Analysis of perception of women's fear of crime on the selected area of Malešice Abstract The objective of this thesis is to define all the physical and social fear factors of crime and its share on the subjective perception of women's fear of crime on the selected area of Malešice. As the main research methods the field research was used to identify the factors of fear in space, spatial analysis of the factors of fear and analysis of interviews with the research group of women, aimed to determine the structure of these factors of fear in the individual categories as well as in specific places, where women feel the fear of crime. The theoretical framework of this work is based on the formation and the classification characteristics of the significance of individual fear factors in relation to the perception of the fear of women. Keywords: The fear factor of crime, the perception of women's fear, the place of fear

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Thesis advisor: Geoffrey Sanzenbacher / Labor unions are generally considered to be beneficial for workers wages and benefits, but have been on the decline for decades. This analysis questions why workers appear more hesitant to vote for labor unions now than in the past by investigating what factors influence individual labor union votes. Specifically, this analysis aims to pinpoint the effect that outside minimum wages have on union election outcomes. Using data from the United States National Labor Relations Board, Michigan State, IPUMS USA and the US Census Bureau, I generated two models – a logistic regression, and an ordinary least squares regression – that each predict the likelihood of union support based upon outside minimum wages, after controlling for a variety of factors including but not limited to the county unemployment rate, the existence of the Right to Work law, and county-level demographics. I find that the difference between state-level or city-level minimum wages and the federal minimum wage has a positive relationship with the likelihood of union certification. Specifically, I find that union support is most likely in areas where the local-level minimum wage is $4.18 higher than the federal minimum wage in the logistic model, and $5.13 higher than the federal minimum in the ordinary least squares model, ceteris paribus. Put differently, with a federal minimum wage of $7.25, areas with minimum wages around $12 are most likely to see union elections pass. Overall, these results suggest that workers are more likely to vote for a union when local exogenous economic environments are strong. / Thesis (BA) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. College of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Departmental Honors. / Discipline: Economics.

La loi doit trouver le moyen de prévenir et sanctionner de façon efficiente les abus de puissance économique constatés dans les relations commerciales déséquilibrés mais sans provoquer d’effets pervers sur le marché et sans ruiner l’efficacité des autres règles relevant du droit de la concurrence. Lorsque les rapports de force entre les parties sont particulièrement déséquilibrés, la partie forte peut imposer des conditions inégales à la partie faible, notamment à la faveur du « facteur crainte ». En effet, tant que le contrat est en cours d’exécution, la partie faible ne réagit pas de peur que la relation commerciale ne se termine. De ce fait, en dépit de la présence de nombreux textes réprimant les abus, la réalité montre qu’ils ne cessent de se répandre. Le législateur agit généralement dans la précipitation, abuse de palliatifs et néglige la faculté d’adaptation des entreprises les plus puissantes qui trouvent souvent le moyen de contourner les règles. En définitive, seul un marché plus équilibré, c’est-à-dire moins concentré, permettrait de remédier durablement aux abus de puissance économique. Dans ces conditions, la mise en place d’une véritable injonction structurelle mériterait d’être de nouveau envisagée. Le présent travail se propose de comparer les principales mesures de prévention et de sanction des abus mises en place en France et en Corée du sud qui, face à un phénomène similaire, adoptent parfois des réponses différentes. / Competition provisions seek to regulate the abuse of economic power in unequal commercial relationships. However, in the process, such provisions should not have the effect of adversely impacting the market or harming the proper functioning of other competition rules. When there exists a significant power disparity between parties, the stronger party can impose unequal conditions on the weaker party, particularly through what is called the "fear factor". During the duration of the contractial relationship, the weaker party will not be able to stand up to the stronger party in fear of the commercial relationship being terminated. This is why oppressive behaviors continue in reality, despite the presence of numerous regulations designed to prevent such behaviors. Law makers have a tendency to react by hastily enacting ad hoc regulations. The adaptability of powerful corporations to circumvent the rules is often overlooked. Ultimately, abuses of economic power can only be regulated on a sustainable basis through the creation of a more balanced and less concentrated market. It is in this context that a truly structural approach should be considered. This analysis compares the principal measures against abuses of economic power employed in France and Korea, which sometimes adopt different responses to similar circumstances.