• Refine Query
  • Source
  • Publication year
  • to
  • Language
  • 61741
  • 9583
  • 6611
  • 4983
  • 2843
  • 1972
  • 1628
  • 1097
  • 1031
  • 761
  • 589
  • 589
  • 589
  • 589
  • Tagged with
  • 23163
  • 6493
  • 4961
  • 4689
  • 4252
  • 4241
  • 3916
  • 3808
  • 3598
  • 3421
  • 3409
  • 3079
  • 3078
  • 3059
  • 2942
  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
121

Can Adam Smith Answer the Normative Question?

Richards, Samuel 13 August 2013 (has links)
In The Sources of Normativity, Christine Korsgaard argues that in order to avoid the threat of moral skepticism, our moral theories must show how the claims they make about the nature of our actions obligate us to act morally. A theory that can justify the normativity of morality in this way answers what Korsgaard calls “the normative question.” Although Korsgaard claims that only Kantian theories of morality, such as her own, can answer the normative question, I argue that Adam Smith’s sentimentalist moral theory, as presented in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, can answer the normative question as well. As a result, it is possible to respond to the moral skeptic in the way Korsgaard outlines without accepting some of the theoretical drawbacks of Korsgaard’s own moral theory.
122

Smith on Self-Command and Moral Judgment

Papiernik, Lauren 29 April 2013 (has links)
In A Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume argues that moral judgments are the product of sentiment. The mechanism of sympathy allows individuals to enter into a common point of view in order to produce judgments that are truly moral, and not merely self-interested. Hume argues that the common point of view is the standard that moral judgments are subjected to. I argue that the common point of view is an inadequate standard for distinguishing between proper and improper moral judgments. The common point of view is inadequate because it is subjective and unreflective. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith offers an account of moral judgment that has an adequate standard for distinguishing between proper and improper moral judgments. Smith avoids the problems with Hume’s account due to his distinction between partial and impartial spectators and the role that self-command plays in his theory of moral judgment.
123

Libertarian Paternalism and the Authority Of The Autonomous Person

Koepke, Cami 13 August 2013 (has links)
Cass Sunstein and Richard Thaler (2003, 2006, 2009) contend that the government is justified in shaping certain choices of individuals to advance their well-being. In this paper, I argue that those who are committed to a robust notion of autonomy, which I call autonomy as authority, have good reason to reject the Sunstein-Thaler (S/T) argument for libertarian paternalism. I draw from Joseph Raz’s (1990) idea of exclusionary reasons and Daniel Groll’s (2012) conception of autonomy to argue that the S/T argument for libertarian paternalism fails to respect autonomy. I consider if soft paternalism could be called upon as a foundation for libertarian paternalism, but argue against this possibility. I conclude that an adequate defense of libertarian paternalism would need to directly attack the notion of autonomy as authority, but such an attack has yet to be mounted by the defenders of libertarian paternalism.
124

Kant and the Priority of Self-Knowledge

Messina, James P 01 August 2013 (has links)
In The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant claims that “the first command” of all self-regarding duties is to know our “heart.” Kant ostensibly identifies our heart with our moral disposition. Strangely, this appears to be precisely the sort of knowledge that, elsewhere, Kant claims is epistemically inaccessible to us. While the more sophisticated attempts to resolve this difficulty succeed in situating an injunction to know the quality of one’s disposition within a Kantian epistemic framework, no account is wholly successful in explaining why Kant takes self-knowledge to be a necessary condition of virtue. To make sense of the priority Kant assigns to the pursuit of self-knowledge, I argue that it is essential to understand the role of what has been called “generic” self-knowledge in Kant’s moral philosophy. I proceed to defend the place Kant grants moral self-knowledge in his moral philosophy, primarily by developing a Kantian account of such “generic” self-knowledge.
125

Thomas Pogge And The Two Types Of Libertarian

Hopper, Zachary 13 August 2013 (has links)
Thomas Pogge proposes the Health Impact Fund (HIF) as a realistic, feasible reform to the pharmaceutical patent regime that would incentivize pharmaceutical research and reward innovation for medicines based on their impact on the global burden of disease. Pogge advances a human rights-based argument to show that the HIF is a morally required addition to the current pharmaceutical patent regime. One objection to his human rights argument comes from a libertarian appeal to property rights. Pogge’s response to the libertarian leads to the counterintuitive conclusion that libertarianism is incompatible with any system of intellectual property rights. This paper will show how Pogge fails to distinguish between what I call status quo and revisionist libertarian positions on intellectual property. Making this distinction, I maintain, would strengthen the human rights argument and allow Pogge to avoid the counterintuitive conclusion of his response to the libertarian.
126

Adam Smith: A Relational Egalitarian Interpretation

Joyce, Kathryn E 09 March 2012 (has links)
In this thesis I argue that Adam Smith is committed to moral egalitarianism, which extends to his theory of political economy. While Smith’s work is often used to justify economic inequality in society, I show that his political theory is best understood as a kind of relational egalitarianism. Using Elizabeth Anderson’s Democratic Equality as a model, I examine Smith’s commitment to equality in the space of social relationships. In particular, I argue that Smith’s focus on eliminating inequalities that cause oppression in society in conjunction with his efforts to design a political and economic system that will yield social conditions of freedom for individuals make him a relational egalitarian.
127

Do Political Liberals Need the Truth?

Randall, Pierce 13 August 2013 (has links)
In this thesis, I defend John Rawls’s assertion that political liberalism does not use the concept of truth. I respond to objections from Joshua Cohen and David Estlund. I argue that Cohen fails to show that public reason needs a minimalist conception of truth, since individuals with a range of conceptions of moral truth can meet the requirements of public reason. I dispute Estlund’s argument that the liberal principle of legitimacy is merely insular. Estlund assumes that the claim that the liberal principle of legitimacy is reasonable is no different than the claim that the principle is acceptable to reasonable persons. I argue that this assumption is incorrect, and that therefore the liberal principle of legitimacy is justifiable on the grounds that it is reasonable. I argue that political liberals need not worry that doing without the concept of truth will undermine the semantic coherence or objectivity of political liberalism.
128

The Concept of "Woman": Feminism after the Essentialism Critique

Fulfer, Katherine Nicole 21 April 2008 (has links)
Although feminists resist accounts that define women as having certain features that are essential to their being women, feminists are also guilty of giving essentialist definitions. Because women are extremely diverse in their experiences, the essentialist critics question whether a universal (non-essentialist) account of women can be given. I argue that it is possible to formulate a valuable category of woman, despite potential essentialist challenges. Even with diversity among women, women are oppressed as women by patriarchal structures such as rape, pornography, and sexual harassment that regulate women’s sexuality and construct women as beings whose main role is to service men’s sexual needs.
129

Marriage as Unconstitutional: How Not Allowing Homosexual Marriage Violates the First Amendment

Payne, Brian M. 09 June 2006 (has links)
For the past several years the issue of homosexual marriage has been at the forefront of an often intense debate in American political culture. Those who oppose the policy have, by and large, been in the majority. But in America, majority decisions are not automatically legal; such status is obtained only when policies are not in conflict with the Constitution. With that in mind, this paper aims to show how not allowing homosexual marriage can amount to an unconstitutional endorsement of religion. To accomplish this I will first examine the main arguments presented against the policy by the defenders of “traditional” marriage and show how they fail. With the main arguments undercut, opponents of gay marriage must have either no real basis for their position, or make their arguments from within specific comprehensive (generally religious) doctrines- a phenomenon widespread enough to possibly constitute a violation of the first amendment.
130

The Female Voices of Islam

LeCompte, Kacie Sherry 12 June 2006 (has links)
The Female Voices of Islam is arguing for feminism to be regarded as a theory instead of an ideology so that the voices of contemporary female Muslims can be heard. This paper reviews the arguments of four such women: Amina Wadud, Fatima Mernissi, Asra Q. Nomani, and finally Zainab al-Ghazali. Collectively their discourses support equality for men and women within the Islamic tradition, while their individual ways of approaching the subject differ dramatically. Wadud and Nomani support the theory that an egalitarian ethic can be found in the roots of the Islamic tradition, in both text and ritual. Mernissi investigates how economic evolution of Islamic society stimulates a shift in spatial boundaries for Muslim women. Al-Ghazali does not address female inequality within the tradition, but advocates an egalitarian ethic through the example she sets in Egyptian society. She is concerned with a world wide observance of “true” Islam.

Page generated in 0.1256 seconds