李耀安. / 電腦打印本, 複本為複印本. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學, 1988. / Dian nao da yin ben, fu ben wei fu yin ben. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves 95-107. / Li Yao'an. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1988.

Texte remanié de: Diss.--Theologische Fakultät--Heidelberg--universität, 1998. / Bibliogr. p. 307-344. Index.

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Antes da publicação do artigo as A Função das Leis Gerais em História de Carl G. Hempel em 1942 havia pouco interesse da filosofia em língua inglesa sobre a história entendida como disciplina nas primeiras décadas do século XX. Os estudos existentes se restringiam principalmente a quatro trabalhos: os primeiros volumes do Um Estudo de História de Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975), um capítulo do Experiência e seus modos de Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990), um livro sobre relativismo de Maurice Mandelbaum (1908-1987) intitulado O problema do conhecimento histórico e a Autobiografia de Robin Collingwood (1889-1943). Nesse artigo Hempel defende que a história é um conhecimento que deveria mostrar que um evento em causa não era questão de acaso\', mas que seria previsível em virtude de certos antecedentes. Essa expectativa não constituiria profecia ou adivinhação, mas antecipação científica racional baseada na aplicação de leis gerais. Ainda que o artigo não tenha chamado a atenção nos anos imediatamente posteriores a sua publicação em 1942, logo depois do final da Segunda Guerra Mundial a situação se modificou drasticamente havendo uma proliferação de artigos e livros sobre o tema. O motivo fundamental dessa mudança de interesse entre os filósofos foi o artigo de Carl Hempel e sua recepção, especialmente depois de sua inclusão numa antologia bastante conhecida organizada por Herbert Feigl e Wilfrid Sellars em 1949, e em outra coletada por Patrick Gardiner dez anos depois. Tendo em vista a carência de informações sobre o contexto histórico, social e político das origens europeias da filosofia analítica antes da Segunda Guerra Mundial e, em especial da escassez de trabalhos que articulem esse contexto com a produção intelectual de seus principais representantes, desenvolvemos esse trabalho. Pretende-se mostrar nesse trabalho que o contexto formativo de Hempel, realizado especialmente no cenário educacional das universidades alemãs fizeram dele um portador particularmente bem-sucedido do debate acerca do estatuto epistemológico das ciências do homem, até então restrito àquela comunidade, para o cenário filosófico anglo-saxão. / Prior to the publication of the paper, \"The Role of General Laws in History\" by Carl G. Hempel in 1942 there was little interest in English-language philosophy about history understood as a discipline in the early decades of the twentieth century. Existing studies were restricted mainly to four works: the first volumes of Arnold Toynbee\'s \"A Study of History\" (1889-1975), a chapter of Michael Oakeshott\'s \"Experience and Manners\" (1901-1990), a book on relativism of Maurice Mandelbaum (1908-1987) entitled \"The Problem of Historical Knowledge\" and the \"Autobiography\" of Robin Collingwood (1889-1943). In this article, Hempel argues that history is a knowledge that should show that an event in question was not a matter of chance, but that it would be predictable by virtue of certain antecedents. This expectation would not constitute prophecy or divination, but rational scientific anticipation based on the application of general laws. Although the article did not draw attention in the years immediately after its publication in 1942, soon after the end of World War II the situation changed dramatically, with a proliferation of articles and books on the subject. The fundamental motive of this change of interest among the philosophers was Carl Hempel\'s article and reception, especially after its inclusion in a well-known anthology organized by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars in 1949, and another one collected by Patrick Gardiner ten years later. In view of the lack of information on the historical, social and political context of the European origins of analytical philosophy before World War II, and especially the scarcity of works that articulate this context with the intellectual production of its main representatives, we have developed this work. We intend to show in this work that Hempel\'s formative context, especially on the educational scene of the German universities, made him a particularly successful bearer of the debate about the epistemological status of the human sciences, hitherto restricted to that community, to the Anglo- Saxon.

Antes da publicação do artigo as A Função das Leis Gerais em História de Carl G. Hempel em 1942 havia pouco interesse da filosofia em língua inglesa sobre a história entendida como disciplina nas primeiras décadas do século XX. Os estudos existentes se restringiam principalmente a quatro trabalhos: os primeiros volumes do Um Estudo de História de Arnold Toynbee (1889-1975), um capítulo do Experiência e seus modos de Michael Oakeshott (1901-1990), um livro sobre relativismo de Maurice Mandelbaum (1908-1987) intitulado O problema do conhecimento histórico e a Autobiografia de Robin Collingwood (1889-1943). Nesse artigo Hempel defende que a história é um conhecimento que deveria mostrar que um evento em causa não era questão de acaso\', mas que seria previsível em virtude de certos antecedentes. Essa expectativa não constituiria profecia ou adivinhação, mas antecipação científica racional baseada na aplicação de leis gerais. Ainda que o artigo não tenha chamado a atenção nos anos imediatamente posteriores a sua publicação em 1942, logo depois do final da Segunda Guerra Mundial a situação se modificou drasticamente havendo uma proliferação de artigos e livros sobre o tema. O motivo fundamental dessa mudança de interesse entre os filósofos foi o artigo de Carl Hempel e sua recepção, especialmente depois de sua inclusão numa antologia bastante conhecida organizada por Herbert Feigl e Wilfrid Sellars em 1949, e em outra coletada por Patrick Gardiner dez anos depois. Tendo em vista a carência de informações sobre o contexto histórico, social e político das origens europeias da filosofia analítica antes da Segunda Guerra Mundial e, em especial da escassez de trabalhos que articulem esse contexto com a produção intelectual de seus principais representantes, desenvolvemos esse trabalho. Pretende-se mostrar nesse trabalho que o contexto formativo de Hempel, realizado especialmente no cenário educacional das universidades alemãs fizeram dele um portador particularmente bem-sucedido do debate acerca do estatuto epistemológico das ciências do homem, até então restrito àquela comunidade, para o cenário filosófico anglo-saxão. / Prior to the publication of the paper, \"The Role of General Laws in History\" by Carl G. Hempel in 1942 there was little interest in English-language philosophy about history understood as a discipline in the early decades of the twentieth century. Existing studies were restricted mainly to four works: the first volumes of Arnold Toynbee\'s \"A Study of History\" (1889-1975), a chapter of Michael Oakeshott\'s \"Experience and Manners\" (1901-1990), a book on relativism of Maurice Mandelbaum (1908-1987) entitled \"The Problem of Historical Knowledge\" and the \"Autobiography\" of Robin Collingwood (1889-1943). In this article, Hempel argues that history is a knowledge that should show that an event in question was not a matter of chance, but that it would be predictable by virtue of certain antecedents. This expectation would not constitute prophecy or divination, but rational scientific anticipation based on the application of general laws. Although the article did not draw attention in the years immediately after its publication in 1942, soon after the end of World War II the situation changed dramatically, with a proliferation of articles and books on the subject. The fundamental motive of this change of interest among the philosophers was Carl Hempel\'s article and reception, especially after its inclusion in a well-known anthology organized by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars in 1949, and another one collected by Patrick Gardiner ten years later. In view of the lack of information on the historical, social and political context of the European origins of analytical philosophy before World War II, and especially the scarcity of works that articulate this context with the intellectual production of its main representatives, we have developed this work. We intend to show in this work that Hempel\'s formative context, especially on the educational scene of the German universities, made him a particularly successful bearer of the debate about the epistemological status of the human sciences, hitherto restricted to that community, to the Anglo- Saxon.

The problem of historical explanation consists in how historical facts are put together. No mere collection of facts constitutes an explanation: there must be some underlying explanation for why those facts occurred in the way they did. Many competing theories of historical explanation have thus been offered, from the highly technical D-N or covering law model, to narrative-based explanations. This paper exposes the flaws in the covering law model proposed by Carl Hempel, and offers a justification for narrative-based explanations by appealing to the notion of language games as used by Ludwig Wittgenstein, as well as the narrative and paradigm models of Arthur Danto and Thomas Kuhn for explaining historical events. / Master of Arts

Numerous studies have attempted to measure scientists' influence by measuring the quantity of citations to their works. The problem with "citation counting," as it is called, is that it assumes that each listing of an author in a citation index is equal to another without bothering to explore the substantive uses of citations in the source article. The present study attempts to alleviate this problem by content analysis of citations in a limited sphere: reference to major philosophers of science by sociologists. In just over 100 sociology journals, citations to Thomas Kuhn, Karl Popper, Ernst Nagel, and Carl Hempel (overall, the most frequently cited philosophers of science) from 1971-1982 were randomly sampled. Each citation was classified according to the following criteria: 1) philosopher cited; 2) work cited, 3) exclusivity (whether cited with others); 4) multiplicity (number of citations by the philosopher in the same article); 5) type of article; and 6) purpose of citation. Purposes of citation included seven categories: 1) listing as relevant literature; 2) definition of a concept; 3) modification or extension of a philosopher's theory; 4) formulation of a research problem; 5) interpretation of results; 6) critical of philosopher's work; and 7) other. Analysis of these data revealed the following conclusions: 1) the major use of philosophy was the furnishing of concepts and their definitions; 2) philosophy of science played little or no role in directing research or interpreting results; 3) the use of citations differed greatly among the philosophers; 4) simple citation counting would have severely distorted the relative influences of each philosopher; and 5) the dialogue between sociology and the philosophy of science has, in the last decade, been dominated by Kuhn's theory of scientific revolutions.

In this essay I defend the notion of deductive explanation mainly against two types of putative counterexamples: those found in genuinely indeterministic systems and those found in complex dynamic systems. Using Railton's notions of explanatory information and ideal explanatory text, deductivism is defended in an indeterministic setting. Furthermore, an argument against non-deductivism that hinges on peculiarities of probabilistic causality is presented. The use of the notion of an ideal explanatory text gives rise to problems in accounting for explanations in complex dynamic systems, regardless of whether they are deterministic or not. These problems are considered in the essay and a solution is suggested. This solution forces the deductivist to abandon the requirement that an explanation consists of a deductive argument, but it is argued that the core of deductivism is saved in so far as we, for full explanations, can still adhere to the fundamental requirement: If A explains B, then A is inconsistent with anything inconsistent with B.