constitutional review, we start by going back to the beginnings of the judicial review within the common law tradition in order to understand the primitive structure of this function. Then we move on to its transplantation into American legal practice, which uses a written constitution as a basis for the judicial review. Next, we examine some of the contemporary uses of constitutional review, as depicted by its critics. Finally, we analyse the relations between the Supreme Court and the National Congress of Brazil in performing judicial review. We argue that in order to overcome the counter-majoritarian difficulty, we must accept this constitutional function as a political one, which means moving beyond its judicial features and including other institutions, such as the Congress, in the process of judging whether or not statutes should be invalidated when they breach the constitution. We call this widening of the range of institutions capable of participating in the constitutional review institutional dialogue.

O controle judicial de constitucionalidade moderno nasceu nos Estados Unidos, a partir da decisão do caso Marbury v. Madison, em 1803. Desde então pode-se dizer que as atenções do meio acadêmico jurídico, especialmente no campo do direito contitucional, foram progressivamente voltando-se a essa prática, com vistas a melhor compreendê-la. A partir da segunda metade do século XX, o controle de constitucionalidade foi amplamente difundido e hoje está presente na grande maioria dos países democráticos. Mais recentemente, os debates sobre o tema convergiram para os excessos cometidos pelos órgãos incumbidos, em cada Estado, da tarefa de revisar a constitucionalidade da legislação. Foram colocados no centro das discussões não apenas o modo por meio do qual os órgãos de controle atuam, especialmente o Poder Judiciário, mas também a própria legitimidade do exercício dessa função, tendo em vista as tensões existentes entre o controle de constitucionalidade das leis por órgãos não representativos e os princípios democrático e do Estado de Direito. Dessa forma, a tese inicia-se buscando compreender as origens do judicial review na tradição do common law inglês; em seguida, procura desvendar como a tradição do direito inglês foi incorporada aos Estados Unidos e compatibilizada à sua constituição escrita; passa, então, a descrever as dificuldades que os autores modernos encontraram para justificar o exercício do controle judicial de constitucionalidade, tendo em vista a dificuldade contramajoritária que enfrenta; expõe, assim, algumas críticas ao que se convencionou chamar de supremacia judicial, tese que afirma competir ao Poder Judiciário proferir a última palavra sobre o significado da Constituição; e, por fim, reinserindo o debate no plano do constitucionalismo político, a tese explicita a noção de diálogo institucional e tenta imaginar os papéis institucionais que Cortes e Parlamentos exercem ou devem exercer nesse debate, com foco especialmente no Brasil e na relação entre o Supremo Tribunal Federal e o Congresso Nacional relativamente à interpretação da Constituição. / This thesis focuses on the problems of the contemporary constitutional review in Brazil. It is widely recognised that constitutional review was established in 1803 with the landmark case Marbury v Madison. By the second half of the 20th century some form of constitutional review had been adopted by most western democracies. More recently the excesses of such a form of control of the legislative function have shifted the experts attention to the phenomenon of judicial supremacy. Because it is most frequently performed by unelected officials, the procedures of judicial review have been put under scrutiny and its very legitimacy has been questioned. This tension between the majoritarian principle and the judicial function of constitutional review became known as the counter-majoritarian difficulty. Although our main focus is on the Brazilian constitutional review, we start by going back to the beginnings of the judicial review within the common law tradition in order to understand the primitive structure of this function. Then we move on to its transplantation into American legal practice, which uses a written constitution as a basis for the judicial review. Next, we examine some of the contemporary uses of constitutional review, as depicted by its critics. Finally, we analyse the relations between the Supreme Court and the National Congress of Brazil in performing judicial review. We argue that in order to overcome the counter-majoritarian difficulty, we must accept this constitutional function as a political one, which means moving beyond its judicial features and including other institutions, such as the Congress, in the process of judging whether or not statutes should be invalidated when they breach the constitution. We call this widening of the range of institutions capable of participating in the constitutional review institutional dialogue.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1987. / Includes index. Bibliography: p. [251]-258.

L’obiter dictum désigne un propos «soit dit en passant», une parole incidente que l’on attribue plutôt au juge anglais. Or le Conseil d’État aussi prononce des obiter dicta à l’occasion de la lecture d’arrêts et d’avis contentieux. Dès lors qu’il déroge à l’économie des moyens ou à l’interdiction de l’ultra petita, le Conseil d’État est en effet amené à formuler un énoncé juridique superflu pour la solution contentieuse. Il utilise la technique de l’obiter dictum de deux façons. D’une part, le Conseil d’État donne forme à sa jurisprudence : il crée et systématise ses précédents, sans immédiatement les appliquer aux espèces qui lui sont soumises. Ainsi manifeste-t-il son pouvoir jurisprudentiel. D’autre part, le Conseil d’État développe son jugement : il justifie et explique sa décision surabondamment par rapport à la solution du litige. Aussi exerce-t-il son pouvoir juridictionnel. La méthode de l’obiter dictum, telle qu’employée par le Conseil d’État, déploie le pouvoir de juger de celui-ci. Il va jusqu’à poser du droit de manière générale et abstraite, même en l’absence de nécessité pour régler un cas spécial et concret. A la différence des précédents du juge anglais, la jurisprudence du Conseil d’État ne dépend donc plus intimement des faits. Son pouvoir jurisprudentiel se distancie, de ce point de vue, de son pouvoir juridictionnel. Ce dernier est mis à l’œuvre dans des incidentes qui, quant à elles, tendent plus directement à la résolution des conflits. Attestant d’un renouvellement de son office de juge, les obiter dicta participent pour le Conseil d’État d’une nouvelle façon de dire le droit et de trancher les litiges, en définitive de rendre la justice. / The notion of obiter dictum indicates a comment made «by the way» or «in passing», usually by a Common Law judge. In this study, obiter dicta refer to incidental statements expressed by the French Council of State when it gives a ruling or delivers a judicial opinion. Obiter dicta can be regarded as departures from the efficient tradition of stating the minimum essential to dispose of the matter or as infringements of the prohibition against passing judgment outside the issues raised by the opposing parties. When the Council of State delivers an obiter dictum, it makes a statement of law that is not essential to the judicial outcome. Obiter dicta fulfil two functions. They enable the Council of State to express generalisations independent of particular judgments and thereby to produce an abstract system of precedent. As a consequence, the decisions of the Council of State produce a general jurisprudence that is no longer limited to the facts of particular cases. Obiter dicta also enable the Council of State to justify and explain its judgments in concrete terms, with the result that they contribute to the elucidation and enforcement of its decisions.We can conclude, therefore, that obiter dicta supply the potential for superior general jurisprudence and for improved particular judgment. In short, that obiter dicta reveal a new way for the French Council of State to dispense justice.