The matter of a gender gap in electoral participation is a fact in many parts of the world but has mostly been investigated by, and studied within, the Global North. In spite of this, scholars have not reached an undisputed conclusion for why this is. Scholars have argued for the importance of studying the institutions and systems composing voting in order to explain electoral participation, especially since the form and degree of direct influence of voters are differing within different electoral systems. Relying on the rational voter hypothesis in combination with feminist theory this thesis suggests that women have different experiences of civic duty and influence, and therefore participate in elections to a lesser extent than men. The main results suggest that presidentialism, to an extent which is neither statistically nor practically significant, decrease women’s electoral participation while majoritarian electoral rules seem to have an even smaller, but similar, effect. Testing electoral systems’ effect on the gender gap, statistically significant results points to the fact that presidentialism increases the gender gap in electoral participation. Majoritarian electoral rules do too increase the gender gap, but to a more restricted extent. This thesis concludes that electoral systems do have a gendered effect on electoral participation and that these effects need to be further investigated by future research.

京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・論文博士 / 博士(地域研究) / 乙第12940号 / 論地博第18号 / 新制||地||62(附属図書館) / 32150 / (主査)教授 玉田 芳史, 准教授 岡本 正明, 准教授 中西 嘉宏 / 学位規則第4条第2項該当 / Doctor of Area Studies / Kyoto University / DFAM

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El 18 de julio de 1962 las Fuerzas Armadas llevaron a cabo el primer golpe institucional militar en la historia del Perú, deponiendo el gobierno de Manuel Prado Ugarteche a tan sólo diez días de su finalización. Dicho episodio llevó al poder a una Junta Militar de Gobierno liderada por Ricardo Pérez Godoy y Nicolás Lindley, la cual se amparó en una acusación de fraude electoral para vetar la elección presidencial que debía ser ejecutada por el Congreso. Aunque sólo permaneció en el poder durante un año, la Junta Militar realizó una serie de reformas que iban de la mano con el nacimiento de una visión particular de desarrollo nacional entre los militares. Una de las prioridades de esta Junta fue la realización de una reforma electoral - dadas las acusaciones de fraude contra el sistema anterior -, proceso que finalizó con la promulgación de un nuevo Estatuto Electoral mediante el Decreto Legislativo 14250. / Tesis

In 1989 with the revolution and the development of democracy, Taiwan first time made newspaper advertisement open to public, in 1991 it also lift the restriction to let political party could made advertisement on TV, in 1993 the radio also be allowed, in 1996 the radio and TV could be afforded non-gratuitous president campaign advertisement, in 2007 November the councilor campaign advertisement straightly be opened, in this time the campaign became hot. Especially when the law of TV been published, the tools of campaign had been restricted. Since 1989 Makro entered Taiwan packed goods store market, Carrefour¡BB&Q ¡BCostco¡BGeant¡BTaisuco¡Ketc packed good stores has changed the habits of consumer in Taiwan. Because those stores spread everywhere and technology of media has been improved fast, besides the budget of campaign is restricted by law, how to use tools to contact the voters has become the most important thing to political parties. Advertisements are everywhere, even on 3000 meters mountain you can see the garbage with production log. Because advertisements are such in flood, people start to ignore them. Newspapers and TV are no longer the powerful tools to advertise, since remote control been invented, the number of channels greatly increased and bloody news attract consumers¡¦ attention. In recent years Taiwan VOD technology system became mature, this research is about how to make efficient advertisement when we go to toilet. This thesis is according to primer collecting and secondary information analyzing to discuss the possibility of setting campaign advertisement in public toilets. This thesis comprises 5 chapters as follows¡GChapter 1, discussing the situation of campaign advertisement in Taiwan¡FChapter 2, describing the progress of campaign and its law¡FChapter 3, discussing TV advertisement characters from human mental points¡FChapter 4, to observe upon real investigation and to prove its possibility¡FChapter 5,as conclusion, this thesis comes up with some suggestions and self-criticisms.

The goal of this report is to examine how the relative balance of power between competing elites affects institutional choice in new democracies and the consequences this may have on democratic stability. I first develop a theoretical framework around the hypothesis that if the newly established democratic institutions to some degree safeguard the interests of the outgoing elites, they are less likely to defy them and find unconstitutional means through which to protect said interests. Given that elites ousted from power in a democratic transition are rarely rendered powerless by the process, this report works under the assumption that democratic reform is to some degree implemented by the outgoing ruling elite groups that at the same time stand to lose from it. If we assume these elite groups behave rationally, they will act strategically to protect their interests and thus will prefer institutions that are compatible with the upholding of such interests even when their political opponents are in power. iii The ability to affect institutional choice is of course limited by the relative power the ruling elites hold at the time of institutional choice. Even so, competing elites may make concessions in order for the outgoing elites not to go back on democratic reform in case the balance of power shifts back in their favor, allowing them to protect their advances in the struggle for power. Thus for democratic reform to be sustainable in the long-term, it must be through institutions that reduce the perceived risks they pose to elites interests. Under this theoretical framework, I study the case of the constitutional choice process that led to the current Chilean electoral system. After the 1988 plebiscite, the military regime was surprised by the fact that over 55% of the electorate voted for elections to be held. This meant that in order for them to secure the market-oriented reforms they had implemented under Pinochet, the 1980 constitution would have to be amended. But given the relative balance of power between them and their opponents, both sides would have to make concessions. This would lead to an electoral system that remains unchanged to this day. / text

Most studies of electoral system effects tend to ignore the characteristics of parties in the causal chain. Yet, this dissertation argues that different party structures, when interacting with electoral systems, lead to different levels of party system fragmentation. In a weak party structure, elite action is the key to explaining the different outcomes: a permissive electoral system tends to inflate the number of parties because the rule poses an obstacle to elites’ electoral coordination. But this major obstacle is removed under a restrictive rule, which results in lower fragmentation. By contrast, the role of voters becomes active in a strong party structure; therefore, the effects of permissive and restrictive electoral systems become similar as both tend to bring down the number of parties through voters’ strategic behavior. This dissertation tests the theory on Thailand since the country has gone through three waves of electoral reform in which the electoral system has been changed between a permissive and a restrictive electoral rule. At the same time, the party structure has changed following the victory of the Thai Rak Thai Party in the 2001 election. The changing interactions of party structures and electoral systems provide a quasiexperimental setting conducive to inspecting the effects of the key factors on party system fragmentation while other confounding variables (social heterogeneity and viii political institutions) are held constant. This research design allows me to compare periods of time in different configurations of party system fragmentation. This dissertation applied multi-methods, including case study analysis, single-country multilevel quantitative analysis, and a large N, cross-national quantitative analysis, to reach the conclusions. Theoretically, the findings suggest that electoral system effects are contingent on party structures. Successful institutional engineering requires deep understanding of both formal rules and the political context of a particular country. In other words, one size cannot fit all, even for the same country at different times. / text

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