Le secteur des TIC est caractérisé par des arrangements stratégiques de transferts de technologies tels que les licences et les regroupements de brevets. Par ailleurs, les produits et services ont souvent de fortes relations de complémentarité dans ce secteur. Afin de garantir un niveau satisfaisant d'interopérabilité aux utilisateurs, les producteurs de biens complémentaires doivent échanger des informations techniques. Cette thèse cherche à prendre en compte ces deux dimensions et à produire de nouveaux éclairages sur les cas de politique de concurrence impliquant des marchés complémentaires (e.g Intel/McAfee, Google/Motorola). Nous étendons la littérature sur les licences de brevets en modélisant des marchés avals différenciés et complémentaires. En utilisant les méthodes de l'économie industrielle, nous caractérisons les stratégies de licences profitables pour un innovateur en situation de monopole concernant le nombre de licences, les instruments tarifaires ainsi que l'intégration verticale et conglomérale. Nous montrons que le nombre de licences attribuées diffère généralement de celui observé lorsque la technologie est utilisée dans un marché aval isolé. En particulier, nous obtenons que le nombre de licences distribuées est plus élevé dans les marchés de niche lorsque le nombre de firmes intéressées par la technologie est limité. Dans ce cadre d'analyse, l'intégration verticale n'est pas profitable à l'exception des cas où, une seule firme est susceptible d'acquérir une licence sur le marché homogène, ou lorsque la demande pour le produit final est incertaine. Par ailleurs, les royalties unitaires perçus sur le nombre de produits vendus en aval ne sont utilisés que dans la structure de l'industrie la plus concurrentielle et lorsque la valorisation pour le bien final est élevée. Enfin, nous montrons que lorsque la demande est incertaine et que les acquéreurs de la technologie sont réticents à la prise de risque, l'innovateur préfère utiliser des royalties ad valorem qui portent sur les revenus issus des ventes de produits finals. Nos résultats montrent que les relations de complémentarité entre les marchés finals influent sur la manière dont sont transférées les technologies et que les fusions verticales et conglomérales ne semblent pas générer de comportements de forclusion. / IT industries are characterized by strategic patent agreements such as patent licensing or patent pools. Products and services frequently have strong potential complementarity relations in this industry. To guarantee a satisfactory level of interoperability to users, the exchange of technical information is required between complementary producers. This dissertation aims at taking into account these two dimensions of the IT sector in order to provide new insights on competition policy cases involving high technology complementary products (e.g Intel/McAfee, Google/Motorola). We extend the literature on patent licensing by explicitly modeling downstream differentiated complementary goods. Using industrial organization methods, we characterize the profitable strategies of a monopoly innovator with respect to the number of licenses, the pricing instruments as well as vertical and conglomerate mergers. We show that the number of licenses delivered in equilibrium can differ from the standard model with a single downstream market. In particular, we consistently find, for various forms of licensing contracts that more licenses are issued in niche markets when the number of potential licensees is capped. Overall vertical integration and conglomerate mergers are found to be unprofitable except when there is only one firm likely to acquire the technology or when there is demand uncertainty. On the other hand, per unit royalty rates are only used in the most competitive structure of the industry for high valuations of the final good. Finally, sales revenue (i.e ad valorem) is found to be a more profitable royalty base than the number of sales (i.e per unit royalties) when demand is uncertain and licensees are risk averse. Our results show that complementarity influences the way in which technologies are transferred and that vertical mergers do not generate foreclosing behaviors in this framework.

In dieser Arbeit wird eine wettbewerbspolitische Beurteilung der Zusammenarbeit von Wettbewerbern in Form von Querlieferungen vorgenommen und der Einfluß von Information, Produktion und Kapazität auf Marktstruktur und Wettbewerb analysiert. In drei spieltheoretischen Modellen werden die Unternehmensstrategien und die wettbewerblichen Effekte von Informationsaustausch und Produktionsaustausch untersucht. Sie wurden motiviert und werden angewandt auf eine Entscheidung zum Europäischen Flachglasmarkt, um die restriktive Wettbewerbspolitik der Europäischen Kommission zu beurteilen. Die Modelle untersuchen die Auswirkungen von Querlieferungen und Austauschvereinbarungen auf Informationsaustausch, Kapazitätsentscheidungen und Produktionsentscheidungen. Dabei wird die Wohlfahrt mit und ohne Querlieferungen verglichen. In einem Modell mit horizontalen Querlieferungen werden erstens Signalling via Querlieferungen und zweitens die Auswirkungen auf Produktvielfalt und Kapazitätsentscheidungen analysiert. In einem Modell mit Austauschvereinbarungen wird die Kooperation zwischen unterschiedlich effizienten Wettbewerbern untersucht. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Technologie und Marktcharakteristika festlegen, ob Querlieferungen zwischen Wettbewerbern die Wohlfahrt erhöht oder reduziert. Der Markt ist in der Lage, Mechanismen wie z.B. Signalling via Querlieferungen zu entwickeln, um Ineffizienzen zu mildern. Die Wettbewerbspolitik sollte aufmerksam bleiben, aber eine rule-of-reason zulassen. / In this study we analyze the competitive effects of cooperation between competitors in the form of subcontracting and the influence of information, production and capacity on market structure and competition. Three game-theoretic models are developed to evaluate firms's strategies and the competitive effects of information sharing and production sharing. They are motivated by and applied to a case study of the flat glass market in order to evaluate the restrictive policy of the European Commission. The models analyze the effects of subcontracting and exchange agreements on information sharing, capacity decisions and production decisions. Welfare effects with and without subcontracting are then being compared. In a horizontal subcontracting model first signalling via subcontracting and secondly the effects on product variety and capacity decisions are being analyzed. In an exchange agreement model cooperation between competitors with different efficiency levels is being studied. The results show that technology and market characteristics determine whether subcontracting between competitors increases or decreases welfare. The market is able to develop mechanisms such as signalling via subcontracting to overcome inefficiencies but competition policy should stay attentive while allowing for a rule-of-reason.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T19:33:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 FALCO_Guilherme_2014.pdf: 1282193 bytes, checksum: a75487fda8645a23d2b25547a581009f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-26 / Market regulation brings on the expectation that government's intervention improves the economy. For example, the assumption that competitive environments enable efficient allocation of resources influences the development of antitrust policies and encourages free competition. The promotion of competition through laws and regulatory agencies follows this reading and public antitrust policies are disseminated throughout developed and developing countries. However, despite its wide application, these regulations lack empirical mechanisms that organize their major institutional properties and allow proper assessment of policy operation and its effects over the economy. This master thesis replicates to the Brazilian reality a set of indexes - previously developed for 13 other jurisdictions - that seek to translate institutional and qualitative information into objective, quantitative and comparable cross-country information. The indexes are created upon the compilation and classification of the characteristics of a particular jurisdiction with respect to a benchmark of best practices in deterring anticompetitive conducts. The immediate goal is to review and critique different designs of competition policy agencies and statutes, allowing cross-time and cross country analysis. The results for the Brazilian policy are positive regarding institutional features (rules of the game), both in cross-time and cross-country perspectives; Brazil presents inferior results regarding enforcement (human/financial resources and volume of cases analyzed by the competent agency); the aggregate index presents high levels in a cross-country analysis. / A regulação de dinâmicas de mercado traz a expectativa de que a interferência estatal melhora a economia. A defesa e a promoção da concorrência por meio de leis e agências estatais se encaixam nessa leitura regulatória e constituem política pública disseminada entre a maioria dos países desenvolvidos e em desenvolvimento. Entretanto, apesar de sua vasta aplicação, essas regulações carecem de mecanismos empíricos que organizem suas principais propriedades institucionais e permitam análises satisfatórias acerca do funcionamento da política e da extensão de seus efeitos sobre a economia, especialmente em perspectiva comparada. Essa dissertação replica para a realidade brasileira um conjunto de Índices de Política de Concorrência, anteriormente construídos para outras 13 jurisdições pelo trabalho de Buccirossi et al (2011), que busca traduzir informações institucionais e qualitativas de uma política antitruste em informações objetivas, quantitativas e comparáveis entre países. Os índices são construídos a partir da compilação e classificação das características de determinada jurisdição com relação a um benchmark de melhores práticas em dissuasão de condutas anticompetitivas. O objetivo imediato é desenvolver instrumento que permita avaliação e comparação de diferentes modelos de política de concorrência, o que engloba tanto análises intertemporais da evolução do modelo aplicado por cada jurisdição quanto análises comparativas entre a evolução de políticas de diferentes jurisdições. O Brasil apresenta resultados positivos do ponto de vista institucional (regras do jogo), seja em avaliação intertemporal seja em caráter comparado; o desempenho nacional é inferior no que se refere à capacidade de enforcement (recursos humanos, financeiros e volume de casos analisados pelas autoridades). De forma agregada, o Brasil possui índices de concorrência elevados em perspectiva internacional.

L’objet de cette thèse est d’analyser comment la politique de la concurrence peut être utilisée pour améliorer le pouvoir d’achat en générant des baisses de prix et affecter la répartition des revenus. L’évaluation des conséquences sur le bien-être de l’entrée de nouveaux concurrents sur un marché a fait l’objet d’une littérature importante. Mais elle repose sur des analyses en équilibre partiel et une approche complémentaire en terme d’équilibre général peut être utile. D’autres analyses de la politique de la concurrence en terme d’équilibre général ont été effectuées pour des économies avec des rendements d’échelle croissants.Cependant, dans la mesure où il semble discutable que les secteurs dans lesquels les rendements d’échelle sont croissants soient majoritaires dans les économies réelles, il apparaît pertinent d’analyser les effets de l’entrée dans des économies "convexes". Nous nous appuyons ainsi sur des modèles simples d’équilibre général pour étudier les conséquences de la politique de la concurrence - en matière d’entrée, de fusions etc... - sur le bien-être. Afin d’analyser ses effets distributifs, nous considérons des économies composées d’agents qui se distinguent par la nature des facteurs qu’ils offrent. Nous supposons en particulier que l’un d’eux fournit une quantité de travail exogène, que nous endogénéisons par la suite. Nous montrons ainsi que la politique de la concurrence peut être conflictuelle : elle peut ne pas impacter tous les consommateurs de la même façon et bénéficier à certains, au détriment d’autres. / This thesis consists in analysing how competition policy by enhancing prices decreases,may be used to boost purchasing power and influence income distribution. A huge literature deals with the evaluation of how entry of firms within a particular sector improves welfare. But this literature mainly relies on a partial equilibrium approach. To complete this approach, a general equilibrium view point on competition policy is called for. There have been several attempts to study the welfare effects of entry in general equilibrium economies with increasing returns to scale. However, it is not clear that pervasive unexploited increasing returns to scale exist in real economies. Therefore, it seems relevant to consider the case of "convex" economies. In this perspective, we use simple general equilibrium models to examine how competition policy - with regard to entry or mergers - affects welfare. In order to study the redistributive effects of competition policy, we consider the case where several agents supply different inputs (the supply of labor is first considered as exogenous,and then endogenous). We show that competition policy is not always welfare improving for all agents.

Die Regierungen in der Europäischen Union retten Unternehmen in Schwierigkeiten durch staatliche Rettungs- und Umstrukturierungsbeihilfen. Diese Dissertation besteht aus drei Kapiteln, die solche Beihilfen analysieren. Im ersten Kapitel nutze ich Daten von 86 Fällen aus den Jahren 1995-2003 um zu prüfen, wie wirksam die Beihilfen bei der Konkursprävention sind. Es gibt drei Ergebnisse. Erstens steigt die geschätzte diskrete hazard rate in den ersten vier Jahren nach der Subvention und sinkt danach, was nahelegt, dass einige Sanierungen den Konkurs eher verzögern als verhindern. Zweitens, Regierungen favorisieren staatliche Unternehmen bei Beihilfeentscheidungen, obwohl diese keine besseren Überlebenschancen haben. Drittens, die Wahl, ob Rettungs- oder Umstrukturierungsbeihilfe gewärt wird, ist eine endogene Variable in der Analyse. Wenn man sie als exogen betrachtet, unterschätzt man die Auswirkungen auf die Konkurswahrscheinlichkeit. Das zweite Kapitel ist eine Studie über die Auswirkungen von Bailouts auf Marktstruktur und Wohlfahrt in einem internationalen, asymmetrischen Cournot -- Duopol. Es wird gezeigt, dass die optimale Beihilfe positiv ist, auch wenn der Marktaustritt einer Firma nicht verhindert werden kann. Der Grund hierfür ist ein strategischer Effekt, der die effizientere Firma zu einer zusätzlichen kostenreduzierenden Maßnahme veranlasst. Wird der Marktaustritt verhindert, ist Effizienz geringer. Das dritte Kapitel enthält empirische Belege der politischen, institutionellen und wirtschaftlichen Determinanten der Sanierungsubventionspolitik. Ich nutze einen neuen Datensatz über Entscheidungen über Rettungs- und Umstrukturierungsbeihilfen während der Jahre 1995-2003 zusammen mit Informationen über Wahlergebnisse in den Europäischen Ländern. Das wichtigste Ergebnis ist, dass die Beihilfen in Ländern mit Mehrheitswahlsystem wahrscheinlicher sind, insbesondere während der Jahre vor Wahlen. / Governments in the European Union bail out firms in distress by granting Rescue and Restructuring Subsidies. This thesis consists of three chapters analyzing European bailouts. In the first chapter, I use data from 86 cases during the years 1995-2003 to examine the effectiveness of bailouts in preventing bankruptcy. The results are threefold. First, the estimated discrete-time hazard rate increases during the first four years after the subsidy and drops after that, suggesting that some bailouts only delayed exit instead of preventing it. Second, governments'' bailout decisions favored state-owned firms, even though state-owned firms did not outperform private ones in the survival chances. Third, subsidy choice is an endogenous variable and treating it as exogenous underestimates its impact on the bankruptcy probability. Policy implications are discussed in the chapter. The second chapter is a study of the effects of bailouts on market structure and welfare in an international asymmetric Cournot duopoly. I show that the subsidy is positive also when it fails to prevent the exit. The reason is a strategic effect, which forces the more efficient firm to make additional cost-reducing effort. When the exit is prevented, allocative and productive efficiencies are lower than in case of exit. The third chapter provides evidence of political, institutional and economic determinants of bailout policies. I use a new data set based on rescue and restructuring aid decisions during the years 1995-2003 merged with information about electoral outcomes in European countries. The main finding is that in countries with majoritarian democratic institutions bailouts are more likely, in particular during years preceding elections. Since bailouts are a targeted fiscal policy, the evidence supports the theory of Persson and Tabellini (2000) predicting that electoral systems shape incentives for fiscal policy choices.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:33:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Saulo Felipe Caldeira de Almeida.pdf: 1106391 bytes, checksum: af2f4ef05707497e6a0ea0b1ccfa1d8f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-08-13 / The scope of this dissertation is to analyze a specific movement of the current Brazilian industrial policy, which organizes its tools to assist certain companies in a real training exercise of national champions. But that, is presents an exhaustive researches about the publications of main agent of Brazilian government at implementation of this policy, the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social BNDES [Brazilian Development Bank]. From the results of this research, as actually observed how this movement occurs, identifying those are this national champions and which operations of BNDES have fostered this movement. As a result, after identifying the criticisms that are made to this model, in which circumstances these national champions were subjected to the Brazilian Antitrust Authorities, we highlight its main performances and analyzed its decisions. / O escopo da presente dissertação é analisar um movimento especifico da atual política industrial brasileira, que organiza seus instrumentos para auxiliar determinadas empresas num verdadeiro exercício de formação de campeões nacionais. Para tanto, apresenta-se uma exaustiva pesquisa sobre as publicações do principal agente do governo brasileiro na implementação desta política, o Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social - BNDES. A partir do resultado desta pesquisa, se observa como realmente ocorre este movimento, identificando quem são estes campeões nacionais e quais as operações do BNDES fomentaram este movimento. Na sequência, após identificar as críticas que se fazem a este modelo, verificamos em que circunstancias estes campeões nacionais foram submetidos ao Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência, elencamos suas principais atuações e analisamos suas decisões.

<p>The Central African Monetary and Economic Community, known by its French acronym CEMAC (Communaut&eacute / Economique et Mon&eacute / taire de l&rsquo / Afrique Centrale), is one of the oldest regional economic blocs in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states. Its membership comprises of Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. It has a population of over 32 million inhabitants in a three million (3 million) square kilometre expanse of land. The changes in the world economy, and especially between the ACP countries, on the one hand, and the European Economic Community-EEC (hereinafter referred to as European Union (EU)), on the other hand, did not leave the CEMAC region unaffected. CEMAC region, like any other regional economic blocs in Africa was faced with the need to readjust in the face of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The region which had benefited from preferential access to the EU market including financial assistance through the European Development Fund (EDF) had to comply with the rules laid down in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This eventually led to a shift in the EU trade policy, in order to ensure that its trade preferences to developing countries were compatible to the rules and obligations of the WTO.</p>

<p>The Central African Monetary and Economic Community, known by its French acronym CEMAC (Communaut&eacute / Economique et Mon&eacute / taire de l&rsquo / Afrique Centrale), is one of the oldest regional economic blocs in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states. Its membership comprises of Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. It has a population of over 32 million inhabitants in a three million (3 million) square kilometre expanse of land. The changes in the world economy, and especially between the ACP countries, on the one hand, and the European Economic Community-EEC (hereinafter referred to as European Union (EU)), on the other hand, did not leave the CEMAC region unaffected. CEMAC region, like any other regional economic blocs in Africa was faced with the need to readjust in the face of a New International Economic Order (NIEO). The region which had benefited from preferential access to the EU market including financial assistance through the European Development Fund (EDF) had to comply with the rules laid down in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). This eventually led to a shift in the EU trade policy, in order to ensure that its trade preferences to developing countries were compatible to the rules and obligations of the WTO.</p>

Submitted by Carlos Saiani (ssaiani@yahoo.com.br) on 2012-04-30T18:40:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese - FGV - Carlos César Santejo Saiani.pdf: 5421316 bytes, checksum: 7065939598ebc1cf0b41062e1f2384c6 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2012-05-02T14:48:33Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese - FGV - Carlos César Santejo Saiani.pdf: 5421316 bytes, checksum: 7065939598ebc1cf0b41062e1f2384c6 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-05-02T14:50:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese - FGV - Carlos César Santejo Saiani.pdf: 5421316 bytes, checksum: 7065939598ebc1cf0b41062e1f2384c6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-04-13 / Esta tese analisou os determinantes e os efeitos da privatização dos serviços de saneamento básico no Brasil (abastecimento de água e coleta de esgoto). Em relação aos seus determinantes, as evidências são consistentes com a hipótese de que as privatizações foram adotadas como estratégias políticas, com o propósito de reduzir a discricionariedade de eventual sucessor político, o que se depreende da maior probabilidade de privatização à medida que eleva o risco eleitoral. Estratégia análoga é a redução do escopo de atuação dos governos estaduais, apontada pela maior probabilidade de privatização em municípios nos quais os prefeitos não pertencem a partidos da coligação dos governadores de seus estados. Em relação aos efeitos da privatização sobre indicadores epidemiológicos (morbidade e mortalidade) e de acesso, foram comparadas duas modalidades de provisão privada: provisão centralizada (regional), que pode gerar ganhos de escala; e provisão descentralizada (local), que pode resultar em maior controle social e redução dos custos de monitoramento. Os resultados indicam que o modelo de provisão privada descentralizada resultou em menor incidência de morbidade e de mortalidade. Como esses indicadores refletiriam os efeitos sobre a qualidade dos serviços, o resultado contradiz a hipótese de existência de um trade-off custo-qualidade na provisão privada de serviços públicos, como argumentado por Hart et al (1997). O mesmo resultado não é observado na modalidade de privatização regional, o que sugere que a forma de privatização é relevante para desempenho das empresas privadas. Por último, foi verificado que a privatização local expande o acesso em municípios nos quais os níveis de cobertura eram baixos, o que poderia refletir suas capacidades de investimento. Além disso, ao contrário da provisão pública, a privatização local não privilegia o abastecimento de água e os domicílios com maiores níveis de renda. Portanto, a competição política, ao influenciar o risco eleitoral dos prefeitos, determina a privatização, que impacta positivamente sobre o acesso e a qualidade dos serviços e, por esta via, reduz a morbidade e a mortalidade. / This dissertation analyzes the determinants and effects of the privatization of sanitation services in Brazil (water supply and sewage). Regarding the determinants, it is noteworthy that privatization is more likely the higher the political risk, which is consistent with the hypothesis of privatization as a political strategy, aiming to mitigate the discretion of the future incumbent. An analogous strategy is to reduce the scope of activities of rival state government, as the privatization is more likely in municipalities where mayors do not belong to the coalition parties of their states’ governors. Regarding the effects of privatization on epidemiological indicators (morbidity and mortality) two different models of private provision were contrasted: centralized provision (regional), which might benefit from economies of scale; and decentralized provision (local), which might result in higher social control, and lower monitoring costs. The latter resulted in lower levels of morbidity and mortality directly associated to the quality of sanitation services. These results contradict the cost-quality trade-off, as presented by Hart et al (1997). In contrast, the regional privatization does not present equally favorable results, so as to suggest that the privatization model is relevant to the performance of private companies. Finally, local privatization expands the access in cities where coverage levels were low, what may be due to former investment constraints by public companies. Moreover, unlike the public provision, local privatization seems not to be biased towards water supply and higher income households. Therefore, political competition, for its effect on the incumbent electoral risk, brings about privatization, which has a positive effect on access and quality of services and, thereby, reduces morbidity and mortality.

The interaction between competition and environmental policy is quite complex, particularly before state aids, whose control level reflects the emerging opportunity cost between both policies. In order to illustrate the potential efficiency losses or the imbalances on level playing field of competition, this article analyzes the legal, economic and political dimensions of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) free allocation of allowances mechanism for the power generation sector. / La interacción entre la política de competencia y la medio ambientales bastante compleja, especialmente en el caso de las ayudas estatales, cuyo nivel de control refleja el coste de oportunidad emergente entre ambas. Con el fin de ilustrar las potenciales pérdidas de eficiencia o los desequilibrios en la equidad de condiciones de competencia, este artículo analiza las dimensiones legal, económica y política del mecanismo de asignación gratuita de permisos de emisión del Régimen Comunitario de Comercio de Derechos de Emisión (RCCDE) de la Unión Europea para el sector de la generación eléctrica.