Submitted by Caroline Xavier (caroline.xavier@pucrs.br) on 2017-06-30T18:44:01Z No. of bitstreams: 1 DIS_MATHEUS_TEIXEIRA_DA_SILVA_COMPLETO.pdf: 1027926 bytes, checksum: d8ef58901a5025177127e19fc76b0fe7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-30T18:44:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DIS_MATHEUS_TEIXEIRA_DA_SILVA_COMPLETO.pdf: 1027926 bytes, checksum: d8ef58901a5025177127e19fc76b0fe7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-03-31 / The dissertation aims at assessing the possibility of a praeter legem decision, thus understanding the decision that does not apply the normative consequent even acknowledging the effective fulfillment of the factual support (normative antecedent). The investigation begins from an evolutionary and conceptual analysis of the legal positivism, standing out their divergence to the antagonistic thesis of the natural law. In the sequence, already under the contemporary framework of legal positivism, the importance of the coherent conception of the law stands out, whose objective is the analysis of the articulation between the elements that make up the legal system. Thus, the theme of coherence is exposed from different perspectives, especially the readings of unity (Canotilho), system (Canaris) and integrity (Dworkin). Such information gives an account of the need to understand the legal order as a unit of meaning in order to avoid interpretations of the rules out of their context, a true presupposition of our central argument. This development leads to the study of the possibility of a praeter legem decision according to the notion of epieikeia (equity) in the Aristotelian tradition, proceeding to the analysis of the institute and a critical attempt of conceptualization, highlighting the problem of the generality of the law and the singularity of the cases. Still, the epieikeia is briefly seen in the work of Thomas Aquinas. On the basis of these elements, it is hoped to justify the possibility of a praeter legem decision in the current conjuncture of the philosophy of law, working with the idea of exception of the rules and based on the search for a coherence of the legal-normative order that may justify a punctual disobedience to the law. Finally, a small analysis is made on judicial discretion and its necessary limitation due to the normative framework. Furthermore, the use of deductivism as legal reasoning is discussed. / A disserta??o tem como objeto de estudo a aferi??o da possibilidade de exist?ncia de uma atua??o judicial praeter legem, assim entendida a decis?o que n?o aplica o consequente normativo mesmo reconhecendo o efetivo preenchimento do suporte f?tico (antecedente normativo). Inicia-se a investiga??o a partir de uma an?lise evolutiva e conceitual do positivismo jur?dico, destacando-se sua diverg?ncia ? tese antag?nica do jusnaturalismo. Na sequ?ncia, j? sob o marco contempor?neo do positivismo jur?dico, destaca-se a import?ncia da concep??o coerentista do direito, a qual tem por objetivo a an?lise da articula??o entre os elementos que comp?em o sistema jur?dico. Assim, exp?e-se o tema da coer?ncia a partir de diferentes perspectivas, sobretudo das leituras de unidade (Canotilho), sistema (Canaris) e integridade (Dworkin). Tais informa??es d?o conta da necessidade da compreens?o do ordenamento jur?dico enquanto unidade de sentido, a fim de se evitar as interpreta??es segmentadas das regras em dissintonia do seu contexto, constituindo verdadeiro pressuposto de nosso argumento central. Esse desenvolvimento conduz ao estudo da possibilidade de uma atua??o judicial praeter legem segundo a no??o de epieikeia (equidade) na tradi??o aristot?lica, procedendo-se ? an?lise do instituto e a uma tentativa cr?tica de conceitua??o, destacando-se o problema da generalidade da lei e da singularidade dos casos. Ainda, v?-se brevemente a epieikeia na obra de Tom?s de Aquino. Com base nesses elementos, almeja-se justificar a possibilidade de uma decis?o praeter legem na atual conjuntura da filosofia do direito, trabalhando-se com a ideia de exce??o das regras e com amparo na busca de uma coer?ncia do ordenamento jur?dico-normativo que possa justificar uma pontual desobedi?ncia ? lei. Por fim, realiza-se uma pequena an?lise sobre a discricionariedade judicial e sua necess?ria limita??o frente ao contexto normativo. Ainda, discute-se sobre o uso do dedutivismo enquanto racioc?nio jur?dico.

L’équité est un concept large dont la signification et la richesse conceptuelle ont évolué temporellement au sein de la théorie du droit et de la théorie politique. Au travers d’une histoire de l’équité, partant de la conception d’Aristote jusqu’aux juristes réalistes américains, ce mémoire analyse et explique la transformation graduelle de ce concept dans le droit, dont la place fut tantôt au centre des réflexions autour de la justice, tantôt minimisée, voire écartée, mais jamais complètement supprimée. Nous fondant sur cette riche histoire de l’équité, nous reconnectons ce concept phare de la théorie du droit à une réception de celui-ci au sein de la théorie politique. Pour ce faire, nous mobilisons la théorie de la liberté comme non-domination de Philip Pettit comme le cadre d’une pratique contemporaine de l’équité, au travers de la jurisprudence de la Cour suprême du Canada sur l’équité procédurale. / The concept of “equity” is vast, and its meaning and depth have dramatically evolved over time within the political and legal theory fields. This thesis offers a history of the concept of equity, starting from Aristotle’s conception of justice and equity to the American legal realist movement. On that basis, this thesis analyzes and explains the reasons why such a gradual transformation of this concept happened and, therefore, how the role of equity changed from being at the centre of theories of justice and law to being minimized, almost excluded from the sphere of legal theory, but never completely suppressed. Drawing on this rich history of equity, we reconnect this key concept of legal theory with its reception in political theory. In that regard, we offer an account of Philip Pettit’s theory of freedom as non-domination understood as the framework for the contemporary practice of equity, notably through the example of the case law of the Supreme Court of Canada on procedural fairness.