Este trabalho analisou os leilões de comercialização de energia elétrica no ambiente de contratação regulada no Brasil, realizados entre 2005 e 2011, com o objetivo de propor aperfeiçoamentos em sua metodologia. Para tanto, foram estudadas três linhas de pesquisa: teoria de leilões, internalização (adicionais) de custos não privados (externalidades) e organização de mercados de capacidade. Após a análise dos 21 leilões de novos empreendimentos realizados no período, conclui-se que o desenho do leilão com fase discriminatória final é adequado aos objetivos de modicidade tarifária, mas que também permite melhoras. As fraquezas da sistemática atual identificadas foram: metodologia de contratação termelétrica por disponibilidade, com viés das fontes de maior custo variável unitário, adoção de preço-teto nem sempre adequado, dificuldade em mitigar o exercício de poder de mercado da Eletrobras nos leilões de energia existente e licitação pelo custo econômico privado. De forma a aprimorar os leilões, as seguintes ações foram sugeridas: realização de uma etapa adicional e prévia ao desenho de leilão híbrido atual visando contornar a problemática de estabelecimento de preço-teto adequado; utilização de adicionais ao lance do leilão para internalizar os custos de transmissão não recolhidos pelo gerador; substituição do mecanismo de contratação termelétrica pelo modelo Colombiano de opções; condução de leilões de energia nova e existente em conjunto, e segmentação de produtos no leilão pela ótica da demanda com possibilidade de lances em pacotes. Com a adoção destas propostas entende-se que o valor negociado nos leilões de comercialização de energia elétrica refletirão melhor o custo social dos projetos, aumentando a eficiência dos certames. / This study analyzes the regulated electricity procurement auctions conducted between 2005 and 2011 in Brazil, in order to propose improvements in its methodology. Thus, it was reviewed three research areas: auctions design, internalization of externalities, and capacity markets. After analyzing the 21 new energy auctions that period, it is concluded the auction design with a second discriminatory bid is appropriate to the aims at achieving as low as possible prices, however there is room for improvement. Identified weaknesses are: (1) thermal availability capacity hiring method biased in favor of energy sources with higher variable costs; (2) inadequate price cap, unable to mitigate Eletrobras market power in existing power auctions, (3) and bidding by private economic cost. So, it is suggested the following actions to improve the efficiency of energy auctions: (a) carrying out an additional step prior to the current hybrid auction design in order to solve the problem of establishing appropriate ceiling price; (b) use of additional to internalize transmission costs not paid by generator; (c) replacement of the bid mechanism used for thermal power plants to Colombian options model; (d) driving new and existing energy auctions together, and (e) segment auctions products by the demand side with the possibility of bidding in packages. In adopting these proposals it is expected the value traded in the electricity procurement auction conducted in Brazil will better reflect the social cost of projects and so improving its efficiency.

[pt] Esta dissertação apresenta um modelo de programação linear para mercados virtuais, que tem como objetivo principal incentivar vendedores a oferecerem preços mais baixos e compradores a pagarem mais pelos produtos. Esse incentivo é feito através de compensações aos participantes do mercado que agirem desta forma. O modelo funciona basicamente como um leilão bi-lateral, onde tanto vendedores quanto compradores podem dar seus lances. Para este modelo básico foram modeladas extensães como: existência de custo de transporte entre vendedores e compradores; economia de escala no preço do comprador; possibilidade de múltiplos produtos em um mesmo leilão. Para o modelo básico e cada uma das extensões propostas foi elaborado o sistema de compensações baseados em princípios da Teoria dos Jogos. Em cada caso, foi verificada a existência de soluções de núcleo e como essas soluções determinam as características do mercado. / [en] This work presents a linear programming model for virtual markets. The main objective is to encourage sellers to offer lower prices and buyers to pay more for products. This is done through a system where the agents are awarded for acting this way. The basic version of the model works as an auction where buyers and sellers can make their bids. Some extensions were developed for this basic model, to allow situations like: transportation cost between buyers and sellers; scale economy for the buyer's price; multiples products in the same auction. For the basic model and each of its extensions, the system of awards has been developed based on Game Theory principles. In each case, the model was reinterpreted as a game and its core solutions were found. It was also verified how these solutions determine market's behavior.

We developed a price-based resource allocation scheme for Differentiated Service (DiffServ) data networks. The DiffServ framework was proposed to provide multiple QoS classes over IP networks. Since the provider supports multiple service classes, we need a differentiated pricing scheme, as supposed to the flat-rate scheme employed by the Internet service providers of today. Charging efficiently is a big issue. The utility of a client correlates to the amount of bandwidth allocated. One difficulty we face is that determining the appropriate amount of bandwidth to provision and allocate is problematic due to different time scales, multiple QoS classes and the unpredictable nature of users. To approach this problem, we designed a pricing strategy for Admission Control and bandwidth assignment. Despite the variety of existing pricing strategies, the common theme is that the appropriate pricing policy rewards users for behaving in ways to improve the overall utilization and performance of the network. Among existing schemes, we chose auction because it is scalable, and efficiently and fairly shares resources. Our pricing model takes the system's availability and each customer's requirements as inputs and outputs the set of clients who are admitted into the network and their allocated resource. Each client proposes a desired bandwidth and a price that they are willing to pay for it. The service provider collects this information and produces parameters for each class of service they provide. This information is used to decide which customers to admit. We proposed an optimal solution to the problem of maximizing the provider's revenue for the special case where there is only one bottleneck link in the network. Then for the generalized network, we resort to a simple but effective heuristic method. We validate both the optimal solution and the heuristic algorithm with simulations driven by a real traffic scenario. Finally, we allow customers to bid on the duration for which the service is needed. Then we study the performance of those heuristic algorithms in this new setting and propose possible improvements.

In markets where suppliers experience learning by doing over time or, more generally, economies of scale in production, buyers are auctioning off longer-term contracts with an eroding price policy. Under an eroding price contract, the buyer initially competitively awards production to the lowest-bid supplier via an auction. Before the auction takes place, the buyer makes it clear to the suppliers that, if chosen, a sequence of price reductions will be mandatory in subsequent periods. In this thesis, we mainly study the design of the optimal eroding price contract in a two period setting under three different model settings : (1) Every supplier faces a new cost in each period (NLI model), (2) The supplier who wins the auction in the first period locks-in his cost for the future, and the buyer makes the future payment based on the winning supplier's current bid (LI1), and (3) The supplier who wins the auction in the first period locks-in his cost for the future, and the buyer makes the future payment based on the winning supplier's actual cost (LI1). Under NLI setting, the magnitude of the cost reduction due to learning by doing is common knowledge, while the magnitude is uncertain under LI1 and LI2 settings. We also study the optimal reserve prices in sequential independent auctions under NLI setting. We go on to compare the performance of the eroding price policy against sequential independent auctions (without or with the optimal reserve prices) under the above model settings. Via analytical and numerical comparisons, we find that even in the presence of learning by doing/economies of scale in production, a buyer is often better off running sequential auctions with a reserve price, rather than limiting competition and contracting with a single supplier in the hopes of extracting a better future price.

The purpose of the study is to analyze the problem of offer pricing and share issuing in the issuer with a dynamic model. The result shows: First, the correlation between discount and the prosperity of the market is not a linear function. Thus, ¡¥the IPO¡¦s timing¡¦ should be the key issue of issuing firm, which can reasonably explain the fluctuations in underpricing over time. Second, we also discover that the relationship between the ownership structure and the prosperity of the market is not a liner function as what Bolton and Thadden (1998) have claimed. Third, the firm with low quality prefers to release issuing shares in IPO when the market is booming. Fourth, the less the IPO discount in traditional industry, the more the share releasing. Finally, the more the phenomena of subscription, the more the investors subscribe blindly and generate an effect of the cascade. One of the contributions in this model comprises the views between the prosperity of the market and IPO discount in the literature to integrate a profound viewpoint by dividing the IPO discount into the offer pricing error and the market pricing error. Another finding is that the offer pricing error will decrease subject to the prosperity of the market. This is consistent with the viewpoint of Chemmanur (1993) that when the market is booming, the issuers can decrease the cost of adverse choice. As for the non-linear relation between the market pricing error and the prosperity of the market is coordinate with what Ma(1999) has claimed that IPO discount is influenced by the offer pricing and the market pricing. Besides, the non-linear relationship between ownership structure and the prosperity of market can reasonably account for the real situation. Besides, the benefit of controlling authority is better than the value of the cash flow of the released shares owing to the depression of the market, even the market is turning booming. Therefore, the issuers will minimize releasing share. However, the issuers will increasing released shares up to the market is keeping booming and the value of the cash flow of the released shares is better than the benefit of controlling authority. An auction model is established to analyze the choice of firms between fixed-price offerings and auctions. Chemmanur and Liu(2003) stated that obtaining the auction information is more advanced; however, the cost is high so that it can not catch enough investors to produce information which does not favor the discovery of the secondary market price. On the contrary, we proclaim that the information transmitting effect produced by auction will be helpful to the discovery of the secondary market price. Thus, a profitable company but suffers from high levels of information asymmetry prior to the IPO might expect the secondly market price to reflect its real value by auction. Moreover, the choice of underwriting mechanisms lies in the prosperity of the market, the reputation of the company and the degree of the releasing shares. The result of the empirical study is consistant with the expectation of our model.

In this study a time based bidding framework is developed which is used for dispatching jobs to manufacturing resources in a virtual shop-floor environment. Agent-based shop-floor control approach is implemented with machine and part agents. The Contract-net communication protocol is utilized as the negotiation scheme between these agents. Single step product reservation (SSPR) technique is adopted throughout the study. Primary objective is determined as meeting the due dates and if the lateness is inevitable, avoiding the parts of high priority from being late. A balanced machine utilization rate is set as the secondary objective. During bid construction step, the SSPR technique is augmented with W(SPT+CR) sequencing rule in order to obtain weighted tardiness results. Bids containing Earliest Finishing Time (EFT) and machine loading values of the corresponding machine are evaluated with considering the priority of the part. An elimination algorithm which discards the highly deviated bids having obvious differences is implemented at the initial stage of the bid evaluation step. A basic algorithm to control the maximum tardiness value is applied, as well. A simulation test bed is developed in order to implement the time concept into the presented bidding framework. The test bed is mainly based on the Computer Integrated Manufacturing Laboratory (CIMLAB) located in Middle East Technical University, Department of Mechanical Engineering. The developed bidding algorithm is tested under several cases. Results revealed that the proposed bidding framework was quite successful in meeting the objectives. The study is concluded with some specific future work, outlined in the light of the results obtained.

The primary argument in favor of mass customization is the delivery of superior customer value. Using willingness-to-pay (WTP) measurements, Franke & Piller (2004) have recently shown that customers designing their own watches with design toolkits are willing to pay premiums of more than 100% (DWTP). In the course of three studies, we found that this type of value increment is not a singular occurrence but might rather be a general phenomenon, as we again found average DWTPs of more than 100% among customers designing their own cell phone covers, T-shirts, and scarves. Building on this, we discuss the sources of benefits that are likely to explain this tremendous value increment. We argue that compared to conventional standard products, a mass-customized product might render the following utilitarian and hedonic benefits: (1) First, the output might be beneficial as self-designed products offer a much closer fit between individual needs and product characteristics. In addition to this mere functional benefit, extra value might also stem from (2) the perceived uniqueness of the self-designed product. As the customer takes on the role of an active codesigner, there may also be two general 'do-it-yourself effects': (3) First, the process of designing per se is likely to allow the customer to meet hedonic or experiential needs (process benefit). (4) Customers may also be likely to value the output of self-design more highly if they take pride in having created something on their own (instead of traditionally buying something created by somebody else). This is referred to as the 'pride of authorship' effect. (author's abstract)

World financial and economic crisis encouraged government institutions to find ways for more efficient organization of public procurement. Therefore there is growing interest in public procurement centralization process. In the dissertation there are analyzed economic, management and law aspects of public procurement centralization. The aim of the dissertation is to create a model for evaluating state’s financial benefits from centralization of public procurement and to evaluate these benefits in the case of Lithuania. By generalizing scientific literature there are abstracted elements influencing formation of financial benefits from centralization of public procurement, also there are advantages and disadvantages of public procurement centralization being analyzed. By synthesizing scientific knowledge of purchasing management and auction theory, few hypotheses are raised to explain differences in prices between centralized and decentralized public procurement. Empirical research of public procurement centralization was conducted and based on research results evaluation of Lithuanian state financial benefits from public procurement centralization was carried out. Also causes of price differences between centralized and decentralized public procurement were defined. Generalization of research results enabled to do prediction of development for public procurement centralization. / Pasaulyje 2008 metais kilusi finansinė ir ekonominė krizė paskatino valdžios institucijas ieškoti būdų, kaip efektyviau naudoti valstybės biudžeto lėšas, skirtas viešiesiems pirkimams. Todėl susidomėjimas viešųjų pirkimų centralizavimu pastaruoju metu labai padidėjo. Disertacijoje nagrinėjami ekonominiai, vadybiniai ir teisiniai viešųjų pirkimų centralizavimo aspektai. Pagrindinis darbo tikslas – sukurti viešųjų pirkimų centralizavimo finansinės naudos vertinimo modelį ir remiantis šiuo modeliu atlikti šios naudos vertinimo tyrimą viešųjų pirkimų centralizavimo Lietuvoje atveju. Disertacijoje, apibendrinus mokslinę literatūrą, išskiriami veiksniai, lemiantys viešųjų pirkimų centralizavimo finansinę naudą, taip pat analizuojami pirkimų centralizavimo pranašumai ir trūkumai. Sintetinant pirkimų valdymo dalyko ir aukcionų teorijos žinias, iškeliamos hipotezės paaiškinančios skirtumus tarp kainų centralizuotuose ir decentralizuotuose viešuosiuose pirkimuose. Darbe atlikti keli empiriniai viešųjų pirkimų centralizavimo tyrimai, kurių pagrindu įvertinta viešųjų pirkimų centralizavimo Lietuvoje finansinė nauda. Taip pat nustatytos kainų skirtumo centralizuotuose ir decentralizuotuose viešuosiuose pirkimuose susidarymo priežastys. Apibendrinti tyrimų rezultatai leido pateikti viešųjų pirkimų centralizavimo plėtros prognozę.

Pasaulyje 2008 metais kilusi finansinė ir ekonominė krizė paskatino valdžios institucijas ieškoti būdų, kaip efektyviau naudoti valstybės biudžeto lėšas, skirtas viešiesiems pirkimams. Todėl susidomėjimas viešųjų pirkimų centralizavimu pastaruoju metu labai padidėjo. Disertacijoje nagrinėjami ekonominiai, vadybiniai ir teisiniai viešųjų pirkimų centralizavimo aspektai. Pagrindinis darbo tikslas – sukurti viešųjų pirkimų centralizavimo finansinės naudos vertinimo modelį ir remiantis šiuo modeliu atlikti šios naudos vertinimo tyrimą viešųjų pirkimų centralizavimo Lietuvoje atveju. Disertacijoje, apibendrinus mokslinę literatūrą, išskiriami veiksniai, lemiantys viešųjų pirkimų centralizavimo finansinę naudą, taip pat analizuojami pirkimų centralizavimo pranašumai ir trūkumai. Sintetinant pirkimų valdymo dalyko ir aukcionų teorijos žinias, iškeliamos hipotezės paaiškinančios skirtumus tarp kainų centralizuotuose ir decentralizuotuose viešuosiuose pirkimuose. Darbe atlikti keli empiriniai viešųjų pirkimų centralizavimo tyrimai, kurių pagrindu įvertinta viešųjų pirkimų centralizavimo Lietuvoje finansinė nauda. Taip pat nustatytos kainų skirtumo centralizuotuose ir decentralizuotuose viešuosiuose pirkimuose susidarymo priežastys. Apibendrinti tyrimų rezultatai leido pateikti viešųjų pirkimų centralizavimo plėtros prognozę. / World financial and economic crisis encouraged government institutions to find ways for more efficient organization of public procurement. Therefore there is growing interest in public procurement centralization process. In the dissertation there are analyzed economic, management and law aspects of public procurement centralization. The aim of the dissertation is to create a model for evaluating state’s financial benefits from centralization of public procurement and to evaluate these benefits in the case of Lithuania. By generalizing scientific literature there are abstracted elements influencing formation of financial benefits from centralization of public procurement, also there are advantages and disadvantages of public procurement centralization being analyzed. By synthesizing scientific knowledge of purchasing management and auction theory, few hypotheses are raised to explain differences in prices between centralized and decentralized public procurement. Empirical research of public procurement centralization was conducted and based on research results evaluation of Lithuanian state financial benefits from public procurement centralization was carried out. Also causes of price differences between centralized and decentralized public procurement were defined. Generalization of research results enabled to do prediction of development for public procurement centralization.

If a correlation exists between cost and project delivery system then this is crucial knowledge for any group organizing a new construction project. It has been observed anecdotally that the construction cost per student of public elementary schools has been observed to continue to increase in the state of Texas, even with the recent downturn in the economy. The recent economic depression in the USA has seen construction material costs stagnate and construction costs dropping. This is a direct result of the competitive nature of a market that has a lack of business. The issue of a rising cost at the time of a falling market is of more than a passing research interest to school superintendents and the people of Texas. This study investigated the relationship between cost and project delivery systems. A survey was sent to all school superintendents in Texas requesting recent data on elementary school enrollment, project delivery type and construction costs. One hundred and thirty six responses were received from one thousand and seventy six Texas school districts. A comparative means test was used to determine if a relationship exists between construction cost per student and project delivery system for public elementary schools in Texas. The research shows that Texas school districts are primarily using two types of project delivery systems for their new school construction, Construction Management at Risk and Competitive Sealed Proposals. After comparing the average construction cost per student for these two project delivery systems, the statistical analysis showed that Competitive Sealed Proposals cost approximately four thousand dollar less per student than Construction Management at Risk. The clear question is then as to why are districts using Construction Management at Risk when the comparative benefits of the contract type are not worth this amount of money per student.