Despite promising prospects to transition towards a democracy after attaining its independence in 1980, Zimbabwe somehow fell into authoritarian rule and became increasingly undemocratic compared to other countries in southern Africa. Therefore, this thesis seeks to understand why a “most likely” case of democratization in the region failed and instead slipped into authoritarianism between 1980 and 2000. The single case study investigates a set of elite level dynamics, using components of process tracing and case study techniques. The analysis is built upon a theoretical framework focusing on dimensions of power dynamics in terms of Bratton’s power capture, power division and power sharing along with Svolik’s politics of authoritarian rule and the dominant party system. The research indicates that the political party Zanu-Pf, under the leadership of Mugabe, has dominated the political arena since the first democratic elections of 1980. With the help of the party’s majority, the ruling elites captured, divided, shared and controlled power; to serve authoritarian ends that ensured regime survival at the expense of democracy.

Over the past decade, a third wave of autocratisation has stormed the world, hitting democracies and autocracies alike. The ongoing democratic backsliding is attributed to a range of factors. From “executive aggrandisement” and strategic manipulation of elections to "autocratic lawfare”. Such autocratic tendencies are contributing to autocratisation in dominant party regimes in Africa. If most dominant party systems are increasingly autocratising in Africa, then there is a problem with the dominant party structure that warrants academic inquiry. However, the literature on one-party dominance and democratic consolidation in Africa are a bit old, hence do not address the current debates on democratic backsliding in the continent. Botswana and Tanzania are interesting cases of autocratising dominant party systems because they have witnessed rapid erosion of democratic qualities over the decade. But what effects do these patterns of democratic backsliding have on the quality of democracy in dominant party systems in Africa? Employing a comparative research design (MSSD) and using historical institutionalism and the substantive democratic theory as well as relying on secondary data in Botswana and Tanzania (Mainly Afrobarometer surveys, V-Dem Index, CPI Index, Ibrahim Index of African Governance, and Freedom Index), this study explores this question within the framework of peace and development research. It analysed four variables: management of social tensions facing the regime, the scope of presidential power, governance performance, and the nature of the electoral competition. Findings suggest that a dominant party structure in Botswana and Tanzania creates conditions that erode the quality of democracy, hence democratic backsliding. Therefore, the thesis argues that autocratisation in Botswana and Tanzania suggests reproduction of one-party dominance at the expense of consolidation of substantive democracy. This way, a dominant party structure in Africa appears to be a peace and development research problem because it creates strong incentives for dominant parties to autocratise rather than democratise when challenged by a strong political opposition.

This thesis examines the impact of one party dominant systems on liberal democracy in developing countries. It is insufficient to argue that one party dominant systems – systems where one party dominates over a prolonged period - need not be further scrutinised because they occur within democracies. Instead it is contended that the term ‘democracy’ is but one public virtue in a political system and thus needs to be prefixed for it to have meaning beyond a method of government selection. The importance of this is highlighted when looking at two major trends in the understanding of democracy. The first is democracy as rule by the people -a non-authoritarian democracy- where governmental control is limited, and agents of voice and accountability are protected. Voice and accountability refers to citizens being able to exercise power over the process of decision-making and not merely power to select decision-makers. The second type of democracy is rule for the people -an authoritarian democracy- where governmental control extends over all spheres of society, and the operating space for agents of voice and accountability is constrained. Since unchecked centralisation is the anti-thesis of a non-authoritarian democracy, the observed tendency of dominant parties to use their predominant position to further consolidate their control is a concern. The apprehension is, as power is centralised so the operating space of agents of voice and accountability (including political and civil society) is constrained. Despite differences in the type of one party dominant system, whether they be hegemonic (Mexico) or dominant (South Africa) the ruling dominant/ hegemonic party uses similar methods of consolidating dominance – they essentially centralise power through the establishment of (1) economic, (2) political, and sometimes (3) ideological monopolies. These monopolies are established using internal and external methods of control (centralising of political power; party controlled process of political leadership selection; institutional arrangements and electoral amendments, which favour the ruling party; patronage and corporatism), which in turn effectively close down or limit the operating space of civil and political society, especially in developing countries which do not have histories of liberal-constitutionalism, and have vast socio-economic inequalities making them especially susceptible to the manipulation of ruling elites. Although one party dominant systems may initially have a uniting, stabilising effect, if continued they tend to lead towards either the entrenchment of authoritarianism or the establishment of authoritarianism, since dominance is achieved at the expense of competition, and independent and alternative voices. Uncompetitive democracies result in unresponsive governments. Pursuing a liberal democracy, while simultaneously monopolising power is to indulge in serious programmatic contradictions. Eventually something has to give and it is usually liberal democracy. Voice and accountability inevitably become inhibited in one party dominant systems due to the mechanisms of internal and external control used by the dominant or hegemonic party. These mechanisms of control culminate in, as they did in Mexico, there being ‘no life outside the ruling party’. Only when the economic, political and ideological monopolies are dismantled through either economic liberalisation, opposition maintaining its integrity, civil society keeping its independence and societies refusing to be drawn into relationships of patronage, can the space for voice and accountability be prised open again. In the interests of its citizens and the future success of its country, the ruling party of a one party dominant system needs to recognise that it is not the sole channel for the voice of its citizens and to acknowledge the space for agents of voice and accountability. Ensuring that non-authoritarian democracy remains the only game in town in a one party dominant system requires responsive and accountable government and effective agents of voice and accountability. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Political Sciences / unrestricted