The central aim of the thesis is to understand why intersectionality remains at the fringes of mainstream discrimination law and to provide an alternative vision to the dominant conception of single-axis discrimination. This aim is pursued by translating intersectionality theory into the conceptual and doctrinal precincts of comparative discrimination law of South Africa, Canada and the United Kingdom. The thesis is divided into three parts. Part One posits the framework of 'intersectional integrity' as forming the backbone of the category of intersectional discrimination. Its normative core insists on mapping the intersections between identities as creating unique and shared patterns of group disadvantage by considering people's identities as a whole. It is this bipartite framework against which the doctrine is considered. Part Two deals with the doctrinal limitations which impede a successful claim of intersectional discrimination. The comparative analysis fine-combs through the judicial interpretation to understand how it fares against the framework of intersectional integrity. The judicial strategies emerging from the doctrinal analysis are consolidated in the form of a graded spectrum which captures the proximity of each response from the category of intersectional discrimination. Beyond this conceptual reimagination, it also considers how other tools in discrimination law need to be recalibrated to accommodate an intersectional claim. These include the conception of equality and discrimination, the criteria for selection of analogous grounds, the understanding of indirect discrimination, the relationship between impact and justification analysis, apportioning the burden of proof and determining the standard of scrutiny. Part Three consolidates the normative insights emerging from the thesis. A restatement of the theoretical and doctrinal recalibrations helps imagine how a lawyer would walk through the labyrinth of discrimination law for realising a claim of intersectional discrimination.

Thesis advisor: Sarah Babb / American discrimination law is a paradox: it attempts to eradicate discrimination – an inherently systemic problem impacting the most marginalized groups – using bureaucratic procedures. As a result, public servants tasked with investigating violations of discrimination law must pursue the fulfillment of such a sweeping goal through incremental means, adhering to laws that define discrimination narrowly. There is an extensive literature arguing that this misalignment between the law’s driving goals and its methods of enforcement renders it ineffective; there is also considerable research on the public servant’s unique position in this sense. Applying these literatures together to twelve discrimination investigators at three state-level commissions, it seems investigators are aware of the law’s limitations, but are able to close the gap between the bureaucratic nature of their work and its driving goals by rationalizing these limitations, allowing them to remain idealistic about the efficacy of the law. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2020. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Departmental Honors. / Discipline: Sociology.

This dissertation examines inequality in school funding in North Carolina from 1964 to 1997. It highlights local, county and state decisions about the distribution of educational funds, and shows that public officials have created and maintained school funding mechanisms that exacerbated inequalities between racial groups to preserve White capital and advantage White communities. Discriminatory taxation schemes, district-line gerrymandering and voter suppression ensured White control of school boards and boards of county commissioners, which presided over school budgets, resulting in uneven revenue distribution. I analyze these mechanisms as instances of theft—theft of civil rights and financial resources—within a tradition of kleptocracy in the state.I first focus on four case studies, including two rural and two urban and suburban counties, where I examine the correlation between financial inequities and racial segregation through quantitative and qualitative analysis. I ask how historical actors have addressed educational inequalities over time, and how local governments, courts and legislatures responded to these intertwined challenges. This study investigates the discrepancy between the legacies of Jim Crow in school finance and racially neutral arguments in education reform and school finance litigation. All four case-study counties became involved in the 1994 Leandro v. State lawsuit, which challenged the state’s school funding formula. The urban-rural plaintiff coalition highlighted contradictions in arguments about the root causes of resource inequalities in public schools. The Leandro case did not address racial discrimination, and I question and historicize this silence.

The purpose of this study was to compare the underlying rationales found in selected Supreme Court cases and briefs of counsel justifying or condemning legal classification by sex and legal classification by race. Political strategies have been developed based on the assumption that racism and sexism are analogous. Yet, in recent years, anti-discrimination law, when used in sex discrimination cases, often has been interpreted and implemented quite differently from cases involving race discrimination. This study, using a content analysis based on "grounded theory," compared per- ceptions of racism and sexism as found in the opinions and briefs of counsel of the United States Supreme Court. The data showed that until the 1970's women were seen as wives and mothers whose place was in the home. Women were perceived as having certain inherent characteristics which made them more vulnerable than men. Special laws for women, therefore, were perceived as justified. On the other hand, there were those who argued equity for women based on fundamental ideals and the notion that women should be seen as individuals, not as a stereotypical composite of womanhood. The efficacy of segregation was argued on the grounds of a perceived belief in a natural antipathy of the races and a fear of violence if there were to be integration. Those advocating integration argued the deprivations caused by segregation. There was a gravity surrounding the race cases that was missing from the sex cases. The race decisions! also, were firmly grounded in the Constitution, which was not true for the sex cases. Fundamentally, blacks and whites were seen as having the same rights even during segregation when they were "separate but equal." Women were never perceived as being the equal of men. They were different and they functioned under a different law. Also, the role of women in the home was primary, not her status in the world outside the home. For blacks, role was never an issue. Rather, for blacks status was the central concern. Finally, the blacks' struggle was perceived as a fight to secure their place in the wider society. The women's place was perceived as in the domestic domain, outside the purview of public concerns. / Ed. D.

This thesis is about the origins and implementation of the Equal Pay Act and Sex Discrimination Act in Britain. For historical and methodological reasons the subject is treated comparatively with similar American policies. British policy makers looked to the United States as an exemplar in this field. The thesis discusses one theory about innovation which predicts such a process. Accounts of policy formation and implementation are used as a method of comparing the general political processes of the two countries. The first chapter introduces ideas about the study of policy and the pattern and timing of policy innovations. It also refers to early moves in the emancipation of women in Britain and America. Part I is about the origins of laws promoting equality of opportunity for working women. It deals with the problems the legislation was supposed to solve, the growth of interest in economic as well as political emancipation and with the actual provisions of the new laws. The emphasis is on Britain to which three chapters are devoted. Similar trends and events in America are dealt with more briefly in a single chapter. Part II discusses implementation in both countries, stressing the essentially political aspects of this process. That is to say, Chapters VI and VII consider the activities of the principle administrative agencies and departments and the courts. The concluding chapter compares the different approaches of American and British institutions promoting equality in the light of variations in more general aspects of politics. Thus it attempts to contribute to the discipline of comparative politics.

This study focuses on the representative nature of the Senate Judiciary Committee in relation to the Senate as a whole. Three definitions of representation (descriptive, symbolic and instrumental) were used in order to assess the degree to which the Senate Judiciary Committee represented the Senate in the area of civil rights from 1957 through 1968. Results show that the Committee was not representative in the descriptive (regional) sense, but it was representative of the Senate in terms of its over-all descriptive (orientations) nature. In terms of symbolic representation, the study whows that the Senate Judiciary Committee has been labeled by the Senate as being "resistant" in the area of civil rights. This was interpreted as being a negative classification of symbolic representation. In the instrumental sense the Committee was not found to represent the Senate. The reasons for this overall lack of representation were attributed to two factors: (1) the lack of any institutionalized form of elections as sanctions for the lack of representation; and (2) the degree of social pluralism that is reflected in the membership of the Committee as a result of the type of issue at hand. / Master of Arts

This thesis makes a unique contribution in exploring the relationship between international legal commitments and women's poverty. Three normative arguments underpin this thesis. First, that poverty is a gender-based phenomenon. Second, that gender-based poverty is a obstacle to human rights. Third, if the promise of human rights is to be realised for all people it is necessary to move gender-based poverty into the realm of international human rights law. The ideal place to theorise on the relationship between human rights and gender-based poverty is CEDAW. Notwithstanding that CEDAW addresses civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and negative cultural attitudes on women, there is no substantive provision in CEDAW requiring State to ameliorate gender-based poverty. The first part of my thesis argues that this gap can be overcome by an evolutionary interpretation of CEDAW. I make the argument, that equality and non-discrimination, two norms that permeate all of CEDAW, can be interpreted to incorporate the harms of gender-based poverty comprehensively into the treaty framework. I use public international law interpretative framework and the Committee's own work to demonstrate that the commitment to eliminating discrimination against women and achieving gender equality in CEDAW necessarily requires State to respect, protect and fulfill the human rights of women in poverty. The second part of thesis shifts to examine how this interpretation can be integrated into the work of the Committee. To ensure a coherent and comprehensive approach to gender-based poverty that is consistent with my proposed interpretation of CEDAW in I propose: (i) modifications to the State reporting guidelines and (ii) a comprehensive General Recommendation on women and poverty. This thesis lays the necessary theoretical and practical groundwork so that the Committee and other relevant national and international actors can hold States accountable for women in poverty's human rights.

This thesis offers an original account of the South African Constitutional Court's reasoning in identifying unfair discrimination perpetrated by the state. I use this account to develop proposals for improving the Court's jurisprudence, in line with its stated aim of addressing patterns of group disadvantage. The Court's Harksen test for unfair discrimination makes dignity the touchstone for identifying this wrong. However, the Court has not explained what is required to prove a violation of dignity or how dignity fits with its concern for group disadvantage. I demonstrate that three necessary conditions must be satisfied for the Court to conclude that dignity has been violated: there must be a) unfavourable treatment on the basis of protected grounds; b) that threatens to create or perpetuate patterns of group disadvantage; and c) that lacks adequate justification. I also investigate important features of the Court's reasoning that have been overlooked in the existing literature, including its concern for messages expressed by discrimination and the fluctuating intensity with which it reviews justifications. Among my proposals for developing this reasoning, I argue that the Court should remove human dignity from the Harksen test and openly acknowledge the considerations doing the work in its decisions. I also provide a detailed critique of five of the Court's most controversial decisions where it found discrimination to be fair despite clear indications that it entrenched patterns of disadvantage. I show that in all five cases the Court applied an indefensibly weak intensity of review, falling below the baseline level of scrutiny which ought to be applied in unfair discrimination cases. I contend that consistent application of this baseline will help to make the Court better at preventing and addressing patterns of group disadvantage. I conclude with a restatement of the Harksen test that consolidates the Court's reasoning and my proposals.

This doctoral thesis is at the intersection of law and technology by focusing on the ethical governance of private companies on the topic of discrimination. It centers on algorithmic and intentional discrimination. It aimed to determine whether the European Union and Federal USA law are equipped to address discrimination in the provision of work, goods, and services online. Through and extensive analyses of sources that included private company practices, private anti-discrimination policies, collective and private litigation, court decisions, public regulation at the EU, Member State levels, and United States, this thesis argued that statutory law and legal precedents in the European Union and United States are only partially equipped to address discrimination against statutorily protected classes. The author of this thesis inferred from the selected sources that the main obstacles to the full implementation of the equality principle rely on businesses' structural challenges, including aesthetic design, matching tools, evaluation systems, and network effect of online platforms that ultimately reinforce old biases against protected classes. Furthermore, rigid and more flexible regimes of liability immunities to online intermediaries results in the lack of incentive for structural changes. Finally, in the light of these structural challenges, this thesis asserts that the fight against discrimination in online platforms might produce the best results when also oriented by a model of regulation that encourages online platforms to implement the principle of transparency and fairness in their interactions with users, coupled with the cooperation of anti-discrimination bodies and private businesses. / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

In the thesis the aim was to compare the EU legal system with the Swedish national legal system with specific focus on gender discrimination law. Findings showed Sweden applied discrimination law in accordance with EU directives but went further than what the Gender Recast Directive, and the EU law itself, required of it. Findings also revealed Sweden uses bi- and multilateral agreements to further EU discrimination law. If such agreements are in accordance with EU primary laws, to which Sweden as a member state has agreed to follow when it acceded to the Union, such agreements will be accepted by the Union. Other findings were related to the Union institutions themselves. These institutions are much more co-dependent than was originally thought and the democratic function of the institutions are treaty secured as far as voting in of representatives to the Parliament give EU citizens power to influence legislation of the EU, likewise the European Citizens’ Initiative giving each EU citizen a chance to propose new legislation. Regulations that are deemed, by member states, to be in breach of EU primary law can be tried and interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union and if said regulation is deemed being in breach of EU primary law it can be annulled.