Jusqu’à l’ordonnance du 23 mars 2006 relative aux sûretés, le créancier désireux de réaliser sa sûreté était tenu d’emprunter les procédures octroyées à tout créancier pour mettre en œuvre son droit de gage général. Les effets de la sûreté réelle ne se manifestaient qu’après la vente forcée du bien grevé, par le désintéressement préférentiel du créancier au cours de la procédure de distribution du prix. La réforme du droit des sûretés opérée en 2006 a modifié cette situation en généralisant l’attribution judiciaire et en légalisant l’attribution conventionnelle du bien grevé. Ces modes de réalisation sont réputés plus simples et rapides que les voies d’exécution traditionnelles, mais également plus efficaces pour écarter les créanciers concurrents. Le créancier titulaire d’une sûreté réelle est désormais avantagé dès l’exercice de ses prérogatives à l’encontre du débiteur défaillant. Pour exercer son pouvoir de contrainte, il bénéficie de voies d’exécution qui lui sont spécifiques. Le législateur a pris soin d’encadrer ces techniques d’attribution afin de protéger les intérêts du débiteur. Toutefois, le régime de ces modes de réalisation mérite d’être aménagé afin d’en améliorer la sécurité juridique, l’efficacité, et par conséquent, l’attractivité. Les effets des ces modes de réalisation à l’égard des créanciers concurrents de l’attributaire sont moins clairs. L’attribution est régulièrement présentée comme une technique garantissant au poursuivant un désintéressement exclusif, les prétentions des autres créanciers inscrits étant reléguées sur l’éventuel reliquat consigné. Quoique les autres créanciers ne puissent prendre part à la procédure, rien ne justifie qu’il soit porté atteinte à leurs droits. Il importe donc de déterminer comment concilier la faculté d’attribution du bien grevé avec les droits des créanciers concurrents. / Up until the order of 23 March 2006 on security rights, a creditor aiming at realizing his surety had to resort to the procedures of execution available to any creditor in order to implement his general right of pledge. The effects of the real surety would manifest only after the execution sale of the encumbered property, through the preferential satisfaction of the creditor during the proceedings of the price distribution. The 2006 reform of the law of security rights has altered this situation by generalizing the judicial attribution and by legalizing the conventional attribution of the encumbered property. These modes of realization are deemed to be simpler and faster than the traditional enforcement proceedings, but also more efficient to shut out the other competing secured creditors. From now on, the creditor benefiting from a real surety is favoured as soon as he exercises his rights against the defaulting debtor. In order to exercise his power of constraint, he may rely on all the enforcement proceedings that are specific to the real surety. The legislator has carefully provided guidelines to use these attribution techniques to protect the interests of the debtor. However, the legal framework applicable to these modes of realization deserves to be adjusted in order to improve their legal certainty, their efficiency, and therefore their attractiveness. The effects of these modes of realization against the competing secured creditors of the recipient are not completely clear. Attribution is often presented as a technique that ensures the plaintiff an exclusive satisfaction, while the competing creditors’ claims are redirected on a hypothetical consigned remainder. Although the other creditors cannot take part in the procedure, nothing justifies that their rights be undermined. It is therefore important to determine how to reconcile the optional attribution of the encumbered property and the rights of the competing secured creditors.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:45Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gustavo Chies Cignachi.pdf: 1149082 bytes, checksum: 3c270af1ed84caa14d9f54a5778dcf7b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-08-14 / The work seeks to defend the feasibility of an interpretation of the fraud against creditors in execution actions based on objective good faith. In the first part, it presents the historical origins of objective good faith in Private Law and defends the possibility of its adoption in Public Law. In the second part, it examines the distinction between fraud against creditors and fraud against creditors in execution actions, it demonstrates the interpretative application of objective good faith and it indicates the arising duties. In the third part, it points out certain situations and seeks solutions in interpreting the objective good faith, as well as it discuss how to defend the purchaser against the recognition of fraud / O trabalho busca defender a viabilidade de uma interpretação da fraude à execução com fundamento na boa-fé objetiva. Na primeira parte, apresenta as origens históricas da boa-fé objetiva no Direito Privado e defende a possibilidade de sua adoção no Direito Público. Na segunda parte, analisa as distinções entre a fraude contra credores e a fraude à execução, bem como demonstra a aplicação interpretativa da boa-fé objetiva e indica os deveres dela recorrentes. Na terceira parte, aponta determinadas situações e busca soluções na interpretação pela boa-fé objetiva, além de discorrer sobre forma de defesa do terceiro adquirente contra o reconhecimento da fraude

Inspiré par une croyance fondée sur l’inégalité des parties, le droit del’exécution poursuit le dessein d’un recouvrement rapide, sûr et peu coûteux descréances. Afin de relever ce défi, le droit OHADA a fait de la sécurité juridique uneexigence fondamentale devant démontrer son aptitude à répondre aux attentes desdifférentes parties. Cependant, la pratique du recouvrement permet d’identifier dessources d’insécurité juridique préjudiciable au climat de confiance voulu par lelégilateur communautaire. Ainsi, le caractère quasi-informel du recouvrementamiable, la résistance des juridictions nationales ou l’ineffectivité de certainesdécisions judiciaires perturbent la prévisibilité inhérente à l’exigence de sécuritéjuridique. Conçu comme un système cohérent, le droit de l’exécution OHADA offredes ressources interprétatives propices à la correction des lacunes observées. Dansces conditions, le juge occupe un rôle central dans la promotion de la sécuritéjuridique. D’une part, il assure le contrôle des prérogatives individuelles des partiesdans le sens de réguler les conflits d’intérêts induits par des attentes souventcontradictoires. Dans cette optique, l’une des finalités de l’intervention du juge estd’assurer le respect du recours à la contrainte dans l’exécution. D’autre part,l’exigence de sécurité juridique servira au juge à établir une meilleure corrélationentre toutes les techniques garantissant le paiement du créancier dans un souciconstant d’efficacité. En l’absence d’une consécration explicite de la sécuritéjuridique, la proposition d’une relecture de la théorie de l’exécution en droit privé offrel’opportunité de voir tous les mécanismes de son intégration dans le recouvrementdes créances en tenant compte de la réalité juridico-économique de la créance. / Inspired by the belief grounded on inequalities between parties, theenforcement law continues to design a fast, safe and inexpensive debt recovery. Tomeet this challenge, the OHADA law made legal certainty requirement which mustshow its ability to live up to the expectations of the different parties. However, therecovery practice identifies sources of legal uncertainty detrimental to the climate oftrust advocated by the Community legislature. Thus, the quasi-informal nature of debtcollection, the resistance of national courts or the ineffectiveness of certain judicialdecisions disrupt the predictability pertaining to the requirement of legal certainty.Designed as a coherent system, The OHADA enforcement law affords interpretativeresources conducive to the rectification of the flaws spotted. In these circumstances,the judge plays a central role in promoting legal certainty. On the one hand, hemonitors the individual prerogatives of the parties in the direction of regulatingconflicts of interest arising from the often conflicting expectations. In this context, oneof the purposes of the intervention of the judge is to ensure compliance of coercion inthe execution. On the other hand, the demand of legal certainty will allow the judge toestablish a better correlation between all techniques guaranteeing the payment of thecreditor for the constant sake of efficacy. In the absence of an explicit consecration oflegal certainty, the proposal for a reinterpretation of the theory of enforcement lawprovides the opportunity to see all the mechanisms of its integration in debt recovery,taking into account the legal and economic substance of the claim.

The thesis aims to reconstruct the procedural rules that apply whenever the simulation of contract becomes an issue within a civil proceeding.To this end, a different method is followed from that commonly used by the courts and in the scholarly literature, which have mostly deduced the content of these rules assuming, as a starting point, a certain solution to the problem of the nature of simulated contracts. The courts, that still adhere to the traditional doctrine of nullity of the simulated contract, state that the rules of the civil code dedicated to the action and the objection of nullity shall also apply to the action and objection of simulation. Part of the scholars, rejecting such premises, uphold interpretative solutions that are at odds with those supported by the courts. On the contrary, in this thesis, the legal notion of simulation is assumed as a starting point. Such a legal notion describes the set of facts that lead to a simulation of a contract and to the legal consequences set forth in articles 1414 and ff of the civil code; these facts are thus material to the process in which the simulation is an issue. Hence, the first part of the thesis (chapters 1 to 4) aims at framing the legal notion of simulation within the main categories of civil procedure, and starts from the definition of the legal notion of simulation by critically assessing the two main conceptions of the simulation phenomenon that emerge from the conspicuous literature on the subject: a “negative” conception, which sees the simulation as the lack of an essential element of the contract, and a “positive” conception, which sees the simulation as an agreement between the parties with the aim of excluding the legal effects of a contract between them (simulation agreement). The arguments in support of this last conception are set forth; after that, the question of the structure of the so-called “concealed contract” and the role of the simulation agreement on its formation and effectiveness is examined. The framing of the simulation in the fundamental categories of the process is then carried out through the observation of the legal effects that the simulation activity produces with regard to third parties, and the procedural classification of the substantial categories referred to in Articles 1415 and 1416 of the Italian Civil Code (in particular, unopposability). Finally, the objective scope of the process in which the ascertainment of the simulation of a contract is requested (action of simulation) is defined by critically examining the prevailing doctrine, according to which the said action aims at ascertaining the lack of a “contractual relationship”. Another doctrine is then examined, according to which simulation and nullity may be described as authonomous legal effects capable of being ascertained within a judgment having the force of res judicata. The second part (chapters 5 and 6) is dedicated to the discussion of selected issues of “procedural dynamics”, namely: a) the objection of absolute simulation, and the problem wether the judge may decide upon it ex officio in both the processes aimed at enforcing a simulated contract, and in those that aim, on the contrary, at the declaration of nullity, or at the annulment, rescission or termination of the same contract; b) the multiple facets that the issue of absolute simulation presents in the course of a forced expropriation proceeding undertaken against an “apparent owner”; c) the form of the concealed contract and the extent to which the simulants may prove a relative simulation by witnesses, particularly in the event that the relative simulation of the price of a sale contract is alleged as an objection to an avoidance action promoted by the bankruptcy trustee; d) the stading to an action of simulation; e) the objective scope of the res judicata in the same action. / La tesi mira a ricostruire la disciplina processuale della simulazione negoziale, ossia le regole concernenti l'attività compiuta nel processo dalle parti e dal giudice, ogniqualvolta la simulazione di un negozio giuridico sia oggetto di allegazione, prova e decisione (nella forma della mera cognizione o dell'accertamento). Si segue, a tal fine, un metodo diverso da quello comunemente impiegato dalla giurisprudenza e dalla dottrina, le quali hanno perlopiù dedotto il contenuto di tali regole a partire dalla soluzione di volta in volta prescelta al problema della qualificazione del contratto simulato. La giurisprudenza, muovendo dalla tesi della nullità del contratto simulato, conclude per la diretta applicabilità delle norme del codice civile dedicate all'azione e all'eccezione di nullità. Parte della dottrina, discostandosi da quella premessa, propone soluzioni applicative di segno opposto. Al contrario, nel presente lavoro, la centralità solitamente assegnata al contratto simulato, è occupata dalla simulazione, ossia dalla fattispecie degli effetti che gli artt. 1414 e seguenti designano quali “effetti della simulazione”. Detta fattispecie è infatti quanto forma oggetto dell'attività dei soggetti del processo (l'allegazione, la prova, la cognizione e l'accertamento). La ricostruzione della disciplina processuale della simulazione muove pertanto dalla collocazione della fattispecie simulatoria entro le categorie che informano il contenuto di quella disciplina, e cioè la qualificazione della simulazione come tema di prova, come questione di merito oggetto di mera cognizione, nonché, infine, come oggetto del processo e dell'accertamento munito di autorità di cosa giudicata. La prima parte della tesi (capitoli da 1 a 4) si occupa esattamente di tale inquadramento, prendendo le mosse dalla definizione della fattispecie simulatoria e dalla discussione critica delle due opposte concezioni del fenomeno simulatorio che emergono dalla cospicua letteratura sul tema: una concezione “negativa”, che vede nella simulazione una forma qualificata di difetto della fattispecie negoziale, e una concezione “positiva”, che ravvisa la fattispecie simulatoria in un negozio distinto da quello simulato (il c.d. accordo simulatorio). Enunciate le ragioni a sostegno di quest'ultima concezione, si prende in esame la questione della struttura del contratto dissimulato e del ruolo dell'accordo simulatorio sulla formazione e l'efficacia del medesimo. L'inquadramento della simulazione nelle categorie fondamentali del processo prosegue mediante l'osservazione degli effetti giuridici che l'attività simulatoria produce riguardo ai terzi, e l'inquadramento processuale delle categorie sostanziali richiamate negli artt. 1415 e 1416 c.c. (segnatamente, l'inopponibilità). Infine, si definisce l'oggetto dell'azione di simulazione, mettendo di fronte la prevalente tesi che detto oggetto fa coincidere con il rapporto fondamentale contrattuale, e quella minoritaria che addita le azioni di simulazione e nullità quali esempi di processi di accertamento di situazioni giuridiche preliminari. Si sottopone quindi a critica la tesi del rapporto fondamentale. La seconda parte (capitoli 5 e 6) è dedicata alla discussione di profili scelti di dinamica processuale, segnatamente: l'eccezione di simulazione assoluta, e il problema della sua rilevabilità d'ufficio nei processi diretti all'esecuzione del contratto simulato, nonché in quelli che mirano, al contrario, alla dichiarazione della nullità, ovvero all'annullamento, alla rescissione o alla risoluzione dello stesso contratto; le molteplici sfaccettature che presenta la cognizione della simulazione assoluta nel corso (o a lato) dell'espropriazione forzata intrapresa contro il titolare apparente; la forma del contratto dissimulato e l'ampiezza dei poteri istruttori dei simulanti che intendano dar prova della simulazione relativa, e per suo tramite del contratto dissimulato, particolarmente nel caso in cui la simulazione relativa del prezzo venga addotta per contrastare l'azione revocatoria promossa dal curatore fallimentare contro una compravendita immobiliare “a prezzo vile”; la legittimazione ad agire nell'azione di simulazione; i limiti oggettivi del giudicato di accertamento della simulazione.