Thesis (D. Min.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2002. / Vita. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 208-213).

Thesis (D. Min.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2002. / Vita. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 208-213).

Thesis (D. Min.)--Catholic Theological Union at Chicago, 2002. / Vita. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 208-213).

This dissertation examines the moral character of civil disobedience. The discussion begins with a conceptual analysis of civil disobedience which eschews standard definitions in favour of a paradigm case approach, highlighting a parallel between the communicative aspects of civil disobedience and the communicative aspects of lawful punishment by the state. Foundations for a moral evaluation of civil disobedience are then laid down through, first, an examination of the nature of wrongdoing and justification, and second, a critique of contemporary defences of political obligation. The absence of political obligation, it is argued, does not immediately justify civil disobedience even in reprehensible regimes because, in all contexts, adherence to the law and disobedience of the law must be judged on the basis of their character and consequences. Various considerations relevant to the justifiability of civil disobedience are then examined before the discussion turns to the three principal claims defended in this thesis. The first is that people have a moral right to engage in civil disobedience irrespective of both the political regime and the merits of their cause. The second is that the reasons for which people engage in civil disobedience may be understood in terms of a pursuit of ideals. When motivated by a deep commitment to the genuine ideals of their society, disobedients may be said to demonstrate responsible citizenship. The third claim is that the law should treat disobedients differently from other offenders. When civil disobedience is morally justified, and sometimes when it is not, the law has reason to be lenient to its practitioners. In defending these claims, this discussion critiques not only the 'classical' narrow conception of civil disobedience as a public, non-violent, conscientious breach of law for which disobedients are willing to be punished, but also broader conceptions of civil disobedience which take a modest view of its justifiability and accord it limited status as a moral right.

Resumé in English In the first chapter, author of the thesis focused on history and creation of the term "civil disobedience" Second chapter was focused on different views on what term civil disobedience actually means and how some of the famous legal theorethics as John Rawls, Hannah Arendt and Ronald Dworkin understand it. In the third chapter, there was specification of the term civil disobedience in all its theorethical aspects in context of polemics with all the different views in previous chapter. Fourth chapter was focused on civil disobedience in democracy and its role, specifics arising from the nature of democracy. In the fifth chapter autor was focused on specifics and nature of civil disobedience in non-democratic states together with mentioning a few examples from history. Sixth chapter compared effects and mutual influence of violent or non-violent civil disobedience and its effectivity. In the seventh chapter, author described in more detail one of the examples of civil disobedience in the Czech Republic which was decided by court, for describing how the process works in real life situations.

Introduction: A Global practice of civil disobedience -- Decency, the right to disobey, and non-domination -- Undocumented disobedients as a special class of civil disobedients -- Institutionalizing the human right of the undocumented to be domestic political participants -- Unfair terms of global cooperation and the fair equality of liberty between peoples -- Executive prerogative and disobedient disclosure of government secrets -- Disobedience as an expression of global solidarity and redefining disobedience in a global perspective. This book explores a hitherto unexamined possibility of justifiable disobedience opened up by John Rawls' Law of Peoples. This is the possibility of disobedience justified by appeal to standards of decency that are shared by peoples who do not otherwise share commitments to the same principles of justice, and whose societies are organized according to very different basic social institutions. Justified by appeal to shared decency standards, disobedience by diverse state and non-state actors indeed challenge injustices in the international system of states. The book considers three case studies: disobedience by the undocumented, disobedient challenges to global economic inequities, and the disobedient disclosure of government secrets. It proposes a substantial analytical redefinition of civil disobedience in a global perspective, identifying the creation of global solidarity relations as its goal. / https://dc.etsu.edu/etsu_books/1124/thumbnail.jpg

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Alberta, 2010. / Title from pdf file main screen (viewed March 9, 2010) "A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, Dept. of Drama." Includes bibliographical references.

The Community Charge (poll tax) was seen by both its supporters and opponents alike as an attempt to promote the British New Right's concept of responsible active citizenship in local politics. The reaction of different groups of citizens to the tax is explored through a detailed case study of events in the London Borough of Ealing, an archetypal London suburb. Here, as in most urban areas, organised anti-poll tax protestors clashed with MPs, councillors and the local magistracy, who played a large role in enforcing the measure. It shows how the protestors attempted to mobilise a 'moral community' built around the idea of 'fair' taxation and promote a campaign of civil disobedience to force abolition. This in turn compelled local actors to make principled choices about the enforcement of a law of which many of them strongly disapproved. The protestors' tactics seemed to strike a popular chord and at least a fifth of all Ealing charge-payers (and eight million people nationally) failed to pay the tax in 1990/91. However, the detailed evidence also suggests that non-payment can best be seen as a mass expression of bloody mindedness, rather than a concerted and organised campaign of civil disobedience. Nevertheless the protests had important implications for the practise of left-wing citizenship in contemporary Britain and served to highlight growing divisions between the mainstream and radical Left. Previously published academic accounts have addressed the 'high' politics of the poll tax. The thesis explores instead the 'popular' politics of the poll tax crisis in a suitably local setting and so redresses an imbalance in the literature. It therefore makes an original contribution to knowledge and understanding of the relationship between conventional means of political participation, radical popular protest movements and competing concepts of citizenship.

Despite its ubiquity in debate over the justifiability of civil disobedience and conscientious objection, “conscience” remains an opaque concept. The attempt to define and employ it properly is not a purely academic exercise. The political language and behavior we associate with conscientiousness are empty to the point of being vulnerable to co-option by manifestly non-conscientious, violent, and reactionary movements. My argument is that the ease with which political actors adopt the language of conscience is due, not poor public understanding of the concept of “conscience,” but to the concept itself. In modern philosophical interpretations of conscience, such as that of Martin Luther and John Locke, the conscience is reified as a moral faculty or interior conversation of the individual. This is a departure from classical views of conscientiousness (for instance, Augustine’s), which emphasize the shared, fragile and habitual nature of conscience. Once “conscientiousness” is reified as “conscience,” it becomes difficult to characterize, except in negative terms, as an inner space free from tradition and force. My thesis is that the co-option of the language of conscience stems, in part, from the empty and conflicted characterization of philosophy in modern contract theory. One example of this conflicted characterization of conscience is the abortive project of distinguishing civil disobedience and conscientious objection. In law, politics, and philosophy, it is difficult to offer sound reasons for distinguishing these latter categories, despite frequent attempts to do so. The attempt fails on conceptual as well as practical grounds. I criticize two prominent treatments of civil disobedience and conscientious objection in evidence of this claim (John Rawls and Michael Walzer). When it comes to the language of conscience, modern American culture has committed the philosophic fallacy (John Dewey). We have substituted the clear divisions and images created by conscientious movements for the process that created them. I argue that “conscience” is best seen as a quality of healthy debate between adversaries—debates over problems so fundamental that they will be carried on in extra-legal and even illegal spheres. Conscience is a not a language that just any political actor can speak at will. It is a series of decisions that indicate to a public that we are not political enemies but political adversaries, seeking a political future together (Chantal Mouffe).

Doctorat en Sciences politiques et sociales / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished