In this essay I discuss if groups can be morally responsible agents over and above the responsibility of their individual members. I consider an important collectivist theory given by List and Pettit arguing that groups can be responsible over its members. I offer some desiderata that a collectivist theory should fulfil and argue that the List and Pettit theory fail to fulfil some of these. Primarily I argue that their theory could come into conflict with a basic ethical and legal principle and that it fails to give a unified account of agency. I draw two conclusions. First, the List and Pettit theory fails to provide a satisfactory collectivist account. And second, a satisfactory collectivist theory ought to give a unified account of agency explaining how the agency side and normative side of responsible group agents fit together.

The concept of causation is essential to ascribing moral and legal responsibility since the only way an agent can make a difference in the world is through her acts causing things to happen. Yet the extent and manner in which the complex features of causation bear on responsibility ascriptions remain unclear. I present an analysis of four aspects of causation which yields new insights into different properties of responsibility and offers increased plausibility to certain moral views. Chapter I examines the realist assumption that causation is an objective and mind-independent relation between space-time located relata – a postulate meant to provide moral assessment with a naturalistic basis and make moral properties continuous with a scientific view of the world. I argue that such a realist stance is problematic, and by extension so are the views seeking to tie responsibility attributions to an objective relation. Chapter II combines the context sensitivity of causal claims with the plausible idea that responsibility ascriptions rest on the assessment of causal sequences relating agents and consequences. I argue that taking context sensitivity seriously compels us to face a choice between moral contrastivism and a mild version of scepticism, viz. responsibility is not impossible, but ultimately difficult to identify with confidence. I show why the latter view is preferable. Chapter III explores the concern that group agents would causally (and morally) overdetermine the effects already caused by their constituent individuals. I argue that non-reductive views of agency and responsibility lack a coherent causal story about how group agents impact the world as relatively independent entities. I explain the practical importance of higher-order entities and suggest a fictionalist stance towards group agency talk. Chapter IV analyses the puzzle of effect selection – if causes have infinitely many effects, but only one or a few are mentioned in causal claims, what determines their selection from the complete set of consequents? I argue that the criteria governing the difference between effects and by-products lack clarity and stability. I use the concerns about appropriate effect selection to formulate an epistemic argument against consequentialism.

Different kinds of collectives help to coordinate between individuals and social groups to solve distribution problems, supply goods and services, and enable individuals to live fulfilling lives. Collectives, as part of the process of socialization, contribute to the normalization of behaviors, and consequently, structure our ability to be self-reflective autonomous agents. Contemporary philosophy of action models characterize collective action as the product of individuals who have the proper motivations to perform cooperative activities (bottom-up); or they begin with the social-level phenomena and explain this in terms of individual actions and the mental states that motivate them (top-down). One general goal of this project is to show how and why both of these approaches through focusing solely on the individuals involved fail to capture and account for important types of group actions: those of economic group agents. Group agents, one kind of organized collective, are unique in that they have the potential to develop group-level decision-making processes that result in the capacity of the group to engage in practical reasoning. Because of this capacity, group agents can be stable and respond to reason--capacities we would not expect from other kinds of collectives. Inasmuch as we value the possibility of influencing the reflexive dynamics that perpetuate social institutions, understanding the range of organization structures and their agential capacities will open up the possibility of altering the course of those dynamics toward more just systems of organization. Understanding what kinds of group agents currently operate within the systems of organizations that make up social institutions is the first step in determining how to move toward developing group agents that are also moral agents. By analyzing how different systems of constraint--inside and outside the firm--inform one another to influence the possibility of design and the group's possibilities for action, I use Christian List and Philip Pettit's account of group agency as a springboard to develop a more adequate account of how structure influences and constrains the possibilities of economic group agents in non-idealized circumstances (i.e. this world, with our history). My chapters include 1) a taxonomy of organization structures and an analysis of how a narrow conception of organization structure in jurisprudence can lead to systems of constraint that limit the rights and freedoms of individuals even as it seeks to extend them, 2) an evaluation of the popular accounts of collective action (cf. Raimo Tuomela, 1997; Michael Bratman, 1993, 1997, 2009; and Christian List and Philip Pettit, 2011) that could be made to accommodate the actions of certain kinds of economic associations, 3) an exploration of the standards of evaluation that influence these powerful group agents, and how these standards limit the economic group agent's capacity to engage in moral reasoning, and 4) an analysis of the group agent's reasoning capacity and the internal mode of interaction between group agent and group members that perpetuate group agency. I argue that we can understand group agents that have the capacity to be moral agents as the products of a particular kind of decision-making process within an organization's structure. The decision-making process, together with the organization structure and group member support, produces and sustains judgments and actions at the level of the group that cannot be reduced to the beliefs and actions of particular members. In this way, the group displays a systematic unity of actions based on its own judgments. That is, the group exhibits agency. Moral group agents exhibit more than practical reasoning; they also demonstrate the capacity for critical reflection upon the ends they pursue. Member buy-in promotes a tight connection between group members and their role in bringing about and sustaining group agency, and is the foundation of the group agent. Without a holistic organization structure, a member's personal identities could undermine group aims, thereby undermining group agency. Group moral agency, I argue, begins with promoting an organizational way of life conducive to collective flourishing and respect for members.

[pt] É comum tratarmos grupos como agentes capazes de interagir intencionalmente com o mundo e, para identificar mentes de grupos, usamos os mesmos mecanismos de percepção de mente em outras pessoas. No caso de cortes, a expressão de seus julgamentos coletivos pode variar de acordo com o grau de liberdade que elas permitem a seus membros. Elas podem publicar uma decisão única, restringindo a publicidade do processo deliberativo (per curiam) ou, ao invés de uma opinião coletiva da corte, podem publicar o conjunto de votos individuais de seus membros (seriatim). Nesse último caso, a identificação dos posicionamentos coletivos da corte pode ser difícil. Esta tese sustenta que, por conta de suas decisões seriatim, o Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) diminui sua entitatividade, o que torna suas razões para decidir difíceis de serem identificadas e limita sua capacidade de uniformizar a jurisprudência nacional através de seus precedentes. No primeiro capítulo, este trabalho trata das condições teóricas para a possibilidade de atitudes intencionais de grupos. Há duas possíveis maneiras de se especificar a natureza da intencionalidade de grupo: uma que se baseia na disposição dos membros do grupo de adotarem a perspectiva coletiva e outra que aponta para a capacidade dos membros de agirem racionalmente enquanto grupo. Da perspectiva de um observador, a noção de mente de grupo exige outras condições. O segundo capítulo especifica as formas como a discussão sobre intencionalidade de grupo podem ser aplicadas à prática judicial. Dependendo da forma como a corte apresenta suas decisões, pode ser que as suas razões motivadoras não sejam claramente distinguíveis das razões endossadas apenas pelos membros individualmente. No terceiro capítulo, é indicado como isso interessa a cortes como o STF, que lidam com questões politicamente controversas, mas que precisam demonstrar capacidade de agir motivadas por razões para que seus precedentes sejam respeitados. Ao optar por publicar decisões seriatim, a corte indica abertura à diversidade de opiniões, reduzindo a sua aparência de entidade coesa. Como consequência, as razões coletivamente aceitas para decidir não são claramente apresentadas. O último capítulo lida com pesquisas psicológicas recentes, que indicam que uma condição para a atribuição de intencionalidade a um grupo é que ele tenha alta entitatividade. Ações coordenadas e objetivos em comum entre os membros aumentam a entitatividade de um grupo e o torna mais propenso a ser reconhecido como um agente. / [en] It is common that we treat groups as agents capable of interacting intentionally with the world. To identify group minds, we use the same mechanisms we use in the perception of the minds of other individuals. In the case of judicial courts, the expression of their collective judgments may vary in accordance with the degree of freedom they allow their members. The courts may publish a single decision, maintaining their deliberative process secret (per curiam) or, instead of an opinion of the court, may publish the set of its members individual opinions (seriatim). In the latter case, identifying the court s collective judgment can be challenging. This dissertation argues that, due to its seriatim decisions, the Brazilian Supreme Court (STF) diminishes its entitativity, making the reasons behind its decisions harder to identify and hindering its ability to standardize national judicial decision-making through its precedents. The first chapter deals with the theoretical conditions for the possibility of group intentional states. There are two possible ways to specify the nature of this kind of intentionality: one that is based on the group members willingness to adopt the collective perspective (the collective acceptance model), and one that points to the members ability to act rationally as a group (the social choice approach). From an observer s perspective, the notion of a group mind demands other conditions. The second chapter specifies the ways in which the discussion of group intentionality could be applied to judicial practice. Depending on the ways in which the court presents its decisions, it could be that its motivating reasons are not clearly distinguishable from the reasons endorsed individually by its group members. The third chapter establishes how this is relevant for courts like the STF, which deal with politically controversial issues, but which need, also, to demonstrate the ability to act motivated by reasons for its precedents to be respected. By choosing to publish seriatim decisions, the court privileges openness to a diversity of positions over its entitativity. As a consequence, the collectively accepted reasons are not clearly stated. The last chapter deals with recent psychological research that suggest that one condition for group intentionality inference is that the group possess high entitativity. Coordinated actions and common goals among members increase the group s entitativity and make it more likely to be seen as an agent.

This thesis provides the theoretical groundwork for a 'virtue ethical' account of international political conduct. The project begins by investigating the distinct patterns of normative theorising within international scholarship, noting not only that moral philosophical foundations are unpronounced and interchangeable, but that even in this diminished capacity the influence of virtue ethical thought is limited and fragmentary relative to its competitors. Redressing this underrepresentation is thus dually motivated: developing a fresh perspective on important global issues, whilst also subjecting the theory to an atypical angle of scrutiny. Adapting virtue ethics to the international realm requires, most essentially, that we settle the level at which its concepts should be applied. Can the theory’s central focus on character be reconciled with the collective nature of global political interaction? Can we accurately ascribe virtues and vices to governments and states? These questions of group agency form the heart of thesis investigation. Beginning from abstract foundations, the possible justification for such ascriptions is sought in competing theories of joint action and attitude. The 'individualist' accounts of Searle and Bratman are ultimately rejected in favour of Gilbert's non-reductive 'plural subject' theory, and - presenting group-level accounts of intention, motivation, practical wisdom, emotion and disposition around her concept of 'joint commitment' - a general model of collective character is constructed. Allied to additional requirements of moral responsibility, this framework is then used to assess the virtue-capability of actual political bodies, considering the decision-making hierarchy of the United Kingdom as a case study for the modern state. Tracing the route of policy authorisation across cabinet, government and parliament, a sophisticated yet ultimately impermanent picture of group-virtue-ethical agency is established, in tension with the notion of enduring state liability. By shifting focus to the national level, it is argued that this fluctuating footprint of agency can nevertheless be unified, modifying Gilbert’s notion of a 'population joint commitment' to tie institutional virtue and vice to a persisting state identity. This provides a template for international character evaluation.

The idea that ‘business ethics' picks out a distinct discipline within ethical theory is contentious; in particular, it is unclear why theoretical approaches to moral and political philosophy cannot satisfactorily address ethical concerns in the context of business activity, just as they can in the context of other human activities. In response, I argue that some features of the business environment require more focused analysis than currently available. This environment is characterised by the presence of large social groups – business organisations – that are not political in nature, but yet wield considerable power and are the vehicles for complex forms of collective action. The most pressing ethical concern raised by such collective action is collective moral responsibility. I develop an account of collective responsibility that is tailored to business organisations and that combines a number of strands of moral thought – a desert-based account of moral responsibility that is of a kind with that typically applied to individual humans; a pluralistic account of how collective responsibility is generated that is rooted in irreducible group-level properties; and a moderate approach to social ontology that sees nothing mysterious in ‘distinct' collective entities. From this starting point I develop two detailed models that illustrate how business organisations can constitute distinct collective entities that may be held morally responsible. The first shows how such organisations may satisfy the conditions required to hold moral agency, which is typically assumed to be a prerequisite for moral responsibility. The second breaks with this tradition and argues for the possibility of ‘non-agential' moral responsibility in cases where complex organisational structures mediate the actions of the moral agents that populate them. I conclude by showing how this distinct organisational-level responsibility, far from insulating organisation members from personal culpability, illustrates quite distinct standards against which such individuals may be judged.