Teachers are considered professional voice users because they depend on the regular and uninterrupted use of the voice. The nature of teaching requires more extensive use of the voice than other professions. Therefore, teachers are faced with a greater risk of developing voice problems. In addition to using the voice to present content to students, teachers must also manage the classroom and student behavior. All of these activities have potential to compromise vocal integrity. The purpose of this study was to examine the vocal health of selected middle school and high school choral directors. Specifically, it explored relationships between vocal health condition as determined by the modified Voice Handicap Index (VHI) and self-report vocal health rating and (a) age, (b) gender, (c) years of teaching, (d) level of teaching, (e) vocal health education, and (f) fundamental frequency and intensity ranges of the voice as indicated by the voice range profile (VRP). This study also sought to determine the relationship between VRP, and age, gender, years of teaching, and level of teaching. Results indicate choral directors' vocal intensity range is significantly smaller than the trained and untrained populations, choral directors' minimum vocal intensity is significantly higher than the trained and untrained populations, and choral directors are able to produce significantly fewer semitones resulting in a smaller vocal frequency range than trained and untrained populations.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2003. / Supervisor: David Bordwell. Includes bibliographical references.

This study examines the significance of corporate governance mechanisms during the corporate governance reform using a sample of 117 non-financial Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the period 1989 to 2001. Japans prolonged recession brought about numerous reforms in post-bubble Japan. Although it is plausible to infer that the corporate governance system in Japan may have been a factor that led to the sustained recession in Japan, it is vague as to how deep and thorough the changes to Japanese corporate governance have been. The inference is that adverse impact of corporate governance may have been one of the factors that led to the sustained recession in Japan. Numerous proposals have been offered and some implemented in an attempt to fix problems exposed during the recession period in the 1990s. Remedies include instituting reforms to corporate governance by establishing new standards, punishing malpractice, and changing corporate board structures. Many Japanese firms look abroad for alternate governance mechanisms to integrate into their own system of control. As such, most reforms propose changes, for the most part, reflecting the American-style of corporate governance: alignment in incentives between top management and shareholders, board size reductions, and greater board independence to promote better monitoring and firmer discipline The significance of proposed changes to traditional Japanese corporate governance is examined in this study. Using a different econometric approach from that of previous studies, the relationship between board composition and firm performance is examined with a simultaneous framework of equations. The purpose of this empirical framework is to tackle potential endogeneity problems between board composition, governance and performance variables. Results show that: (1) there exists a significantly negative relationship between turnover of members of the board of directors and firm performance; (2) board size reduction is significant, but there is no evidence of consistent relationship between outside directorship and firm performance. (3) While keiretsu membership is generally relevant in linking board turnover and performance in Japan, board turnover is sensitive to performance in firms where ownership is concentrated than where ownership is dispersed. (4) President turnover, whether routine or non-routine, is unrelated to performance. Overall, results support that the entire board assumes responsibility for the firms performance and the 2SLS model is an effective estimator for estimating the relationship between board composition and firm performance.

This study examines the significance of corporate governance mechanisms during the corporate governance reform using a sample of 117 non-financial Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the period 1989 to 2001. Japans prolonged recession brought about numerous reforms in post-bubble Japan. Although it is plausible to infer that the corporate governance system in Japan may have been a factor that led to the sustained recession in Japan, it is vague as to how deep and thorough the changes to Japanese corporate governance have been. The inference is that adverse impact of corporate governance may have been one of the factors that led to the sustained recession in Japan. Numerous proposals have been offered and some implemented in an attempt to fix problems exposed during the recession period in the 1990s. Remedies include instituting reforms to corporate governance by establishing new standards, punishing malpractice, and changing corporate board structures. Many Japanese firms look abroad for alternate governance mechanisms to integrate into their own system of control. As such, most reforms propose changes, for the most part, reflecting the American-style of corporate governance: alignment in incentives between top management and shareholders, board size reductions, and greater board independence to promote better monitoring and firmer discipline. <p>The significance of proposed changes to traditional Japanese corporate governance is examined in this study. Using a different econometric approach from that of previous studies, the relationship between board composition and firm performance is examined with a simultaneous framework of equations. The purpose of this empirical framework is to tackle potential endogeneity problems between board composition, governance and performance variables. Results show that: (1) there exists a significantly negative relationship between turnover of members of the board of directors and firm performance; (2) board size reduction is significant, but there is no evidence of consistent relationship between outside directorship and firm performance. (3) While keiretsu membership is generally relevant in linking board turnover and performance in Japan, board turnover is sensitive to performance in firms where ownership is concentrated than where ownership is dispersed. (4) President turnover, whether routine or non-routine, is unrelated to performance. Overall, results support that the entire board assumes responsibility for the firms performance and the 2SLS model is an effective estimator for estimating the relationship between board composition and firm performance.

This paper argues that “enlightened shareholder value” (“ESV”) offers a “third way” between the shareholder primacy and stakeholder theories of the corporation; one that maintains the creation of shareholder value as the corporation’s primary function, but requires directors to take into account the environmental impact of the corporations’ operations. ESV requires directors to “have regard to”, among other things, “the impact of the company’s operations on…the environment.” The obligation to “have regard to” should be interpreted as a procedural duty requiring directors to inform themselves as to the environmental impact of the corporation’s operations, which may in itself cause directors to reallocate corporate resources to environmental protection. ESV may also improve corporations’ environmental disclosure and impact social norms of corporate behaviour with respect to the environment. Any negative impact of ESV on present shareholder returns is justified by the obligation to avoid imposing foreseeable severe or irreparable environmental harm on future generations.

This paper argues that “enlightened shareholder value” (“ESV”) offers a “third way” between the shareholder primacy and stakeholder theories of the corporation; one that maintains the creation of shareholder value as the corporation’s primary function, but requires directors to take into account the environmental impact of the corporations’ operations. ESV requires directors to “have regard to”, among other things, “the impact of the company’s operations on…the environment.” The obligation to “have regard to” should be interpreted as a procedural duty requiring directors to inform themselves as to the environmental impact of the corporation’s operations, which may in itself cause directors to reallocate corporate resources to environmental protection. ESV may also improve corporations’ environmental disclosure and impact social norms of corporate behaviour with respect to the environment. Any negative impact of ESV on present shareholder returns is justified by the obligation to avoid imposing foreseeable severe or irreparable environmental harm on future generations.

The purpose of the study was to identify and describe the nature of change, relative to the roles and responsibilities of personnel administrators in selected Indiana public school corporations, resulting from mandated teacher collective bargaining.Personnel administrators with seven or more years of experience were selected to insure that participants in the study had had experience both before and after the enactment of Public Law 217. In-depth taped interviews were conducted with nine personnel directors.The responses of personnel directors participating in the study were compared, correlated and contrasted with statements made by authorities in the field relative to private and public sector personnel administrators. Major findings were:Additional Time Requirements1. Personnel directors are devoting additional time to record keeping activities, such as:a.Formulating reduction in force lists and call back lists.b. Reviewing and revising student enrollment by building and class as necessary.c. Developing expanded salary schedules which reflect broader range of teacher educational preparation.d. Maintaining information relative to the number of graduate hours taken and advanced degrees earned by teachers.e.Maintaining information relative to teacher fringe benefits.f.Maintaining information relative to compensation for extracurricular responsibilities.g.Maintaining information relative to number and type of leave days taken by teachers.h.Maintaining teacher requests for transfers.i.Maintaining detailed information relative to teachers holding temporary contracts.j.Maintaining information relative to teacher seniority by school system and building.2. Personnel directors are devoting additional time to activities required for the collective bargaining process, such as:a. Collecting and organizing financial and personnel information.b. Providing and explaining financial and personnel information to the chief spokesman.c. Preparing salary schedules to determine cost of various teacher group and board proposals.d. Compiling and analyzing statistics relative to the number of various teacher leave days taken and days on which leaves occurred.e. Developing expanded salary schedules which reflect broader range of teacher educational preparation as required by the agreement.3. Personnel directors are devoting additional time to consultation, such as:a. Providing guidance to building administrators relative to teacher evaluations.b. Advising building administrators regarding granting of teacher leave days.c. Discussing the status of negotiations with building administrators, superintendent and board members.d. Providing guidance to building administrators relative to contract implementation.4. Personnel directors are devoting additional time to grievance activities, such as:a. Reviewing teacher evaluations to prepare for grievance hearings.b. Meeting with union officials to hear grievances.Preparing for grievances and arbitration hearings.5. Personnel directors are devoting additional time to inservice training activities, such as:a. Explaining evaluation procedures and instruments to building administrators.b. Explaining the intent of contract language to building administrators to insure uniform contract implementation.6. Personnel directors are devoting additional time to cooperative activities with union officials, such as:a. Providing personnel and financial information relative to teacher seniority, salaries, and fringe benefits.b. Developing and revising teacher evaluation instruments.c. Hearing grievances and jointly determining equitable settlements.7. Personnel directors are devoting additional time to other activities, such as:a. Considering leave requests of teachers.b. Planning for staffing needs and teacher vacancies.Changed Organizational Relationships1. The majority of personnel directors have been placed in the grievance structure and now represent the superintendent, usually at the second or third step of the grievance procedure. Therefore, personnel directors now have more line authority to make binding decisions regarding grievances.2. Because personnel directors now have line authority in the grievance structure, personnel directors may support or reverse the decisions of building administrators regarding grievances. Therefore, building administrators are now consulting more with the personnel director relative to the handling of employee grievances at the initial step of the grievance structure.3. Building administrators are now seeking advice and approval of personnel directors regarding teacher evaluations and granting of leaves.4. The majority of personnel directors participate in the negotiation process either as chief spokesman or members of the negotiating team. As the administrative representative in the collective bargaining process, personnel directors are now the main communication link between the teacher union, superintendent and board of education.5. As the administrative representative in the collective bargaining process, personnel directors have been given the additional responsibility of insuring that principals understand the intent of contract language and implement the contract accordingly.Direct Participation in the Negotiations Process1. The majority of personnel directors participate in the negotiation process either as chief spokesman or members of the negotiating team.a. As chief spokesmen, new roles and responsibilities of the personnel director include:(1) Consultation with the superintendent relative to the selection of negotiating team members.(2) Consultation with the superintendent and other administrative personnel concerning the collecting, organizing and writing of board proposals for negotiations.(3) Consultation with the superintendent and other administrative personnel relative to the development of a negotiation strategy.(4) The presentation of school board proposals.(5) Receiving teacher union proposals during negotiations.(6) Communications between the teacher union, superintendent and school board.(7) Consultation with the superintendent and board members concerning the development of school board counterproposals.(8) The equitable and expeditious conclusion of negotiations.b. As members of the negotiating team, new roles and responsibilities of the personnel directors included:(1) Providing relevant and necessary personnel and financial information to the chief spokesman.(2) Explaining and describing pertinent conditions surrounding negotiations, personalities of the individuals involved in negotiations, and attitudes within the community.

A number of practitioner surveys across a range of industries have cited the lack of senior female role models as a barrier to career progression. There is very little academic literature to explain this at a senior organizational level. An initial review of the extant role model literature led to the inclusion of two further related areas – organizational demographics, as a contextual factor affecting the availability of role models, and work identity development as a link between the lack of senior female role models and the lack of career progression. In seeking to answer the question of why and then how female role models are important for senior women, this study fills an identified gap in the comprehension of the concept of role models and their importance in the workplace. It addresses a need to understand both the key elements of the concept and the mechanism by which they come into play. The research uses qualitative methods, specifically in-depth semi-structured interviews. These were conducted with a senior group of 33 female directors from six global investment banks, in order to elicit their experiences of role models in demographically imbalanced work contexts. Analysis of interview data considered all three areas of role models, demographic context and work identity development. As the women forged their identities in the male-dominated context of global investment banks, what became clear was that who they are and have become was informed by the critical relationships they have had. Whilst clearly some of the women had found male role models with whom to develop these critical relationships, there were some identity issues, particular salient to women, which could not be addressed by men. Thus the findings demonstrated the utility of female role models. This thesis has a number of contributions to make on varying levels: On a conceptual level, this study adds to our understanding of the value of role models, particularly detailing the affective or symbolic value. It has added to the conceptualization of role models, detailing what were the core attributes of individuals chosen to be role models, who they were in relation to the women, how the women used them and why they were important. It has combined the three literature areas of role models, organizational demographics and work identity development in a way not previously done, and has shown empirically that they are related and explain each other. Organizational demographics affect the availability of role models. And it is suggested that the relatively new theory of relational identification is the mechanism that explicates how the presence of positive female role models is a key influence on women’s work identity development. It has clarified the value of role models in extreme gender demographic contexts, and how and why they are important to senior women’s professional development, thereby adding to the theory of role modelling. Practically, the study explains why women in surveys may have been citing the lack of female role models as such a prominent issue, and suggests what some of the issues are that organizations should pay heed to in trying to address this.

Board involvement in Information Technology (IT) governance and the antecedents and consequences of such involvement are examined from both a theoretical and practical perspective. Practitioner and academic IT governance literature highlight the need for increased board involvement in IT governance; however, it seems that many corporate boards do not practice a formalized style of IT governance, while those that do, face significant challenges. A gap clearly is seen as in spite of the potential benefits of board IT governance and the costs of ineffective oversight, there has been little field-based research in this area, nor adequate application of theory. This research addresses this gap by developing and testing an exploratory multi-theoretic framework of board IT governance. Drawing upon strategic choice and institutional theories, and Ashby’s Law of Requisite Variety, a model of the antecedents (organization factors and board attributes) of board IT governance and its consequences (financial performance and operational performance) is both developed and tested. Unlike previous studies, board IT governance is designated as a central construct in this model rather than a secondary factor. Constructs of board IT governance and IT competency are explored and multi-item measures for both constructs are developed. Board IT governance is conceptualized as the extent of offensive and defensive board oversight activities, while IT competency is conceptualized as the extent of IT expertise (IT knowledge, experience and training) and IT governance mechanisms (structures, processes and relational mechanisms). Detailed interviews with board members enabled a preliminary examination of the theoretical framework. To further test the propositions in the theoretical framework and to validate the measures for the board IT governance and IT competency constructs, an online survey was administered to corporate directors across Canada. Exploratory Factor Analysis and Ordinary Least Squares multiple regression were used to analyze responses from 188 directors. The board IT governance and IT competency constructs were well supported by the data. In addition, the results show that the organizational factors explain 28% of the variance in board IT governance, and that board attributes explain 39% more of the variance, for a total explained variance in board IT governance of approximately 68%. The results also show that board IT governance has a positive impact on operational performance, explaining 19% of the variance in operational performance. However, the proposed impact of board IT governance on financial performance, and the impacts of ‘fit’ between role of IT and board IT governance approach on financial and operational performance were not supported by the survey results. Overall, this research makes a theoretical contribution by: focusing on the board’s role in IT governance; developing a multi-theoretical model of the antecedents and consequences of board IT governance; developing measures of board IT governance and board IT competency, and; empirically assessing the antecedents and consequences of board IT governance.

In the evolving global economy, boardroom governance has forged an increasing influence on what transpires in corporations today. Within the boardroom, expectations of board directors and executive management (key actors) have shifted dramatically due to the financial failures (i.e., Enron and WorldCom, etc.) and the ensuing global financial crisis in the 2000s. The belief is that these directors and managers contributed greatly to these crises (Boerner, 2011). Consequently, there is a growing appeal to study boardroom governance and the roles of board directors and executive managers, not from a structural description, but rather from a behavioral perspective. In the literature, corporate governance structural framework is well informed while the behavioral framework is lacking. Often referred to as a black box, board behavior is not well understood because board processes are not easily observed nor are researchers readily invited to do so (Barratt & Korac-Kakabadse, 2002). There is therefore a clear call for studies to examine the black box of boardroom governance (Erakovic & Overall, 2010; Lockhart, 2010; Huse et al, 2011). Recognizing this demand, an examination of the beliefs and values of the board directors and executive managers in their boardroom culture, was undertaken as the starting point to open the black box of boardroom governance.