A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man is viewed traditionally by many critics and scholars alike more or less, if not entirely, as Joyce’s autobiographical novel. The identity of the narrator and his relationship to the focalizer and the narrative text are aspects that have thus not been sufficiently examined and explored. An analysis of the passage when Stephen clarifies to himself his relationship to words which makes possible the revelation of his calling as an artist will reveal the intimacy of the narrator and Stephen, indicating they are one and the same. But it will also disclose the structure of the narration of Portrait to be the result of Stephen’s very discovery of the meaning of words to him. And the view of Stephen as a narrator, as well as the main focalizer, turns Portrait into a work of fictional autobiography. His thoughts and contemplations monopolize the narration, granting him exclusive authority over the presentation of his story. Furthermore, the suggestion in the title of the novel that he is also the writer begs the question of reliability. Can Stephen’s story be trusted, or is Portrait a fabrication of his childhood in order to convince the world that he really was born to become an artist? The opening and ending of the novel suggest that the narrative is not “based on a true story” of Stephen’s life but instead that it is composed in the fantasy world which Stephen withdraws into as his meagre output does not meet his expectations. Thus Stephen writes his first novel entitled A Portrait with which he hopes to achieve the fame and receive the recognition he desires. But Stephen is still a struggling artist when the narrative finishes, hence the ambiguous ending as Stephen is the novel itself, its inconclusive narrative. Stephen’s A Portrait is a glorious act of self-creation.

Šiame darbe remiamasi hipoteze, kad modernioji epocha privedė visuomenę prie tapatybės krizės. Žmogus nuolatos stengiasi suvokti, pažinti ir apibrėžti save tam, kad atsakytų į klausimą „kas aš esu?“. XX amžiaus moralės filosofijoje susiformavo kryptis, kuri ima interpretuoti žmogų kaip istorijas pasakojantį gyvūną. Ši tradicija vadinama naratyvistine. Joje išsiskiria dvi srovės. Viena jų asmenybės tapatumo modelyje akcentuoja savęs interpretavimą, kita – savęs sukūrimą. Pirmosios krypties siūlomas naratyviosios asmenybės tapatumo modelis įvardijamas hermeneutiniu; tokį modelį kuria Alasdairas MacIntyre‘as, Charlesas Tayloras, ir Paulis Ricoeure‘as. Antrosios krypties modelis – neonyčinis; jo atstovai – Alexanderis Nehamas ir Richardas Rorty. Fenomenologinė filosofija taip pat susiduria su asmens tapatumu. M. Merelau-Ponty kūno fenomenologija teigia kūną esant save suprantančiu objektu, kuris per savo buvimo patyrimą išgyvena savo tapatybę. Alphonso Lingis aiškinasi‚ kaip suprasti veiksmą kaip būtent mano, tokį, kuriame atrandu savo asmeninio tapatumo prasmę. Jis aptaria daug tapatumo variantų ir sąlygų. Darbo tikslas yra ištyrinėti, kaip šiuolaikinėje filosofinėje antropologijoje keliama ir nagrinėjama žmogaus tapatybės problema, t. y. kaip žmogus aptinka ir supranta save kaip esantį šiame pasaulyje, kaip pajaučia savo egzistenciją. Šiame darbe bus siekiama atskleisti, kaip tapatybės problema pasirodo hermeneutinėje Paulio Ricoeure‘o, Charleso Tayloro ir A. MacIntyre‘o... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / This final paper is based on the hypothesis, what a modern epoch provoked chrisis of personl identity. Person is constantly attempting to realize, recognize and define itself, because he wants to get answer the question “who am I?” In the XX century formed a trend, which began interpretate person like an animal, which tells stories. This trend is known as narrative. It splits into two modus. First emphasizes in personal identity self interpretation, second- self creation. First modus suggests narrative self identity model, which is called hermeneutica. Such model compose Alasdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, and Paul Ricoeur. Second modus is neonietzschean and its members are Alexander Nehamas and Richard Rorty. Phenomenological philosophy also deals with personal identity. Maurice Merleau-Ponty established body phenomenology. It affirms, what human body is a self conscious subject, what experience his own identity through his being. Other phenomenological philosopher, Alphonso Lingis, tries to explain how to understand action like namely my own, in which I found meaning of my personal identity. He discuss many variants and conditions of identity. Work’s aim. The aim of this final paper is to investigate how the problem of personal identity is accepted and researched in the modern philosophical anthropology and also to investigate how the person understand itself like a being in this world and how he feels his own egzistence. In this paper will be reaching to unfold how... [to full text]

Fundação Cearense de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Tecnológico / O objetivo desta tese é o de propor uma via de interpretação e significação possível ao problema ético-estético ou ético-poiētico da criação de si a partir da formulação de um conceito de hipocrisia. A partir de um espectro de análises acerca das práticas de engano, compõe-se um cenário inicial na forma de prolegômenos, nos quais se esboça uma distinção entre hipocrisia e autoengano, sob dois registros: formal, com a distinção de perspectivas entre enganar e ser enganado, com base no reconhecimento do engano; e processual, onde a hipocrisia, como incorporação intencional de personagens, distingue-se do autoengano como processo não reconhecido de incorporação de crenças. O primeiro capítulo dedica-se a compreender como as práticas de engano e a hipocrisia vêm a se tornar um problema moral. Remontando o problema aos gregos, abrem-se, para além dessa condenação, vias para uma reavaliação das formas de inteligência astuciosa nomeada por mêtis. No segundo capítulo, procura-se elaborar um conceito de hipocrisia como significação ao problema ético e estético da criação de si. A oposição entre as formas éticas da amizade e da lisonja, tendo em comum a atenção ao kairós, o tempo oportuno, é o mote para se pensar duas formas de discurso: o retórico, comandado pela mêtis, e o filosófico, pautado pela parrēsía; e para se propor uma forma de cuidado de si distinta da que é constituída pelo discurso parrēsiástico e vertida em ḗthos pela áskēsis. Tal seria a criação de si pela atenção aos acasos e instintos e teria como modelo o trabalho de incorporação e manejo artístico próprio à arte do ator. Daí emerge o conceito de hipocrisia como: arte de interpretar um saber da dóxa pela mestria do kairós, e de configurá-lo pela mímēsis de modo a criar a si como autor e obra de si mesmo. No terceiro capítulo, com enfoque interpretativo, toma-se esse conceito de hipocrisia como fio condutor para uma articulação entre três aspectos do pensamento de Nietzsche: i) a compreensão extramoral acerca das práticas de engano, tendo a vontade de aparência como aquilo que lhes subjaz; ii) a perspectiva epistêmica de processos sem sujeito, tendo as noções de máscara e interpretação como mote para se pensar a hipocrisia como um manuseio ou manejo artístico visando à criação de um eu hipócrita; e iii) a proposta ético-estética de criação de si e constituição de um caráter, onde a hipocrisia poderia ser compreendida como uma ética-estética do espírito livre, que pela incessante troca de papéis, cria a si como obra de arte e se torna o que é. / The aim of this thesis is to propose a way of interpreting and a possible meaning to the ethical-aesthetical or ethical- poiēthical problem of self-creating by formulating a concept of hypocrisy. From a spectrum of analysis about the deceiting practices, it is built an initial scenario in the form of prolegomena, which outlines a distinction between hypocrisy and self-deception, under two biases: formal, with the distinction of perspectives between deceiving and being deceived, based on the recognition of the deceiving; and processual, where the hypocrisy, as an intentional incorporation of characters, stands of self-deceiving, as an unrecognized process of incorporating beliefs. The first chapter is dedicated to understanding how the practice of deceit and hypocrisy happen to become moral issues. Dating back the problem to the Greeks, beyond that condemnation, it is opened pathways to a reassessment of the forms of cunning intelligence named mêtis. The second chapter aims at drawing up a concept of hypocrisy as a meaning to the ethical-aesthetical problem of self-creation. The opposition between the ethical forms of: friendship and flattery, having in common the attention to kairós, the right time, is the motto to consider two forms of discourse: the rhetorical, ruled by mêtis, and the philosophical, guided by parrēsía; and to propose a kind of care of the self, distinct from that which is constituted by the parrēsiástic speech and poured into ḗthos by the áskēsis. That would be the self-creation by attempting to hazards and instincts, and it would have the work of incorporation and artistic handling due to the art of the actor as reference. Here emerges the concept of hypocrisy as the art of interpreting a knowledgement from dóxa by the mastery of kairós, and setting it by mímēsis in order to creat itself as author and piece of art of self. In the third chapter, in an interpretive approach, that concept is token as leitmotif for a linkage between three aspects of Nietzsches thought: i) the extramoral understanding about deceiving practices, having the will to appearing what underlies them; ii) the epistemic perspective of processes without subject, taking the concepts of mask and interpretation to consider hypocrisy as an artistic handling aiming at creating a hypocrite self; and iii) the ethical-aesthetical proposal of self-creating and establishment of a character, where the hypocrisy could be understood as an ethics-aesthetics of the free spirit, which by the incessant changing of roles, creates itself as a piece of art and becomes what he is.

Fundação Cearense de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Cientifico e Tecnológico / O objetivo desta tese é o de propor uma via de interpretação e significação possível ao problema ético-estético ou ético-poiētico da criação de si a partir da formulação de um conceito de hipocrisia. A partir de um espectro de análises acerca das práticas de engano, compõe-se um cenário inicial na forma de prolegômenos, nos quais se esboça uma distinção entre hipocrisia e autoengano, sob dois registros: formal, com a distinção de perspectivas entre enganar e ser enganado, com base no reconhecimento do engano; e processual, onde a hipocrisia, como incorporação intencional de personagens, distingue-se do autoengano como processo não reconhecido de incorporação de crenças. O primeiro capítulo dedica-se a compreender como as práticas de engano e a hipocrisia vêm a se tornar um problema moral. Remontando o problema aos gregos, abrem-se, para além dessa condenação, vias para uma reavaliação das formas de inteligência astuciosa nomeada por mêtis. No segundo capítulo, procura-se elaborar um conceito de hipocrisia como significação ao problema ético e estético da criação de si. A oposição entre as formas éticas da amizade e da lisonja, tendo em comum a atenção ao kairós, o tempo oportuno, é o mote para se pensar duas formas de discurso: o retórico, comandado pela mêtis, e o filosófico, pautado pela parrēsía; e para se propor uma forma de cuidado de si distinta da que é constituída pelo discurso parrēsiástico e vertida em ḗthos pela áskēsis. Tal seria a criação de si pela atenção aos acasos e instintos e teria como modelo o trabalho de incorporação e manejo artístico próprio à arte do ator. Daí emerge o conceito de hipocrisia como: arte de interpretar um saber da dóxa pela mestria do kairós, e de configurá-lo pela mímēsis de modo a criar a si como autor e obra de si mesmo. No terceiro capítulo, com enfoque interpretativo, toma-se esse conceito de hipocrisia como fio condutor para uma articulação entre três aspectos do pensamento de Nietzsche: i) a compreensão extramoral acerca das práticas de engano, tendo a vontade de aparência como aquilo que lhes subjaz; ii) a perspectiva epistêmica de processos sem sujeito, tendo as noções de máscara e interpretação como mote para se pensar a hipocrisia como um manuseio ou manejo artístico visando à criação de um eu hipócrita; e iii) a proposta ético-estética de criação de si e constituição de um caráter, onde a hipocrisia poderia ser compreendida como uma ética-estética do espírito livre, que pela incessante troca de papéis, cria a si como obra de arte e se torna o que é. / The aim of this thesis is to propose a way of interpreting and a possible meaning to the ethical-aesthetical or ethical- poiēthical problem of self-creating by formulating a concept of hypocrisy. From a spectrum of analysis about the deceiting practices, it is built an initial scenario in the form of prolegomena, which outlines a distinction between hypocrisy and self-deception, under two biases: formal, with the distinction of perspectives between deceiving and being deceived, based on the recognition of the deceiving; and processual, where the hypocrisy, as an intentional incorporation of characters, stands of self-deceiving, as an unrecognized process of incorporating beliefs. The first chapter is dedicated to understanding how the practice of deceit and hypocrisy happen to become moral issues. Dating back the problem to the Greeks, beyond that condemnation, it is opened pathways to a reassessment of the forms of cunning intelligence named mêtis. The second chapter aims at drawing up a concept of hypocrisy as a meaning to the ethical-aesthetical problem of self-creation. The opposition between the ethical forms of: friendship and flattery, having in common the attention to kairós, the right time, is the motto to consider two forms of discourse: the rhetorical, ruled by mêtis, and the philosophical, guided by parrēsía; and to propose a kind of care of the self, distinct from that which is constituted by the parrēsiástic speech and poured into ḗthos by the áskēsis. That would be the self-creation by attempting to hazards and instincts, and it would have the work of incorporation and artistic handling due to the art of the actor as reference. Here emerges the concept of hypocrisy as the art of interpreting a knowledgement from dóxa by the mastery of kairós, and setting it by mímēsis in order to creat itself as author and piece of art of self. In the third chapter, in an interpretive approach, that concept is token as leitmotif for a linkage between three aspects of Nietzsches thought: i) the extramoral understanding about deceiving practices, having the will to appearing what underlies them; ii) the epistemic perspective of processes without subject, taking the concepts of mask and interpretation to consider hypocrisy as an artistic handling aiming at creating a hypocrite self; and iii) the ethical-aesthetical proposal of self-creating and establishment of a character, where the hypocrisy could be understood as an ethics-aesthetics of the free spirit, which by the incessant changing of roles, creates itself as a piece of art and becomes what he is.

Traversant à eux trois l’ensemble du XXe siècle, Vladimir Nabokov, Romain Gary et Philip Roth sont issus de mondes géographiques, culturels et théoriques différents. Pourtant, leur œuvre et leur conception de la fiction présentent bien des affinités : une sensibilité cosmopolite, une réflexion sur l'écriture de la mémoire, un goût prononcé pour la mystification, un rapport au langage qui dote la lettre d’un puissant pouvoir d’incarnation. Ces écrivains confient à leurs personnages une réflexion sur l'exil et l’acculturation, sur l’impossible coïncidence de soi à soi liée au multilinguisme, au cosmopolitisme ou à la judéité. Refusant les étiquettes identitaires, ils sont animés par une même ambition : celle de se créer eux-mêmes, de repenser l'identité patrimoniale en lui substituant une identité réflexive et dynamique. Mettant en jeu différentes formes de transgressions (filiales, génériques, ontologiques), la fiction devient ce lieu où l'écrivain fait son autoportrait sériel et où le biographique est incessamment construit et déconstruit. Le personnage romanesque se décline en autant de variantes de soi, parfois polémiques, qui permettent de faire émerger une vérité sur soi. Mais cette vérité ne peut se dire qu'entre les lignes, entre les langues et dans une écriture polyphonique. La langue elle-même devient la cachette où l'écrivain tente de redonner la parole aux disparus. / Vladimir Nabokov, Romain Gary and Philip Roth are three 20th century writers who have different geographical, cultural and theoretical backgrounds. However, their works and their conceptions of fiction share many similarities: a cosmopolite sensibility, a reflection on writing memory, a strong interest in mystification, and a specific relation to language that endows words with a strong power of incarnation. These writers have their characters voice their reflection on exile and acculturation, as well as on the impossibility of self-coincidence, in relation to their multilingualism or Jewish identity. Nabokov, Gary and Roth distrust identity labels, and therefore share the same ambition : to create their own self, to rethink patrimonial identity by replacing it with a reflexive, dynamic one. Because fiction operates different forms of transgression (filial, generic, ontological), fiction becomes a place for the writer to create a serial self-portrait, where biography is constantly constructed and deconstructed. The multi-faceted self finds its incarnation in conversely multiple characters, some of them being sometimes polemical, and it enables the surfacing of a truth on oneself. This truth can only be found “between the lines”, in-between languages and in the polyphony of writing. Language itself becomes a hiding-place where the writer tries to retrieve the voices of the departed.

The aim of this thesis is to define the character of higher man, the conditions and the process of his development and also his relationship with the lower man and his significance in the whole of Nietzsche's philosophy. I present an interpretation which envisions the main character traits of the higher man in his strength, will, creativity, relation to suffering and need of overcoming resistance. The thesis presents the process of becoming a higher man (so called flourishing) as a process of self-creation in the sense of forming himself in harmony with his own substance and realization of his dormant potential. Manifestation of already flourished higher man consists of self-expression and a constant attempt to overcome oneself which allows the higher man to increase his will to power. The thesis interprets the importance of the higher man in Nietzsche's philosophy as a critical element of balance in society and the development of that society toward greatness. In the conclusion, the thesis sees Nietzsche's philosophy as primarily pro-human and striving for realization of its authenticity, where the higher man is the only authentic human. Keywords: higher man, greatness, lower man, flourishing, self-creation, morality

(EN) In the last of his finished works, Nietzsche presents a special sort of retrospect of his past and, at the same time, prospect of his future. The aim of the thesis is to examine the possibility that Nietzsche attempts to present some of the results of his preceeding inquires in practice and provides readers with a guideline for creation of practical philosophy in accord with their own constitution, being aware of external and internal dangers of the project. By means of an exemplary self-interpretation, Nietzsche demonstrates the process of human self-becoming.

Richard Rorty found Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of epistemology (perspectivism) to be a helpful tool in getting us to stop thinking of knowledge as something we find, and instead as something that we create. He also found perspectivism to be a helpful tool in that of the private sphere, of private self-creation. The Nietzsche that provides perspectivism is “The Good Nietzsche”. Rorty, however, conceived of Nietzsche’s ideas as being absolutely useless when it comes to politics, along with his ideas regarding morality, the Will to Power, and the Übermensch. These are the ideas of “The Bad Nietzsche”. Rorty’s actual usage of Nietzsche’s ideas, however, defies such easy, self-defined categorization, because these ideas extend outside of their spheres into the realm of politics in Rorty’s own writings. Most traditional analyses of the relationship between Nietzsche and Rorty as it regards politics tend to focus on Nietzsche. By focusing on Rorty’s appropriation of Nietzsche, through looking at his extensive writings and interviews, a more subtle, and complex relationship between Nietzsche’s various ideas and Rorty’s politics is seen to exist.

The narrative identity: Alexander Nehamas, Richard Rorty This work analyzes the problem of narrative identity developed in the works of Nehamas and Rorty. These two American philosophers work in the same – postnietzschean – paradigm. Both of them claim that the identity is not simply given to a person; rather, it is something one has to achieve if he/she wants to have one. A means both philosophers offer to such an achievement is to narrate a story about one’s person, one’s style of life and thus to create ones identity. Nehamas and Rorty assert that while creating identity one has to obey to some rules. However, the rules the philosophers announce are somewhat different. As to Nehamas, he claims that the project of the self-creation ought to be coherent and distinctive. These two criteria are to be achieved, otherwise the self-creation will fail. In addition, this project has to be accomplished in writing. Nehamas demonstrates how these criteria distinctiveness and coherence – are achieved in the writings of certain philosophers. These philosophers are Socrates, Plato, Montaigne, Nietzsche, Foucault and ultimately Nehamas himself. Nehamas suggests that all these philosophers belong to the tradition of the art of living and that all of them are primarily concerned with the projects of self-creation and self-perfection. As to Rorty, he asserts that the creator of oneself has to fulfil one major requirement. Like Nehamas, Rorty claims that the aim of self-creator, whom he... [to full text]

Richard Rorty found Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of epistemology (perspectivism) to be a helpful tool in getting us to stop thinking of knowledge as something we find, and instead as something that we create. He also found perspectivism to be a helpful tool in that of the private sphere, of private self-creation. The Nietzsche that provides perspectivism is “The Good Nietzsche”. Rorty, however, conceived of Nietzsche’s ideas as being absolutely useless when it comes to politics, along with his ideas regarding morality, the Will to Power, and the Übermensch. These are the ideas of “The Bad Nietzsche”. Rorty’s actual usage of Nietzsche’s ideas, however, defies such easy, self-defined categorization, because these ideas extend outside of their spheres into the realm of politics in Rorty’s own writings. Most traditional analyses of the relationship between Nietzsche and Rorty as it regards politics tend to focus on Nietzsche. By focusing on Rorty’s appropriation of Nietzsche, through looking at his extensive writings and interviews, a more subtle, and complex relationship between Nietzsche’s various ideas and Rorty’s politics is seen to exist.