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When the women´s suffrage movement began in the last decades of the nineteenth century it was the beginning of the emancipation. In England Jewish women were both active in the suffrage movement – even as suffragettes - and formed the Jewish League for Woman Suffrage. And after World War I, when many European women gained their rights to vote, the English-Jewish women started a Women´s International Zionist Organization; WIZO. In Germany and Czechoslovakia too. But not in Sweden. Why? Jewesses in Stockholm are hard to discover among the Swedish women´s suffrage movement and they waited until the early 1930´s before organizing in a Jewish Women´s club; Judiska Kvinnoklubben (JKK) and a couple of years later in WIZO. My hypothesis is that Jewish women were made invisible in both the suffrage movement and the Jewish community. The subordination of women in Jewish community and their exclusion from religious leadership in congregational life was reflected by the patriarchal structures in Jewish community - as well in Swedish society - and patriarchal theology. It constructed the identity of Jewish women as primarily wives and mothers with the special mitzva of charity, instead of having leadership positions. But the women´s suffrage challenged that. The aim of this study is to analyze in what way Jewish women in Stockholm were involved in the Swedish suffrage movement and what importance it had for their future organizing (1931-1936). To achieve this, I use a method of content analysis with a gender perspective and a theory of social constructionism with an intersectional perspective. The result shows that there is a connection between the two female leader figures (in JKK and WIZO) and the suffrage movement. And by examining the context of how JKK and WIZO were established the analysis shows that Jewish women in Stockholm were inspired by how the suffrage movement was organized, when they began their own Jewish organizing.

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A thought experiment by Avicenna known as the Flying man presents a hypothetical man in the air who is not aware of the existence of his body but simultaneously is aware of himself. A common objection to the Flying Man accuses Avicenna of committing an epistemic and logical fallacy known as the Masked Man. This paper analyses the two most recent interpretations of the Flying Man thought experiment, where each interpretation attempts to understand the main argument which Avicenna poses through the thought experiment.  On one hand, I will examine Peter Adamson and Fedor Benevich’s interpretation, which rejects previous criticisms of the Flying Man with an emphasis on Avicenna’s philosophy of essences. I will, on the other hand, present Jari Kaukua’s interpretation; a response to Adamson and Benevich’s interpretation with two closely related objections. The last section of this paper discusses and evaluates the scholars’ debated points and offers a more charitable interpretation of the Flying Man through my suggestive indicative method.

Some things do not disappear. Violence is one of them. We are predisposed to think of several forms of violence – especially its collective manifestations – as profoundly destructive activities that ideally should be abolished altogether through laws and rules. However, laws and rules are also often thought to require violence to operate meaningfully. The more destructive the violence one tends to see, the tougher (and more violent) measures one tends to require. What one defines as “violence” is often thought to require some kind of counterforce, which also could be said to constitute “violence”. Indeed, at a deep level, law, order, and violence are often thought to be somehow related, creating a so-called double-bind that informs such important notions as authority and legitimate uses of force. The thesis argues that a contingent but powerful version of this figure of thought, a version which for the purposes of the thesis is named “productive violence”, can be traced back to one of the perhaps most important treatises in political philosophy, namely Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan. It is then argued that “productive violence” still resonates with us today, both within academia and politics. In short, “productive violence” has a close relationship to a particular account of law which both takes violence to be foundational and purports to present an antidote to its excesses or otherwise undesirable manifestations. The thesis shows how this figure of thought can be said to be relevant and how it also can be said to be contagious. It does so by illustrating how “productive violence” can be found in various texts by various thinkers. By assembling a collection of texts in more recent political philosophy to trace the development of this figure of thought, the thesis closely reads four thinkers – Carl Schmitt, Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, and Giorgio Agamben – whose texts, in both explicit and implicit ways, refer to each other and produce and reproduce this figure of thought. It is then shown how “productive violence” seemingly has had and continues to have a strong hold in contemporary academia and politics. The thesis uses an extreme but illustrative example, namely the political question of military intervention in civil war. By using this example, and by reading studies of international relations, the thesis shows how “productive violence” can be said to have a strong hold on political imagination. Lastly, the thesis suggests that although it is important to not let go of the notion that violence might be important to understand practices of law and politics, future research on violence, especially critical inquiries of political violence, should be aware of how presuppositions of its productive character in relation to order might perpetuate the very predicament that its criticism wants to escape.

Fiduciary Duty is the legal obligation that economic agents must act in the best interests of their beneficiaries, however the legal definition is vague. There are two general categories of ways of interpreting Fiduciary Duty. The dominant, so-called narrow interpretation binds an economic fiduciary to act in the best financial interests of their beneficiaries. There are also broader interpretations which attempt to account for the welfare and/or ethical priorities of the beneficiaries. The narrow interpretation favors the sole prioritization of profit motivation while the broad interpretations favor environmental and social considerations above profit. The historical legal favor enjoyed by the narrow view seems to, at least in part, allow and even encourage the unsustainable exploitation of natural and social resources. On the other hand, favoring broad interpretations seems to undermine the pecuniary interest inherent in the act of investment. In this paper, I will formulate an alternative account of fiduciary duty by analyzing the underlying ethical desiderata put forward by both categories of interpretations and suggesting a synthesis of the views considered. Using John Stuart Mill's Harm Principle, I outline where sufficient conditions are met in investment decisions to make profit motivation a secondary consideration. While the primary ethical framework I will adopt is most influenced by Rawls' contractarianism, I will support my view by showing that my account of fiduciary duty is favorable on several ethical perspectives over existing broad and narrow interpretations, namely deontological, utilitarian, and consequentialist points of view. My conclusion suggests a few possible actions for the goals of future legislation surrounding the economic agent's relationship to their beneficiaries. One, that environmental and social considerations by economic agents are both prudent and loyal to their beneficiaries, meeting the criteria outlined in fiduciary duty. Therefore, taking such considerations in business decisions should not be punishable as it currently is in many jurisdictions. Second, regulations should be proposed that either: A. Restricts investments enabling economic agents that are prone to environmental and social abuses, or B. Makes the beneficiary explicitly aware of the agent’s questionable business practices before they make the decision to invest. My proposed revision of fiduciary duty therefore aims to provide a philosophical framework for current market regulators to respond to environmental and social challenges facing our planet that are posed by economic agents.

Den moderna filosofiska analysen av kausalitet utarbetades under 1700-talet av den skotskefilosofen David Hume. Under beteckningen regularitetsteorin har Humes analys varit utgångspunkten för alla senare empiriska analyser av orsaksförhållanden. Men Humes ståndpunkt om kausalitet tolkas olika och åsikterna varierar om vad hans orsaksteori utgörs av. En samtida tolkning av Hume som kausal realist gör gällande att Hume tror på existensen av objekt i tid och rum som är oberoende av våra sinnen och som uttrycker kausala relationer, vilka upprätthålls av icke–reducerbara kausala krafter. Dessa kausala relationer är sådana att om idén om dem vore tillgänglig för vårt medvetande, kunde effekten härledas a priori från orsaken. Detta arbete avser att argumentera mot den realistiska tolkningen av Hume, och visa på att Hume utvecklade en särskilt rigorös empirisk metodik för att undvika att gå längre än erfarenheten. Detta realiseras i första hand av Humes idéteori, dvs. uppfattningen att varje enkel idé härrör från erfarenheten som en kopia av ett enkelt intryck. Idéer står enligt Hume i bestämda relationer till varandra, varav några är naturliga associationer, medan andra är filosofiska relationer. Hume gör ytterligare en åtskillnad i fråga om filosofiska relationer: sådana som endast beror på idéerna och vars motsats är otänkbar, och sådana som kan förändras utan att idéerna undergår någon förändring och vars negation inte resulterar i en kontradiktion. Till den senare hör orsaksförhållanden. På detta sätt betraktat är kausalitet ett kontingent förhållande och något vi får kunskap om a posteriori. Givet Humes begreppsempirism, hörnstenen för båda hans resoluta antimetafysiska hållning och hans naturalistiska projekt, är det inte ens begripligt att tala om kausala krafter såsom en kvalitet hos orsaken. Hume påstår att vi felaktigt projicerar en idé om nödvändighet, något som endast existerar i sinnet, på yttre objekt, som i sin tur påverkar kausalitetens fenomenologi. Humes modus operandi i dettasammanhang är att göra våra idéer klara och tydliga genom att urskilja intrycken från vilka de kopierats. För Hume fungerar oklara idéer som analysandum och sökandet efter dess motsvarande intryck syftar till att ge klarhet åt idén. Mot bakgrund av Humes idéteori är den relevanta betydelsen av intryck för Hume perceptuell, och således förutsätter att de aktuellarepresentationerna är adekvata. Härigenom får distinkta perceptioner en framträdande roll i Humes filosofiska system.

This essay discusses the futuristic view of radical human enhancement through the lenses of the transhumanist project. The focus of the essay is on the transhumanistic values proposed by Nick Bostrom, and the technological progress that transhumanism proposes. In this essay I ask if the transhumanist project is a desirable project and in our long-term interests as humans. I propose that at least two of three criteria must be fulfilled in order for any radical human enhancement project to be a desirable project. Of these 3 criteria, two will be addressed in this essay. The two criteria discussed is named “The worthwhile criterion”, and “The obsolescence criterion”. The thirds criteria regarding feasibility will not be addressed in this essay. The conclusion is that transhumanist project cannot fulfill these two criteria and thus it is not a desirable project. / Den här uppsatsen diskuterar den futuristiska synen på radikal mänsklig förbättring genom linserna av det transhumanistiska projektet. Fokuset i uppsatsen ligger på de transhumanistiska värderingar som förslagits av Nick Boström, och det de tekniska framstegen som transhumanism föreslår. I denna uppsats ställer jag frågan om det transhumanistiska projektet är ett önskvärt projekt i våra långsiktiga intressen som människor. Jag föreslår att åtminstone två av tre kriterier måste uppfyllas för att ett radikalt mänskligt förbättringsprojekt ska vara ett önskvärt projekt. Av dessa tre kriterier så kommer två att behandlas i denna uppsats. De två kriterierna som diskuteras heter ”Det värdefulla kriteriet” och ”Föråldrande kriteriet”. Det tredje kriteriet angående genomförbarhet kommer inte att behandlas i denna uppsats. Slutsatsen är att det transhumanistiska projektet inte kan uppfylla dessa två kriterier och därför inte är ett önskvärt projekt.

To deter is central for strategic thinking. Some of the more astute observations regarding the dynamics of deterrence were made during the Cold War by game theorists. This set the stage for how deterrence has come to be studied. A strong methodological element like the research on deterrence’s reliance on game theory requires examination in order to understand what sort of knowledge it actually yields. What sort of knowledge does one acquire when deterrence is viewed through game theoretic models? How do they inform us about the phenomenon of deterrence? To understand the nature of a phenomenon through models requires idealization, which in turn presupposes assumptions. This licentiate thesis investigates the type of knowledge we attain when approaching deterrence from a game theoretic perspective. The two articles presented address two separate but related issues. The first article reviews a debate regarding which deterrence model best capture the phenomena of deterrence, i.e. how models can be compared to one and other. The article presents a framework for comparing models and then appraises how these different deterrence models inform us about deterrence. The second article uses one of the more central deterrence models in order to evaluate how and to what extent the naval operation Atalanta managed to deter the Somali piracy. / <p>QC 20190201</p>

This is an exploration of concepts and identities of Sami people in northern Sweden regarding conflicts on mining. The Sami have a history of feeling that others are encroaching on them and ignoring them and their wishes, the latest being the mining companies. There is also the issue of who gets to be considered as Sami and how the Sami identity is characterised. There are different positions among the Sami, some are enthusiastic and some are opposed. The view of the traditional land can be understood as a sacred connection with nature that is not understood by the majority society. Connecting with the land is vital as the link between the generations. Sweden has been ranked as one of the world’s most attractive places for mining investments in recent years and it is seen as one of today’s biggest challenges for the survival of the Sami culture. The majority society’s and the mining industry’s view on sustainability includes opening of mines, to be able to extract minerals to use in wind parks and electric cars where the Sami are seen as standing in the way. A discourse in Sweden is that all of the north is a vast space, with fewer and fewer inhabitants. With many who are moving to the bigger cities in the south, this is also seen as a way to create jobs for a hopeful future in the towns up north. The Sami faces a misunderstanding majority society where their history is not recognised and the strengthening of indigenous peoples’ rights in recent years have only lead to symbolic gestures for the Sami. This thesis has been made through spending time with these groups as well as trying to be a sensitive researcher who will contribute to the interest and understanding of those written about.