archives@tulane.edu / The overarching argument in this study is that although sovereign distressed debt investors can create holdout problems during the debt restructuring of a defaulting sovereign, the reality is that they remain a linchpin for an efficient sovereign debt market that guarantees the flow of private credit for capital formation in the Global South. In other words, holdout creditors are a bit of a curate's egg, a necessary feature of the sovereign debt markets. They are not the “spawn of the devil”. The presence of distressed debt investors in the market contributes to the liquidity and efficiency of the market. They enable non-litigant investors who would like to sell their debt and exit the market on their own volition to do so. In addition, they tend to put pressure on recalcitrant sovereign debtors who might not be acting in good faith. They therefore possess “nuisance value” that could spur efficiency in the sovereign debt market. In this context, a universal framework for dealing with holdout problems during the debt restructuring of a defaulting sovereign is needed and that is what this study proposes. Such rules can be developed into a soft-law mechanism spearheaded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). A global normative framework that has elements of nonmarket private standard setting and nonmarket public standard setting, is therefore proposed to address the disruptive and exploitative activities of these creditors in the sovereign debt market. This normative framework would strike the delicate balance between the rights of commercial creditors on the one hand, and interests of sovereign debtors on the other hand, and inject some measure of equity into the process. In summary, this study challenges the contemporary negative and dismissive narratives about holdout creditors, and the assumption and unshaken faith placed on “restructuring or workout of sovereign debt” as the only favored path to alleviating the perennial problem of sovereign default and the attendant debt crises in the developing world. / 1 / MARIA OLUYEJU

The purpose of this paper was to examine the inflation hedging capabilities of property shares. A common notion is that property is a good hedge against inflation. Indeed, positive correlations have been found for direct investments and inflation. However, property shares are generally perceived as a perverse inflation hedge. This discrepancy has often been quoted as evidence of property shares divergence from the development of the underlying property market. However, it has been argued that property shares should be driven by the underlying property market because the companies defining business is identified as the management of the assets themselves. More precisely the management has been recognized as the realization of rent. This paper argued that this management is long term. Moreover the inflation hedging capabilities was seen as long term because the rent is indexed with the inflation and contracts are continuously renegotiated. Cointegration is perceived as an indicator of a long term relationship between processes. Therefore this paper argued of its usefulness for the examination of the inflation hedge of property shares. However, earlier studies have found only for certain markets evidence of a weak cointegrated relationship. It has been noted that the failure to recognize a structural break might lead to the rejection of any cointegration relationship. Therefore this paper took such a possibility into account. Using an error correction framework (ECM), Property shares and inflation was found to be uncorrelated as expected. Evidence of cointegration was found, but no such evidence was found when an unknown structural break was taken into account. Therefore it was suggested as reasonable to believe that property shares is a long term inflation hedge, no matter if it is seen as a perverse inflation hedge in the short run.

Crop revenue insurance is an exception in the insurance industry offering a guarantee subsuming a highly systematic risk- price variability. This study examines whether crop insurance companies could use put and call options to hedge the price risk present in corn revenue insurance. The behavioral model used to examine hedging optimization behavior of a crop producer with crop insurance by Coble, Heifner, and Zuniga (2002) is modified to examine optimal hedge ratio of a company selling revenue insurance. The crop insurance summary of business from 1985-2015 for corn revenue policies was simulated. Corn futures prices were collected from the Commodity Research Bureau databases. Results show that net return from call and put options can hedge indemnities paid by corn RP and RP-HPE resulting from the price variability in some scenario. This suggests hedging the price risk of corn revenue insurance through options could be a viable practice for crop insurers.

This thesis examines three important topics in corporate governance: the relationship between activist hedge funds and other institutional investors, the role of perks in the market for CEO talent, and public scrutiny and the changing nature of perks. First, I provide an in depth study of the interaction between activist hedge funds and other institutional investors. Hedge funds are more likely to target firms with high levels of institutional ownership, and demonstrate a preference for short term focused institutional investors. Hedge fund activism generates short run and long run abnormal returns without increasing stock return volatility. Regardless of investment horizon, volatility is inversely related to prior period institutional ownership. The trading behavior of institutional owners with different investment horizons is consistent with hedge fund activism creating value. These findings hold regardless of whether investment horizon is based on portfolio churn rate or type of institution. Overall, the results suggest a mutually beneficial relationship between activist hedge funds and other institutional investors. Second, in a coauthored paper with Drs. Seungijn Han and Jiaping Qiu, I provide the first comprehensive analysis on how CEOs’ wage and perks are jointly determined in a competitive CEO market. The underlying theory shows that in equilibrium, firm size, wage, perks and talent are all positively related. Perks are more sensitive than wage to changes in firm size. The more perks enhance the CEO’s productivity, the faster perks increase in firm size. Closed form solutions allow the recovery of the cost function of providing perks. I examine the determinants of CEO perquisite compensation using hand-collected information for S&P 500 companies and find consistent empirical evidence. Third, I examine the impact of public scrutiny on CEO compensation using the unique opportunity provided by the 2008 financial crisis, government support, and legislated compensation restrictions. I introduce novel data on executive perks at S&P 500 firms from 2006 to 2012. Overall, my results are consistent with increased public scrutiny having lasting impact on perks and temporary impact on wage, and with legislated compensation restrictions having temporary impact on wage. Changes in specific perks items provide evidence on which perks firms perceive as excessive and which provide common value. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Bison production is an emerging retail meat industry. As demand increases, it creates opportunity for supply-side growth. However, the bison market is volatile and the potential for a drop in the value of bison makes price risk an important factor for producers. Following price risk theory, hedging opportunities for bison producers are investigated using the live cattle futures contract. For the time periods researched, there is no clear evidence that cross-hedging reduces price risk for bison producers. However, there is a possibility that after the bison industry becomes more established and consumer knowledge plays lesser of a role in prices, cross-hedging strategies will be advantageous to producers. / Master of Science

Essay One Under the principal-agent framework, we study and compare different compensation schemes commonly adopted by hedge fund and mutual fund managers. We find that the option-like performance fee structure prevalent among hedge funds is suboptimal to the symmetric performance fee structure. However, the use of high water mark (HWM) mitigates the suboptimality, though to a very limited extent. Bothour theoretical models and simulation results show that HWM will induce more managerial efforts only when a fund is slightly under the water but it will unfavorably dampen incentives when a fund is too deep under the water and when the manager's skill is poor. Allowing managers to invest personal wealth in their own funds, however, helps align interests and provides positive managerial incentives. Essay Two Existing literature has detected a "tournament behavior" among mutual fund managers that mid-year underperformers tend to take relatively higher risk than peers in the second half-year. We reexamine this issue and provide empirical evidence that such behavior does not exist among hedge fund managers, either at fund level or risk style level. Instead, hedge fund managers shift risk at mid-year in response to the moneyness of their incentive contracts. Also, risk shifting decisions are more driven by underperformance than by outperformance. HighWater Mark can strongly rein in excess risk-taking and therefore better aligns interests. Last, risk shifting on average does not improve either performance, moneyness of incentive contracts, or cash inflows. Essay Three We use factor models and optimal change point regression models to capture the intra-year risk dynamics of hedge fund managers. Those risk shifting managers are further divided into 'Informed', 'Uninformed' and 'Misinformed' groups, according to their post-shifting risk adjusted performance. We find evidence that supports the existence of an Adverse Selection' problem of managers compensation schemes. Namely, incentive contracts, designed to share risks and align interests, induce the strongest risk taking from the least informed or skilled hedge fund managers, whose risk-shifting decisions result in undesired or even deteriorated risk-adjusted returns for investors. We also find that the High Water Mark has only limited influence on mitigating excessive risk shifting.

Initial Coin Offerings (ICOs) came into worldwide attention in 2018, when over $11.6 billion flowed through them. The CME Group launched Bitcoin futures contracts in December 2017, giving large funds their first regulated exposure to digital assets. As digital assets move towards the mainstream of finance, institutional investors have followed. This study comparatively analyzes Hedge Fund investment in digital assets against that of other institutional investment firm types (Private Equity and Venture Capital) by analyzing their crypto holdings and rebuilding an equally weighted portfolio for each fund. Under these conditions, the study succeeds in finding significant differences between hedge fund results in the sample and those of private equity/venture capital firms. Specifically, this study shows through the composite portfolios built that digital asset investments made by hedge funds generate a much higher return than that of private equity and venture capital firms. Average hedge fund investments have much higher trading volumes and market capitalizations than those made by private equity and venture capital firms, suggesting that PE and VC firms are taking higher risks by investing in new and little-known crypto projects. The results of this study signal that the hedge fund business model is much better suited for the high-risk, high-volatility cryptocurrency market than strategies employed by venture capital and private equity firms.

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No / It is a commonly held view that gold protects investors’ wealth in the event of negative economic conditions. In this study, we test whether other metals offer similar or better investment opportunities in periods of market turmoil. Using a sample of 13 sovereign bonds, we show that other precious metals, palladium in particular, offer investors greater compensation for their bond market losses than gold. We also find that industrial metals, especially copper, tend to outperform gold and other precious metals as hedging vehicles and safe haven assets against losses in sovereign bonds. However, the outcome of the hedge and safe haven properties is not always consistent across the different bonds. Finally, our analysis suggests that copper is the best performing metal in the period immediately after negative bond price shocks.

The main objective of this study is to analyze the effects cotton quality has on hedging and basis movements within the cotton market to help market participants minimize price risk. The effectiveness of using cotton futures in hedging price risk will be determined by calculating optimal hedge ratios by tenderable quality. Hedge ratios will be calculated using simple differences and error correction models (ECM) on overlapping price data, estimated under both generalized least squares (GLS) and maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). An empirical analysis shows that as cotton quality improves, the optimal hedge ratio decreases. ECMs estimated under GLS are found to be most efficient. It is also found that cotton classing data by quality has no significant effect on cotton basis. Farmers and merchandisers can take these results as a framework to better manage price and basis risk in the hedge and speculative scenarios.