Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 1935. / Hand written copy, original hard-copy in J. S. Gericke Library Compact storage - KTES 362.292 FOU / No Abstract Available

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Pennsylvania, 1926. / Bibliography: p. 48.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study comprises a survey of the atheist solution to the problem of evil that has occasionally in the past been suggested by philosophers, but has largely been neglected in the philosophy of religion. Against this background, the study has two main objectives. It focusses in the first place on the reasons upon which philosophers like Mackie and McCloskey regard the giving up of one or more of the attributes of God in theism as an adequate solution to the problem of evil, considered to be the strongest argument against the rationality of theistic belief. What the study however would like to add to this objective, is to point to the existence of an even more fundamental reason upon which it can be claimed that the problem of evil can be solved along this way and that the emotional pressure so typical of this problem can be relieved without any serious implications for the belief in God. Concerning the more negative orientated of these reasons, it is shown that the latter revolves around the concept of the logical inconsistency of the theistic theory that can truly be regarded as the rationale of the atheistic argument known as the problem of evil. Furthermore, this concept also represents the cornerstone of the rejection of theistic solutions to this problem by Mackie and others as inadequate. In focussing on the origins of these reasons, it is shown that although the roots of the problem of evil is to be found in pre-Christian times and it continued to be a point of discussion throughout the whole of the Apostolic Age and the Middle Ages, it was the period of the Enlightenment and in particular the legacy of David Hume that became the strongest inspiration of the atheist rejection of theism in modern times. Concerning the more positive orientated of these reasons, the focus is on the efforts of philosophers that have been following the suggestions of Hume and that have against the background of the deficiencies of the theistic solutions to the problem of evil, started to experiment with solutions wherein at least one of the constituting propositions of the problem of evil is rejected. It is also argued that the way to these experiments has been paved by the contributions of Mill and Geach and that the latter encouraged philosophers to also belabour the problem of evil from an atheistic point of view. Against this background, the final focus is on the second objective of the study, namely to show that there exists an even more fundamental reason upon which it can be claimed that the problem of evil can be solved along this way and that the emotional pressure so typical of this problem can be relieved without any serious implications for the belief in God. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie behels 'n ondersoek na die ateïstiese oplossing vir die probleem van die kwaad wat weliswaar in die verlede al by geleentheid deur filosowe gesuggereer is, maar wat nietemin nog nie veel aandag in die godsdiensfilosofiese debat oor hierdie problematiek geniet het nie. Binne hierdie raamwerk het die studie twee oogmerke. Dit wil in die eerste plek fokus op al daardie redes op grond waarvan filosowe soos Mackie en McCloskey meen dat die skrapping van een of meer van die Goddelike attribute in die teïsme tot 'n toereikende oplossing van die probleem van die kwaad as sterkste argument teen die rasionele houdbaarheid van hierdie teorie kan lei. Wat die studie in die tweede plek egter hieraan wil toevoeg, is om aan te toon dat daar 'n nog meer fundamentele rede bestaan op grond waarvan daar aangevoer kan word dat die probleem van die kwaad inderdaad langs hierdie weg en ook sonder ernstige implikasies vir die geloof in God opgelos en die emosionele druk so eie aan hierdie problematiek verlig kan word. Wat die meer negatief gerigte van hierdie redes aan betref, word daar verduidelik dat laasgenoemde rondom die konsep van die logiese inkonsistensie van die teïstiese teorie sentreer. Laasgenoemde kan met reg as die spil van die ateïstiese argument bekend as die probleem van die kwaad beskryf kan word en verteenwoordig die rasionaal van die argumente op grond waarvan Mackie en andere die teïstiese oplossings vir die probleem van die kwaad as ontoereikend afwys. In 'n nadere omskrywing van die oorspronge van hierdie redes, word daarop gewys dat alhoewel die probleem van die kwaad sy wortels in die voor-Christelike tyd het en dit ook dwarsdeur die Patristiek en die Middeleeue In onderwerp van drukke bespreking gebly het, dit egter die denkklimaat van die Verligting en in die besonder die nalatenskap van David Hume was wat sedertdien die belangrikste inspirasie van ateïstiese afwysings van die teïsme geword het. Wat die meer positief gerigte redes betref, word daar gefokus op ateïsties georiënteerde filosowe se pogings om op voetspoor van die onderskeidings van Hume en teen die agtergrond van die leemtes van teïsties georiënteerde oplossings vir die probleem, met daardie oplossings te eksperimenteer waarin daar van ten minste van een van die proposisies wat die probleem van die kwaad konstitueer, afstand gedoen word. Daar word aangevoer dat die weg tot eksperimentering met hierdie oplossings reeds deur onder meer die opvattings van Mill en Geach gebaan is en dat dit aan filosowe oënskynlik genoegsame rede gebied het om die probleem van die kwaad ook vanuit 'n ateïstiese gesigspunt te bearbei. Teen hierdie agtergrond word daar ten slotte op die tweede oogmerk van die studie gefokus, naamlik om aan te toon dat daar 'n nog meer fundamentele rede bestaan op grond waarvan daar aangevoer kan word dat die probleem van die kwaad inderdaad langs hierdie weg en ook sonder ernstige implikasies vir die geloof in God opgelos en die emosionele druk so eie aan hierdie problematiek verlig kan word. / wa201509

Thesis (MA) -- Stellenbosch University, 1949. / INLEIDING: Enige denker wat die geskiedenis van die filosofie bestudeer, gee daarmee te kenne dat die geskiedenis van die filosofie meer is as bloot 'n ry van aaneengeskakelde dog verwerpte sisteme. Die geskiedenis van die filosofie is nie 'n museum van historiese kuriositeite, wat vir die huidige denker van geen waar is nie. In die geskiedenis van die filosofie vind die denker die probleme terug waarmee hy homself ook besig hu alhoewel hierdie probleme steeds in 'n ander verband of vanuit 'n ander gesigspunt gestel is. Die geskiedenis van die filosofie is 'n leerskool vir elke denker. Die feit dat die geskiedenis van die filosofie 'n leerskool vir elke denker is, op wat ter punt van die geskiedenis hy ook staan, hou egter verskillende implikasies in.

Thesis(MA) -- Stellenbosch University, 1948. / No abstract available

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 1982. / No abstract available

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / Prof. F P Cilliers acted, until his death on 31 July 2011, as the original promotor of this dissertation / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This dissertation departs from the argument that an encounter with complexity exposes the breakdown of traditional doctrines that have been taken for granted for too long (markedly modernist reductionism). Contrary to reductionist strategies that rely on the methods of analysis and isolation, the study of complex phenomena focuses on the dynamic relations and organisation of systems and their environments. Although the proliferation of ideas concerning the notion of complexity is abundant, there is no agreed upon definition that informs an overarching ‘Theory of Complexity.’ This problem is addressed by following the historical development in the field of systyms thinking. A distinction is made between ‘restricted’ and ‘general’ theories of complexity. The study problematises the conceptual and empirical difficulties of studying complex phenomena. The impossibility of being able to have complete knowledge of complex systems is discussed in detail. It is argued that although the study of complexity serves as an alternative approach to reductionist approaches, our knowledge of complexity in principle remains a reduction thereof. This insight leads to the claim that the study of complex phenomena is at best a post-reductionist effort, which is necessarily a critical position. It is argued that the ‘complexity approach’ coincides with other poststructural approaches in the field of philosophy in general and with deconstruction in particular. However, situating the complexity approach within poststructuralism is not unproblematic, seeing that poststructural forms of critique are marred by problems of legitimation. Allegiance to postmetaphysical ideals implies that objective grounds for justifying or warranting the choice of norms from where to launch critical inquiry are sacrificed. A deconstructive reading of the Kantian concept of ‘critique’ reveals a double movement that is at work in the concept. This double bind displaces the definition of critique to change to mean ‘critique as stricture.’ From this perspective the logic of différance is at work in critical analysis and the limitations of our meaning making strategies are exposed. It is suggested that ‘critique as stricture’ is a poststructural form of critical inquiry that regains legitimacy by operating in the tension of the force field created by antagonistic positions. A provisional grounding in the name of the limit emerges. The kind of thinking that can be cognisant of this general movement of ‘critique as stricture’ is found in the notion of ‘complex thinking.’ By drawing on Derrida’ and Morin’s reappropriation of Bataille’s distinction between the restricted and general economy, it is demonstrated how complex thinking is operating within the movement of the general economy. The study concludes with the argument that informed by ‘critique as stricture,’ the complexity approach progresses to what Cilliers calls ‘critical complexity.’ This brand of complexity distinguishes itself by a normative turn, which is distinguished by three imperatives: 1) the Provisional Imperative, 2) the Critical Reflexive Imperative and 3) the World-disclosing Imperative. All of these operate under the influence of the general economy, which allows critical inquiry to be grounded and legitimised in the tension of thinking antagonistic positions together without reducing them to one another. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie proefskrif word aangevoer dat die verskynsel van kompleksiteit die disintegrasie van tradisionele leerstellings se aansprake, wat te lank as vanselfsprekend aanvaar was, ontbloot (merkbaar reduksionistiese modernisme). In teenstelling met reduksionistiese strategieë wat staat maak op metodes van analise en isolasie, fokus die studie van komplekse verskynsels op die dinamiese verhoudings en organisasie van sisteme en hul omgewings. Alhoewel die studie van kompleksiteit ’n byna alledaagse verskynsel geword het, bestaan daar geen bindende definisie wat ’n enkele ‘Teorie van Kompleksiteit’ daarstel nie. Daar word spesifiek op hierdie probleem gefokus in terme van hoe die wetenskaplike studie van kompleksiteit histories ontwikkel het. Dit word aangevoer dat dit sinvoller is om eerder tussen ‘beperkte’ en ‘algemene’ teorieë van kompleksiteit te onderskei as om ’n oorkoepelende teorie te ontwikkel. Heelwat probleme duik op in die poging om komplekse verskynsels konseptueel en empiries te bestudeer. Alhoewel die studie van komplekse verskynsels ’n alternatiewe posisie tot reduksionistiese benaderings daarstel, kan kennis van kompleksiteit in beginsel slegs ’n reduksie daarvan wees. As gevolg hiervan word die studie van komplekse verskynsels ten beste as ’n post-reduksionistiese poging beskryf wat noodwendig ’n kritiese posisie impliseer. Die kompleksiteitsbenadering stem in die algemeen met post-strukturele filosofiese benaderings, en spesifiek met dekonstruksie ooreen. Hierdie ooreenstemming is egter nie onproblematies nie, aangesien post-strukutrele kritiese posisies deur probleme van legitimasie gekenmerk word. Lojaliteit aan post-metafisiese ideale het tot gevolg dat daar geen objektiewe, grondige vertrekpunt bestaan vanwaar normatiewe begrondings geregverdig kan word nie. ’n Dekonstruktiewe lees van Kant se idee van die begrip ‘kritiek’ openbaar dat daar ’n ‘double movement’ aan die werk is wat die konsep ‘kritiek’ kan verruim ten einde dit te verander om ‘critique as stricture’ te beteken. Die werking van différance is altyd betrokke tydens kritiese analise waardeur die beperkinge van ons singewende strategieë blootgestel word. Hierdie her-definiëring van kritiek as ‘critique as stricture’ stel ons in staat om nuwe lewe in die kritiese projek te blaas deurdat legitimiteit gevind word in die spanning van die kragveld wat geskep word tussen antagonistiese posisies. ’n Voorlopige grondslag word in die naam van die beperkings van ons denkstrategië gevestig. ‘Kompleksiteitsdenke’ (‘complex thinking’) stel ’n denkstrategie daar wat tred hou met die dinamiese beweging wat in ‘critique as stricture’ teenwoordig is. ‘Kompleksiteitsdenke’ word aan die hand van Derrida en Morin se interpretasie van Bataille se onderskeid tussen die beperkte en algemene ekonomie gedoen ten einde te demonstreer dat ‘kompleksiteitsdenke’ binne die beweging van die algemene ekonomie val. Die studie word afgesluit met die argument dat, ingelig deur ‘critique as stricture’, die kompleksiteitsbenadering tot die begrip ‘kritiese kompleksiteit’ ontwikkel soos voorgestel deur Cilliers. Kritiese kompleksiteit word deur ’n normatiewe impuls gekenmerk wat in sigself weer deur drie noodsaaklike eienskappe uitgeken kan word: 1) die Voorlopige Imperatief, 2) die Kritiese Refleksiewe Imperatief en 3) die Wêreld-ontsluitende Imperatief. Al drie hierdie imperatiewe staan onder die invloed van die algemene ekonomie wat ons toelaat om kritiese analise te begrond in die spanning wat onstaan wanneer antagonistiese konsepte saam gedink word sonder dat hulle tot mekaar gereduseer word.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The distinction between treatment and enhancement is often considered to be a morally significant boundary, which, at the very least, marks the limits of our moral obligations. This conviction holds despite the fact that treatment and enhancement are situated along a continuum of interventions that are directed towards the improvement of human functioning. The distinction between these two sorts of interventions is based upon a notion of normative normality, which suggests that we are morally obligated to provide interventions which are directed toward the achievement of normal functioning, but that no obligation exists to improve functioning beyond this point. This dissertation will subject this position to critique by examining the constitution of normal functioning, and by suggesting that this kind of functioning cannot operate as a normative standard which determines the limits of our moral obligations. The moral desirability which we attribute to the achievement of normal functioning is based upon the independent ethical imperative to promote the possibilities for well-being of moral agents. This motivation, however, equally suggests that we will be obligated to provide certain kinds of enhancement interventions which will be likely to promote the welfare interests of moral agents, when these become available. This argument also implies that the development of enhancement technologies will require us to rethink our ethical conception of harmful non-benefits. We currently think of the non-provision of medical treatment and some environmental enhancements, such as education, as harmful to the extent that state intervention is justified to rectify this. We recognise that such non-provision, and the resultant failure to promote the welfare interests of moral agents, where such promotion is possible, harms persons by putting them in a worse position than they could have been in, with regards to their chances of leading a good life. The new technological possibilities offered by the prospect of genetic enhancement mean that we might soon have a better alternative, in terms of our chances of leading a good life, to the level of functioning that we have thus far been able to achieve. This implies that the non-provision of these enhancements would be harmful to the extent that intervention to bring about this provision would be justified. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die onderskeid tussen behandeling (“treatment”) en verbetering (“enhancement”) word dikwels geag 'n skeiding daar te stel wat van morele belang is, in soverre dit ten minste, die perke van ons morele verpligtinge afbaken. Hierdie oortuiging geld ten spyte van die feit dat behandeling en verbetering op „n kontinuum van ingrype wat op die verbetering van menslike funksionering gerig is, geleë is. Die onderskeid tussen hierdie twee tipes ingrype is gebaseer op 'n bepaalde begrip van normatiewe normaliteit, wat suggereer dat ons moreel verplig is om ingrype te voorsien wat daarop gerig is om normale funksionering te bewerkstellig, maar dat geen sodanige verpligting bestaan om funksionering duskant hierdie punt te verbeter nie. Hierdie proefskrif sal laasgenoemde posisie aan kritiek onderwerp deur die manier waarop ons normale funksionering verstaan, te ondersoek, en deur aan die hand te doen dat hierdie tipe funksionering nie as normatiewe standaard wat die perke van ons morele verpligtinge bepaal, kan dien nie. Die morele gewenstheid wat ons toeskryf daaraan om normale funksionering mee te bring, is op die onafhanklike etiese imperatief om die moontlikhede vir welstand van morele agente te bevorder, gebaseer. Hierdie motivering doen egter eweseer aan die hand dat ons verplig sal wees om sekere tipes verbeteringsingrype te verskaf wat waarskynlik die welsynbelange van morele agente sal bevorder, wanneer sulke verbeteringsingrype beskikbaar word. Hierdie argument impliseer ook dat die ontwikkeling van verbeteringstegnologieë van ons sal vereis om ons etiese konsepsie van skadelike nie-voordele opnuut te deurdink. Tans dink ons dat die nie-voorsiening van mediese behandeling, sowel as sommige omgewingsverbeterings soos opvoeding, tot so „n mate skadelik is dat staatsinmenging met die doel om dit reg te stel, geregverdig is. Ons erken dat sulke nie-voorsiening en die gevolglike versuim om die welsynsbelange van morele agente te bevorder, waar sulke bevordering moontlik is, mense skade berokken deur hulle in „n slegter posisie te plaas as waarin hul kon gewees het, ten aansien van hul kanse om 'n goeie lewe te leef. Die nuwe tegnologiese moontlikhede wat die voortuitsig van genetiese verbetering ons bied, beteken dat ons binnekort 'n beter alternatief mag hê vir die vlak van funksionering wat ons tot dusver kon bewerkstellig, ooreenkomstig ons kanse om 'n goeie lewe te leef. Dit impliseer dat die nie-voorsiening van hierdie verbeterings skadelik sal wees tot die mate wat ingrype om hierdie voorsiening teweeg te bring, geregverdig sal wees.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Multicultural conflicts pervade our world and have sparked considerable debate about their possible resolution. We argue that how culture is conceptualized is crucial to the continued dialogue about multicultural conflicts. Specifically, we argue that approaches that argue for the protection of cultures run into significant problems if they do not employ a conception of cultures as delineated entities. However, we also hold that the notion that cultures cannot be distinct in any way, does very little to contribute to dialogue. From the very beginning, it excludes the notion of a culture that is to be protected and thus stops the dialogue there and then. To be true to the principle of audi ad alteram partem, approaches to multicultural conflicts must conceive of an alternative model, provided that such a model is logically possible. This may provide the dialogue with a much needed point of common understanding from which to proceed. Accordingly, we develop a model of culture whereby it is possible to delineate cultures. In this model, a culture can be delineable in a manner analogous to how we delineate persons. Our model of personal delineation suggests a dual structure whereby a trivial personal boundary contains a unity of conflict within the person. In persons, this unity of conflict lies in the relationship between the “I” and repressed meanings. This relationship must be characterised by self-referential decisions and the capacity to make self-referential decisions is central to our definition of personal autonomy. In cultures, we argue that multicultural conflicts provide the necessary conditions that enable us to conceptualize trivial boundaries in cultures in terms of the communicative relationships between members of a particular culture. Multicultural conflicts prompt self-categorizations by individuals and such self-categorizations are made in terms of group membership. Though all members may not agree as to who belongs to the culture and who does not, the claims made about membership serve to differentiate the communicative relationships inside the culture from those outside it. Furthermore, we show that, inside this trivial boundary, a unity of conflict analogous to the one found in personal autonomy, can be exhibited by cultures. We show how a culture, through its institutions, particularly through an institutionalised exit possibility, 1) may exhibit self-reference and 2) relate to a source of authority in the same way as a person does when making selfreferential decisions. In this regard, we argue that institutionalised exit possibilities embody adherence to the consensus vs. power criterion, according to which the dominant account of a culture is achieved through consensus, as opposed to through the exertion of power. Furthermore, we argue that with a strong analogy between cultures’ and personal delineation, it becomes reasonable to extend concepts we usually apply to persons, such as fairness, attachment and viability, so that they can also apply to cultures. We show that the application of these concepts clarifies certain current multicultural issues. The application of theses concepts also leads to the development of a decision making process to deal with multicultural issues. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Multikulturele konflikte kom wêreldwyd voor en het reeds aansienlike debat oor die resolusie van sodanige konflik ontlok. Ons voer aan dat hoe kultuur gekonseptualiseer word, besonder belangrik is vir die voorgesette dialoog oor multikulturele konflikte. Meer spesifiek voer ons aan dat benaderings wat vir die beskerming van kulture argumenteer, beduidende probleme ondervind indien dit nie `n konsepsie van kulture as delinieerbare entiteite gebruik nie. Die gedagte dat kulture nie op enige manier afgebaken kan word nie, dra egter ook weinig by tot dialoog. Dit sluit van meet af die gedagte dat kulture beskerm moet word, uit en staak dus die dialoog daar en dan. Ten einde getrou te wees aan die beginsel van audi ad alteram partem, moet benaderings tot multikulturele konflik `n alternatiewe model van kultuur bedink, mits so `n model logies moontlik is. So `n model kan die dialoog van `n broodnodige gemeenskaplike uitgangspunt voorsien. Ons ontwikkel dienooreenkomstig `n model van kultuur waarvolgens dit moontlik is om kulture te delinieer. Volgens hierdie model kan `n kultuur delinieer word in analogie met hoe persone delinieer word. Ons model van persoonlike deliniëring stel `n tweeledige struktuur voor, waarvolgens `n triviale persoonlike grens `n eenheid van konflik binne die persoon omspan. In persone lê hierdie eenheid van konflik in die verhouding tussen die “ek” en onderdrukte betekenisse. Hierdie verhouding moet deur self-referensiële besluite gekenmerk word. Die vermoë tot self-referensiële besluite, so voer ons aan, is ook die sentrale kenmerk van persoonlike outonomie. Ons voer aan dat multikulturele konflikte die noodsaaklike toestande skep wat ons in staat stel om triviale grense in kulture te definieer in terme van die kommunikatiewe verhoudings tussen lede van `n spesifieke kultuur. Multikulturele konflikte ontlok self-kategorisering deur individue en sodanige kategorisering word in terme van groeplidmaatskap gedoen. Hoewel alle lede van die kultuur nie noodwendig saamstem oor wie aan die kultuur behoort en wie nie, maak die bewerings wat oor lidmaatskap gemaak word dit moontlik om die kommunikatiewe verhoudings binne die kultuur te onderskei van dié buite die kultuur. Verder demonstreer ons dat, binne hierdie triviale grens, kulture `n eenheid van konflik ten toon kan stel wat soortgelyk aan die eenheid van konflik by persoonlike outonomie is. Ons wys hoe `n kultuur, deur sy instellings, en vernaam deur `n geïnstitusionaliseerde uitgangsmoontlikheid (‘exit possibility’) 1) self-referensie ten toon kan stel en 2) in verhouding met `n bron van gesag kan staan soos `n persoon wanneer s/hy self-referensiële besluite maak. In dié verband voer ons aan dat geïnstitusionaliseerde uitgangsmoontlikhede die beliggaming is van die nakoming van die konsensus vs. mag-kriterium, waarvolgens die dominante weergawe van `n kultuur bereik word deur konsensus, teenoor deur die uitoefen van mag. Verder voer ons aan dat `n sterk analogie tussen kulture en persone se deliniëring dit moontlik maak om begrippe soos regverdigheid, binding en lewensvatbaarheid, wat gewoonlik op persone toegepas word, op kulture toe te pas. Die toepassing van hierdie begrippe verbeter ons begrip van sekere huidige multikulturele kwessies en lei ook tot die ontwikkeling van `n besluitnemingsproses vir multikulturele kwessies.

Thesis (MA (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / The Philosophy of Poverty and the Ethics of Ubuntu The question posed in this article is if and how the ethics of ubuntu could play a role in poverty eradication in a capitalist economic system. I address this question by investigating a specific poverty eradication project proposal called Pela Nambu, aimed at utilising the principle of participation that exists in the “second economy”, combined with the instruments of wealth creation of the “first economy”. After describing and expanding the Pela Nambu approach, I interrogate some of its main assumptions, and find that the ethics of ubuntu does not really have a chance to be mainstreamed as the philosophy of poverty has to reckon with the fact that the multinational corporation is the dominant institution of our time. For Pela Nambu to succeed, “first economy” participation will need to be in the form of partnerships and not charity. The present Corporate Social and Environmental Responsibility performance of companies is not encouraging. Yet, the new Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment codes and the increased marketability of differentiated products does offer an opportunity that initiatives like Pela Nambu could fruitfully explore. From hauntology to a new animism? Nature and culture in Heinz Kimmerle’s intercultural philosophy Derrida has proposed a new spectrology in an attempt to deal with the ghost of Marx. Kimmerle shows that Marx has forgotten nature, and enquires about Derrida’s forgetting Marx’s forgetting. With specific reference to African culture he asks whether a new animism should not be explored within the framework of a new spectrology. Derrida uses the concept animism, but not in terms of the being of things in and of themselves, which could positively be thought as animated. Kimmerle proposes a way in which Western philosophy could be opened to African philosophy in order to understand the problem of animated nature more adequately. African philosophy has a concept of the universe of spiritual forces, in which nature and its powers are completely integrated. This paper explores these issues in dialogue with a number of African philosophers, while linking them to certain contestations within environmental philosophy and ethics, especially Murray Bookchin’s critique of spirit-talk in Deep Ecology. Kimmerle’s work on the relationship between Africa and Hegel sets the scene for an elaboration of his re-evaluation of animism which is compared to the ground-breaking hypothesis of Bird-David. A relational epistemology is understood in ethical terms, and it is implied that such an epistemology would be more adequate for a new humanism that would be new in going beyond the western tradition, and in the process gain a more inclusive concept of ‘person’ and ‘community’. The community and the individual in Western and African thought: Implications for knowledge production The tension between the group and the individual is a pervasive condition of humanity that is resolved differently in Western and African knowledge systems. The polarity of “I think therefore I am” versus “I am because we are” does not do justice to the role of the individual in African knowledge systems, and recent attempts in Western philosophy to ormulate a “philosophy of we”. A contextual philosophy of knowledge production is concerned about the we as the carrier of traditions. It is a philosophy of the in-between cultures and knowledge systems that is engaged in dialogues aimed at the formulation of universals. Intercultural (or contextual) philosophy becomes the ‘contemporary idiom’ within which to express ‘the cluster of humanist principles which underlie the traditional African society’ (Nkrumah).