A number of studies have concluded that cognitive control is not fully established until late adolescence. The precise differences in brain function between adults and adolescents with respect to cognitive control, however, remain unclear. To address this issue, we conducted a study in which 185 adolescents (mean age (SD) 14.6 (0.3) years) and 28 adults (mean age (SD) 25.2 (6.3) years) performed a single task that included both a stimulus-response (S-R) interference component and a task-switching component. Behavioural responses (i.e. reaction time, RT; error rate, ER) and brain activity during correct, error and post-error trials, detected by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), were measured. Behaviourally, RT and ER were significantly higher in incongruent than in congruent trials and in switch than in repeat trials. The two groups did not differ in RT during correct trials, but adolescents had a significantly higher ER than adults. In line with similar RTs, brain responses during correct trials did not differ between groups, indicating that adolescents and adults engage the same cognitive control network to successfully overcome S-R interference or task switches. Interestingly, adolescents with stronger brain activation in the bilateral insulae during error trials and in fronto-parietal regions of the cognitive control network during post-error trials did have lower ERs. This indicates that those mid-adolescents who commit fewer errors are better at monitoring their performance, and after detecting errors are more capable of flexibly allocating further cognitive control resources. Although we did not detect a convincing neural correlate of the observed behavioural differences between adolescents and adults, the revealed interindividual differences in adolescents might at least in part be due to brain development.

Diese Dissertation fasst drei wissenschaftliche Arbeiten (Artikel) zusammen, welche sich mit veränderten Entscheidungsprozessen bei substanzgebundenen- und substanzungebundenen Abhängigkeitserkrankungen beschäftigen. In Artikel I wurde beobachtet, dass Probanden mit Alkoholkonsumstörung (AD) und Probanden mit Glücksspielstörung (GD) eine ähnlich reduzierte Verlustaversion gegenüber gesunden Kontrollen (HC) aufweisen. Beide Gruppen zeigten jedoch unterschiedliche neuronale Korrelate dieser reduzierten Verlustaversion: Während AD-Probanden eine unterschiedliche funktionelle Aktivität im dorsal-lateralen-präfrontalen Kortex im Vergleich zu HC aufwiesen, zeigten GD-Probanden eine veränderte funktionelle Konnektivität zwischen Amygdala und orbito-frontalem Kortex (OFC) bzw. medial-präfrontalem Kortex. In den Artikeln II und III wurde untersucht, ob das Verhalten und die neuronale Aktivität bei einer Verlustaversionsaufgabe bei GD-Probanden moduliert wird, wie dies in ähnlichen Studien bei AD-Probanden beobachtet wurde. Tatsächlich konnten GD-Probanden von HC-Probanden auf Grundlage ihrer veränderten Glücksspielannahme während der Präsentation spielbezogener Hinweisreize unterschieden werden. Auf neuronaler Ebene (Artikel III) konnten GD-Probanden von HC-Probanden durch die neuronalen Korrelate der reizinduzierten Veränderungen im Spielverhalten in einem Netzwerk aus Amygdala, Nucleus Accumbens und OFC unterschieden werden. Da in den Studien der Fokus auf Glücksspielabhängigkeit lag, also auf einer Abhängigkeit, welche unabhängig von Substanzmissbrauch existiert, deuten die hier diskutierten Ergebnisse darauf hin, dass verminderte Verlustaversion, sowie erhöhte reizinduzierte Veränderungen im Entscheidungsverhalten – welches beides bekannte Phänomene von Substanzabhängigkeiten sind – nicht durch Substanzmissbrauch zustande kommen. Beide Phänomene scheinen vielmehr erlernte Merkmale oder sogar prädisponierende Faktoren von Abhängigkeitserkrankungen zu sein. / This dissertation summarizes three papers concerned with decision-making impairments in a substance-based and a non-substance-based addictive disorder. In Paper I, it was observed that subjects with alcohol use disorder (AD) and subjects with gambling disorder (GD) show similarly reduced loss aversion. Both groups, however, showed different neural correlates of this reduced loss aversion: While AD subjects showed different functional activity in dorsal-lateral-prefrontal cortex compared to healthy controls (HC), GD subjects showed different amygdala-orbital-frontal and amygdala-medial-prefrontal connectivity. Paper II and III investigated whether behavior and neural activity in a loss aversion task is modulated in GD subjects, as has been observed in similar studies in AD subjects. The data showed that GD subjects can be distinguished from HC subjects using a behavioral pattern of increased cue-induced gamble increase when gambling-related cues are presented in the background. On neural level (Paper III), GD subjects could be distinguished from HC subjects by neural correlates of cue-induced changes in gambling behavior in a network of amygdala, nucleus accumbens and orbital-frontal cortex. Since the focus of the studies was GD, an addiction that is independent of substance abuse, the results suggest that reduced loss aversion and increased cue-induced changes in gambling behaviors, two phenomena related to substance-based addictions, are not dependent on a substance of abuse but rather on learned characteristics or even on predisposing traits of addictive disorders.