The aftermath of Italy's cinematic movement neorealism left several directors searching for a new cinematic practice and a new directorial identity. Many of the most artistically intrepid directors of the era turned to women as a means of professional and personal reinvention. This study analyzes the collaborations of Vittorio De Sica, Roberto Rossellini, Federico Fellini, and Michelangelo Antonioni with the actresses Sophia Loren, Ingrid Bergman, Giulietta Masina, and Monica Vitti, respectively. / Romance Languages and Literatures

CEO duality has been the subject of debate for over twenty years and shows no signs of abating. With conflicting theoretical and empirical evidence underpinning the debate the practice has fluctuated, investor perception of board leadership structure has altered, international regulation has reacted, scholarly conceptualizations of duality have become overly complex, and the need to understand duality and conclude the debate has increased. This thesis explores duality in listed corporations and aims to form an appropriate solution to end the dichotomy. My solution requires one to confront misunderstandings which have led to a traditional insistence towards structural reform and prolonged the contentious debate, and recognize an underlying contention which needs to be resolved to bring finality to the debate. I argue finality is possible if a process oriented approach is adopted and corporations recognize the need to be technically equipped to deal with leadership structures in the modern corporate arena.

CEO duality has been the subject of debate for over twenty years and shows no signs of abating. With conflicting theoretical and empirical evidence underpinning the debate the practice has fluctuated, investor perception of board leadership structure has altered, international regulation has reacted, scholarly conceptualizations of duality have become overly complex, and the need to understand duality and conclude the debate has increased. This thesis explores duality in listed corporations and aims to form an appropriate solution to end the dichotomy. My solution requires one to confront misunderstandings which have led to a traditional insistence towards structural reform and prolonged the contentious debate, and recognize an underlying contention which needs to be resolved to bring finality to the debate. I argue finality is possible if a process oriented approach is adopted and corporations recognize the need to be technically equipped to deal with leadership structures in the modern corporate arena.

An analysis of company law may allow us to abandon a perception that company law is impartial to the political context in which it is applied. This paper argues that state protectionism is reflected in the design of company law. Specifically, states may confer public functions to board of directors through their duties and authorities; in turn, directors’ functions may become barriers to foreign investments. To illustrate this argument, focus is placed on the duties of Canadian corporate directors and how their functions affect foreign direct investment in Canada. It demonstrates that the public function conferred to corporate directors echoes the State’s policy and regulations governing foreign investment. As a consequence to the redundancy of the public interest rationalization and the lack of political will to affect real market openness, unnecessary barriers are being placed for market access which may ultimately render Canada less attractive for foreign investors.

Il se pose présentement un problème de compréhension du concept de malhonnêteté en matière de fraude. Pour fms de rappel, la fraude peut être commise par mensonge, par supercherie ou par tout autre moyen dolosif. Cette dernière notion, selon l'état actuel de la jurisprudence sera évaluée selon un critère objectif. C'est donc en fonction de la personne raisonnable que l'on se référera afin de déterminer du caractère malhonnête de la conduite. Or, la notion de malhonnêteté n'étant pas défmie, il en résulte incertitude et confusion surtout en matière de crimes économiques. Considérant que les administrateurs sont assujettis en droit des sociétés à une obligation de loyauté et d'honnêteté, il s'agira de s'inspirer des principes développés en cette matière afm de dégager certaines constantes qui nous permettront de déterminer ce qui constitue une conduite malhonnête. La première partie se veut un exposé sommaire des grands principes régissant le droit corporatif. Y sont décrites certaines conduites considérées comme malhonnêtes en droit des sociétés. De cette analyse, il ressort que la malhonnêteté est davantage définie en relation au projet commun des investisseurs qu'en fonction d'un droit de propriété. La notion se divise ainsi autour de deux grands axes, à savoir, les conflits horizontaux et les conflits verticaux. La deuxième partie se concentre sur le droit criminel. Y sont repris, en matière de fraude les conduites considérées comme faisant partie de la catégorie des «autres moyens dolosifs» et décrites par la juge Mclachlin. Au besoin, une référence aux principes du droit corporatif est faite. D'autres infractions, telles les commissions secrètes, les délits d'initiés et le vol sont examinées. La malhonnêteté en droit criminelle est davantage définie en relation avec le droit de propriété. Toutefois, le manque de loyauté se voulant également dénoncé, la notion d'intérêt de la compagnie, comme en matière de droit corporatif présente toute sa pertinence. / There presently is a problem regarding the comprehension of the concept of dishonesty relating to fraud. Fraud can be the result of deceit, falsehood or other fraudulent means. This last notion is determined objectively, by reference to what a reasonable person would consider to be a dishonest act. Considering that the notion of dishonesty has no definition, a confusion exists especially when it cornes to economic crimes. Due to the fact that directors are compelled to respect an obligation of good faith and loyalty, we will refer to the general principles that exist in corporate law in order to define what can be qualified as dishonest behaviour. The first part is a summary of the general principals relating to corporate law. In fuis part we describe sorne behaviours which are considered as dishonest. From this analysis, we have come to the conclusion that dishonesty is understood as being an obstacle to the common project ofthe investors, and not in relation to property. The second part relates to criminal law. Some of the behaviours that were described as being part of other fraudulent means by justice McLachlin are analyzed. A reference to the general principles of corporate law is made when needed. Other offences like secret commissions and insider trading are also part of the analysis. Dishonesty pertaining to criminal law is described in relation to property. However, a lack of loyalty being also denounced, the notion of the best interest of the company, as in corporate law, remains relevant. / "Mémoire présenté à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de maîtrise en droit option droit des affaires". Ce mémoire a été classé parmi les 15% des mémoires de la discipline.

Directors in not-for-profit organizations are not only monitors who ensure that financial reports are free from misreporting but also often act as fundraisers. This paper examines the intensity of directors’ monitoring when management misallocates expenses to solicit donations; especially whether the directors’ oversight is influenced by the organization’s expense disclosure transparency and the donors’ evaluation focus. The results from two experiments indicate that directors play a monitoring role to not allow management’s expense misallocation. Further, the enhanced transparency of expense disclosures increases directors’ tendency not to endorse management’s expense misallocation. However, the donors’ adoption of a balanced evaluation process (i.e., considering both financial and nonfinancial performance metrics) reduces directors’ monitoring compared to the donors’ adoption of an expense-focused evaluation process (i.e., focusing solely on financial metrics). This effect of the donors’ adoption of a balanced evaluation process occurs when directors anticipate donors will not donate to the not-for-profit organization, but not when directors anticipate donors will donate. This paper contributes to a richer understanding of directors’ role in not-for-profit organizations’ expense misallocations. Implications for nonprofit governance are discussed. / Thesis (Ph.D, Management) -- Queen's University, 2011-08-29 14:29:22.41

No description available.

This study analyzes ownership and directorship links among larger Canadian-owned corporations. These links have received insufficient attention from Canadian economists. It shows that these corporations did not undergo the radical changes predicted for their counterparts in other countries: proprietor ownership remains high, and the board of directors persists as the centre of power. / Ownership links form the basis for the development and empirical investigation of the "Shadow Group" concept. The taxonomical classification of shadow groups reveals complex structures accompanying diversification strategies. Interlocking directorships exist among "core" corporations inside the groups and are frequent between the shadow groups and the rest of the economy. / Shadow groups were at the heart of mergers and acquisitions between 1978 and 1981. A case study shows that external growth (especially takeovers) is their characteristic tactic for expansion. Hence, the necessity exists for amending economic theories to account for the behaviour of these groups.

An analysis of company law may allow us to abandon a perception that company law is impartial to the political context in which it is applied. This paper argues that state protectionism is reflected in the design of company law. Specifically, states may confer public functions to board of directors through their duties and authorities; in turn, directors’ functions may become barriers to foreign investments. To illustrate this argument, focus is placed on the duties of Canadian corporate directors and how their functions affect foreign direct investment in Canada. It demonstrates that the public function conferred to corporate directors echoes the State’s policy and regulations governing foreign investment. As a consequence to the redundancy of the public interest rationalization and the lack of political will to affect real market openness, unnecessary barriers are being placed for market access which may ultimately render Canada less attractive for foreign investors.

Replicating and extending Singh and Vinnicombe (2006), the primary problems addressed in this research are: What factors influence women's attainment of corporate directorships? And what are the proportions of female executive and non-executive directors and CEOs in New Zealand? Executive directors are company employees who attain board directorships via progressing through CEO and other top management roles; therefore, this study included an investigation of the proportion of women in executive and non-executive director and CEO roles in New Zealand companies. To understand women's non-progression to corporate boards, 11 male and female directors were interviewed. Contrary to international research findings, the majority of interviewees in this study emphasised the importance of networks in attaining corporate directorships in New Zealand. Explanations for women's under-representation on corporate boards included lack of networks, family commitments, pipeline theory, lack of aspiration for power, career choices, risk adversity, male organisational culture, discrimination and women's unsuitability for director roles. Archival analysis indicated that of a total of 1366 corporate directors, women constituted 88 (6.44%) directorships. Women held 64 non-executive (4.69% of total directorships), 23 executive (1.68% of total directorships) and one alternate directorship. The findings indicated that there were only five women CEOs and only five out of a total of 240 New Zealand corporate boards achieved gender equality. Social identity theory was used to provide insight into this change resistant phenomenon.