No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

This dissertation presents the results of three experimental research studies investigating factors within the executive compensation process and the effects these factors have on the pay-for-performance paradigm. The first study examines the influence of individual anchoring and the effects of private versus public decisions upon compensation awards by subjects role-playing as either an outside CEO or a non-CEO director. Research results show that subjects anchor to personal pay levels, CEO subjects shield the focal CEO from declining compensation when performance is below average, and that this phenomenon is mitigated when the individual director-subject decision is deemed to be made public. The shielding of compensation is consistent with Social Comparison Theory in that the CEO-subjects identify to and protect the CEO by limiting negative compensation awards of the CEO, and thus, representing an agency cost. The second study examines affect as an influencing factor on individual decision makers in the compensation setting process. Results are consistent with Prospect Theory in that, in the absence of a tangible payoff, personal affect is the outcome monitored and used by individuals in the decision process in the determination of a gain or loss. Using personal pay and personal performance as anchors for subjects role-playing as directors on the compensation committee, results indicate that subjects make decisions to maximize (minimize) positive (negative) affect in compensation awards to the focal CEO. The findings suggest that although individual anchors may interact and add to the complexity of the decision process, the outcomes are consistent with Prospect Theory. The third study examines group decision making as compared to individual decisions when making compensation awards. Results show that in a committee of individuals where a majority of beliefs is present, group polarization occurs and the compensation results are exaggerated as compared to the individual beliefs. The findings also suggest, though, that the appointment of a leader as chair of the committee, either in the majority or minority view, has a moderating effect on the group outcome. These results highlight the potential for agency costs in the group decision process that may be found in the executive compensation-setting environment. Overall, these results add to the knowledge of factors affecting executive compensation. These studies provide evidence that individual anchors, individual performance, individual affect, and the group decision process may add to agency costs and be contributing factors in the imperfection of the pay-for-performance paradigm. / Ph. D.

This study utilized a nationwide survey of collegiate female athletic directors in the three NCAA divisions to ask about their perceptions about organizational barriers, pathways, and mentorship. The following research questions guided the thesis, with a feminist Standpoint Theory focus: (1) What are some of the organizational barriers that keep women from becoming ADs? (2)What are some of the pathways that women take to become an AD? (3)What are the roles of mentoring in advancing through collegiate athletic administration? The 93 respondents provided responses suggesting that women seeking leadership positions are still outsiders within athletic administrations. They still have to push through the glass ceiling and maneuver through the old boys' club in order to have success. Women are the outsiders within the athletic director role and are working together through mentoring to gain access to the position. / Master of Arts

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2004. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The main problem area this dissertation studied is whether there the appointment of independent directors to the board, is firstly an adequate way to ensure good corporate governance, and secondly, if it is not the case, what must companies do to amend the situation. As result of various factors, amongst them the spectacular corporate failures worldwide that demonstrated the flaws in the shareholder democratic model, shareholder activism and global competitiveness corporate governance has taken centre stage. Pivotal to good corporate governance is the board of the company, as postulated not only by the majority of corporate governance models, but also by all the corporate governance codes. Furthermore, the perception of shareholders that independent directors are the most effective way to ensure that shareholder interests are protected has also been entrenched in the directives of corporate governance codes, with the inclusion of the South African King Code. As a result of the foregoing the role of independent directors has come under the spotlight, especially their failure to act in some of the instances of governance abuse by management. In this regard strong responses and possible prosecution has now alerted non-executive directors to the fact that there is no difference in liability between them and the executive brothers. Non-executive directors or independent directors have primarily two functions, they must monitor the performance of management and provide strategic input. As a result of the aforesaid corporate collapses non-executive directors are of the opinion that their monitoring role is being emphasis at the cost of their strategic role, which might be to the detriment of the company. Independent directors as the solution to all governance problems are however not flawless. Independence interpreted restricts access to possible suitable candidates. Furthermore, ineffective selection processes curtail the optimal functioning of boards, manipulation of information by management, lack of director training, and the increasing cost attendant to ensure adequate independent representation on the board. There are also "soft issues" that are even mere pervasive and destructive, the boardroom atmosphere that precludes open and honest discussion, the powerful chief executive and the failure of some directors to distinguish between managing and directing. In view of the problems highlighted above, this study project proposes that there has, firstly been an over-emphasis of the role that the independent director can play in ensuring good corporate governance at the cost of other measures that can be implemented. A more optimal situation can be created through a combination of a strong independent presence coupled with ongoing training and evaluation of boards and directors. There are two prerequisites for such training and evaluation to be successful. Firstly, the process must be actively driven by the chairman of the board and, secondly, directors must be made aware of the fact that shareholders have become more demanding and critical of their performance. Unless they are perceived to add value to the company they may find that they are without a job. In today's demanding environment companies and boards that do not actively encourage a learning culture will not survive. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die kern-probleemgebied wat in die verhandeling bestudeer is is tweeledig, eerstens, of die aanstelling van onafhanklike direkteure op die direksie voldoende is om goeie korporatiewe bestuur te verseker, en tweedens, indien dit nie die geval is nie, wat maatskappye te doen staan om die situasie reg te stel. As gevolg van verskeie faklore, onder andere die skouspelagtige korporatiewe mislukkings wereldwyd, wat die gebreke in die aandeelhouer demokratiese model aan die kaak gestel het, aandeelhouer aktivisme en globale mededinging, het korporatiewe bestuur 'n sentrale rol aangeneem. Die kern tot goeie korporatiewe bestuur is die direksie van die maatskappy, soos daargestel deur beide die meerderheid van koperatiewe bestuursmodelle en al die kodes ten opsigte van korporatiewe bestuur. Voorts, word die aanname van aandeelhouers dat onafhanklike direkteure die mees doeltreffendste wyse is om hulle belange te beskerm, verder ingeburger in die voorskrifte van korporatiewe bestuurskodes, wat die Suid-Afrikaanse King Kode 2 insluit. As gevolg van voormelde het die rol van onafhanklike direkteure in die spervuur beland, veral as gevolg van hulle versuim om op te tree in sommige gevalle van korporatiewe vergrepe deur die bestuur van die maatskappy. In die verband, het die sterk reaksie en die sprake van vervolging, 'n waarskuwing aan nie-uitvoerende direkteure gerig dat hulle net so aanspreeklik gehou kan word as hulle uitvoerende broers. Nie-uitvoerende direkteure or onafhanklike direkteure het primer twee funksies, hulle moet die prestasie van die bestuur monitor and hulle moet strategiese insette lewer. As gevolg van gesegde korporatiewe mislukkings is nie-uitvoerende direkteure nou van mening dat hulle moniteringsrol beklemtoon word ten koste van hulle strategiese rol, wat tot die nadeel van die maatskappy mag strek. Onafhanklike direkteure as die oplossing tot alle bestuursprobleme is egter nie volmaak nie. 'n Streng interpretasie van onafhanklikheid beperk die keuse van moontlike geskikte kandidate. Voorts word die optimale funktionering van direksies ingeperk deur ondoeltreffende keuringsprosesse, die manipulering van inligting deur die bestuur, gebrek aan direkteursopleiding and die stygende koste verbonde aan 'n voldoende onafhanklike teenwoordigheid op die direksie. Daar is ook "sagte" aspekte wat selfs meer vernietigend inwerk, naamlik die atmosfeer wat heers in die direksiesaal, die magtige hoof uitvoerende direkteur en die gebrek aan insig by direkteure rakende die verskil tussen die pligte van 'n direkteur en 'n bestuurder. Gegewe die voorafgaande probleme, is die verhandeling van mening dat die rol wat die onafhanklike direkteur kan speel om goeie korporatiewe bestuur te verseker oorbeklemtoon word. Hierdie klem is ten koste van ander maatreels, wat ingestel kan word. 'n Meer optimale klimaat kan geskep word deur 'n kombinasie van 'n sterk onafhanklike teenwoordigheid op die direksie, gekoppel aan deurlopende opleiding en evaluering van direksies en direkteure. Ten einde te verseker dat sodanige opleiding en evaluasie suksesvol is, is daar twee voorvereistes. Eerstens, moet die proses aktief deur die voorsitter bestuur word, en tweedens, moet 'n bewustheid by direkteure gekweek word aangaande die verwagtinge van aandeelhouers, wat meer veeleisend en krities staan teenoor hulle prestasie. Tensy hulle geag word waarde toe te voeg, mag direkteure hulle sonder 'n werk bevind. In vandag se veeleisende omgewing kan maatskappye en direksies, wat nie 'n leerkultuur aanmoedig nie, nie verwag om te oorleef nie.

Thesis (MBA)--Stellenbosch University, 2004. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Corporate governance has become the latest business "buzz-word" during the last number of years. It is almost being used as an excuse for too many things that go wrong with, or within, companies. However, the word is not going to disappear from business lexicon, it has come to stay. Too many companies and investors have suffered due to the greed of individuals, appointed to lead and manage the business that have misused their position of trust and enriched themselves in many ways. This could have been brought about by many reasons: • Directors who have not been trained properly for their fiduciary duties and other duties and responsibilities. • Directors who have not been evaluated on their performance as a board or individually. • No formal governance structures within the organisation. • No culture of accountability within the organisation. • Simple greed. This study concentrates on some of the literature, ranging from the Cadbury report released in 1992, the OECD principles and international trends, to the South African King II Report, released in 2002. From the literature, and the recommendations from it, there can be no doubt that the pressure to improve governance structures will become fiercer around the globe. Investors are taking it seriously and are willing to pay a premium for shares in a properly governed enterprise. Directors will have to sharpen their skills in being the primary instrument in preventing further corporate scandals. The importance of their accountability towards the company will be measured when board evaluation no longer is an exception, but the rule, in creating effective boards. Agricol Beherend Limited should be no exception. Although not required to formally comply with the recommendations of the King II Code, it can only be advantageous in striving to long-term sustainability. It is further concluded that entrepreneurship is at the heart of capitalistic society, the sphere in which businesses operate in creating wealth for their investors. This is where the influence and leadership abilities of non-executives play a vital role in creating the environment and culture for enterprises to flourish in. They have to determine the equilibrium between conformance and performance in keeping the entrepreneurial spirit alive, yet complying with best practice principles of corporate governance. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Korporatiewe bestuur, of beheer, het oor die laaste aantal jare die nuutste gebruikswoorde in die besigheidsomgewing geword. Dit word feitlik as verskoning gebruik vir alles wat met, of binne-in, organisasies verkeerd loop. Desnieteenstaande, die woorde gaan nie van die algemene besigheidsspreektaal verdwyn nie, dit het gekom om te bly. Te veel maatskappye en beleggers het gely onder die hebsug van individue wat aangestel is om maatskappye te lei en te bestuur, maar wat hulle vertrouensposisie misbruik het om hulself op verskeie maniere te verryk. Dit kon deur 'n verskeidenheid van redes teweeggebring gewees het: • Direkteure wat nie behoorlik opgelei is in hulle fudisiëre pligte, asook ander pligte en verantwoordelikhede nie. • Direkteure wat nie behoorlik geëvalueer is op hulle prestasie as 'n raad of op individuele basis nie. • Geen behoorlike formele korporatiewe bestuursstrukture binne die maatskappy nie. • Geen kultuur van verantwoording binne die maatskappy nie. • Eenvoudige hebsug. Die studie konsentreer op sekere gedeeltes van die literatuur wat strek van die Cadbury verslag wat in1992 vrygestel is, die OECD beginsels en internasionale tendense, tot by die Suid-Afrikaanse King II verslag wat in 2002 verskyn het. Uit die literatuur, en die aanbevelings daarin vervat, kan daar geen twyfel wees dat die druk om korporatiewe beheerstrukture te verbeter in die toekoms, wêreldwyd, slegs groter sal word nie. Beleggers is besig om ernstig daarna op te let en is selfs bereid om 'n premie te betaal vir aandele in 'n organisasie wat behoorlike korporatiewe bestuur toepas. Direkteure sal hulle vaardighede moet opknap, aangesien hulle die primêre instrument is om verdere korporatiewe skandale te voorkom. Die belangrikheid van hulle verantwoording teenoor die maatskappy sal gemeet word wanneer die evaluering van direksies nie meer die uitsondering is nie, maar die reël, in die samestelling van effektiewe direksies. Agricol Beherend Beperk behoort geen uitsondering te wees nie. Alhoewel dit nie verlang word om formeel aan die aanbevelings van die King II Kode te voldoen nie, kan dit slegs tot voordeel wees in die strewe na langtermyn volhoubaarheid. Die verdere gevolgtrekking is dat entrepreneurskap die kern vorm van 'n kapitalistiese bestel, die ruimte waarin besighede opereer om welvaart vir beleggers te skep. Dit is waar die invloed en leierskapsvaardighede van nie-uitvoerende direkteure 'n belangrike rol speel in die skepping van 'n omgewing en kultuur waarbinne besighede kan floreer. Hulle moet die ekwilibrium bepaal tussen voldoening en prestasie, deur 'n gees van entrepreneurskap, terwyl daar voldoen word aan beste korporatiewe bestuursbeginsels.

published_or_final_version / Comparative Literature / Master / Master of Philosophy

O objetivo principal da pesquisa foi investigar quais fatores motivaram empresas brasileiras de capital aberto a adotarem o Comitê de Auditoria como parte integrante de sua estrutura de Governança Corporativa. Como complemento, investigou-se a associação entre características das companhias, como Liquidez, Porte e Emissão de ADR\'s, e a adoção ou não de comitês de auditoria. Para tanto, foi selecionada uma amostra de 100 companhias, extraídas de um universo de 420, com maior volume de negócios entre abril de 2009 e março de 2010. Para esse grupo, foi submetido um questionário a fim de coletar informações referentes à estrutura geral dos comitês de auditoria, bem como informações sobre os motivos que as levaram a implantar o referido comitê. O índice de respondentes foi de 32%. Para analisar os dados dos questionários, a pesquisa foi dividida em duas partes inter-relacionadas. Na primeira, buscou-se interpretar os resultados provenientes do questionário utilizando-se de técnicas estatísticas simples, com o intuito de descrever os resultados. Na segunda, estudou-se as associações entre características das companhias e a opção de elas adotarem ou não o comitê de auditoria em suas estruturas de governança corporativa. A Análise de Correspondência (ANACOR) foi empregada nessa parte. Em relação à primeira parte, pelas respostas das próprias companhias, os principais determinantes para a adoção do comitê de auditoria foram: i) apoiar as atividades do Conselho de Administração; ii) atender à legislação norte-americana - SOX; iii) atender à Resolução do Conselho Monetário Nacional / Banco Central do Brasil; e iv) incrementar o sistema e as práticas de governança corporativa. Em relação aos resultados da segunda parte, de forma geral, os resultados sugerem que empresas com alta liquidez estão fortemente associadas com a adoção de comitês de auditoria e empresas com baixa liquidez estão associadas à ausência de comitês em sua estrutura de governança. Outro resultado obtido foi com relação ao porte das companhias. Pela ANACOR, foi possível verificar a associação de comitês de auditoria e outros comitês do conselho a empresas de médio e grande porte, com uma maior aproximação entre empresas de médio porte. Por fim, observou-se que empresas que emitem ADR\'s cujos níveis de exigências são mais baixos (ADR\'s Nível 1 e Regra 144-A) estão associadas com a ausência de comitês, enquanto que as empresas que emitem ADR\'s Nível 2 e 3, estão associadas com a adoção de comitês em suas estruturas de governança corporativas, mas não necessariamente o comitê de auditoria. Esse resultado pode ser explicado pela flexibilidade existente na legislação norte-americana que possibilita às empresas optarem pela adaptação do Conselho Fiscal às normas da Securities and Exchange Commission. Todavia, é necessário salientar as limitações inerentes à pesquisa. A primeira importante limitação é com relação à amostra, tendo em vista que as companhias não foram selecionadas aleatoriamente, e sim pelo volume de transações. Logo, há um viés de seleção na amostra, cujo resultado direto é a impossibilidade de generalização dos resultados. Em seguida, cabe salientar que as definições apresentadas na pesquisa também podem ser criticadas, tendo em vista que o conceito de governança corporativa está limitado às características do comitê de auditoria. As técnicas estatísticas também podem ser criticadas, pois as análises descritivas e ANACOR não permitem afirmar haver causalidade entre as variáveis estudadas. / The main objective of this research was to investigate which factors motivated Brazilian public companies to adopt the Audit Committee as part of its Corporate Governance organizational structure. Additionally, it was investigated the association between characteristics of companies, such as Liquidness, Size and Issuance of ADRs, and the adoption or lack of audit committees. For this purpose, a sample of 100 companies were selected, drawn from a universe of 420, with higher trade volume between April 2009 and March 2010. For this group, a questionnaire was sent to collect information regarding the overall structure of audit committees, as well data related with the reasons which led them to establish such a committee. The rate of respondents was 32%. To analyze the data, the research was divided into two interrelated parts. In the first session, the results were analyzed based on simple statistical techniques, in order to describe the results. In the second session, the results were analyzed based on associations between the companies\'characteristics as well as the option to adopt them with regards the Audit Committee in their corporate governance organizational structures. The Correspondence Analysis (ANACOR) was used in this session. Based on the survey results of the first session, the main determinants for the adoption of the Audit Committee are: i) to support the Board of Directors activities; ii) to comply with USA SOX law; iii) to comply with the Resolution established by National Monetary Council / Central Bank of Brazil; and iv) to enhance the best practices of Corporate Governance. Moreover, the results of the second session, in general suggested that the companies of high liquidness are strongly associated with Audit Committees adoption while the companies of low liquidness are associated with the absence of committees in its organizational structure. Another result was related to the size of the companies. As per ANACOR, it was possible to verify the association between the Audit Committees and other board of directors committees with companies from middle to large size with slightly trend to middle size companies. Finally, it was observed that companies with ADR\'s launch which requirement levels is low (ADR\'s level 1 and Rule 144-A) are associated with the absence of Audit Committees while the companies with ADR\'s launch with high requirement level (ADR\'s level 2 and 3) are associated with the adoption of its committees on corporate governance structures, but not necessarily the audit committee. This result can be explained for the flexibility of U.S. law that allows the companies to opt for the adaptation of Fiscal Council to the rules of Securities and Exchange Commission. Notwithstanding is necessary to highlight the limitation inherent in this research. The first important limitation is related to the sample used, considering that the companies were not selected randomly, but by the volume of transactions. So there is a selection bias, whose offer the impossibility of generalizing results. Furthermore, it is important to highlight that the presented definitions in the survey could be criticized considering that the Corporate Governance concept is limited by characteristics of the Audit Committees. The statistics techniques could also be criticized once the descriptive analysis and ANACOR couldn\'t guarantee the causality between the study variables.

Agency theory proposes that the role of the board of directors is to control management (Fama & Jensen 1983). A structurally independent board, one with a high percentage of non-executive directors and a chairperson who is not the CEO, has been used as a proxy for the control role. Therefore, agency theory predicts a positive relationship between independent board structure and firm performance. These predictions have not been confirmed by meta-analytic reviews (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson 1998; Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy 2000). This thesis applies structural contingency theory to provide an alternative explanation for the relationship between board structure and firm performance. Structural contingency theory (Donaldson 2001) proposes that the relationship between an organization???s structure and its performance is moderated by contingencies. In this study the contingency is the salience of the board???s control role. I argue that structural independence of the board has a beneficial effect on performance only if it is in fit with control salience. For example, a firm with an independently structured board that gives high prominence to the control role will perform well. On the other hand, another firm with a less independently structured board that does not see its main role as controlling management will also prosper. Survey data were analyzed to measure the control salience for 98 Australian listed companies. Archival data provided measures of board structure and firm performance. Consistent with the meta-analytic reviews, there was no association between independent board structure and firm performance. There was some evidence that high control salience resulted in high performance, but this effect was evident chiefly when performance was measured by total shareholder returns. This may indicate that the share market was responding to the symbolism of high control salience. In contrast to the symbolic main effect of control salience, the fit between the control salience and the independent structure of the board caused increased return on equity. This reflects the board???s objective effect on profit when its structure is in fit with control salience.