This dissertation exposes the status of eros in the works of Levinas, Irigaray, and, Nancy. I begin by evaluating Levinas’s phenomenological analyses of eros in Time and the Other and Totality and Infinity. In order to fully appreciate this, however, I must necessarily also provide a summary overview of the central theme which guides Levinas’s work: ‘the Other.’ This leads Levinas to develop ethics as first philosophy, which in turn implies that the reduction of the Other to the same is the unethical gesture par excellence. Levinas formulates eros as the ‘equivocal par excellence’; a profane relation with the radical alterity of the feminine. Eros, for Levinas, inevitably lapses back to the economy of the same, and hence he looks to paternal fecundity to understand a relation with alterity untainted by erotic sensuality. Moreover, I identify the themes in Levinas’s work which guide this dissertation: the plurality of being, the tactility of erotic caressing, transcendence in eros, sexual difference, the affair between love and death, revisiting Plato’s Symposium, and, the erotic relationship with alterity. Having exposed these themes, and pre-empting a feminist critique of Levinas, I move on to the work of Luce Irigaray. After contextualising Irigaray’s feminist project, I expose and evaluate her critical reading of Levinas, particularly in her essay “The Fecundity of the Caress.” For Irigaray, Levinas mistakenly assumes a universal masculine subject, which in turn denies the feminine (and thus empirical women) a chance to be subjects. The fact that Levinas considers eros profane suggests, for Irigaray, that Levinas’s phenomenology of eros is haunted by a patriarchal bias evinced in the way he turns to paternity to salvage eros from a damnable carnality. Irigaray, in contrast, asserts eros as a relationship between the two real poles of sexual alterity. Eros thus holds potential as a just relation between the sexes. However, I find that Irigaray’s insistence on the biological markers of sexual difference becomes somewhat too idealistic. When compared with one another, Irigaray and Levinas arrive at an impasse which is solved by turning to the work of Jean-Luc Nancy. Nancy insists that love (including eros) cannot be thought as anything but an indefinite multiplicity. Nancy’s thought on love reflects his formulation of ‘being-singular-plural,’ an ontology which asserts ‘being-with’ is axiomatic in all philosophical investigations. In Shattered Love, Nancy deconstructs dialectics in order to show that love does not operate in a dialectical fashion. Both Levinas’s and Irigaray’s accounts of eros are exposed as dialectical. Nancy, in contrast, formulates love and sex/gender as the exposure of a subject to the relation with the other. Moreover, by examining Nancy’s thought on the body, eros can be derived as subtending all relations between sexed bodies. Thus Nancy figures eros as neither ideal nor profane, nor does he restrict eros to an ideal relation between the masculine and the feminine. However, Nancy’s opaque philosophy is not without fault. Although Nancy offers an interesting way in which to think eros, certain avenues of thought remain unexplored. / Dissertation (MA)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Philosophy / unrestricted

A partir da suspeita de que o pensamento e sua expressão não se limitam a uma única forma, o presente trabalho investiga de que modo podemos pensar, a partir de Fernando Pessoa, uma relação possível entre filosofia e literatura. Quais os pressupostos que permitem considerar o fenômeno heteronímico pessoano como um expediente trágico que diz respeito ao próprio pensamento, ou ainda, como entrever, no projeto pessoano, o lugar de embate trágico, por excelência entre aquilo que somos, enquanto sujeitos, e os processos que franqueiam à escrita a constituição de uma subjetividade outra? Desdobrada em heterônimos, a obra de Pessoa comportaria em si a justaposição de formas diversas de ver e compreender o mundo, mas o processo pelo qual este desdobramento se dá poderia ser tomado como anterior às formas constituídas das personalidades particulares, apresentando-se como uma disposição anti-dialética do pensamento. Privilegiando como ponto de partida os escritos do heterônimo louco e filósofo de Fernando Pessoa, António Mora, nosso intuito é analisar de que modo sua crítica à tradição metafísica ocidental, em ressonância com a filosofia francesa contemporânea de inspiração nietzschiana, pode se constituir como um intercessor capaz de dar a ver uma potência impessoal atuando entre a filosofia e a literatura, representada pelo verso de Alberto Caeiro: a natureza é partes sem um todo" / Based on the suspicion that thought and its expression are not bound by a unique form, the present work makes use of Fernando Pessoas writings to investigate by which way we could come to terms with a possible relation between philosophy and literature. What are the presuppositions that allow us to consider the heteronymical pessoan phenomenon as a tragic procedure of thought, or yet, how to detect, in the pessoan project, the place of a tragic clash between the condition that we embody, as a subject, and the processes that unveil, through writing, the constitution of an alternative subjectivity? Spread through different heteronyms, Pessoas oeuvre could admit in itself the juxtaposition of diverse ways of seeing and comprehending the world, although the process by which this movement is activated could be taken as anterior to the finished forms of particular personalities, appearing as an anti-dialectical disposition of thought. Privileging as a starting point the writings of António Mora, the mad and philosopher heteronym of Fernando Pessoa, our aim is to analyze by which way its critique on the metaphysical Western tradition through the resonance with contemporary French philosophy inspired by Nietzsche can constitute itself as a powerful intercessor that is able to foresee an impersonal power flowing through philosophy and literature, and which can be apprehended by Alberto Caeiros verse: nature is parts without a whole"

Orientador: Pedro Angelo Pagni / Banca: Maria Eugênia Morais Vilela / Banca: Divino José da Silva / Banca: Sinésio Ferraz Bueno / Banca: Silvio Donizete de Oliveira Gallo / Resumo: A presente tese analisa o tema do ensino da filosofia no ensino superior, tendo em vista discutir o problema do ofício do filósofo quando sua tarefa é ensinar a filosofia. Nesse sentido, o tema analisado e o problema discutido na tese têm como ponto de partida as questões suscitadas no exercício da docência da disciplina Filosofia em cursos de graduação de outras áreas, objetivando contribuir tanto para buscar outros sentidos a essa prática quanto para os estudos sobre o ensino da filosofia no Brasil. Por meio de uma revisão bibliográfica sobre o ensino da filosofia no Brasil, e da leitura de autores clássicos (Kant e Hegel), procuramos encontrar ressonância de nosso problema na literatura sobre o assunto. Essa revisão além de não responder ao problema, ampliou-o, pois, pudemos notar que os questionamentos sobre o ensino da filosofia se agrupavam em três grupos: sobre a importância, sobre o conteúdo e sobre o método para se ensinar a filosofia. Com o objetivo de escapar dessas formas de problematização, recorremos a Gilles Deleuze e Michel Foucault para propor uma outra maneira de encaminhar uma problematização de modo que o problema do ensino da filosofia não recaísse nesse mesmo registro. Com Deleuze pudemos compreender que existem mecanismos, chamados por ele de imagens dogmáticas do pensamento, que aprisionam os problemas a respostas preestabelecidas. A partir disso, fizemos a relação dessa noção com os problemas que eram colocados pelo ensino da filosofia, os quais funcionavam como essas imagens dogmáticas do pensamento. Com Foucault procuramos um modo de problematizar no qual pudéssemos estar, simultaneamente, como elemento e ator desse problema. Com isso, circunscrevemos um problema presente no ensino da filosofia que se plasma no empobrecimento da experiência, causado pela excessiva preocupação com a transmissão de conhecimentos através da... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: This thesis analyses the teaching of philosophy in undergraduate courses in order to discuss the problem of the philosopher's work when his task is to teach philosophy. Thus, the issue analyzed and the problem discussed in the thesis have as a starting point the matters raised in teaching the discipline of philosophy in undergraduate courses of different areas, aiming to contribute to seek other senses both to this practice and to the studies on the teaching of philosophy in Brazil. Through a literature review on the teaching of philosophy in Brazil, and reading classic authors (Kant and Hegel), we tried to find resonance of our problem in the literature about the issue. This review not only did not answer to the problem, but also increased it, because we could note that the questions on the teaching of philosophy were divided into three groups: concerning the importance, the content and the method to teach philosophy. Aiming to avoid these ways of problematization, we turned to Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault in order to propose another manner of conducting a problematization so that the problem of teaching of philosophy did not remain in that same scope. Together with Deleuze, we could understand that there are mechanisms, named images of thought, which enclose the problems to pre-established answers. From that, we set a relation of this notion with the problems that were put by the teaching of philosophy, which worked as those images of thought. With Foucault, we sought a way of problematizing in which we could be both a part and an actor of that problem. Thus, we circumscribed an existing problem in the teaching of philosophy that takes place in the impoverishment of experience, which is caused by the excessive concern with the transmission of knowledge through the explanation. Looking for ways that we would allow us to think of a teaching of philosophy which assured the... (Complete abstract click electronic access below) / Doutor

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:33:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2009-02-13Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:45:06Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 gelamo_rp_dr_mar.pdf: 698211 bytes, checksum: 26f19383531b000497dc16bf428efd5e (MD5) / Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP) / A presente tese analisa o tema do ensino da filosofia no ensino superior, tendo em vista discutir o problema do ofício do filósofo quando sua tarefa é ensinar a filosofia. Nesse sentido, o tema analisado e o problema discutido na tese têm como ponto de partida as questões suscitadas no exercício da docência da disciplina Filosofia em cursos de graduação de outras áreas, objetivando contribuir tanto para buscar outros sentidos a essa prática quanto para os estudos sobre o ensino da filosofia no Brasil. Por meio de uma revisão bibliográfica sobre o ensino da filosofia no Brasil, e da leitura de autores clássicos (Kant e Hegel), procuramos encontrar ressonância de nosso problema na literatura sobre o assunto. Essa revisão além de não responder ao problema, ampliou-o, pois, pudemos notar que os questionamentos sobre o ensino da filosofia se agrupavam em três grupos: sobre a importância, sobre o conteúdo e sobre o método para se ensinar a filosofia. Com o objetivo de escapar dessas formas de problematização, recorremos a Gilles Deleuze e Michel Foucault para propor uma outra maneira de encaminhar uma problematização de modo que o problema do ensino da filosofia não recaísse nesse mesmo registro. Com Deleuze pudemos compreender que existem mecanismos, chamados por ele de imagens dogmáticas do pensamento, que aprisionam os problemas a respostas preestabelecidas. A partir disso, fizemos a relação dessa noção com os problemas que eram colocados pelo ensino da filosofia, os quais funcionavam como essas imagens dogmáticas do pensamento. Com Foucault procuramos um modo de problematizar no qual pudéssemos estar, simultaneamente, como elemento e ator desse problema. Com isso, circunscrevemos um problema presente no ensino da filosofia que se plasma no empobrecimento da experiência, causado pela excessiva preocupação com a transmissão de conhecimentos através da... / This thesis analyses the teaching of philosophy in undergraduate courses in order to discuss the problem of the philosopher’s work when his task is to teach philosophy. Thus, the issue analyzed and the problem discussed in the thesis have as a starting point the matters raised in teaching the discipline of philosophy in undergraduate courses of different areas, aiming to contribute to seek other senses both to this practice and to the studies on the teaching of philosophy in Brazil. Through a literature review on the teaching of philosophy in Brazil, and reading classic authors (Kant and Hegel), we tried to find resonance of our problem in the literature about the issue. This review not only did not answer to the problem, but also increased it, because we could note that the questions on the teaching of philosophy were divided into three groups: concerning the importance, the content and the method to teach philosophy. Aiming to avoid these ways of problematization, we turned to Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault in order to propose another manner of conducting a problematization so that the problem of teaching of philosophy did not remain in that same scope. Together with Deleuze, we could understand that there are mechanisms, named images of thought, which enclose the problems to pre-established answers. From that, we set a relation of this notion with the problems that were put by the teaching of philosophy, which worked as those images of thought. With Foucault, we sought a way of problematizing in which we could be both a part and an actor of that problem. Thus, we circumscribed an existing problem in the teaching of philosophy that takes place in the impoverishment of experience, which is caused by the excessive concern with the transmission of knowledge through the explanation. Looking for ways that we would allow us to think of a teaching of philosophy which assured the... (Complete abstract click electronic access below)

A partir da suspeita de que o pensamento e sua expressão não se limitam a uma única forma, o presente trabalho investiga de que modo podemos pensar, a partir de Fernando Pessoa, uma relação possível entre filosofia e literatura. Quais os pressupostos que permitem considerar o fenômeno heteronímico pessoano como um expediente trágico que diz respeito ao próprio pensamento, ou ainda, como entrever, no projeto pessoano, o lugar de embate trágico, por excelência entre aquilo que somos, enquanto sujeitos, e os processos que franqueiam à escrita a constituição de uma subjetividade outra? Desdobrada em heterônimos, a obra de Pessoa comportaria em si a justaposição de formas diversas de ver e compreender o mundo, mas o processo pelo qual este desdobramento se dá poderia ser tomado como anterior às formas constituídas das personalidades particulares, apresentando-se como uma disposição anti-dialética do pensamento. Privilegiando como ponto de partida os escritos do heterônimo louco e filósofo de Fernando Pessoa, António Mora, nosso intuito é analisar de que modo sua crítica à tradição metafísica ocidental, em ressonância com a filosofia francesa contemporânea de inspiração nietzschiana, pode se constituir como um intercessor capaz de dar a ver uma potência impessoal atuando entre a filosofia e a literatura, representada pelo verso de Alberto Caeiro: a natureza é partes sem um todo" / Based on the suspicion that thought and its expression are not bound by a unique form, the present work makes use of Fernando Pessoas writings to investigate by which way we could come to terms with a possible relation between philosophy and literature. What are the presuppositions that allow us to consider the heteronymical pessoan phenomenon as a tragic procedure of thought, or yet, how to detect, in the pessoan project, the place of a tragic clash between the condition that we embody, as a subject, and the processes that unveil, through writing, the constitution of an alternative subjectivity? Spread through different heteronyms, Pessoas oeuvre could admit in itself the juxtaposition of diverse ways of seeing and comprehending the world, although the process by which this movement is activated could be taken as anterior to the finished forms of particular personalities, appearing as an anti-dialectical disposition of thought. Privileging as a starting point the writings of António Mora, the mad and philosopher heteronym of Fernando Pessoa, our aim is to analyze by which way its critique on the metaphysical Western tradition through the resonance with contemporary French philosophy inspired by Nietzsche can constitute itself as a powerful intercessor that is able to foresee an impersonal power flowing through philosophy and literature, and which can be apprehended by Alberto Caeiros verse: nature is parts without a whole"

Foucault en 1983 prononce pour la première fois, durant une leçon au Collège de France, le syntagme « ontologie critique de nous-mêmes ». Une telle dénomination s’ajoute aux autres termes choisis rétrospectivement par Foucault pour définir sa démarche philosophique : durant ces années quatre-vingts il utilise à la fois « ontologie historique de nous-mêmes », « ontologie de l’actualité », « ontologie du présent », « ontologie de la modernité » et enfin « ontologie de nous-mêmes ». Cette série de formules synonymiques renferme l’objective premier de ma thèse : expliciter ce qu’est l’ontologie critique de nous-mêmes. L’enjeu fondamentale de ce travail consiste en fait d’une part à interroger et comprendre le syntagme en question, de l’autre à évaluer la possibilité de la construction d’une genèse de cette idée dans le cadre global de la philosophie foucaldienne. / In 1983 Foucault pronounces for the first time, during a lesson at the Collège de France, the syntagma “Critial Ontology of Ourselves”. Other similar denominations are used by Foucault in a retrospective way to define his philosophical researches, indeed throughout 1980 he uses at the same time: “Historical Ontology of ourselves”, “Ontology of the Actuality”, “Ontology of the present”, “Ontology of modernity”, et finally “Ontology of ourselves”. This list of synonyms concerns the principal aim of my dissertation: understand what is the Critical Ontology of Ourselves. The crucial point of this work consist from one hand in interrogating and understanding the syntagma above mentioned, from the other in verifying the possibility of the construction of a genesis of this idea

Entre la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale et le début des années 1960, les représentants les plus importants du courant phénoménologique en France, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty et Trân Duc Thào, estiment non seulement qu'il est nécessaire de se confronter au marxisme, mais également que l'articulation entre phénoménologie et marxisme constitue l'un des enjeux essentiels de la philosophie dans le monde contemporain. L'objet de notre recherche est de comprendre la spécificité du travail philosophique que chacun de ces auteurs opère sur ces deux courants en apparence si opposés afin de rendre possible leur synthèse. Ce travail montre notamment comment le projet initial de 1944 est progressivement mis en question et reconfiguré au contact des évolutions historiques et politiques, des débats philosophiques et du développement des sciences humaines. Nous entendons ainsi restituer les enjeux et inventions conceptuelles de ce qui restera l'un des moments les plus féconds et originaux de la philosophie française contemporaine. / Between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the 1960s, the chief representatives of the phenomenological school in France, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Tran Duc Thao, not only considered that they had to confront Marxism in their works : they deemed the endeavour to combine Marxism with phenomenology one of the major tasks of philosophy in the modern world. The object of our research is to understand the specificity of the philosophical work each performed on these two apparently incompatible schools of thought, in order to make their synthesis possible. Our work traces the way in which the initial project of 1944 was progressively questioned and reworked in the wake of political and historical change, philosophical debates and the development of human sciences. Thus we hope to bring to light the underlying stakes and conceptual innovations of what remains one of the most fertile and original moments in contemporary French philosophy.