The syntactic and semantic treatment of Chinese Bare Conditionals is a topic of much debate (Cheng and Huang 1996; Lin 1996; Chierchia 2000). This dissertation investigates the nature of Chinese Bare Conditionals in three aspects: quantification and modal implications as compared to English free relatives with –ever, and pronoun occurrence. With regard to quantification, I propose to treat the anteceding wh-phrase and its anaphoric element (pronoun/wh-word) uniformly as a definite description denoting a maximal plural entity similar to Jacobson (1995). This entity can be an atomic entity resulting in a singular definite reading, or an entity consisting of more than one atom deriving a universal-like reading. Concerning modal implication, I propose to capture the agent’s/speaker’s indifference reading of bare conditionals with von Fintel (2000). Indifference reading in his analysis is interpreted against a counterfactual modal base which predicts a causal link. His analysis is needed for the interpretation of Chinese bare conditionals but may not be applied directly to whatever, given that a causal link is necessarily present in a bare conditional, but not required in an English whatever-sentence. I argue that the use of a pronoun in a bare conditional is not subject to a uniqueness and existence condition as claimed in Lin (1996). Although bare conditionals typically contain two identical wh-words, they may occur naturally with a pronoun that links bare conditionals with other sentences into a piece of coherent discourse. This account bears an important implication for the study of Chinese wh-phrases and third person pronouns in being able to predict the existence of anaphoric definite wh-phrases and bound-variable pronouns in the language. It also improves on existing accounts of Chinese bare conditionals in being able to capture the details of the form and meaning of this construction. Chinese bare conditionals are structurally related to ruguo ‘if’-conditionals and Hindi left-adjoined correlatives and their meaning is similar to, and yet not quite the same as that of whatever. / text

I develop a novel semantic theory for modals that has important consequences for contemporary work in epistemology, metaphysics and ethics. My theory replaces the dominant view about semantics--that our best theory of meaning should ascribe truth-conditions to modalized sentences--with a non-truth-conditional yet fully compositional semantics for modals. Its contributions to current debates in analytic philosophy include an explanation of the possibility of modal disagreement that avoids relativism, a solution to the paradoxes about conditional obligations (including the gentle murder paradox), and new impulses for a generalized solution to the Frege-Geach problem for noncognitivism. / text

This thesis presents a series of experiments where endorsement rates, latencies and measures of cognitive ability were collected, to investigate the extent to which people search for counterexamples under necessity instructions, and alternative models under possibility instructions. The research was motivated by a syllogistic reasoning study carried out by Evans, Handley, Harper, and Johnson-Laird (1999), and predictions were derived from mental model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991). With regard to the endorsement rate data: Experiment 1 failed to find evidence that a search for counterexamples or alternative models took place. In contrast experiment 2 (transitive inference) found some evidence to support the search for alternative models under possibility instructions, and following an improved training session, experiment 3 produced strong evidence to suggest that people searched for other models; which was mediated by cognitive ability. There was also strong evidence from experiments 4, 5 and 6 (abstract and everyday conditionals) to support the search for counterexamples and alternative models. Furthermore it was also found that people were more likely to find alternative causes when there were many that could be retrieved from their everyday knowledge, and that people carried out a search for counterexamples with many alternative causes under necessity instructions, and across few and many causal groups under possibility instructions. .The evidence from the latency data was limited and inconsistent, although people with higher cognitive ability were generally quicker in completing the tasks.

The Backward Induction strategy for the Centipede Game leads us to a counterfactual reasoning paradox, The Centipede Game paradox. The counterfactual reasoning proving the backward induction strategy for the game appears to rely on the players in the game not choosing that very same backward induction strategy. The paradox is a general paradox that applies to backward induction reasoning in sequential, perfect information games. Therefore, the paradox is not only problematic for the Centipede Game, but it also affects counterfactual reasoning solutions in games similar to the Centipede Game. The Centipede Game is a prime illustration of this paradox in counterfactual reasoning. As a result, this paper will use a material versus subjunctive/counterfactual conditional analysis to provide a theoretical resolution to the Centipede Game, with the hope that a similar solution can be applied to other areas where this paradox may appear. The solution involves delineating between the epistemic systems of the players and the game theorists.

Hur har vi kunskap om vad som är möjligt? Enligt vad som kan betraktas som det traditionella svaret till den frågan, har vi kunskap om modalitet via föreställningsbarhet. Vi föreställer oss ting och tar sedan detta som bevis för möjlighet. Denna uppsats kommer att undersöka tre invändningar till detta svar angående hur vi har kunskap om möjlighet. Vi kommer sedan att överväga Williamsons förmodan: att vår kognitiva kapacitet för att hantera kontrafaktiska konditionaler bär med sig den kognitiva kapaciteten för oss att även hantera metafysisk modalitet (2007, 136), och undersöka om denna förmodan undviker dessa invändningar. Det kommer här att argumenteras att Williamson’s förmodan undviker två av invändningarna och att den inte tycks kunna svara på den sista invändningen. Det kommer även att argumenteras att en invändning mot Williamson’s förmodan ser ut att vara särskilt problematisk, och att det inte är klart att Williamson’s förmodan är i någon bättre position än den negativa föreställningsbarhets vyn. / How do we have knowledge of what is possible? On what could be considered as the traditional response to this question, we have knowledge of modality by conceivability. We conceive of things and on the basis take this as evidence for possibility. This thesis will consider three objections to this response of how we have knowledge of possibility. We will then consider Williamson’s conjecture: that our cognitive capacity to handle counterfactual conditionals carries the cognitive capacity for us to also handle metaphysical modality (2007, 136), and see if this conjecture avoids these objections. It will be argued that Williamson’s conjecture avoids two of the objections and that it does not seem to have a response to the last objection. It will also be argued that one objection to Williamson’s conjecture seems particularly problematic, and that it is not so clear that Williamson’s conjecture is any better off than the negative conceivability view.

Orientador: Maria Luiza Braga / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Estudos da Linguagem / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-27T19:14:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rodrigues_AngelicaTerezinhaCarmo_M.pdf: 3730027 bytes, checksum: ef1d6083270ff884218582dc219c17b5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2001 / Resumo: Neste trabalho, investigo as orações hipotáticas de tempo e condição presentes na fala de crianças em fase de aquisição de primeira língua. Na literatura consultada, há um consenso de que as orações temporais emergem na fala da criança primeiro do que as condicionais. Como sugere Slobin (1975), algumas noções, por serem mais salientes psicologicamente do que outras, são primeiramente desenvolvidas na infância. Os dados, no entanto, permitem afirmar apenas que as primeiras ocorrem em maior número do que as segundas. A justificativa, nesse caso, remete tanto a Givón quanto a Heine et alii. Tomando por base os pressupostos de Givón (1995), pode se dizer que as temporais representam estruturas não-marcadas, uma vez que são menos freqüentes. Nesse caso, é provável que tendam a ser, ao contrário das condicionais, menos complexas. Uma outra hipótese remete ao continuum de categorias cognitivas proposto por Heine et alii (1991), que defende que entidades mais concretas, como as que se referem a TEMPO, podem ser recrutadas para expressar noções mais abstratas, como CONDIÇÃO. Mostro, entre outros aspectos que, em algumas orações, é possível identificar uma superposição de significados temporais e condicionais, e que, em outras, essa possibilidade é, senão bloqueada, pelo menos, mais difícil. A correlação modo-temporal e o grau de hipoteticidade explicam, parcialmente, a intercambialidade entre noções temporais e condicionais. Para aferir o grau de integração dessas orações, utilizei as variáveis correlação modo-temporal, explicitude, correferencialidade e formas de expressão dos sujeitos. Em relação ao primeiro parâmetro, os resultados empíricos sugerem que as construções de tempo, por apresentarem tempos e modos idênticos tanto na núcleo quanto na temporal, estão mais integradas, e, portanto, mais gramaticalizadas. No que concerne aos outros parâmetros, parece haver uma inversão nos resultados. Casos de anáfora zero, que indicam um grau forte de entrelaçamento, foram registrados mais nas orações condicionais do que nas temporais. Todavia, em ambas estruturas, os sujeitos apresentaram os traços [- correferencialidade] e [+ explicitude], que indicam relações sintáticas mais frouxas / Abstract: This study investigates the hypotactic temporal and conditional clausespresent in the speech pattems of children who are in the language acquisition phase. According to the literature researched there is consensus that temporal clauses emerge in children speech patterns before conditional clauses. Like Slobin (1975) suggests, some notions, being more visible than others frem a psychological perspective, are the first to be developed in childhood. In my data, however, I verified to a certain extent that the first occur in greater number than the latter. In this case, the justification points to the hypotheses of both Givón and Heine et aloTaking Givón's pressupositions as a basis, I can say that the temporal clauses are unmarked structures, once they are less frequent. In this case, it is possible that they tend to be, contrary to condicional clauses,less complex. Another hypotheses alludes to the continuum of cognitive categories proposed by Heine et al (1991), which defends that concrete entities are recruited to express more abstract notions, such as condition. I emphasize, among other aspects, that in some sentences it is possible to identify a superposition of temporal and conditional meanings and that, in other sentences, this possibility is, if not blocked, at least less apparent. The modus-temporal correlation and hypothetical explanation ratio partially explain the interchangeability of temporal and conditional notions. In order to assess the integration degree of these sentences I used the sharing of tenses and moods, co-reference and expressions forros of subject variables. As regards the first parameter, empiric outcomes suggest that temporal constructions, because identical tenses and modes are presented in both the nucleus and the temporal clause, are more integrated and therefore characterized by more marked grammaticalization. Conceming the other parameters there seems to be an inversion of results. Cases of total absence of anaphora, which indicate a strong degree of interchange, were found more frequently in conditional than in temporal clauses. However, in both structures the subjects presented signs that indicate looser syntactic relationships [- co-reference] e [+ explicitness] / Mestrado / Mestre em Linguística

Donkey pronouns seem to defy the conventional categories of referential and anaphoric pronouns and hence cannot be analyzed as variables. An orthodox treatment is that donkey pronouns are semantically equivalent to definite descriptions. I argue on the contrary that donkey pronouns can be analyzed as bound variables given a distinct notion of binding. I provide a systematic comparison between the static, description-theoretic approach and Discourse Representation Theory (DRT), a representative of dynamic semantics. By exposing the inadequacy of various descriptivist theories, I motivate and argue that DRT is the better alternative. DRT is superior for being a coherent and flexible analysis of donkey pronouns, a unified analysis of pronouns in general, and an intuitively appealing model of meaning. In addition, I uncover the similarities between the situational descriptivist account and DRT. I show that when fully elaborated, the former turns out to be a notational variant of the latter. I then trace their common problems to the Lewisian assumptions of quantification and conditionals; my proposed solutions suggest non-trivial modifications to and clarifications of the underlying Lewisian framework. / text

No description available.

Orientador: Ítala Maria Loffredo D'Ottaviano / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-19T12:55:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Andrade_RamonSouzaCapelle_D.pdf: 2199404 bytes, checksum: 2cfe6779d4b1e626d3847b217ffd7a7f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / Resumo: O objetivo desta Tese consiste em defender que (a) os condicionais constituem a forma lógica subjacente à manifestação das leis naturais, das leis biológicas e dos hábitos psicocomportamentais. Defendemos, também, que, (b) embora tenhamos a mesma forma lógica subjacente à manifestação dessas regularidades (leis, hábitos), não temos, contudo, o mesmo grau de conexão entre antecedentes e conseqüentes nesses contextos de realidade (físico-químico, biológico e psicocomportamental). Em concordância com a nossa interpretação de parte da Hipótese Cosmológica de Peirce, defendemos que: (c) as leis naturais fortemente determinam seus conseqüentes (Se o antecedente acontece, então o conseqüente quase-necessariamente se segue), (d) as leis biológicas moderadamente determinam seus conseqüentes (Se o antecedente acontece, então o conseqüente muito provavelmente se segue) e (e) os hábitos psicocomportamentais fracamente determinam seus conseqüentes (Se o antecedente acontece, então o conseqüente provavelmente se segue). Anexamos o rótulo Hipótese do Espectro de Determinação de Condicionais Causais a essas diferentes (quase-necessária, muito provável e provável) modalidades de conexão entre antecedentes e conseqüentes. Oferecemos (f), com base na semântica de David Lewis (2005), um modelo para esse espectro de determinação, e procuramos expressar a determinação do condicional e, ao mesmo tempo, deixar espaço para a indeterminação ou acaso. Procuramos (g) caracterizar sistema e organização, e (h) argumentamos que um hábito constitui um componente organizacional da estrutura psicocomportamental de um agente. Oferecemos (i) uma classificação dos hábitos em hábitos que estabelecem os traços da identidade do sistema/agente, hábitos racionais e hábitos degenerados. Procuramos ainda (j) caracterizar a auto-organização e (l) analisar como um processo de auto-organização secundária se estabelece na estrutura psicocomportamental de um agente / Abstract: The objective of this thesis consists in arguing that (a) conditionals constitute the logical form underlying the manifestation of natural laws, biological laws, and psycho-behavioral habits. It is also argued that (b) even though we find the same logical form underlying the manifestation of these regularities (laws and habits), we do not find, however, the same degree of connection between antecedents and consequents in the relevant contexts of reality (physico-chemical, biological, and psycho-behavioral). In accord with our interpretation of part of Peirce's cosmological hypothesis, we argue that (c) natural laws strongly determine their consequents (if the antecedent occurs, then the consequent almost necessarily follows), (d) biological laws moderately determine their consequents (if the antecedent occurs, then the consequent very probably follows), and (e) psycho-behavioral habits weakly determine their consequents (if the antecedent occurs, then the consequent probably follows) We use the appellation "hypothesis of the spectrum of determination of causal conditionals" to express these different modalities of connection between antecedents and consequents (almost-necessary, very probable, and probable). Based on the semantics of David Lewis (2005), we propose (f) a model for this spectrum of determination, and we seek to express the determination of the conditional and, at the same time, to allow room for indetermination or chance. We seek (g) to characterize system and organization, and we argue that (h) a habit constitutes an organizational component in the psycho-behavioral structure of an agent. We offer (i) a threefold classification of habits into habits that establish the features of the identity of the system/agent, rational habits, and degenerate habits. We seek (j) to characterize self-organization, and (k) to analyze how a process of secondary self-organization establishes itself in the psycho-behavioral structure of an agent / Doutorado / Filosofia / Doutor em Filosofia

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished