In December 2007, Kenya held a presidential election. The incumbent was Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU). His political opponent was Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM). The vote was peaceful and described by many in positive terms; that is, a continuation of the positive democratic transition that Kenya began toward the end of the 1990s. However, many in Kenya accused the government of foul play, when the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) delayed declaring a winner for two days. The ECK eventually declared Kibaki President, and rushed the swearing - in ceremony, skipping the stipulated 72 hours. Two days after declaring Kibaki president, Samuel Kivuitu, the chair of the ECK, admitted he did not know whether Kibaki had won the elections. He insisted that he had agreed to release the results and announce Kibaki as president, under pressure from above. Kenya then experienced its worst bout of violence since the Mau Mau rebellion, before independence. The Post - Election Violence (PEV) lasted two months. It was resolved following an agreement, the Kenya National and Reconciliation Dialogue (K N D R), negotiated by a Panel of Eminent Personalities. The fighting parties agreed to form a Government of National Unity (GNU), a Commission of Enquiry into the Post - Election Violence (CIPEV) and an Independent Review Commission on the General elections (Kriegler Commission). The GNU was to have Kibaki reinstated as President, to add the post of Prime Minister for Odinga, and was to undertake a reconciliation and accountability process, prosecuting perpetrators. This thesis seeks to determine what were the politics that led Kenya to prosecute those who bore greatest responsibility for the PEV. More specifically, what were the politics that resulted in selecting the ICC, as the court where individuals were going to be held accountable?

abstract: This dissertation seeks to show that the fate of emerging democracies is largely dependent upon the strategic behaviors of political militaries and their coup potential. Given the known issue of democratization's temporarily destabilizing effects, it first examines if such effects makes states vulnerable to coups. It finds clear evidence on democratization's destabilizing effects on coup risk. Such evidence is used to shed new light on the literature about the armed forces and coups in emerging democracies. To explain variation in the military's responses to democratization and consolidation against coup threats, it argues that how the armed forces were organized and controlled during the authoritarian periods influences whether emerging democracies are able to consolidate against coup risk. Second, it explores the declining coup risk and the trilateral relationship between Western democracy promotion, coup risk, and election violence in recently emerging electoral regimes, the so-called "illiberal democracies." It argues that vulnerability to Western leverage, coupled with an emphasis on multiparty elections, creates a political moral hazard problem for incumbents, permitting them to commit electoral violence during the emergence of mass electoral politics. / Dissertation/Thesis / Doctoral Dissertation Political Science 2015

ABSTRACT Democracy can be a useful tool in Africa. It can open channels for foreign aid and ultimately development. Many African countries have struggled with the changes and expectations that democracy brings. They have opted for authoritarian regimes or one party state regime. Zimbabwe and Kenya represent some of these countries. Such countries have been unable to promote or perfectly place liberal democracy within their societies. The most salient issue in the democratization process of Africa has been the post colonial state. Transitions into democracy have not always gone well at all in fact many transitions remain stagnant. This research investigates the problems surrounding the attainment of democracy in Africa, using the cases of Kenya and Zimbabwe. It seeks to understand the obstacles and challenges to the democratization processes in the two countries by focusing on the 2007/2008 contested elections as well as previous elections, and the attempts by external actors to deal with the results of the elections. The citizens of Kenya and Zimbabwe have both been affected and impacted by the lack of democracy that has existed in each country. This research also investigates the role of citizen participation in the electoral process. For both countries to succeed in all regards there is a pressing need for regime change and institution building.

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M.A. University of the Witwatersrand, Faculty of Humanities, 2012 / The past two decades have seen the rise of power sharing agreements as a means to end protracted civil wars. Following from the perceived success of these agreements, power sharing has become an important tool in the mediator’s arsenal and has increasingly been advocated in periods of democratic deadlock and civil strife following highly-contested elections. The viability of this model has rarely been questioned. This study will undertake a deep analysis of the success or failure of the power sharing agreements undertaken in Kenya and Zimbabwe in 2008 following the outbreak of violence in both countries. It will explain the different results seen in these two cases through an examination of the agreements, the roles played by regional and international actors as well as through an analysis of the influence of local political culture and inter-elite relations. The relative success of the Kenyan agreement can be attributed to a culture of cooperation amongst the elite alongside consistent and concerted pressure exerted by the mediation team and international actors. In contrast, the Zimbabwean government of national unity has hobbled along and little progress has been made to implement the agreement. This can largely be attributed to a badly drafted document which allowed for an inequitable distribution of power, the obduracy of the ZANU-PF elite and the unwillingness of the agreement guarantors to place sufficient pressure on the parties for reform. In a context where inter-elite relations are characterised by opposition and intransigence, the framing of the document and the actions of enforcer parties become particularly important. Due to the political cultures in both countries, it is unlikely that the power sharing agreements will have produced significant gains for democracy or have reformed the prevailing culture of impunity. This report concludes that in spite of the problems with the power sharing model, there are currently few alternatives to help mend torn societies. In order to overcome the problems that have been highlighted within this report, it is necessary for mediators to undertake innovative and reflexive strategies to ensure the full implementation of future agreements.

Elections are a core democratic procedure intended to peacefully transfer power between political parties. However, in many parts of the world, elections are associated with the strategic use of violence to affect results and future power dynamics. This study tests a current theory on how the state apparatus affects challengers’ and incumbents’ perpetration of electoral violence. It hypothesizes that incumbents are the main perpetrator of electoral violence because they have a comparative advantage through the coercive state apparatus. This makes resorting to election violence more rational for incumbents. The hypothesis is empirically tested by conducting a logistic regression on global data from the DECO and QoG datasets. The results are inconclusive due to statistical insignificance and low confidence in the accuracy of the expected relationship. Moreover, the inconclusive result is assumably affected by scarce and incompatible data. While the result is inconclusive, the paper contributes to research by providing descriptive statistics on the main perpetrator of electoral violence. Furthermore, the research design can also be a reference for future research on how state capacity affects electoral violence.

The resort to coalition governments following the disputed presidential elections in Kenya and Zimbabwe pioneers a new trend in unlocking political gridlock in Africa. This dissertation analyses this trend with a view to establishing its viability in guaranteeing sustainable peace and democracy. It is argued that the resort establishes a precedent in which incumbent presidents, upon losing elections, may refuse to vacate office in the hope that a power sharing agreement will be negotiated with opposition leaders. Concludes that while the resort to coalition government in the aftermath of a disputed election and electoral violence may rescue a country from disintegration, it is not a guarantee to sustainable peace and democracy / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2008. / Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Law University of Pretoria, in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree Masters of Law (LLM in Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa). Prepared under the supervision of Prof. Nico Steytler, Faculty of Law, University of Western Cape, South Africa / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/ / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

The institutional, electoral and ethnic factors contributing to electoral violence have well been documented through both quantitative and qualitative research, while the mobilization process for electoral violence has been examined qualitatively. This study aims to contribute to quantitative research on factors that explain why citizens turn into perpetrators of electoral violence by examining how education can contribute to a decrease in electoral violence through the question: How does the level of education influence the occurrence of electoral violence? Given the presence of disinformation about elections during the electoral cycle, this research asserts that education contributes to a decrease in electoral violence by decreasing the acceptance of disinformation about elections. The hypothesis is tested through a large-N study on sub-national data of elections organized between 2004 and 2012 worldwide. The study’s results identify no support for the hypothesized association between education and election violence.

The aim of this thesis is to answer the research question as to whether post-election antigovernment actions lead to increased probability of incumbent being replaced. The theoretical argument is that the anti-government groups can choose to use violence or non-violence to force the government to give concessions, the ultimate one being replacement of the incumbent. Both violence and non-violence are argued to have a positive effect on the probability of this to happen, but the latter should be stronger. Two hypotheses capture this: H1: Anti-government violence increases the incumbent’s probability of being replaced. H2: Anti-government non-violence increase the incumbent’s probability of being replaced more than anti-government violence does. Using a logistic regression on 550 elections compiled from the NELDA and ECAV datasets, the first hypothesis is not supported due to lack of statistical significance across the models. The second hypothesis is supported as the non-violent independent variable receives statistically significant results, but these do not hold in the robustness test. Taking into account the suggestions from previous literature, the results do hint towards non-violence being the more successful option of action, but it cannot be concluded with certainty.

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