Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Breslau.

Avtalsförhandlingar innebär skyldigheter för avtalsparterna, detta är delvis ett utfall av lojalitetsplikten. Parterna måste ta hänsyn till varandras intressen, någon som handlar vårdslöst eller illojalt under avtalsförhandlingarna kan ådra sig skadeståndsskyldighet. Vid fastighetsköp har denna grundtanke länge varit undantagen genom praxis. Motiveringen för undantaget har hittills varit att prekontraktuella skadestånd innebär att formkravet urholkas. Genom ett obiter dictum uttalande, vid sidan av huvudfrågan i domen, från 2012 har HD yttrat ett försiktigt stöd för pre-kontraktuellt ansvar vid fastighetsköp. För att undersöka rättsläget tillämpas rättsdogmatisk metod. I skrivande stund har inget nytt mål prövats av HD och rättsläget förblir oklart.

Dans un contexte de mondialisation, face à l’accroissement des échanges et la complexification des contrats internationaux, les négociations précontractuelles ont pris une dimension particulière : création de nouvelles obligations, étirement de la durée des pourparlers, multiplications des contrats préliminaires, tout conduit à transformer cette simple période de transition en une étape primordiale de la vie contractuelle. Les différentes phases de négociation entre partenaires internationaux vont ainsi générer des contentieux qui intéressent le droit international privé. En effet, la valeur juridique de la négociation diverge d’un régime juridique à un autre. Alors que les Etats de common law adoptent une conception individualiste des pourparlers avec pour principe une liberté contractuelle très étendue, la civil law circonscrit la liberté contractuelle par le respect d’un devoir de bonne foi. Par conséquent, il apparaît essentiel, pour les parties, de connaître avec certitude le droit applicable à leur relation précontractuelle.Or les règles de conflits existantes, supposées garantir la sécurité juridique des parties à la négociation en leur assurant une certaine prévisibilité des solutions, ne sont pas adaptées à l’heure actuelle. Dans cette perspective, l’objet de la recherche s’attache à considérer les spécificités de la période précontractuelle et les questions de droit international privé s’y rattachant et tente d’y apporter des réponses efficaces en proposant des règles de conflits adaptées, afin de garantir la sécurité juridique à laquelle aspirent les parties à la négociation. / In a context of globalization, facing increased trade and the increasing complexity of international contracts, pre-contractual negotiations take a special dimension: creating new obligations, stretching the length of talks, multiplications of preliminary contracts, are leading to transform this simple transition in a primordial stage of contracts. The different phases of negotiation between international partners and will generate interest litigation private international law.Indeed, the legal negotiation differs from one legal regime to another. Common law countries adopt an individualistic principle for talks with extensive contractual freedom, whereas civil law circumscribes the freedom of contract in respect of a duty of good faith. Therefore, it is essential for the parties to know with certainty the law applicable to their pre-contractual relationship.However, the existing conflict rules, supposed to guarantee the legal security of the negotiating parties by ensuring predictability solutions are not appropriate at this time. In this perspective, the purpose of the research focuses on considering the specificities of the pre-contractual period and issues of private international law relating thereto and attempts to provide effective responses by providing conflict rules adapted to ensure legal certainty aspired parties to the negotiation.

Univ., Diss.--Kiel, 1996.

Univ., Diss.-2003--Regensburg, 2002. / Literaturverz. S. 238 - 248.

Univ., Diss.--Regensburg, 2002. / Literaturverz. S. 246 - 257.

Univ., Diss.--Trier, 2001. / Literaturverz. S. [201] - 215.

Univ., Habil.-Schr.--Göttingen, 1999.

Within Swedish tort law, liability for damages is regulated within both contractual and non- contractual relationships. Furthermore, a culpable act must have taken place for a liability for indemnity to be possibly/probable presented. Furthermore, it is the principle culpa in contrahendo that imposes liability for culpable acts that take place in the pre-contractual stage. Culpa in contrahendo is, however, a principle that is not found in statutory law, but instead in several legal systems.  The principle was applied for the first time in the case NJA 1963 p.105. The case concerned negotiations that never led to a final contractual relationship, which resulted in an adjudged indemnity. Although the indemnity was limited with regard for the negative contractual interests, they still became a support for a pre-contractual liability for indemnity based on the principle culpa in contrahendo. However, implementing the principle in contractual issues concerning property purchases, turns out to involve a number of contradictions; on the one hand, the negative freedom of contract and the formal requirements weigh heavily, on the other hand, the duty of loyalty and its pre-contractual responsibility prevail. In a balance of interests, at what point does one aspect weigh more heavily than the other? How far advanced should the contract negotiations be before the duty of loyalty outweighs the formal requirements and the negative contractual interest, which, among other things, must mean security and freedom of contract? Is the principle even possible to implement in matters concerning property purchases? The investigation states that culpa in contrahendo can possibly be applied even to property purchases, as the principle may be considered accepted within Swedish law. However, the formal requirements and the negative contractual interest may limit any indemnity. The time when the duty of loyalty arises seems to be when one party makes another party believe that an agreement will be finalized, when the intention to execute an agreement does not in fact exist. It is also required that adequate causality is established, between the party’s culpable actions and the other party’s costs as well as financial damage in connection with the belief that an agreement should be executed. However, it is also required that other circumstances speak in favor of, or rather do not argue against, an adjudged indemnity. / Inom den svenska skadeståndsrätten regleras skadeståndsansvaret inom såväl kontraktuella som utomkontraktuella avtalsförhållanden. Vidare ska bland annat ett culpöst agerande ha ägt rum för att ett skadeståndsansvar ska vara möjligt att utdömas. Fortsatt är det principen culpa in contrahendo som utdömer skadeståndsansvar för culpösa ageranden som sker i det prekontraktuella stadiet. Culpa in contrahendo är dock en princip som inte återfinns i den svenska lagtexten. Principen har istället internationellt vuxit fram och återfinns i flera rättsordningar.  Sett till en implementering av principen i svensk domstol tillämpades principen för första gången i rättsfallet NJA 1963 s.105. Rättsfallet berörde förhandlingar som aldrig ledde till ett slutligt avtalsförhållande, vilket resulterade i ett utdömt skadestånd. Visserligen begränsades skadeståndet, med hänsyn till de negativa kontraktsintresset, men det lade ändock en grund för möjligheten att tillämpa principen om culpa in contrahendo i svensk rätt. Men att däremot implementera principen i avtalsfrågor berörande fastighetsköp, visar sig dock innebära ett flertal motstridigheter; å ena sidan väger den negativa avtalsfriheten och formkraven tungt, å andra sidan råder lojalitetsplikten och dess prekontraktuella ansvar. Vid en intresseavvägning, vid vilken tidpunkt väger den ena aspekten tyngre än den andra? Hur långt framskridna bör avtalsförhandlingarna vara innan lojalitetsplikten väger tyngre än formkraven och det negativa kontraktsintresset, som bland annat ska innebära trygghet och avtalsfrihet? Är principen ens möjlig att implementera i frågor gällande fastighetsköp? Undersökningen visar att culpa in contrahendo inte omöjligen kan appliceras även vid fastighetsköp, då principen får anses vara accepterad inom svensk rätt. Dock, kan formkraven och det negativa kontraktsintresset komma att begränsa ett eventuellt skadestånd. Tidpunkten för då lojalitetsplikten inträder tycks vara då en av parterna låter motparten tro att avtal kommer att ingås, när avsikten att ingå avtal i själva verket inte finns. Det krävs även att adekvat kausalitet råder,  mellan parts culpösa agerande och motpartens kostnader samt ekonomiska skada i samband med tron om att avtal ska ingås. Dock, krävs det även att övriga omständigheter talar för, eller snarare inte talar emot, att ett skadestånd ska utdömas.

The legal conception and methodology developed by the Historical School of Jurisprudence had a strong impact on Swedish legal scholars in the 19th century, influencing the legal faculties at the universities as well as the drafting of private law legislation. In his seminal work System des heutigen römischen Rechts Friedrich Carl von Savigny, the figurehead of the Historical School, used the terms legal relations and legal institutions as core concepts, distinguishing between the natural institutions of family law and the artificial institutions of private law. These terms were used in a similar capacity to how Friedrich Julius Stahl, a decade earlier, had used them in his work on legal philosophy, Die Philosophie des Rechts nach geschichtlicher Ansicht. The distinction between natural and artificial institutions has been criticized as an unhistorical abstraction and as a necessary precondition for the subsequent development of conceptual jurisprudence. This thesis investigates the relation between natural and artificial institutions, as well as the function and meaning of the artificial institutions in the legal system and the reasoning of the courts. The thesis proposes a spectrum ranging from natural to artificial as an analytical framework. Through a historical and dogmatic analysis of three legal institutions different aspects of the artificial character of legal institutions are presented. The analysis of the legal institution of stoppage in transitu shows that a natural institution based on customary law over time can evolve into an artificial institution, far removed from the concrete circumstances in which it developed. This is the case with stoppage in transitu in Swedish law. The analysis of the legal institution of culpa in contrahendo shows that it originated in a legal remedy theorized by Rudolf von Jhering and gained authority through court practice over time until it was codified in German law. By contrast, the use of culpa in contrahendo in Swedish law has declined over time and been functionally replaced by a general principle of good faith. Though the institution has not been made obsolete, it is now generally regarded as a specific expression of the good faith principle. The analysis of the legal institution of unjust enrichment shows that in contrast to the continental civil law systems, Nordic and Swedish legal scholars have generally been firmly opposed and highly critical of its application. There are provisions stipulating compensation based on unjust enrichment in several different laws and it has been used in the reasoning of the Supreme Court, but the prevailing opinion among legal scholars has been that such an institution doesn’t exist in Swedish law. In the last thirty years, essentially a new generation of legal scholars has acknowledged the existence of unjust enrichment in Swedish law. From the results of the historical analysis artificial institutions can be understood as abstract systematic units with a core normative content expressed in technical-legal language. Their function in the legal system is to bridge the gap between fundamental ethic norms inherent in the system and individual legal relations for which no rule exists. The natural or artificial character of institutions can only be determined in relative terms, and in the evolution of a specific legal institution this character is not fixed, but subject to gradual change.  In the reasoning of the court the analyzed artificial institutions are mainly used as a vehicle for legal analogies or as an argument to determine if a proposed analogy is justified. These arguments are routinely based on legal doctrine and prior court praxis, and only occasionally cites preparatory works or legislation. In the reasoning of the court, invoking artificial institutions are a means of solving hard cases by creating new rules which are formally coherent.