The goal of this report is to examine how the relative balance of power between competing elites affects institutional choice in new democracies and the consequences this may have on democratic stability. I first develop a theoretical framework around the hypothesis that if the newly established democratic institutions to some degree safeguard the interests of the outgoing elites, they are less likely to defy them and find unconstitutional means through which to protect said interests. Given that elites ousted from power in a democratic transition are rarely rendered powerless by the process, this report works under the assumption that democratic reform is to some degree implemented by the outgoing ruling elite groups that at the same time stand to lose from it. If we assume these elite groups behave rationally, they will act strategically to protect their interests and thus will prefer institutions that are compatible with the upholding of such interests even when their political opponents are in power. iii The ability to affect institutional choice is of course limited by the relative power the ruling elites hold at the time of institutional choice. Even so, competing elites may make concessions in order for the outgoing elites not to go back on democratic reform in case the balance of power shifts back in their favor, allowing them to protect their advances in the struggle for power. Thus for democratic reform to be sustainable in the long-term, it must be through institutions that reduce the perceived risks they pose to elites interests. Under this theoretical framework, I study the case of the constitutional choice process that led to the current Chilean electoral system. After the 1988 plebiscite, the military regime was surprised by the fact that over 55% of the electorate voted for elections to be held. This meant that in order for them to secure the market-oriented reforms they had implemented under Pinochet, the 1980 constitution would have to be amended. But given the relative balance of power between them and their opponents, both sides would have to make concessions. This would lead to an electoral system that remains unchanged to this day. / text

Most studies of electoral system effects tend to ignore the characteristics of parties in the causal chain. Yet, this dissertation argues that different party structures, when interacting with electoral systems, lead to different levels of party system fragmentation. In a weak party structure, elite action is the key to explaining the different outcomes: a permissive electoral system tends to inflate the number of parties because the rule poses an obstacle to elites’ electoral coordination. But this major obstacle is removed under a restrictive rule, which results in lower fragmentation. By contrast, the role of voters becomes active in a strong party structure; therefore, the effects of permissive and restrictive electoral systems become similar as both tend to bring down the number of parties through voters’ strategic behavior. This dissertation tests the theory on Thailand since the country has gone through three waves of electoral reform in which the electoral system has been changed between a permissive and a restrictive electoral rule. At the same time, the party structure has changed following the victory of the Thai Rak Thai Party in the 2001 election. The changing interactions of party structures and electoral systems provide a quasiexperimental setting conducive to inspecting the effects of the key factors on party system fragmentation while other confounding variables (social heterogeneity and viii political institutions) are held constant. This research design allows me to compare periods of time in different configurations of party system fragmentation. This dissertation applied multi-methods, including case study analysis, single-country multilevel quantitative analysis, and a large N, cross-national quantitative analysis, to reach the conclusions. Theoretically, the findings suggest that electoral system effects are contingent on party structures. Successful institutional engineering requires deep understanding of both formal rules and the political context of a particular country. In other words, one size cannot fit all, even for the same country at different times. / text

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Esta tesis es de carácter interdisciplinario, entre economía y ciencias políticas. Usando métodos bien explotados en economía explico como las instituciones electorales afectan las decisiones de los individuos en varios contextos políticos. El capítulo 2 es normativo y propone dos modificaciones en los sistemas electorales. Ambos resultan en una participación más alta y dan incentivos a los partidos políticos a que sean de mejor calidad. Primero, analizo un sistema electoral donde el número de los candidatos que obtienen representación en el parlamento es endógeno y depende del nivel de la participación. Segundo, analizo el efecto de un quorum de participación en elecciones parlamentarias. Según mis resultados, las dos modificaciones implican beneficios más bajos para los partidos, y bienestar más alto para los ciudadanos. Dichos resultados explican porqué los partidos usan otros tipos de medidas para incrementar la participación en las elecciones. Además, mis resultados explican la evolución del uso de un quorum en algunos países. El capítulo 3 es un trabajo junto con Sabine Flamand. Estudiamos el efecto de un quorum de participación en reuniones de pocos miembros. Usando un modelo de reuniones repetitivas, demostramos que la decisión se retrasa cuando el quorum es alto, y que los miembros no pierden utilidad por el hecho de retrasar la decisión. Finalmente, la presencia de un quorum puede tanto aumentar como reducir el número de miembros tomando la decisión final. El capítulo 4 ofrece un análisis empírico de las decisiones de votar en blanco y votar nulo. El análisis es innovador porque por primera vez se tratan las dos decisiones por separado. Demuestro que el voto blanco contiene un mensaje de insatisfacción contra los partidos políticos, mientras que el voto nulo contiene insatisfacción contra las instituciones y los niveles de democracia. / The present thesis lies at the intersection of economics and political science. Using methods, well developed in economics, I try to understand how electoral institutions shape individuals' behavior in different political contexts. Chapter 2 has a normative flavor. Focusing on the interplay between low quality parties and citizens' apathy, I try to break the vicious cycle that links the two, by proposing two electoral rules that increase turnout in PR elections, and at the same time give incentives to parties to be of better quality. First, I propose an electoral rule where the number of candidates elected depends on the level of participation. Second, I propose the introduction of a participation quorum that has to be met in order for the election to be valid. The common feature and innovation of these rules is that turnout affects the electoral outcome, and as a consequence these rules incentivize parties to care about the level of turnout. I show that both rules, while they increase turnout they imply lower profits for parties. My results explain why parties target to increase turnout through a certain type of measures that do not necessary improve the quality of the vote. Moreover, I also explain the evolution of the use of the participation quorum in certain countries. Chapter 3 is coauthored with Sabine Flamand, and tries to understand the effect of such a participation requirement on individuals' behavior and the decision outcome. To this end, we model a setup of repeated meetings, where a small group of individuals has to take a decision. We show that the decision is delayed when the quorum requirement is high and members are not harmed by postponing the decision. Surprisingly, the presence of the quorum may decrease the number of attendees taking the decision, while we show that in order to avoid policy distortions, the required number of participants must be even. Apart from abstaining, voters that are not willing to support any of the candidates in most parliamentary elections, are given the choice to participate in the election and cast a blank or a null vote. A blank vote is a disapproval vote of all competing candidates, while a null vote is a vote cast erroneously or deliberately in a way not conforming with the legal voting procedure. Political scientists were treating blank and null votes in an identical way. My attempt in chapter 4 is to study these two protest actions on a separate basis, in order to understand, why in some elections blank votes are many more than null votes and vice versa. After constructing a database considering the percentages of blank and null votes separately, I show that the amount of blank and null votes cast in an election are not affected by the same factors. Null votes convey dissatisfaction towards the electoral and democratic institutions, while blank votes convey dissatisfaction towards the parties. More important, my results go against one of the prevailing criticisms of compulsory voting. The latter has no significant effect on the amount of uninformative votes since it has no significant effect on the amount of null votes. On the contrary, it increases only the amount of blank votes, which by definition disclose information, and in particular voters' disapproval of all competing parties. Although abstention is one of the most studied issues both by political scientists and economists, the current thesis extends our knowledge, by giving insight into some of abstention's unexplored but widely observed aspects.

Why do countries tax the same fuels at widely different rates, even among similarly situated countries in the global political economy? Given the potentially destabilizing effects of climate change, and the political and economic risks associated with a reliance on geographically concentrated, finite fossil fuels, International Organizations and economists of all political stripes have consistently called for increasing tax rates on fossil-based energy. Despite much enthusiasm among policy experts, however, politicians concerned with distributional consequences, economic performance and competitiveness impacts continue to be wary of raising taxes on carbon-based fuels. In this context, this thesis investigates the political economy of tax rates affecting the price of fossil fuels in advanced capitalist democracies. Through an examination of the political limits of government capacity to implement stricter carbon-energy policy, as well as the identification of the correlates of higher carbon-based energy taxes, it throws new light on the conditions under which carbon-energy tax reform becomes politically possible. Based on recent data collected from the OECD, EEA and IEA, I develop an estimate of the relative size of implicit carbon taxes across OECD member countries on six carbon-based fuels and across the household and industrial sectors. I exploit large cross-national differences in these carbon-energy tax rates in order to identify the correlates of, and constraints on, carbon-energy tax reform. Applying multiple regression analysis to both cross-section and time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data, this thesis leverages considerable empirical evidence to demonstrate how and why electoral systems matter for energy and environmental tax policy outcomes. In particular, I find considerable empirical evidence to support the claim that systems of proportional representation (PR), in addition to the partisan preferences of the electorate, work together to explain differential rates of carbon-energy taxation. By opening up the ideological space to a broader spectrum of “green” parties, I argue that PR systems create a favourable institutional context within which higher rates of carbon-energy taxation become politically possible. After specifying a key causal mechanism within different types of electoral systems – the seat-vote elasticity – I argue further that, voters in disproportional systems actually have more leverage over politicians, and that an increase in environmental voting can have an impact on rates of carbon energy taxation, even in the absence of PR. While the accession to power of green political parties in PR systems is more likely to lead to higher rates of carbon energy taxation, voting for green parties in highly disproportional systems creates incentives for other parties to adopt “green” policies, leading to a similar outcome. In this way, the effect of green votes and green seats will have the opposite effect on policy according to the type of electoral system in use.

Why do countries tax the same fuels at widely different rates, even among similarly situated countries in the global political economy? Given the potentially destabilizing effects of climate change, and the political and economic risks associated with a reliance on geographically concentrated, finite fossil fuels, International Organizations and economists of all political stripes have consistently called for increasing tax rates on fossil-based energy. Despite much enthusiasm among policy experts, however, politicians concerned with distributional consequences, economic performance and competitiveness impacts continue to be wary of raising taxes on carbon-based fuels. In this context, this thesis investigates the political economy of tax rates affecting the price of fossil fuels in advanced capitalist democracies. Through an examination of the political limits of government capacity to implement stricter carbon-energy policy, as well as the identification of the correlates of higher carbon-based energy taxes, it throws new light on the conditions under which carbon-energy tax reform becomes politically possible. Based on recent data collected from the OECD, EEA and IEA, I develop an estimate of the relative size of implicit carbon taxes across OECD member countries on six carbon-based fuels and across the household and industrial sectors. I exploit large cross-national differences in these carbon-energy tax rates in order to identify the correlates of, and constraints on, carbon-energy tax reform. Applying multiple regression analysis to both cross-section and time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) data, this thesis leverages considerable empirical evidence to demonstrate how and why electoral systems matter for energy and environmental tax policy outcomes. In particular, I find considerable empirical evidence to support the claim that systems of proportional representation (PR), in addition to the partisan preferences of the electorate, work together to explain differential rates of carbon-energy taxation. By opening up the ideological space to a broader spectrum of “green” parties, I argue that PR systems create a favourable institutional context within which higher rates of carbon-energy taxation become politically possible. After specifying a key causal mechanism within different types of electoral systems – the seat-vote elasticity – I argue further that, voters in disproportional systems actually have more leverage over politicians, and that an increase in environmental voting can have an impact on rates of carbon energy taxation, even in the absence of PR. While the accession to power of green political parties in PR systems is more likely to lead to higher rates of carbon energy taxation, voting for green parties in highly disproportional systems creates incentives for other parties to adopt “green” policies, leading to a similar outcome. In this way, the effect of green votes and green seats will have the opposite effect on policy according to the type of electoral system in use.

<p>Abstract</p><p>The topic of this thesis is electoral systems and electoral reform in Zambia. In Africa, democratization is on its way in many countries. However, the democratic upswing in the early 1990s was in most countries followed by a standstill. In recent years the tendency has been a renewal of democratization which makes it possible to reach new heights. As a part of this recent democratic progress questions regarding constitutional reform and electoral reform have been raised. It is within that context that this thesis has its setting. In search for the incentives behind electoral reform the purpose of this thesis revolves around what the consequences are of the current electoral system in Zambia. A complimentary purpose is how an electoral reform can take place and what it might result in.</p><p>A qualitative literature study with a hermeneutic approach has been used in this thesis. A theoretical framework has been created which focuses on different types of electoral systems and their respective consequences on the political system. Important key points of electoral reform have been discussed to give an understanding and foundation for the analysis. The result of the study is that there are several negative consequences with the current electoral system in Zambia. The negative effects range from minority and gender marginalization, lacking representation, weak governments with lacking legitimacy and wasted votes. Some surprising positive traits include the absence of ethnic politization, from time to time a strong opposition and possibilities of coherent policing. It is also believed that there is a profound support for an electoral reform with in many levels of the country and there are.</p> / <p>Sammanfattning</p><p>Denna uppsats tar sin start i valsystem och valreform i Zambia. Demokratisering är ett vanligt tema i Afrika och många länder är i full gång med att befästa sin nyvunna mark. Det demokratiska uppsving som kunde ses i början av 1900-talet följdes i många länder utav ett stillestånd i utvecklingen. På senare år har en tydlig tendens kunnat ses där demokratiseringen på nytt har tagit fart. Som en konsekvens av denna nytända demokratisering i Afrika har frågor kring valsystem, valreform och dess effekter på det politiska systemet börjat att cirkulera. Det är i det sammanhanget som uppsatsen finner sig.</p><p>På uppdrag att finna vad som driver valreform, cirkulerar syftet med denna uppsats kring vilka konsekvenser det nutida valsystemet har i Zambia. Ett kompletterande syfte, eller frågeställning, för analysen vidare mot valreform och vilka utsikter som finns. En kvalitativ literaturstudie med en hermeneutisk ansats har använts i denna uppsatsen. Ett teoretiskt ramverk har skapats som fokuserar kring olika valsystem och deras respektive konsekvenser för det politiska systemet. Teorier kring valreform har också beskrivits och diskuterats fär att ge en förståelse och bakgrund till analysen. Slutsatsen för uppsatsen är att det finns många negativa kopplingar till valsystemet I Zambia. De tydligaste effekterna är att minoriteter och kvinnor blockeras från att delta i parlamentet, att svaga regeringar har funnits trots ett pluralistiskt valsystem som i sig självt har resulterat i en legitimitetsbrist och bortfallna röster. En del positiva inslag kunde även hittas, däribland en saknad av etniska konflikter, en stundom stark opposition och en möjlighet till sammanhängande politik. Som en del av resultatet verkar det också som att det finns ett stöd för en valreform på många olika nivår i Zambia. Detta anses vara nödvändigt om Zambia vill fortsätta att utveckla sin demokrati.</p>

The matter of a gender gap in electoral participation is a fact in many parts of the world but has mostly been investigated by, and studied within, the Global North. In spite of this, scholars have not reached an undisputed conclusion for why this is. Scholars have argued for the importance of studying the institutions and systems composing voting in order to explain electoral participation, especially since the form and degree of direct influence of voters are differing within different electoral systems. Relying on the rational voter hypothesis in combination with feminist theory this thesis suggests that women have different experiences of civic duty and influence, and therefore participate in elections to a lesser extent than men. The main results suggest that presidentialism, to an extent which is neither statistically nor practically significant, decrease women’s electoral participation while majoritarian electoral rules seem to have an even smaller, but similar, effect. Testing electoral systems’ effect on the gender gap, statistically significant results points to the fact that presidentialism increases the gender gap in electoral participation. Majoritarian electoral rules do too increase the gender gap, but to a more restricted extent. This thesis concludes that electoral systems do have a gendered effect on electoral participation and that these effects need to be further investigated by future research.