The accession into NATO and the EU, from the perspective of the new Central and Eastern European members, symbolized their ‘return to Europe’. However, as the former outsiders have become insiders, they have become subjected to a new form of hierarchy. This is even reflected in international relations literature that studies the socialization of the new members into ‘European’ or ‘Western’ states (Checkel 2005; Gheciu 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, etc.). The new members continue to be perceived as geographically and culturally on the ‘verge of Europe’, ‘not quite European’ or ‘in transition’ (Wolff 1994; Kuus 2004a; Mälksoo 2010; Zarycki 2014). Their status as ‘latecomers’ in Western institutions has become a stigma. This dissertation asks how stigmatization and subjection to tacit hierarchies, constructed through discourse, affect a state’s foreign policy. It focuses on the East-West relation in the European Union as one example of a hierarchy within this community of states. This dissertation looks at Poland’s foreign policy in the EU. Analytically, I build on the concept of strategic culture, a set of collective, historically shaped ideas and norms guiding a state’s pursuit of security. I go beyond the existing literature to argue that the guiding principle of a state’s strategic culture is the pursuit of not just physical but ontological security, which refers to stable subjectivity (Giddens 1991; Kinnvall 2004; Mitzen 2006a; Zarakol 2010). The recognition as a full member of the ‘Western’ and ‘European’ identity community is essential for Poland’s ontological security. This dependence on recognition makes Poland particularly sensitive to stigmatization within that community. In three case studies, the 2003 Iraq crisis, the 2008 Russo-Georgian war, and the 2013/4 Ukraine crisis, I study how its ‘latecomer’ stigma, and quest for recognition as a full-fledged member of ‘Europe’, and the ‘West’, affects Poland’s foreign policy. I show how Polish foreign policy-makers alternate between two possible responses to stigmatization, adaptation and contestation, and how, paradoxically, both of these strategies often reinforce stigmatization.

Este trabalho busca analisar os diferentes enfoques da política externa da Nigéria, de sua independência, em 1960, até os dias atuais, na tentativa de avaliar mudanças e continuidades nas prioridades desta ao longo do período. Além disso, o trabalho busca, por meio de uma perspectiva histórico-descritiva, melhor compreender a posição ocupada pela Nigéria, um Estado semiperiférico (ou grande Estado periférico), no cenário internacional e também no continente africano. Para tanto, o trabalho divide-se em quatro capítulos, nos quais além de se fazer uma retomada histórica da evolução do sistema interafricano, são analisadas todas as décadas da política externa nigeriana. O que se percebe, através dessa análise, é que, ao longo da história nigeriana, o principal objetivo da política externa do país foi a sua consolidação como principal potência e liderança do continente africano. A busca desse objetivo, todavia, atravessou diferentes fases, fortemente vinculadas principalmente ao desempenho econômico nigeriano, mas também ao contexto vivido pelo sistema internacional e pelo sistema interafricano em cada período analisado, o que fez com que, em momentos distintos, a atuação nos âmbitos regional ou extracontinental fosse intensificada – em geral como uma forma de reforçar a posição ocupada pelo país no continente africano. / This work seeks to analyze Nigeria’s different foreign policy approaches, from its independence in 1960 to the present day, in an attempt to evaluate changes and continuities in its priorities over the period. In addition, the work aims to, through a historical descriptive perspective, better understand the position occupied by Nigeria, as a semi-peripheral State (or large peripheral State), in the international arena and also on the African continent. In order to do so, the work is divided into four chapters, in which we present a historical overview of the evolution of the inter-African system and then proceed to analyze every decade of Nigerian foreign policy. It becomes clear, through this analysis, that over the course of Nigerian history, the main goal of the country’s foreign policy was its consolidation as the main power and leader in Africa. The pursuit of that goal, however, went through different phases, strongly linked mainly to Nigerian economic performance, but also to the context of the international and inter-African systems in each period, which, at different times, caused Nigeria’s foreign policy to be intensified in the regional or extracontinental sphere – generally as a way to strengthen its position on the African continent.

No description available.

Este trabalho busca analisar os diferentes enfoques da política externa da Nigéria, de sua independência, em 1960, até os dias atuais, na tentativa de avaliar mudanças e continuidades nas prioridades desta ao longo do período. Além disso, o trabalho busca, por meio de uma perspectiva histórico-descritiva, melhor compreender a posição ocupada pela Nigéria, um Estado semiperiférico (ou grande Estado periférico), no cenário internacional e também no continente africano. Para tanto, o trabalho divide-se em quatro capítulos, nos quais além de se fazer uma retomada histórica da evolução do sistema interafricano, são analisadas todas as décadas da política externa nigeriana. O que se percebe, através dessa análise, é que, ao longo da história nigeriana, o principal objetivo da política externa do país foi a sua consolidação como principal potência e liderança do continente africano. A busca desse objetivo, todavia, atravessou diferentes fases, fortemente vinculadas principalmente ao desempenho econômico nigeriano, mas também ao contexto vivido pelo sistema internacional e pelo sistema interafricano em cada período analisado, o que fez com que, em momentos distintos, a atuação nos âmbitos regional ou extracontinental fosse intensificada – em geral como uma forma de reforçar a posição ocupada pelo país no continente africano. / This work seeks to analyze Nigeria’s different foreign policy approaches, from its independence in 1960 to the present day, in an attempt to evaluate changes and continuities in its priorities over the period. In addition, the work aims to, through a historical descriptive perspective, better understand the position occupied by Nigeria, as a semi-peripheral State (or large peripheral State), in the international arena and also on the African continent. In order to do so, the work is divided into four chapters, in which we present a historical overview of the evolution of the inter-African system and then proceed to analyze every decade of Nigerian foreign policy. It becomes clear, through this analysis, that over the course of Nigerian history, the main goal of the country’s foreign policy was its consolidation as the main power and leader in Africa. The pursuit of that goal, however, went through different phases, strongly linked mainly to Nigerian economic performance, but also to the context of the international and inter-African systems in each period, which, at different times, caused Nigeria’s foreign policy to be intensified in the regional or extracontinental sphere – generally as a way to strengthen its position on the African continent.

A presente dissertação visa compreender a relação das políticas públicas com o desenvolvimento do setor sucroenergético, tendo em vista as exigências da comunidade internacional em relação à produção de combustíveis sustentáveis sob a ótica do mercado globalizado. Partimos da análise das políticas públicas para agricultura, energia e meio ambiente e da política externa brasileira para os biocombustíveis nos governos Fernando Collor de Mello, Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso e Luís Inácio Lula da Silva. Após isso, analisamos as políticas públicas ambientais e de ordenamento territorial através da compreensão dos três zoneamentos existentes para o setor sucroenergético, com um recorte no estado de São Paulo. Finalmente, discutimos os acordos internacionais para o setor de biocombustíveis. / This work aims to understand the relationship between public policy and the development of sugarcane industry, in view of the international communitys regarding sustainable production of fuels from the perspective of the global market. First, we analyze the public policies for agriculture, energy and environment and foreign policy for biofuels in Brazilian government of Fernando Collor de Mello, Itamar Franco, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Luís Inácio Lula da Silva. After that, we analyze the public policy for environmental and the land use planning, through the understanding of the three existing zoning for the sugarcane industry, with an indentation in the state of Sao Paulo. Finally, we discuss the international agreements for the biofuels sector.

No description available.

In March 2015, the European Union decided to respond to the ongoing disinformation campaigns by setting up the East Stratcom Task Force. This thesis applies theories of communication logic, disinformation-defence and EU’s normativity to develop an analytical framework that can theoretically and empirically enhance our understanding of EU’s campaign. A content analysis was used to analyse the material and to categorize different key concepts that derives from the aforementioned theoretical fields. The finding generated by the analysis of the disinformation reviews show that the Task Force uses both media and political logic in its communication. The results also indicate clear traits of a confronting disinformation-defence strategy. Furthermore it is possible to detect a trend among some of the responses that had similarities to another category within the field of disinformation- defence called “ignoring”. Interestingly the reviews do not regularly reference the normative values of the EU. However, this does not prove that the reviews or the Task Force that writes them do not share the normative values. Although the normative values of the EU is not discussed or referenced in the vast majority of the reviews, on several occasions they do defend the EU on the basis of its normative values. This illustrates a certain level of neutrality of the position of the Task Force with regards to the self-identity of the EU. Despite only being active for two years, the East Stratcom Taskforce seems to have found its place among the EU’s arsenal of foreign policy tools.

Numerous academics and foreign policy practitioners have argued that relations with Russia are one of the most divisive issues within the European Union (cf. Leonard and Popescu 2007, Mandelson 2007). Mainstream explanations highlight that this is due to the different interests and security concerns of EU member states (David et al. 2011). This dissertation proposes an alternative understanding that focuses on national identity construction and Russia‘s role therein. Germany, Poland and Finland, three EU member states that traditionally have different stances towards Russia, are selected for in-depth analysis. The key argument is that divergent national discourses on Russia are due to the different ways in which the country was constructed in national identity. In order to show this, the thesis elaborates on social constructivist scholarship studying the relationship between identity and foreign policy. It argues that constructivist models theorising a causal link between identity and foreign policy (eg Wendt 1999, Katzenstein 1996) are insufficient to fully explain the complexity of this relationship. Drawing on the work of scholars such as Ted Hopf (2002), Richard Ned Lebow (2008, 2008a) and Ole Waever (2002), this thesis develops an interpretive theoretical framework in which national identity and foreign policy are conceptualised as mutually constitutive and studied at the level of discourses. Dominant identity and foreign policy narratives are examined in a longue durée perspective, which allows for an exploration of their deep historical roots. The research conducted through this model highlights the relevance of long-standing narratives on Russia to current foreign policy discourses. However, the thesis also shows that national identity is malleable and top national officials can reformulate dominant discourses in order to achieve particular foreign policy goals. This is illustrated in the case studies, which focus on official narratives concerning the building of the Nord Stream pipeline, the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 and the mass demonstrations in Russian cities in the winter of 2011-2012. The empirical analysis shows that gradual convergence took place across national discourses as national constructions of Russia were reformulated in order to pursue a pragmatic foreign policy towards Moscow. Finally, through the comparison of national discourses in the EU discursive arena, the dissertation assesses the prospects for the emergence of shared EU foreign policy narratives on Russia.

Since the 1970s, the number and variety of states providing bilateral aid has grown. In 1973, 16 states provided aid; in 2013, 31 provided aid. This growth may not appear substantial, but it greatly outstrips growth in the number of states in the international system over the same time period (~46% versus 94%). Given states commit aid for a variety of reasons – prominently, including their own geopolitical self-interests – this growth in the bilateral aid donor community suggests donors are likely to encounter increased competition for any given recipient’s foreign policy cooperation. In the face of this increased competition, this dissertation asks: under what conditions will some bilateral aid donors experience greater foreign policy cooperation as a result of their aid efforts than other donors? To answer this question, this dissertation develops and contributes a framework for better understanding when bilateral donors – in the context of a competitive aid-for-policy "marketplace" – will experience greater geopolitical gain. The donor-recipient aid and cooperation framework suggests each component of the aid-for-policy exchange – the donor, the recipient, and the aid itself – is likely to influence the success any given donor experiences utilizing aid to promote foreign policy cooperation. At its core, the framework argues any given donor’s ability to use aid to promote foreign policy cooperation is a function of their own decision-making and policy process; in particular, their abilities to interpret information and adjust policies. This function, however, is likely to be conditioned by the recipient’s set of donor relationships, the donor's ability to overcome friction and resistance in their policy process, and the on-the-ground experience of the aid’s consumers. In developing this argument, the donor-recipient aid and cooperation framework draws upon a variety of theories from international relations, foreign policy decision-making, public policy, and organization theory. Overall, I find elements related to the donor and the recipient condition the success any given donor experiences utilizing aid to promote foreign policy cooperation. The results indicate that donors who possess dependence-based power advantages, or higher levels of mutual dependence, with their recipients are likely to experience improved foreign policy cooperation, but this experience substantively varies across different levels of aid giving. Additionally, some donors – due to their power status, regime type, or organizational memberships and normative adherences – are likely to experience more cooperation than others as a result of lower decision costs and institutional costs in their policy processes. The third element of the donor-recipient aid and cooperation framework, the aid itself, remains untested and is left for analysis in future work.

Magister Philosophiae - MPhil / Despite the fact that South Africa in terms of its Constitution and foreign policy believes in making human rights central to its activities, on many occasions in the UNHRC, it has been found voting opposite to these values. In this regard, it has been found aligning itself with the countries known for poor human rights records. Subsequently, this raises the question of whether the current foreign policy of South Africa is still driven by the high regard for human rights. As a result, this paper endeavours to look specifically at the voting records and patterns of the Government of South Africa as a member of the UN Human Rights Council (2008-2010 and 2013-2015). It will assess such a record with a view to determine whether the Government's foreign policy is in compliance with its international human rights obligations.