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Lying with the TruthWarnott, Emily Dohoney 27 November 2013 (has links)
No description available.
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Hipocrisia: arte do engano, arte do ator. Um olhar sobre a criação de si em Nietzsche / Hypocrisy: art of deception, art of the actor. A look at the creation of self in Nietzsches thoughtGustavo Bezerra do Nascimento Costa 11 December 2013 (has links)
Fundação Cearense de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Tecnológico / O objetivo desta tese é o de propor uma via de interpretação e significação possível ao problema ético-estético ou ético-poiētico da criação de si a partir da formulação de um conceito de hipocrisia. A partir de um espectro de análises acerca das práticas de engano, compõe-se um cenário inicial na forma de prolegômenos, nos quais se esboça uma distinção entre hipocrisia e autoengano, sob dois registros: formal, com a distinção de perspectivas entre enganar e ser enganado, com base no reconhecimento do engano; e processual, onde a hipocrisia, como incorporação intencional de personagens, distingue-se do autoengano como processo não reconhecido de incorporação de crenças. O primeiro capítulo dedica-se a compreender como as práticas de engano e a hipocrisia vêm a se tornar um problema moral. Remontando o problema aos gregos, abrem-se, para além dessa condenação, vias para uma reavaliação das formas de inteligência astuciosa nomeada por mêtis. No segundo capítulo, procura-se elaborar um conceito de hipocrisia como significação ao problema ético e estético da criação de si. A oposição entre as formas éticas da amizade e da lisonja, tendo em comum a atenção ao kairós, o tempo oportuno, é o mote para se pensar duas formas de discurso: o retórico, comandado pela mêtis, e o filosófico, pautado pela parrēsía; e para se propor uma forma de cuidado de si distinta da que é constituída pelo discurso parrēsiástico e vertida em ḗthos pela áskēsis. Tal seria a criação de si pela atenção aos acasos e instintos e teria como modelo o trabalho de incorporação e manejo artístico próprio à arte do ator. Daí emerge o conceito de hipocrisia como: arte de interpretar um saber da dóxa pela mestria do kairós, e de configurá-lo pela mímēsis de modo a criar a si como autor e obra de si mesmo. No terceiro capítulo, com enfoque interpretativo, toma-se esse conceito de hipocrisia como fio condutor para uma articulação entre três aspectos do pensamento de Nietzsche: i) a compreensão extramoral acerca das práticas de engano, tendo a vontade de aparência como aquilo que lhes subjaz; ii) a perspectiva epistêmica de processos sem sujeito, tendo as noções de máscara e interpretação como mote para se pensar a hipocrisia como um manuseio ou manejo artístico visando à criação de um eu hipócrita; e iii) a proposta ético-estética de criação de si e constituição de um caráter, onde a hipocrisia poderia ser compreendida como uma ética-estética do espírito livre, que pela incessante troca de papéis, cria a si como obra de arte e se torna o que é. / The aim of this thesis is to propose a way of interpreting and a possible meaning to the ethical-aesthetical or ethical- poiēthical problem of self-creating by formulating a concept of hypocrisy. From a spectrum of analysis about the deceiting practices, it is built an initial scenario in the form of prolegomena, which outlines a distinction between hypocrisy and self-deception, under two biases: formal, with the distinction of perspectives between deceiving and being deceived, based on the recognition of the deceiving; and processual, where the hypocrisy, as an intentional incorporation of characters, stands of self-deceiving, as an unrecognized process of incorporating beliefs. The first chapter is dedicated to understanding how the practice of deceit and hypocrisy happen to become moral issues. Dating back the problem to the Greeks, beyond that condemnation, it is opened pathways to a reassessment of the forms of cunning intelligence named mêtis. The second chapter aims at drawing up a concept of hypocrisy as a meaning to the ethical-aesthetical problem of self-creation. The opposition between the ethical forms of: friendship and flattery, having in common the attention to kairós, the right time, is the motto to consider two forms of discourse: the rhetorical, ruled by mêtis, and the philosophical, guided by parrēsía; and to propose a kind of care of the self, distinct from that which is constituted by the parrēsiástic speech and poured into ḗthos by the áskēsis. That would be the self-creation by attempting to hazards and instincts, and it would have the work of incorporation and artistic handling due to the art of the actor as reference. Here emerges the concept of hypocrisy as the art of interpreting a knowledgement from dóxa by the mastery of kairós, and setting it by mímēsis in order to creat itself as author and piece of art of self. In the third chapter, in an interpretive approach, that concept is token as leitmotif for a linkage between three aspects of Nietzsches thought: i) the extramoral understanding about deceiving practices, having the will to appearing what underlies them; ii) the epistemic perspective of processes without subject, taking the concepts of mask and interpretation to consider hypocrisy as an artistic handling aiming at creating a hypocrite self; and iii) the ethical-aesthetical proposal of self-creating and establishment of a character, where the hypocrisy could be understood as an ethics-aesthetics of the free spirit, which by the incessant changing of roles, creates itself as a piece of art and becomes what he is.
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Hipocrisia: arte do engano, arte do ator. Um olhar sobre a criação de si em Nietzsche / Hypocrisy: art of deception, art of the actor. A look at the creation of self in Nietzsches thoughtGustavo Bezerra do Nascimento Costa 11 December 2013 (has links)
Fundação Cearense de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Tecnológico / O objetivo desta tese é o de propor uma via de interpretação e significação possível ao problema ético-estético ou ético-poiētico da criação de si a partir da formulação de um conceito de hipocrisia. A partir de um espectro de análises acerca das práticas de engano, compõe-se um cenário inicial na forma de prolegômenos, nos quais se esboça uma distinção entre hipocrisia e autoengano, sob dois registros: formal, com a distinção de perspectivas entre enganar e ser enganado, com base no reconhecimento do engano; e processual, onde a hipocrisia, como incorporação intencional de personagens, distingue-se do autoengano como processo não reconhecido de incorporação de crenças. O primeiro capítulo dedica-se a compreender como as práticas de engano e a hipocrisia vêm a se tornar um problema moral. Remontando o problema aos gregos, abrem-se, para além dessa condenação, vias para uma reavaliação das formas de inteligência astuciosa nomeada por mêtis. No segundo capítulo, procura-se elaborar um conceito de hipocrisia como significação ao problema ético e estético da criação de si. A oposição entre as formas éticas da amizade e da lisonja, tendo em comum a atenção ao kairós, o tempo oportuno, é o mote para se pensar duas formas de discurso: o retórico, comandado pela mêtis, e o filosófico, pautado pela parrēsía; e para se propor uma forma de cuidado de si distinta da que é constituída pelo discurso parrēsiástico e vertida em ḗthos pela áskēsis. Tal seria a criação de si pela atenção aos acasos e instintos e teria como modelo o trabalho de incorporação e manejo artístico próprio à arte do ator. Daí emerge o conceito de hipocrisia como: arte de interpretar um saber da dóxa pela mestria do kairós, e de configurá-lo pela mímēsis de modo a criar a si como autor e obra de si mesmo. No terceiro capítulo, com enfoque interpretativo, toma-se esse conceito de hipocrisia como fio condutor para uma articulação entre três aspectos do pensamento de Nietzsche: i) a compreensão extramoral acerca das práticas de engano, tendo a vontade de aparência como aquilo que lhes subjaz; ii) a perspectiva epistêmica de processos sem sujeito, tendo as noções de máscara e interpretação como mote para se pensar a hipocrisia como um manuseio ou manejo artístico visando à criação de um eu hipócrita; e iii) a proposta ético-estética de criação de si e constituição de um caráter, onde a hipocrisia poderia ser compreendida como uma ética-estética do espírito livre, que pela incessante troca de papéis, cria a si como obra de arte e se torna o que é. / The aim of this thesis is to propose a way of interpreting and a possible meaning to the ethical-aesthetical or ethical- poiēthical problem of self-creating by formulating a concept of hypocrisy. From a spectrum of analysis about the deceiting practices, it is built an initial scenario in the form of prolegomena, which outlines a distinction between hypocrisy and self-deception, under two biases: formal, with the distinction of perspectives between deceiving and being deceived, based on the recognition of the deceiving; and processual, where the hypocrisy, as an intentional incorporation of characters, stands of self-deceiving, as an unrecognized process of incorporating beliefs. The first chapter is dedicated to understanding how the practice of deceit and hypocrisy happen to become moral issues. Dating back the problem to the Greeks, beyond that condemnation, it is opened pathways to a reassessment of the forms of cunning intelligence named mêtis. The second chapter aims at drawing up a concept of hypocrisy as a meaning to the ethical-aesthetical problem of self-creation. The opposition between the ethical forms of: friendship and flattery, having in common the attention to kairós, the right time, is the motto to consider two forms of discourse: the rhetorical, ruled by mêtis, and the philosophical, guided by parrēsía; and to propose a kind of care of the self, distinct from that which is constituted by the parrēsiástic speech and poured into ḗthos by the áskēsis. That would be the self-creation by attempting to hazards and instincts, and it would have the work of incorporation and artistic handling due to the art of the actor as reference. Here emerges the concept of hypocrisy as the art of interpreting a knowledgement from dóxa by the mastery of kairós, and setting it by mímēsis in order to creat itself as author and piece of art of self. In the third chapter, in an interpretive approach, that concept is token as leitmotif for a linkage between three aspects of Nietzsches thought: i) the extramoral understanding about deceiving practices, having the will to appearing what underlies them; ii) the epistemic perspective of processes without subject, taking the concepts of mask and interpretation to consider hypocrisy as an artistic handling aiming at creating a hypocrite self; and iii) the ethical-aesthetical proposal of self-creating and establishment of a character, where the hypocrisy could be understood as an ethics-aesthetics of the free spirit, which by the incessant changing of roles, creates itself as a piece of art and becomes what he is.
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Seeing is Deceiving: The Effects of Stimulus Adaptation on Perceptual Error in the Ebbinghaus IllusionKersten, Courtney G. 04 1900 (has links)
Page 193 is included twice. Numbered the same, but are different pages. / Although visual illusions have been used extensively to explore the mechanisms subserving perception and action, controversy exists regarding the extent to which illusions may differentially affect the perceptual and motor systems. In part, this is because it is often difficult to accurately assess the perceptual influence of illusory stimuli since participants are usually asked only to report binary size decisions (bigger or smaller) of an illusory stimulus relative to a control figure. Questions of relative size or the direction of misperception remain
unanswered. In this thesis, 10 experiments, comprising eight separate studies, were conducted to address these issues. In Experiment 1, a software tool was developed that allowed participants to size-match a target to a Control figure (Experiment 1a), as well as both the Large (Experiment 1b) and Small Annuli (Experiment 1c) Ebbinghaus Illusion stimuli. These experiments provided an accurate percentage of misperception score when each of the three conditions was presented in isolation. Results from Experiment 2, however, suggest that
when each of the three conditions are presented in a random and repeated stimulus array, a degree of perceptual adaptation occurs in which illusory effects are biased in the direction of the large annuli stimulus. Experiments 3-8 provided evidence to suggest that the degree of motor involvement (Experiment 3), number of illusory stimuli present (Experiments 4 and 5), direction of attention (Experiment 6) and visual field laterality (Experiments 7 and 8) have minimal influence on the adaptation effects observed in Experiment 2. / Thesis / Master of Science (MSc)
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Hobbes’s Deceiving God: the Correspondence Between Thomas Hobbes and Rene DescartesGorescu, Gabriela 08 1900 (has links)
In presenting their correspondence, I highlight the means in which Hobbes is able to divorce nature and politics in his philosophy. This is done by bringing to light Hobbes’s agreement with Descartes’s deceiving God argument. First, I demonstrate Hobbes’s hidden agreement with it by analyzing his objection to Descartes’s first Meditation. Second, I show that Hobbes and Descartes both retreat into consciousness in order to deal with the possibility of deception on the behalf of God. Third, I trace Hobbes’s rational justification for entertaining that very possibility. Fourth, I bring forward Hobbes’s certain principle, that God is incomprehensible. Fifth, I demonstrate Hobbes’s rationalization for rendering nature incomprehensible in turn. From this key insight, the differences between the two philosophers stand out more. Whereas Descartes rids himself of the possibility of a deceiving God, Hobbes does not. Sixth, I show that Descartes needs to rid himself of that possibility in order to have a basis for science, Hobbes’s science is such that he does not need to rid himself of that possibility. My investigation ends by considering both Hobbes’s and Descartes’s stance on nature, in relation to politics. I find that Hobbes’s principle is much more practical that Descartes’s principle. Hobbes’s principle is shown to be much more instructive and sustainable for human life. In conclusion, this analysis of the origins, principles, and orientation of the two philosopher’s thought brings forward the overarching question, whether the recovery of value and meaning is to be brought about in nature, or in civilization.
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