This thesis examines the problem of racist disinformation on the World Wide Web and the role played by anti-racist sites in providing balance. The disinformation capacity of the Web is an important issue for those who provide access to the Web, for content providers, and for Web users. An understanding of the issues involved, including the characteristics of racist disinformation, is vital if these groups are to make informed decisions about how to deal with such Web content. However, in Australia especially, there has been limited research into racism in general and racism on the Web in particular. To address this deficiency, the integration of perspectives from the fields of race relations and information science is facilitated utilising a critical realist methodology to provide new insights. Through an extensive examination of the literature, including Australian media reports, terms are delineated and the problem situated within an historical, cultural and political environment. Alternatives for tackling racist disinformation are evaluated and the issues involved in the provision and utilisation of balancing information are discussed. The literature analysis underpins an assessment of anti-racist sites using three data collection methods to gain multiple perspectives on the balancing qualities of these sites. These methods are an assessment of anti-racist website longevity, an assessment of website reliability, and a questionnaire of content providers of anti-racist websites. This thesis provides a synthesis of the academic literature and media coverage related to Australian racism and racist disinformation on the Web, leading to new insights about the range and depth of issues concerned. An analysis of the data collected concludes that while anti-racist websites take on diverse roles in tackling racism, few provide content directly to balance Web racist disinformation. Approaches that seek to control or censure the Web are ineffective and problematic, but balancing disinformation is not in itself an adequate solution.

Disinformation poses a clear security threat to institutions and society as a whole, as it has been shown to increase insecurity, radicalization and polarization. Currently, there are many different understandings of this phenomenon which creates barriers to finding solutions. The initial objective of this thesis is to provide an overview of the different conceptions in order to formulate an inclusive understanding of disinformation. This will then be used to test three hypotheses: that disinformation is not a new phenomenon, that it is not only state sponsored, and that technology has allowed for the recent inundation in campaigns. Through a case study analysis this thesis concluded that not only were all of these hypotheses verifiable, but that based on the discussion, it can be expected that disinformation will become increasingly prevalent. The finding suggest that it will be possible for even non-securitized actors to start campaigns, making them harder to identify. Additionally, technology will allow narratives to be increasingly targeted. These narratives are amplified by the systemic problems with social media that benefit outrage and shocking content. The thesis concluded that it may be possible to address disinformation proactively.

Online disinformation is a complicated and controversial phenomenon that is proving to be a large challenge for governments, private sector bodies, and civil society groups in a variety of different contexts around the globe. Foreign influence operations conducted through online disinformation campaigns have been implemented in various contexts with the intention to create political instability within these targeted nations. This thesis examines the question: What education policy initiatives are being implemented and/or already exist in the United States and Finland in an effort to make themselves more resilient to transnational online disinformation campaigns? Various policy documents that concern education legislation are analyzed through Bacchi’s (2009) ‘What’s the Problem Represented to be?’ approach. Concepts associated with the Securitization theory and Buzan’s (1998) security analysis framework were applied to the content of these documents in order assess whether the reasoning or discourse associated with the introduction of critical media literacy programs was related to counteracting the threat of one foreign disinformation. Results indicated that there were many differences in how and why the United States and Finland implemented media literacy programs. There are indications that the perceived threat of foreign disinformation campaigns is one of the main justifications for the United States and Finland to introduce or improve national media literacy policies. This work allows other researchers to see these differences in approaches and how they relate to the international communities’ efforts toward utilizing media literacy as a security measure against disinformation.

Abstract. The outbreak of the novel coronavirus put democratic process, and security architecture across the globe in jeopardy. The global health crisis galvanised the proliferation of pandemic-related disinformation and other malign influence operations, and this phenomenon gave birth to a new buzzword, known as "infodemic". The "infodemic" provided hostile countries with a possibility to launch disinformation campaigns and other malign communication efforts, which in most cases were attributed to external state actors, such as China and Russia. Both actors aimed to weaken the legitimacy of European institutions, and undermine its democratic process. The "infodemic", thus, posed a threat to the EU's security and became a watershed moment in the disinformation discourse for the EU. In the aftermath, this mounting threat of disinformation was instantly acknowledged by EU representatives and institutions in their numerous official statements and policy documents. This dissertation examines the EU's approach towards Chinese and Russian disinformation campaigns through the lenses of securitisation theory and evaluates the success of this process. The findings of the evaluation showcased that neither Russian nor Chinese disinformation was successfully securitised by the EU. It also argues that the EU has...

Disinformation campaigns are a growing threat towards democracy and a phenomenon that is important to understand in order to guard against. One part of the literature around disinformation campaigns that is as of yet not widely studied is how they can be connected to social movements. Previous research on this connection have shown that disinformation campaigns will tend to support social movements indirectly through the spread of disinformation which both amplifies the claims of the movement and attracts more mobilizers, which can lead to for example lessened trust towards institutions and thus a successful disinformation campaign. This paper analyses the case of the mobilization against the Swedish Social Services in order to see if this connection between the disinformation campaign and the social movement was present in this case as well. The findings made shows that the connection was not that of an indirect connection as have been observed in previous studies but rather one of direct cooperation. Furthermore, this paper also explores what factors allowed for both a disinformation campaign and mobilization against the Swedish Social Services to manifest.

This thesis focuses on the analysis of a possible formation of the EU disinformation policy by norm entrepreneurs including Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, France and Germany. The work is based on the theory of social constructivism and the concept of norms. Through the analytical framework of the norm life cycle, it seeks to find out how the disinformation policy can be integrated into the EU by norm entrepreneurs, and what normative clashes can be found in the process of the birth of the disinformation policy of the EU. A possible formation of the EU disinformation policy is analysed through three stages of the norm life cycle - norm emergence, norm cascade and norm internalisation. In the norm emergence part, the Baltic states with France and Germany are examined in terms of their motivation and efforts to promote a disinformation-related norm. The norm cascade part discusses a normative clash of a regulation norm and the norm of freedom of expression. Lastly, the norm internalisation part analyses the challenges of the incorporation of the norm in the system once the previous stages are accomplished. The research has shown that even though a common regulation norm of the EU is inevitable, the EU should introduce a cooperative mechanism of its member states and private actors to prevent clash with...

Following the rise of social media, the world has found itself in a hyperconnected state. Through the press of a button, it is today possible to reach every corner of the world. This has brought opportunities for freedom and liberation, but in the past years it has also become a danger for these ideas. The rise of disinformation has been declared a major threat to democracy and our society by several major institutions, one of them being the European Union. They have also made it clear that the tech companies, through whose products disinformation primarily spreads, not only inadequately prevent it, but also question if they have enough incentive to do so. The executive branch of the EU, the European Commission, has therefore put forth an action plan in which they outline their work going forward in mitigating the crisis. Comparing with previous research on the vital parts of disinformation, there are heavy indications that the EU’s work will focus on reactionary measures; discovery and sharing of data on ongoing disinformation campaigns between neighbouring and Member States, as well as societal media literacy efforts. For now, due to what seems to be a fear of over-regulating freedom of expression, the responsibility to battle creation and spread is left to the Code of Practice on Disinformation, a plan created by tech companies that hold the platforms that are center in the spread of disinformation. After a first yearassessment, the EU indicates that the results of this Code of Practice is unsatisfactory, and further action might be needed. / Med uppkomsten av sociala medier så befinner sig världen nu i ett hyperuppkopplat tillstånd. Genom ett simpelt knapptryck är det idag möjligt att nå hela världen. Med detta har vi sett möjligheter till en förhöjd frihet, men under de senaste åren finns det också exempel på när just idéer som dessa har satts under hård press. Ökningen av desinformation har förklarats ett stort hot mot demokrati och dagens samhälle av flera stora institutioner, en av dem den Europeiska Unionen. De har gjort tydligt att stora teknikbolag, genom vilkas produkter desinformation i synnerhet sprids, inte bara gör för lite för att förhindra det, men också ifrågasätter ifall de har tillräckligt med incitament för att göra det. EU:s verkställande gren, Europeiska Kommissionen, har därför satt fram en handlingsplan där de redogör för sitt arbete för att hantera krisen. I en jämförelse med tidigare forskning om de mest vitala delarna av desinformation så finns det tunga indikationer att EU:s arbete kommer att fokusera på reaktionära åtgärder: upptäckande och delning av data mellan grannländer och medlemsstater om pågående desinformationskampanjer, samt ansträngningar för samhällskunskap så som källkritik. I vad som verkar vara en rädsla för överreglering av yttrandefrihet lämnas ansvaret för bekämpningen av skapande och spridning till en desinformationspraxis skapad av de teknikföretag som har de plattformar som är centrala i spridningen av desinformation. Efter en första årsutvärdering indikerar dock EU att resultaten dittills ej är tillfredsställande, och att ytterligare åtgärder kan vara nödvändiga.

In March 2015, the European Union decided to respond to the ongoing disinformation campaigns by setting up the East Stratcom Task Force. This thesis applies theories of communication logic, disinformation-defence and EU’s normativity to develop an analytical framework that can theoretically and empirically enhance our understanding of EU’s campaign. A content analysis was used to analyse the material and to categorize different key concepts that derives from the aforementioned theoretical fields. The finding generated by the analysis of the disinformation reviews show that the Task Force uses both media and political logic in its communication. The results also indicate clear traits of a confronting disinformation-defence strategy. Furthermore it is possible to detect a trend among some of the responses that had similarities to another category within the field of disinformation- defence called “ignoring”. Interestingly the reviews do not regularly reference the normative values of the EU. However, this does not prove that the reviews or the Task Force that writes them do not share the normative values. Although the normative values of the EU is not discussed or referenced in the vast majority of the reviews, on several occasions they do defend the EU on the basis of its normative values. This illustrates a certain level of neutrality of the position of the Task Force with regards to the self-identity of the EU. Despite only being active for two years, the East Stratcom Taskforce seems to have found its place among the EU’s arsenal of foreign policy tools.

The diploma thesis is focused on disinformation and its relationship to the mass media and public. The main aim of the thesis is to provide a general overview of disinformation, point out the menace resulting from its underestimating and present the clues on how to eliminate its impacts. The work is divided into two main parts. The first one is theoretical and summarizes the existing knowledge in information and disinformation theory. It is supplemented by own typology of the disinformation and includes a practical example of each type. The end of the theoretical part is addressed to the special place that mass media have in the process of disinforming. The second part is related to practical issues. It results from a detailed analysis of the most widely-read statewide daily newspapers and the structure of their readers. The social-demographic factors that influence the rate of received disinformation are set.

The master thesis analyses the perception of Information Warfare and Russia among German politicians. By using the Qualitative Content Analysis by Schreier, speeches given in the German Bundestag relating to Information Warfare, and Russia were analyzed from January 2015 until December 2018. Using International Relations (IR) theories and political psychological approaches, a theoretical framework was developed in order to determine factors which have an impact on the perception of politicians. The thesis divides this perception into three categories - friend, partner, and threat. Each category is analyzed in depth resulting in support for two of the four hypotheses. The thesis demonstrates that it is not only the political orientation, but also economic interests which determine if a state and its warfare tactics are perceived as a danger. Moreover, the deductive part of the analysis reveals that Russia's behavior which can be perceived as aggressive, irrational, and power-seeking, also determines whether the regime is perceived as threatening. Information Warfare per se is no issue of concern in the Bundestag. However, information warfare tactics such as disinformation campaigns, the spread of fake news and propaganda, and Russia's meddling in western politics are perceived as a danger to...