Vårt syfte med detta arbete har varit att undersöka kommunalt lag- och domstolstrots utifrån KomL och att försöka finna ett svar på varför det trots flera utredningar inte har blivit sanktionerat. Vidare har vårt syfte varit att utreda vilka möjliga sanktioner som varit på förslag. Vart ansvaret för kommunalt lag- och domstolstrots ska riktas har också varit en central del i vårt arbete. Vår metod har varit rättsdogmatisk och har kompletterats av en undersökning riktad till de förtroendevalda i kommunfullmäktige i Luleå kommun. Resultatet för arbetet har utmynnat i en förståelse för varför det inte finns några sanktioner mot kommunalt lag- och domstolstrots. Det har för regeringen funnits en gränsdragningsproblematik mellan legalitetsprincipen och det kommunala självstyret. Vårt resultat har lett fram till förslag på möjliga sanktioner som kan motverka kommunalt lag- och domstolstrots utan för stort ingrepp i det kommunala självstyret.

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<p> </p><p> </p><p> </p><p>Officially, Sweden has a very low level of corruption and in 2008 topped Transparency International’s list in terms of the perception of a lack of corruption. However, on closer examination it would appear that the Swedish public sector is not as clean as the Transparency International list suggests. What appears to be relatively common and quite widely accepted in Sweden, especially in local government, are conflict of interest situations in which public officials use their position to obtain advantages for themselves, their friends and their colleagues, in particular with respect to public procurement.</p><p> </p><p>According to the Swedish constitution, the public administration shall be governed by the principles on legality and objectivity. Grave violations of these principles are deemed illegal and contrary to the penal code provisions relating to bribery, public misconduct and breach of confidentiality<em>.</em> This, however, is where the problem arises. The provisions of the law regarding public misconduct only cover those areas involving the exercise of public authority. Although the handling of public matters when a conflict of interest exists is prohibited, there are no sanctions in the penal code for occasions where these provisions are violated. As public procurement is considered to be a contractual matter rather than one that falls within the scope of public authority, there are technically no means, from a criminal law point of view, to address conflict of interest situations, unless the actions taken amount to for example bribery, fraud or a criminal breach of trust.</p><p> </p><p>The aim of this paper is to answer the following questions:</p><p> </p><p>Where does the improper influencing of public decisions due to a conflict of interest fit within the concept of corruption?</p><p>How can improper influence and conflict of interest be tackled from a criminal law point of view under the current Swedish legislation;</p><p>What changes, if any, would be required to permit that improper influence due to a conflict of interest can be properly addressed from a criminal law point of view?</p><p> </p><p>My research established that a situation in which public officials improperly influence the official decision-making process because of private interests falls within most international definitions of corruption, i.e. “the abuse of public office for private gain”. It was also established that this type of behaviour in the Swedish public service is often impossible to deal with through criminal prosecution, although it violates the legal provisions on public conflict of interest. This paper therefore concludes that the improper use of influence due to a conflict of interest should be regarded as corrupt activities and be criminalised, thus safeguarding the constitutional principles of the public administration.</p>

Officially, Sweden has a very low level of corruption and in 2008 topped Transparency International’s list in terms of the perception of a lack of corruption. However, on closer examination it would appear that the Swedish public sector is not as clean as the Transparency International list suggests. What appears to be relatively common and quite widely accepted in Sweden, especially in local government, are conflict of interest situations in which public officials use their position to obtain advantages for themselves, their friends and their colleagues, in particular with respect to public procurement.   According to the Swedish constitution, the public administration shall be governed by the principles on legality and objectivity. Grave violations of these principles are deemed illegal and contrary to the penal code provisions relating to bribery, public misconduct and breach of confidentiality. This, however, is where the problem arises. The provisions of the law regarding public misconduct only cover those areas involving the exercise of public authority. Although the handling of public matters when a conflict of interest exists is prohibited, there are no sanctions in the penal code for occasions where these provisions are violated. As public procurement is considered to be a contractual matter rather than one that falls within the scope of public authority, there are technically no means, from a criminal law point of view, to address conflict of interest situations, unless the actions taken amount to for example bribery, fraud or a criminal breach of trust.   The aim of this paper is to answer the following questions:   Where does the improper influencing of public decisions due to a conflict of interest fit within the concept of corruption? How can improper influence and conflict of interest be tackled from a criminal law point of view under the current Swedish legislation; What changes, if any, would be required to permit that improper influence due to a conflict of interest can be properly addressed from a criminal law point of view?   My research established that a situation in which public officials improperly influence the official decision-making process because of private interests falls within most international definitions of corruption, i.e. “the abuse of public office for private gain”. It was also established that this type of behaviour in the Swedish public service is often impossible to deal with through criminal prosecution, although it violates the legal provisions on public conflict of interest. This paper therefore concludes that the improper use of influence due to a conflict of interest should be regarded as corrupt activities and be criminalised, thus safeguarding the constitutional principles of the public administration.