Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Delineating the relevant product and geographic market is an important first step in competition inquiries, as it permits an assessment of market power and substitutability. Critics often argue that market definition is arbitrary and increasingly unnecessary, as modern econometric models can directly predict the competitive effects of a merger or anti-competitive practice. Yet practical constraints (such as limited data) and legal considerations (such as case law precedence) continue to support a formal definition of the relevant market. Within this context, this dissertation develops three tools to improve market definition: two empirical tools for cases with limited data and one conceptual decision-making tool to elucidate important factors and risks in market definition. The first tool for market definition involves a systematic analysis of consumer characteristics (i.e. the demographic and income profiles of consumers). Consumer characteristics can assist in defining markets as consumers with similar characteristics tend to switch to similar products following a price rise. Econometric models therefore incorporate consumer characteristics data to improve price elasticity estimates. Even though data constraints often prevent the use of econometric models, a systematic analysis of consumer characteristics can still be useful for market definition. Cluster analysis offers a statistical technique to group products on the basis of the similarity of their consumers. characteristics. A recently concluded partial radio station merger in South Africa offers a case study for the use of consumer characteristics in defining markets. The second tool, or set of tools, for defining markets involves using tests for price co-movement. Critics argue that price tests are not appropriate for defining markets, as these tests are based on the law of one price - which tests only for price linkages and not for the ability to raise prices. Price tests, however, are complements for existing market definition tools, rather than substitutes. Critics also argue that price tests suffer from low statistical power in discriminating close and less close substitutes. But these criticisms ignore inter alia the role of price tests as tools for gathering information and the range of price tests with better size and power properties that are available, including new stationarity tests and autoregressive models. A recently concluded investigation in the South African dairy industry offers price data to evaluate the market definition insights of various price tests. The third tool is conceptual in nature and involves a decision rule for defining markets. If market definition is a binary classification problem (a product is either 'in' or 'out' of the market), it faces risks of misclassification (incorrectly including or excluding a product). Analysts can manage these risks using a Bayesian decision rule that balances (1) the weight of evidence in favour of and against substitutability, (2) prior probabilities determined by previous cases and economic research, and (3) the loss function of the decision maker. The market definition approach adopted by the South African Competition Tribunal in the Primedia / Kaya FM merger investigation offers a useful case study to illustrate the implementation of such a rule in practice. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Mededingingsake neem gewoonlik 'n aanvang met die afbakening van die relevante produk- en geografiese mark. Die markdefinisie-proses werp dikwels lig op markmag en substitusie-moontlikhede, en ondersteun dus die beoordeling van 'n mededingingsaak. Markdefinisie word egter deur kritici as arbitrer en selfs onnodig geag, veral aangesien ekonometriese modelle die uitwerking van 'n samesmelting of 'n teen-mededingende praktyk op mededinging direk kan voorspel. Tog verkies praktisyns steeds om markte formeel af te baken op grond van sowel praktiese oorwegings (insluitend databeperkings wat ekonometriese modellering bemoeilik) as regsoorwegings (insluitend die rol van presedentereg). Hierdie proefskrif ontwikkel dus drie hulpmiddels vir die definisie van markte: twee empiriese hulpmiddels vir gevalle waar data beperk is sowel as 'n denkhulpmiddel om o.a. risiko's rondom markdefinisie te bestuur. Die eerste hulpmiddel vir die definisie van markte behels die sistematiese analise van verbruikerseienskappe, insluitend die demografiese en inkomste-profiel van verbruikers. Verbruikerseienskappe werp lig op substitusie, aangesien soortgelyke verbruikers neig om na soortgelyke produkte te verwissel na aanleiding van 'n prysstyging. Ekonometriese modelle maak derhalwe van data omtrent verbruikerseienskappe gebruik om beramings van pryselastisiteit te verbeter. Hoewel databeperkings dikwels ekonometriese modellering beperk, kan verbruikerseienskappe op sigself steeds nuttig wees vir die afbakening van die mark. Trosanalise bied 'n statistiese metode vir 'n stelselmatige ondersoek van verbruikerseienskappe vir markdefinisie, deurdat dit produkte op grond van gelyksoortige verbruikerseienskappe groepeer. 'n Onlangse ondersoek in Suid-Afrika rakende die gedeeltelike samesmelting van Primedia and Kaya FM radiostasies bied data om die gebruik van trosanalise en verbruikerseienskappe vir markdefinisie-doeleindes te illustreer. Die tweede hulpmiddel vir markdefinisie behels statistiese toetse vir verwantskappe tussen prystydreekse van verskillende produkte of streke. Hierdie prystoetse is gebaseer op die wet van een prys en beklemtoon prysverwantskappe eerder as die vermoë om pryse te verhoog (wat die uiteindelike fokus in mededingingsbeleid is). Hierdie klem verminder egter nie noodwendig die insigte wat prystoetse bied nie, aangesien markdefinisie dikwels 'n omvattende analise verg. Prystoetse se statistiese onderskeidingsvermoe word ook dikwels deur kritici as swak beskryf. Hierdie tegniese kritiek beskou prystoetse as eng-gedefinieerde hipotesetoetse eerder as hulpmiddels vir die verkenning van substitusiepatrone. Voorts ignoreer hierdie tegniese kritiek 'n verskeidenheid nuwe prystoetse met beter onderskeidingsvermoë, insluitend nuwe toetse vir stasioneriteit en nuwe autoregressiewe modelle. 'n Onlangse mededingingsondersoek in die Suid-Afrikaanse melkindustrie verskaf prysdata om die verrigting van verskillende prystoetse vir geografiese markdefinisie te ondersoek. Die derde hulpmiddel vir die definisie van markte behels 'n besluitnemingsreël. Hiervolgens word markdefinisie as 'n binêre klassifikasieprobleem beskou, waar 'n produk of streek 'binne' of 'buite' die mark geplaas moet word. Gegewe dat hierdie klassifikasie onder toestande van onsekerheid geskied, is markdefinisie blootgestel aan risiko's van wanklassifikasie. Praktisyns kan hierdie risiko‟s bestuur deur gebruik te maak van 'n Bayesiaanse besluitnemingsreël. Sodanige reël balanseer (1) die gewig van getuienis ten gunste van en teen substitusie, (2) a priori waarskynlikhede soos bepaal deur vorige mededingingsake en akademiese navorsing, en (3) die verliesfunksie van die besluitnemer. Die benadering van die Suid-Afrikaanse Mededingingstribunaal in die saak rakende die gedeeltelike samesmelting van Primedia en Kaya FM bied 'n nuttige gevallestudie om hierdie beginsels te demonstreer.

The impact of domestic policy regulations and standards on trade has been at the forefront of global policy during the past decade. Every country develops their own policies and standards that differ from country to country. These differences create problems for manufacturing industries, especially in major exporting countries. This study overviews the policy context driving standards in the manufacturing industries. The study consists of three different articles that attempt to examine the role of technical regulations and standards and their relationship with trade using different econometric models In the first article, the standard factor endowment approach is employed to explain the effects of environmental regulatory policy on net exports in different manufacturing industries. The study hypothesizes that a countrys comparative advantage depends on its factor abundance. The regulatory policy increases production costs and, thus, reduces the output level of an industry. The results indicate that each industry is unique in the factors determining net exports and in many instances environmental regulations are important. In the second article, we investigate the impact of competition policy on a countrys production and export competitiveness. Since the impact of competition regulation depends upon the particular circumstances of the industry to which the policy is applied, we examine how competition policy impacts production and exports of a specific sector, in particular the agri-food processing sector. The results suggest that competition policy enhances competition by reducing entry barriers, and causes firms to produce more output with lower prices. Exports for both total and food manufacturing in the post-competition policy period are higher than exports in the pre-competition period. In the third article, we estimate regressions based on an extended gravity model to determine the possible influence of food safety standards on export flows of six Asia-Pacific countries to ten importing countries. We examine the relationship between bilateral exports and importers imposition of food safety standards. The results show that the value of exports in food and food products is negatively affected by food safety standards: the greater the aflatoxin standards, the lower its restrictiveness, and higher the bilateral export flows.

The first chapter considers a common agency model where two competition authorities share information about a firm under investigation. It shows that information-sharing can sometimes be welfare detrimental unless the authorities coordinate their enforcement policies as well as share information. The reason behind is that the authorities may have different leniency levels and the firm may decide to provide less precise information to one in an attempt to appeal the other. Furthermore it shows that the authorities may want to distort their policies in order to prevent the firm from obscuring the information it provides. The second chapter studies the seller's incentives to provide misleading advice about complex goods such as consumer electronics, banking or phone services. It shows how the incentives to give biased and imprecise advice are affected by the possibility of ex-post litigation, when a court or consumer protection authority investigates how biased the advice is and penalises accordingly. It finds that a more biased advice will also be less precise, thus, a stricter punishment for deceiving consumers also increases precision. The third chapter analyses the impact of trade credit on a relational contract between two vertically related firms. The firms operate in an environment with unobservable shocks, like a developing country or a black market, which create moral hazard in the repayment decision. It shows that the quantity sold in the market will be distorted downwards in order to curb the constrained firm's incentives to steal the credit and derives the optimal repayment scheme.

This thesis whose topic is "Environmental policy in the context of competition policy within the European Union" I take to make clear, at least in part, the relationship of the environment and competition, from the perspective of European Union policies. I achieve this by analysis of the relationship of basic values of the EU policies, specifically finding their harmony or conflict, or finding harmony and contradictory points. I consider the comparison of objectives and principles as an appropriate means for consultation at the elementary level of this relationship. I also deal with questions whether the primary law of the Union is prepared to a possible conflict of policies and whether in this case governs their relationship. The conclusion of this work is that environmental protection is not in direct conflict, or in full compliance with the protection of competition. The relationship of the two policies and their ideal setting must be considered for each individual case. Individual competition policy goals and values of environmental policy and their implementation can be both, inconsistent and also consistent, due to the rate and method of the regulation of that relationship. The principles of integration and sustainable development define status of environmental policy. The core of this...

La thèse s’intéresse à l’économie de l’industrie des télécommunications et à sa régulation. La première partie est dédiée au déploiement du réseau fixe de fibre optique. L’étude de différentes méthodes de régulation permet de comparer les approches en termes de vitesse et d’efficacité du déploiement ainsi que de bien-être de consommateurs. Un modèle technico-économique est construit afin d’estimer les coûts du réseau d’accès de fibre en France et de comparer les résultats des différentes approches de régulation en termes quantitatifs. La deuxième partie applique la théorie de marchés bifaces au domaine des communications électroniques. Elle aborde le sujet de la régulation concurrentielle de marchés bifaces et montre en quoi leur traitement doit être spécifique, en s’appuyant sur des résultats théoriques et études de cas. Un modèle de la discrimination par les prix sur des marchés bifaces est proposé qui révèle les facteurs qui déterminent le caractère favorable ou défavorable de l’impact de la discrimination. La troisième partie étudie la question de l’impact de la différenciation tarifaire en fonction de la destination d’appel sur le marché des communications mobiles. Un modèle théorique est construit et ensuite calibré sur la base de l’exemple du marché français en 2003. Il est montré que des baisses all-net des tarifs vers tous les réseaux simultanément entreprises par tous les opérateurs sont plus avantageux pour les consommateurs que des baisses on-net du tarif intra-réseau. / The thesis focuses on the economics of the telecommunications industry and on its regulation. The first part is dedicated to the deployment of the fixed network of the optical fibre. The study of different regulation methods allows to compare the approaches in terms of the speed and efficiency of deployment as well as the consumers’ welfare. We construct a technico-economic model of the fibre access network in France in order to compare the results of different regulation approaches in quantitative terms. The second part applies the theory of two-sided markets to the field of electronic communications. It deals with the issue of competition regulation on two-sided markets and shows in what way their treatment should be specific, based on theoretic results and case studies. A model of price discrimination on two-sided markets is proposed that reveals the factors determining favourable or unfavourable impact of discrimination. The third part studies the impact ofthe price differentiation depending on the call destination on the mobile communications market. A theoretic model is constructed and then calibrated based on the example of the French market in 2003. It is shown that the all-net reduction of the tariffs towards all the networks and by all the operators is more beneficial for consumers than the on-net reduction of the intra-network tariffs.

The main goal of this diploma thesis is to evaluate the protection of competition in the European Union. For this purpose in EU serves competition policy, whose application is in charge of the European Commission. During my research I chose to examine the IT industry, particularly on the Microsoft case, which became one of the most significant antitrust disputes over the past years. In the thesis I compare competition policy framework with the theoretical approaches of various economic schools. Then I monitor the Commission's investigation and I discuss the legitimacy of the accusations and actions. I conclude that the EU competition policy has significant flaws in its application. I find that the European Commission is trying to reduce Microsoft's market power at all costs because when I compare Commission's attitude to other companies with identical behavior, it is completely different.

First chapter of this thesis describes the formation of EU policy on energy and summarizes the current objectives, which should be followed by the European Union in the field of energy. There are also mentioned the main actors in the European energy market (i.e. markets with electricity and natural gas as the main focus of the thesis). In the second chapter, mergers and takeovers in general and then their control through the EU competition policy is described. Third, i.e. the last chapter is devoted to the possible consequences of mergers and takeovers (especially dominant position and its abuse). The whole chapter and thesis is closed by selected cases of control of mergers and takeovers in the electricity and gas markets.

The starting point in industrial organization is the notion of perfect competition. In a market with perfect competition, everything is transparent. In particular, there is perfect information about price, product value and firms' actions. This dissertation deals with exceptions from the world of perfect competition. The first two essays deal with imperfect information about prices and firms' actions, whereas the third essay considers imperfect information about the value of the traded goods. The first essay "Transparency and Competition" asks the question If prices are more or less transparent, does that favour consumers or producers? Starting from a search model, where some consumers know prices and other have to search, it is shown that a greater price transparency, i.e. a lower search cost, reduces the price in a single play of the game. When the game is repeated, however, the lower is the search cost, the easier it is to sustain collusion. Thus, promoting greater price transparency reduces the price in the stage game at the risk of increased opportunity for collusion. The second essay "Does Advertising Prevent Collusion?" analyses the case when firms can transmit price information to consumers by advertising. In contrast to the first essay, improved price transparency through advertising always reduces the price. It is even shown that the mere possibility of advertising can reduce the price, when firms are colluding. Thus, it is important to distinguish between advertising by firms and price publication by a third party. The first fosters competition, whereas thesecond may be harmful. In the third essay "Underwriter Competition" it is not the price that is more or less transparent. Instead, we consider a situation where sellers cannot transfer knowledge about their product values to the buyers. In order to overcome this problem, sellers may hire a renowned third party, an underwriter, who can certify that the products are of a certain value. The question that is posed in this essay is What happens if sellers can chose between different underwriters? It is shown that the underwriter market is a natural monopoly, where the underwriter with the highest ability toassess the value of the products gets the whole market. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2001

Master’s Thesis in Competition Policy Title: ”The Microsoft Case – A reflection on the tying of Windows Media Player and the Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 (Case COMP/C- 3/37.792)” Author: Ursula Ferrari Tutor: Göran Wahlgren Date: [2005-05-23] Subject terms: Competition Policy, EU law, Abuse of dominance, tying Abstract This Master’s thesis is an analysis of the European Commission Decision in the Microsoft Case-COMP/C-3/37.792 and the tying as an abusive practice prohibited by Article 82 of the EC Treaty. In this case the European Commission (Commission) applied a rule-of-reason approach for the first time to Microsoft’s tying practice and considered it to be anticompetitive. Microsoft tied its Windows Media Player (WMP) to its client operating system Windows and after a thorough analysis done by the Commission, Microsoft was considered to have abused its dominant position. In the past the Commission and the European Court of Justice used a per se illegality approach to tying practices and it was enough to establish that a company which applied the tying strategy was dominant in the tying product market. The hostile approach taken by the Commission and the ECJ has been criticized by economists mainly because tying is a commonly applied business strategy in the world economy and companies apply this be-cause of the economic efficiencies that this business strategy leads to. The efficiency gains are indirectly past on to the consumers in the form of product quality and innovation, reduced transaction costs and lower prices. It is argued that tying in fact increase consumer welfare. Economists would therefore rather see a per se legality approach or at least a rule-of-reason approach in the future. Due to the complexity of the Microsoft case, the Commission had to do a thorough analysis of the actual impact that the tying of WMP had on the market and the foreclosure effects that this strategy might lead to. This was therefore the first time that a rule-of-reason approach was applied on the matter of tying. However, after the Commission’s Decision of the Microsoft case there is still uncertainty in this matter. There is a strong need for future clarification. Microsoft Corporation has lodged an appeal against the Commission’s Decision with the European Court of Justice but it will take several years before the ECJ will be able to give a final judgement of the case. Until then the legal certainty is yet still very unclear.

<p>Master’s Thesis in Competition Policy Title: ”The Microsoft Case – A reflection on the tying of Windows Media Player and the Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 (Case COMP/C- 3/37.792)” Author: Ursula Ferrari Tutor: Göran Wahlgren Date: [2005-05-23] Subject terms: Competition Policy, EU law, Abuse of dominance, tying Abstract This Master’s thesis is an analysis of the European Commission Decision in the Microsoft Case-COMP/C-3/37.792 and the tying as an abusive practice prohibited by Article 82 of the EC Treaty. In this case the European Commission (Commission) applied a rule-of-reason approach for the first time to Microsoft’s tying practice and considered it to be anticompetitive. Microsoft tied its Windows Media Player (WMP) to its client operating system Windows and after a thorough analysis done by the Commission, Microsoft was considered to have abused its dominant position. In the past the Commission and the European Court of Justice used a per se illegality approach to tying practices and it was enough to establish that a company which applied the tying strategy was dominant in the tying product market. The hostile approach taken by the Commission and the ECJ has been criticized by economists mainly because tying is a commonly applied business strategy in the world economy and companies apply this be-cause of the economic efficiencies that this business strategy leads to. The efficiency gains are indirectly past on to the consumers in the form of product quality and innovation, reduced transaction costs and lower prices. It is argued that tying in fact increase consumer welfare. Economists would therefore rather see a per se legality approach or at least a rule-of-reason approach in the future. Due to the complexity of the Microsoft case, the Commission had to do a thorough analysis of the actual impact that the tying of WMP had on the market and the foreclosure effects that this strategy might lead to. This was therefore the first time that a rule-of-reason approach was applied on the matter of tying. However, after the Commission’s Decision of the Microsoft case there is still uncertainty in this matter. There is a strong need for future clarification. Microsoft Corporation has lodged an appeal against the Commission’s Decision with the European Court of Justice but it will take several years before the ECJ will be able to give a final judgement of the case. Until then the legal certainty is yet still very unclear.</p>