This dissertation is a discussion of the challenge that cases of over-determination pose to Act-Consequentialism. Although there are many realistic examples of such cases – for example, pollution, overfishing, or the election of an inappropriate politician – I consider structurally purer examples, one of which I call “Case One.” Suppose that you and I independently shoot and kill a third person called “Victim.” Our bullets arrive at the same time and each shot would have killed Victim by itself. Finally, Victim would not have been killed, if neither of us had pulled the trigger. According to the Standard Version of Act-Consequentialism, an action is wrong if and only if it has an alternative whose consequences would be intrinsically better. Case One challenges the Standard Version because there does not seem to be such an alternative to my action: Victim would have died by your shot if I had not shot him, and similar remarks apply to your action. The dissertation is structured as follows. After Chapter One, which briefly introduces the main issues of the dissertation, I turn to Chapter Two – “Preliminaries” – where I outline the Standard Version and highlight the main characteristics of over-determination cases. These cases are divided into cases of redundant difference making and cases of redundant causation. Cases of redundant causation are subdivided further into cases of causal over-determination and pre-emption. I make an important stipulation in this chapter. I say that our actions in Case One and similar cases are “redundant negative difference makers.” In Chapter Three – “Replies” – I consider whether the proponent of Act-Consequentialism might question the intuition that you and I, respectively, act wrongly in Case One. The proponent might accept that we have this intuition but explain it away, or she might deny that we have the intuition and instead point to something else that is wrong in this kind of case. For example, she could suggest that although neither you nor I act wrongly individually, we act wrongly together. I argue that these replies are problematic.  For instance, explaining away this intuition might also force us to explain away intuitions that support the Standard Version. In Chapter Four – “Causal Consequences” – I discuss an alternative version of Act-Consequentialism that might seem to fare better. The Standard Version interprets the term “outcome of an action” as referring to the entire possible world that would obtain, if the action were performed. The version I have in mind, the “Causal Consequences Version of Act-Consequentialism,” understands “outcome of an action” as instead referring to the causal consequences of the action. It seems clear that you and I, respectively, cause the state of affairs that Victim dies in Case One. However, I show that the Causal Consequences Version has a number of unattractive implications. In Chapter Five – “the Non-Standard Version” – I suggest another alternative version of Act-Consequentialism. This version – the Non-Standard Version – implies that you and I act wrongly in Case One. Roughly, the Non-Standard Version says that an action is wrong if and only if it has an alternative whose consequences would be intrinsically better, or is a redundant negative difference maker. The Non-Standard Version is similar to a principle suggested by Derek Parfit. However, I shall argue that the Non-Standard Version is preferable to Parfit’s principle. In Chapter Six – “Further Cases” – I discuss a number of cases that challenge the Non-Standard Version. For example, what would the Non-Standard Version imply in a case very similar to Case One but where I would have killed another person, if I had not shot Victim? I argue that the Non-Standard Version handles this and other problematic cases, and that it is therefore a plausible alternative to the Standard Version.

No description available.

När teknik får en allt större plats i vardagen är det många som har ställt sig frågan om det är lämpligt att ge teknik möjligheten att agera utifrån en etik. I detta arbete argumenterar jag för att det är lämpligt att ge datorer som tar plats i vardagen en etik, även om de ännu inte kan ses som medvetna eller etiskt ansvariga fullt ut. Den etik som är vald att argumentera utifrån är Kants pliketik, som initialt är mycket tilltalande som vald etik för datorer. Dock argumenterar jag för att även om så är fallet så är den inte lämplig. Som avslutning har jag valt att istället för att lämna förslag på annan etisk teori lyfta de frågor som kan bli aktuella i framtida dikussioner, alternativt som kommer att uppstå då när datorn får andra förutsättningar. Nyckelord: Kant, pliktetik, teknik, datorer, medveten, tänkande. / Many has asked themselves the question, now when technology gets a larger importance in everyday life, if it is necessary to give this technology the ability to act according to an ethical theory. In this paper I will say that it is a good idea to give computers that take part in everyday life an ethic, even though they are not conscious or ethically responsible to a higher degree. The choosen ethic for this paper is the deontological ethics of Kant, which initially seems very appealing as an ethic for computers. I write that even if that is the case, it is not suitable as a theory for computers. As a conclusion I have choosen to present questions that may be up for discussion later, or that will be interesting to discuss when computers work under new conditions. This paper is written in Swedish. Key words: Kant, ethics, technology, computers, consciousness, thinking.

Yttrandefrihet är en nödvändig förutsättning för det demokratiska statsskicket, men det går att argumentera för att andra värden i vissa fall bör beredas företräde. Interaktion mellan medborgare och politiker ses ofta som något demokratistärkande, men i kontaktytorna kan även negativa konsekvenser uppstå, exempelvis i form av hot. Inom deliberativ demokrati har kommunikationen en central roll. Den här uppsatsen har till syfte att undersöka hur yttrandefrihet som är kompatibel med deliberativ demokrati bör se ut. Detta görs genom en analys av Waldron, Benhabib och Youngs teorier och mot bakgrund av samtal med politiker om deras upplevelser av yttrandeklimatet. Politiska och filosofiska aspekter av rättigheten berörs, inte de primärt juridiska. Slutsatserna omfattar att yttrandefriheten bör vara långtgående men inte absolut; yttranden som omfattar hot eller kränker värdighet bör begränsas. Vidare att förhållningssätt mellan samtalets aktörer är av stor betydelse; detta ska omfatta en vilja och förmåga att anta andra perspektiv än det egna. Medvetenhet om maktasymmetrier och en vilja att eliminera dessa bör finnas för att ett gott demokratiskt samtal ska åstadkommas. / Freedom of speech is a fundamental condition for democracy, but it can be argued that sometimes other values should be given priority. Interaction between citizens and politicians is often viewed as something that is strengthening the democracy, but these interactions may also cause damage, for example if trustees are threatened. Communication is fundamental within the theory of deliberative democracy. The aim of this thesis is to examine how to approach freedom of speech in a way that is compatible with deliberative democracy. To do so, I analyze the theories of Waldron, Benhabib and Young against the background of the narratives of politicians about their experiences of the political discussion; focusing on the political and philosophical aspects rather than the legal. The conclusion is that freedom of speech should be extensive but not absolute; limiting speech that is threatening or that is violating the human dignity of others. I also conclude that the attitude of the participants is of essence, as well as awareness of differences in influence and power.

This essay aims to understand the relationship between Shakespeare’s poetical formula, which is Hamlet´s claim that “time is out of joint” and Kant’s positioning of time (and space) based on Deleuze’s conception in Sur quatre formules poétiques qui pourraient résumerla philosophie kantienne from 1986. I explore this relationship in the way of how Deleuze relates it to the entanglement between time and movement. With Kant, time becomes purely formal and it has unrolled itself into a pure “straight line” that is all the more mysterious for being simple. The consequences of this new Kantian definition of time are tremendous: the ancient cosmological harmony between the world and the heavens, man and the heavenly gods have broken down. Time has ceased to be an image of the eternal order and time has ceased to be curved by God. When time has shaken off its subordination to the periodical movements of planets it is out of joint, and in order to see how that time operates I will relate it to the temporality within tragic drama.

No description available.

Detta arbete undersöker hur karaktärsanimationer kan användas som gränssnittsfunktion i både underhållande och lärande spel. Bakgrund behandlar gränssnittsdesign, karaktärsanimation i relation till instruktionsdesign samt förutsättningar för inlärning enligt kognitionsteori. Frågeställningen som undersökningen ämnar att besvarar utreder om en spelare kan lösa enklare spatiala uppgifter som förmedlas genom gestindikation från en 3D-animerad karaktär. Artefakten består av ett kort spel där karaktärsindikation hänvisar till ett objekt i scenen med nivåer från vag till tydlig indikation där respondenten ska lyckas klicka på rätt objekt. Av 28 respondenter var det 22 personer som löste uppgiften och 6 respondenter inte lyckades att lösa uppgiften. Resultaten från undersökningen visar på att det är möjligt för en spelare att lösa enklare spatiala uppgifter på en bredd mellan subtil indikation till mycket tydligt indikation från en icke spelbar karaktär. Framtida studier kan ämnas att vidare utreda hur olika nivåer av subtil till tydlig gestindikation kan vägleda en spelare.

No description available.

The aim of this thesis essay is to show that Bayesian confirmation theory can be used instead of the hypothetico-deductive method for all sciences.Føllesdal argues in his paper "Hermeneutics and the hypotheticodeductive method" that the hypothetico-deductive method is used in all sciences, only more or less visible and this paper takes his arguments and applies the same reasoning to Bayesian confirmation theory. To do this, an an example of literature study is gone through where the Bayesian confirmation theory is applied. The cases of confirmation and disconfirmation from the hypothetico-deductive method are worked through in terms of Bayes' theorem and the conclusions are that Bayesian confirmation theory can be used with respect to all sciences and that it might prove even better since its higher adaptability.

No description available.