Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T17:22:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo6076_1.pdf: 2825689 bytes, checksum: d1ce9b137020083cf37c5966c5ca3adc (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 / Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / Constituindo-se um mecanismo político de interferência na garantia, modificação ou implementação de direitos da sociedade, todavia freqüentemente confundida com outras atitudes, a desobediência civil e neste trabalho toma-se como conceito o delineado por Hannah Arendt em seu ensaio Desobediência Civil - pode-se constituir também um instrumento no fortalecimento da cidadania. Na perspectiva deste trabalho, conceitua-se cidadania como uma prática conflituosa vinculada ao poder, que reflete questões como quem poderá dizer o quê, ao definir quais são os problemas comuns e como serão tratados, em especial nos espaços públicos criados ou mantidos pela sociedade civil. Exemplificamos com um estudo de caso de uma rádio comunitária, uma vez que as dificuldades existentes para legalização deste espaço nos apontam que a estrutura legal para validá-lo criada pelo Estado é inconsistente e inclinam à descaracterização das rádios comunitárias em suas finalidades e objetivos, e cujo fato tem lesado direitos e restringido o espaço público originário da sociedade civil. Observa-se que permanece a tensão entre representação e participação cidadã, quando a construção democrática requer ambos processos, uma vez que democracias baseadas em situações delegativas têm pela frente o enfraquecimento, diante do não contemplamento do implemento e desenvolvimento das formas de participação e controle pela sociedade civil. Desta forma, a desobediência civil pode ser um instrumento valioso uma vez que pode atuar na manutenção, ampliamento e criação de espaços de interferência, discussão e reivindicação política

Orientador: Romualdo Dias / Resumo: A que nos conduz o pensamento de Hannah Arendt? Neste estudo concebe-se o pensamento de Hannah Arendt a partir de uma dimensão inerente a sua condição de “conduzir”, nos marcos do sentido etimológico da “pedagogia”. Faz-se um exercício de cartografia do seu pensamento, com uma demarcação sobre aqueles escritos que nos permitem aproximar melhor da condição humana de seu exercício na filosofia. Procuram-se em algumas correspondências, memórias, entrevistas e discursos, as marcas de um pensamento que nos auxiliam a pensar o sentido de “pertencimento”, na relação do sujeito com o mundo, e o sentido do “reconhecimento”, na relação do sujeito com o outro seu semelhante. A resposta à pergunta nuclear alcança a sua elaboração final com a definição do exercício mesmo do pensamento, em uma solução de acerto do sujeito consigo mesmo. Discute-se o sentido do pensar, enquanto uma prática, ao mesmo tempo individual e social, como a expressão da responsabilidade que um sujeito assume diante do outro e diante do mundo. Tais elementos da composição do sujeito a partir do reconhecimento do mundo, do outro e de si, são trazidos para a reflexão dos desafios de uma educação diferente, que tenha-os como base de condução. / Abstract: Where does Hannah Arendt thoughts lead us? In this study Hannah Arendt's thinking is conceived from a dimension inherent in his condition of "driving" within the framework of the etymological sense of "pedagogy". An exercise of cartography of his thought is made, with a demarcation on those writings that allow us to better approach the human condition of his exercise in philosophy. We seek in some correspondences, memories, interviews and speeches, the marks of a thought that help us think the sense of "belonging", regarding the subject with the world, and the sense of "recognition", regarding the subject with the other of his resembling. The answer to the nuclear question reaches its final elaboration with the definition of the exercise of thought, in a solution of hits of the subject's own self-satisfaction. It discusses the meaning of thinking, as a practice, both individual and social, as an expression of the responsibility that one admits before the other and before the world. Such elements of one’s composition from the recognition of the world, from the other and from itself, are brought to the reflection of the challenges of a different education that has them as a basis of conduction. / Mestre

Diss.--Universität Frankfurt am Main, 2001. / Contient un resumé. Bibliogr. p. 155-162.

This dissertation is about the political rhetorical process of reconciliation in the wake of crimes against humanity. In contrast to war crimes trials, the political process of reconciliation aims to bring together parties in conflict under the auspices of what are most often called "truth and reconciliations commissions" (TRC). For the Western juridico-political tradition, the ends of transitional justice are directed toward the enactment of retributive violence as a way to reestablish the political field through punishment and the institution of the rule of law. Rather than reestablishing a relationship, law reflects the logic of the sovereign decision and the application of supposedly universal moral standards. The TRC forum works, in contrast, toward a coming-into-relation of perpetrators and the aggrieved, and does so by focusing on the performance of speech and action about past atrocities as a way to turn toward future peace. Following the work of Hannah Arendt, I propose that rhetoric is central to the process of political relationship building. I conceive of rhetoric in its persuasive mood as a process of wooing an other where free deeds transform into free words in the exchange of opinion. I explore the role of forgiveness in the reconciliation process and the need for deliberation in discerning the border between the forgivable and unforgivable as part of the process of coming-into-relation. Finally, I consider how reconciliation and the process of political transition is suited to the notion of "democracy to come" and its implications for always already thinking a future that will never come, but that we, as citizens of democratic communities, must take as our goal.

In my dissertation, I argue that the neoliberalization of higher education results in the university becoming less and less a place of wonder, self-cultivation and thinking and instead more and more a place to specialize, strategize and produce. This is a result of the volatile infusion and mixing of the logic of calculative rationality at work in consumer capitalism with the logic of scientific instrumental rationality already hegemonic in academia. This adds to the demands of the academic world of production the demands of the world of consumption. Now the academic (and also the student) is interpellated not only as a producer of knowledge but also as an object of consumption (to be consumed by others). These new pressures, previously kept at a distance from academia, explosively accelerate the already rapid process of rationalization of which science is already a key part and increasingly structure higher education as a field of strategic action in which students no longer have the time to think and to develop good judgment. I worry this undermines the opportunity for students to develop into good citizens that can truly think critically and judge carefully. Thinking and judgment are, according to Arendt, the only things that can save us if the powerful machines of science or capitalism begin to work in ways they should not. Arendt saw Nazi Germany use the newest science and the best economic management to systematically kill six million Jews. She saw the disturbing inability of the populace and the intellectuals to capably resist the Nazi machine once it got rolling. I argue than unless checked, neoliberalization threatens to turn the university into a place that discourages thinking and the development of judgment in favor of hyperspecialization and strategic action.

Hannah Arendt reinterpreta la tradición del pensamiento político desde la constitución comunicativa del espacio público, proponiendo el juzgar estético como modelo del debate político que genera la participación como reconocimiento mutuo en la pluralidad. Este ensayo aplica estas perspectivasa rendtianas para comprender cómo experiencias concretas articuladas en torno a la creatividad y al arte generan espacios de poder y ciudadanía con un impacto significativo en lo social y político.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-12T17:22:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 arquivo5851_1.pdf: 625876 bytes, checksum: 5fdcf9b8eec417df4124e432def5b82f (MD5) license.txt: 1748 bytes, checksum: 8a4605be74aa9ea9d79846c1fba20a33 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2002 / AUTORIDADE, "palavra-guia", palavra adjetivadora porque também adjetivável , vem alimentando propostas e novas formas de se pensar a importância e o papel do professor, sendo constante a preocupação acerca do seu "declínio" e "erosão" como um dos problemas que afligem a educação, na atualidade. Mas, o que significa, para a educação, a "perda" ou "erosão" da autoridade, em especial, do professor? O que pensa o próprio professor a respeito da questão da autoridade e de sua crise? É em torno dessas duas questões que se desenvolve este trabalho, a partir de entrevistas realizadas com professores de quatro escolas estaduais e duas escolas particulares, na região metropolitana do Recife - PE. Após a análise dos dados coletados, chegamos à conclusão de que a autoridade, na concepção dos professores, mesmo associada à idéia de "poder" e "dominação", corresponde a dois principais elementos: às "características do professor" e a uma "concepção da relação pedagógica". A constante referência a esses dois elementos, nas entrevistas, fez com que a autoridade fosse identificada ora com aspectos subjetivos e individuais do professor, ora com o resultado das características dos diversos sujeitos que constituem a relação pedagógica e das condições que interferem nessa relação, configurando-se como as fontes a partir das quais os professores compreendem e dão significado à sua importância política e cultural, sua "responsabilidade do mundo"

Orientador: Hermas Arana / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Educação / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-25T13:15:06Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Leonhardt_RuthRieth_M.pdf: 705456 bytes, checksum: 61639f6a90581cbcfdc573e0b8b05ec3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1999 / Mestrado

<p> This thesis explores and clarifies Hannah Arendt' s conception of evil and its impact on her political theory. While following Arendt' s reflections on evil over the course of her career-from The Origins of Totalitarianism through Eichmann in Jerusalem and The Life of the Mind-I make the argument that the common thread in her apparently divergent accounts is a certain understanding of evil's negative ontology. I then demonstrate that Arendt's alternative "ontology of appearances" results in an account of "conscience" that prevents action based on cognitive certainty, and thus, evil. In the third chapter, I suggest that Arendt' s political theory, with its opposition to biological "life," is a direct response to totalitarianism's emphasis on animality and its de-emphasis on appearance. I claim furthermore that the difficulties of Arendt' s political thought (particularly her vacuous account of freedom and its troubling connection to immortality) are best explained in relation to her account of evil. On this point I suggest critically that her notion of political freedom is paralyzing or preventative in a way that resonates with her account of conscience. Finally, I propose that in seeking to articulate the meaning of immortalizing action, Arendt might have instead elucidated the difference between a totalitarian perversion of human desire, where desires become cognitive prescriptions, and a Platonic notion of properly erotic desire, where action manifests a desiring orientation to an independent object, but in a decisively non-totalitarian fashion.</p> / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

Hannah Arendt has been widely criticized for conceiving a theory of action and the public realm as devoid of any ethical restraints. This paper suggests that such criticism, as well as proponents of Arendt’s theory, fails to deal with her theory on its own terms and argue that her own notion of manifesting principles as the purpose of action, provides an account of political action that is ethically oriented towards our common world. Although such an account does not determine the rectitude of political judgement nor direct action towards ethically preconceived goals, it distinguishes political from practical reasoning as a distinct sphere of normativity that accords with the necessary conditions of Arendt’s theory of action. This paper suggests that the necessary conditions for a valid notion of action and thus a valid political normativity are (1): the performativity of action, (2): the autonomy of action and (3): action as the generative source of our common world. This paper concludes by suggesting that a proper critique or defence of Arendt’s theory of action should proceed by first engaging with the relationship between her notion of principles and the necessary conditions of a political normativity. Such an endeavor would refrain from shackling action according to the precepts of moral philosophy that either deny or downplay the importance of these conditions.