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Ao observarmos como os partidos políticos se posicionam na arena federal, podemos perceber que eles se distinguem em relação às suas prioridades estabelecidas para as políticas públicas. Entretanto, não sabemos se estas prioridades, expressas por parlamentares na arena federal, traduzemse em políticas quando seus respectivos partidos estão no controle do poder executivo local. Poucos estudos têm se dedicado à investigação da influência dos partidos políticos brasileiros sobre as políticas que são implementadas pelos governos subnacionais. O objetivo deste trabalho é dar uma contribuição para esta agenda de pesquisa mediante i) a apresentação de um modelo formal que simplifique e exponha as melhores opções dos prefeitos de diferentes partidos quando há preferências partidárias sobre políticas e quando estas preferências estão ausentes; e ii) a análise da política de educação desenvolvida pelos prefeitos e seus partidos. Os resultados encontrados indicam que a demanda por políticas, o comportamento dos diferentes níveis de governo e a existência de serviços similares ofertados por outras redes são fatores importantes que influenciam a provisão de políticas. Não há relação entre o partido do prefeito e a política de educação local, mas há relação entre a política local de educação e o partido do governador. Ainda assim, os resultados não indicam que esta relação seja constante ao longo do tempo. / When we observe how political parties position themselves in the federal arena, we can see that they differ in their priorities established for public policy. However, we do not know if these priorities expressed by legislators in the federal arena, translate into policies when their parties are in control of the local executive power. Few studies have been devoted to the investigation of the influence of Brazilian political parties on the policies implemented by subnational governments. This work aim to give a contribution to this research agenda by i) the presentation of a formal model that simplifies and exposes the best options of mayors from different parties when there are party preferences on policy and when these preferences are absent; and ii) by the analysis of the education policy developed by the mayors and their parties. The results indicate that the policies demand, the behaviour of the different levels of government and the existence of similar services offered by other networks are important factors that influence the provision of policies. There is no relation between the mayor\'s party and the local education policy, but there is a relation between the local education policy and the governor\'s party. Still, the results do not indicate that this relation is constant over time.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2002. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 85-93).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 158-170). Also available on the Internet.

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The theme of this thesis is the involvement of employees from business/industry in the governance of state schools in England and Wales. Following a conceptual analysis and the identification of imprecision in the relevant legislation, the research was designed in two phases. The Phase 1 survey examined the extent of that involvement in 1994 and built up a profile of employee-governors, including their personal and company characteristics. A questionnaire was used to gather descriptive and enumerative data from the school governors employed by twelve national companies, with further qualitative data amassed through some open questions on the questionnaire a,!d from semi-structured interviews of company managers. From 1995 to 1997, Phase 2 assessed the purposes, functions and skills of governors from this sector, through a quasi-experimental design which gathered pre-test and post-test data from thirty-five co-opted business/industrial governors, their headteachers and their chairs of governors. A Likert-type scaling instrument and focus group discussions were used. The main findings from the 1994 survey were that there were few governors from business and industry and even fewer were in governance to represent that sector of the community; most were parent governors. These governors and their company managers felt, however, that there were appreciable benefits to be gained from company employees being school governors. Phase 2 showed that the sample of specifically co-opted business/industrial governors adopted the distinctive purposes of objectivity and non-executive judgement, and brought generic management skills to governance through their company experience at a strategic level. These skills were especially appreciated in inner city schools. The research was the first study of governors from across business and industry and advanced the first model of practice related to purpose for governors from this sector of the community. Aspects of this model have been used to inform the Labour Government's policy for recruiting business/industrial governors for inner city schools.

Thesis (D.Phil.)--University of Oxford, 2009. / Supervisor: Professor Alan Bowman. Bibliography: leaves 358-438.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2005. / Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center; full text release delayed at author's request until 2006 Aug 15.

A literatura focada na Primeira República brasileira (1891-1930) normalmente considera o parlamento desprovido de poder político porque enquadra neste período o marco do acordo firmado entre o presidente Campos Sales e os governadores estaduais para impedir a eleição das oposições no Legislativo Federal. Uma tese até hoje consolidada na historiografia política e que em geral tributa o desfecho autoritário daquele regime à cristalização dos efeitos do referido pacto, mais conhecido como politica dos governadores. O presente trabalho investiga a suposta passividade dos parlamentares eleitos de 1900 em diante através do exame da composição partidária do Congresso Nacional e comportamento legislativo dos representantes em algumas questões cruciais valendo-se do estudo da Câmara dos Deputados. A hipótese de pesquisa parte do entendimento clássico e assume que a Casa não constituía uma importante arena decisória para se construir consenso, garantido de antemão. Contraintuitivos, os resultados mostram que as bancadas estaduais empossadas nas onze legislaturas abertas entre 1900 e 1930 tenderam majoritariamente ao unipartidarismo, mas nem por isso agiram de modo unânime, coeso e subserviente à orientação do governo, havendo espaço para obstrução e eventuais derrotas amargadas pelo Poder Executivo. Definitivamente, o parlamento não gozava de status marginal no regime como frequentemente se alega, mas configurava um foro de negociação central para a governabilidade. / The literature on the Brazilian First Republic (1891-1930) usually claims that the parliament lacked political power, due to an agreement made between President Campos Sales and state governors that prevented the oppositions from gaining representation in the federal legislature. A well-known thesis in the political historiography links the authoritarian nature of the regime to the effects of that pact, known as politics of governors. This dissertation assesses the supposed passivity of parliamentarians elected from 1900 on, by analyzing the party composition of the national Congress and the legislative behavior of representatives in some crucial issues, based on the study of the Chamber of Deputies. The research hypothesis is rooted on the classic interpretation and assumes that the House did not constitute an important decision-making arena for building consensuses, which were guaranteed beforehand. The results of the analyses reported in this dissertation are counterintuitive and show that the state benches of the eleven legislatures between 1900 and 1930 tended to be single-party, but did not act with unanimity, cohesion and subordination to the recommendations of the government, giving room to obstructions and defeats of the Executive. Definitely, the parliament was not a marginal player in the regime as is frequently claimed, but was rather a forum for negotiations with important consequences for governability.