Zugl.: Augsburg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2008.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1953. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 451-537) and bibliographical essay (leaves 538-551).

No description available.

Snow melt is an important component of Western US water resources, accounting for about 50-80% of the annual runoff. Prediction of runoff from snowmelt in heterogeneous watersheds requires the quantification of physical processes accounting for the effects of forest canopy on snow accumulation, melt and sublimation. The forest canopy intercepts snowfall that resulting in smaller snow accumulations in forest area than in open area. The forest canopy also modifies the energy exchange between snow surface and the atmosphere, and alters the sublimation and melting of sub-canopy snow relative to open area. This dissertation has examined ways to improve snowmelt modeling capability to better account for canopy effects and has presented enhancements to an energy balance model that include i) an improved representation of the transmission of radiation through the canopy, ii) an improved representation of the atmospheric transport of heat and water vapor between the snow on the ground, in the canopy and the atmosphere above, and iii) an improved representation of the processes of canopy snow interception and unloading. These enhancements were evaluated against 4 years of field data (2006-2010) collected at the TW Daniels Experimental Forest (TWDEF) located 30 miles N-E of Logan. Observations included continuous automated climate and snow depth measurements supported by periodic field measurements of snow water equivalent and temperature in four different vegetation classes (grass, shrubs, coniferous forest, deciduous forest). The enhanced canopy components were included into the Utah Energy Balance Snowmelt model and provide improved capability to predict the surface water input and runoff from snowmelt in heterogeneous watersheds using a parsimonious approach that can be used with practically available information.

Title from title page of PDF (University of Missouri--St. Louis, viewed March 3, 2010). Includes bibliographical references (p. 26).

<p>This thesis deals with two species of a very well known and popular method of moral justification called the method of reflective equilibrium. These two species are narrow and wide reflective equilibrium (NRE/WRE). More specifically, the thesis looks at the roles so called background theories are expected to play in WRE. The use of background theories distinguishes WRE from NRE. Whether background theories can fulfil all these roles, and whether these roles are needed at all, is discussed. One conclusion is that whether WRE is preferable to NRE or not, depends to large degree on how the key concept of coherence is understood. Given a common understanding of coherence as something thicker than mere logical consistency though, WRE is clearly preferable to NRE as a method of justification.</p> / <p>Uppsatsen tar upp två varianter av en metod för rättfärdigande av moralteorier kallad reflektivt ekvilibrium-metoden. Dessa varianter är VPDOW respektive EUHWW reflektivt ekvilibrium. Framför allt undersöks den roll så kallade bakgrundsteorier förväntas spela i brett reflektivt ekvilibrium. Användning av bakgrundsteorier skiljer brett reflektivt ekvilibrium från smalt reflektivt ekvilibrium. Om bakgrundsteorier kan uppfylla alla de förväntningar som ställs på dem, samt om dessa förväntningar verkligen behöver uppfyllas, diskuteras. En slutsats är att huruvida brett eller smalt reflektivt ekvilibrium är att föredra är starkt kopplat till vilken förståelse av begreppet koherens som företräds. Givet en vanlig uppfattning av koherens som något fylligare än endast motsägelsefrihet så är dock brett reflektivt ekvilibrium att föredra.</p>

This thesis deals with two species of a very well known and popular method of moral justification called the method of reflective equilibrium. These two species are narrow and wide reflective equilibrium (NRE/WRE). More specifically, the thesis looks at the roles so called background theories are expected to play in WRE. The use of background theories distinguishes WRE from NRE. Whether background theories can fulfil all these roles, and whether these roles are needed at all, is discussed. One conclusion is that whether WRE is preferable to NRE or not, depends to large degree on how the key concept of coherence is understood. Given a common understanding of coherence as something thicker than mere logical consistency though, WRE is clearly preferable to NRE as a method of justification. / Uppsatsen tar upp två varianter av en metod för rättfärdigande av moralteorier kallad reflektivt ekvilibrium-metoden. Dessa varianter är VPDOW respektive EUHWW reflektivt ekvilibrium. Framför allt undersöks den roll så kallade bakgrundsteorier förväntas spela i brett reflektivt ekvilibrium. Användning av bakgrundsteorier skiljer brett reflektivt ekvilibrium från smalt reflektivt ekvilibrium. Om bakgrundsteorier kan uppfylla alla de förväntningar som ställs på dem, samt om dessa förväntningar verkligen behöver uppfyllas, diskuteras. En slutsats är att huruvida brett eller smalt reflektivt ekvilibrium är att föredra är starkt kopplat till vilken förståelse av begreppet koherens som företräds. Givet en vanlig uppfattning av koherens som något fylligare än endast motsägelsefrihet så är dock brett reflektivt ekvilibrium att föredra.

John Rawls developed principles of justice to guide the fair allocation of resources in a society. However, his principles did not take into consideration a society’s differing health needs. Norman Daniels attempted to extend Rawlsian principles of justice to apply to the allocation of health resources. In Just Health, Daniels argued that, under certain circumstances, an age-based allocation of health resources can be prudent. He proposed the Prudential Lifespan Account (PLA) to defend age-rationing against claims that it would lead to favoring one age-group over another. In this paper, I analyze Daniels’s PLA and argue that societal aging poses a significant threat to its effectiveness. I then examine and critique alternate theories to extend Rawlsian principles of justice to account for health, specifically those proposed by Dennis McKerlie and Hugh Lazenby.

In this thesis, many topics will be discussed and a variety of philosophers will be mentioned. The main goal of this thesis is to determine a health care plan that fits with the theories of Robert Nozick, Arthur Ripstein, Norman Daniels, and Amartya Sen. I conclude that Ezekiel Emanuel’s health care plan, The Guaranteed Healthcare Access Plan, can be used as a compromise between the views of each of these philosophers. In reaching such a conclusion, I take many steps. I begin with the explanation of theories of justice and their focus. I then turn to the important distinction between rights and ethics. Next, I explain that often closely held values come into conflict with one another. Then, I turn to the specific philosophers and their theories. Beginning with Nozick, I explain the justification for a state and how this justification is important for all four of the philosophers. Afterwards, in turn, I lay out what each philosopher claims in regards to a just society and the role of a state, his justification for such claims, and the results of such claims specifically in regards to health care. Subsequently, I examine the connections between philosophers, which help me understand the ways a health care system could be instituted to appeal to all four of them. After questioning if a just society can really exist in a limited world, I decide what type of health care system such a just society should implement. Finally, I rest on Ezekiel Emanuel’s plan, which I believe should be implemented in a just society and which best demonstrates the common ground between the four philosophers I discuss.

I explore the problem of using primary goods as the index for determining the least-advantaged members in a society in Rawls’s theory of justice. I look at the problems presented to Rawls by Amartya Sen and his capabilities approach. I discuss the solutions to Sen’s problems given by Norman Daniels, who argues that primary goods are able to take capabilities into account. Finally, I supplement Daniels, arguing that the parameters Rawls uses to define his theory limit Sen’s objection and that primary goods are the appropriate metric of justice in Rawls’s theory.