Thesis advisor: Marius Stan / This dissertation is about the immortality of the self and whether from a transcendental idealist perspective, one could sustain this notion based on theoretical grounds. It is well known that Kant closed this door in the Critique, and this is the position that Kantian scholars defend. But has Kant set up a series of dogmatic premises that presuppose that we accept conclusions for which Kant offers no argument? Thus, this dissertation aims at a minimal ontology of the human self within an idealist framework. To do this, I turn to Schopenhauer’s ‘perfected system of criticism.’ Without abandoning idealism, Schopenhauer introduces an objective perspective that suggests a more ontological robust understanding of the self. Although Schopenhauer’s position can be interpreted in a way favorable to theoretical arguments for the immortality of the self, his commitment to an identity of brain/mind, and the consequences that he draws from this, obscures some of his most important contributions. To tackle this issue and others, I analyze the Plotinian perspective, a philosophical position that blends epistemology and ontology which I think solidifies my interpretation of Schopenhauer and breaks the supposed identity between brain/mind. Thus, theoretical arguments for the immortality of the self are possible when idealism is an account in which epistemology and ontology intermingle. Specifically, an argument is supported by a premise that is accepted by both Plotinus and Schopenhauer, namely, that of the existence of Ideas, real objects external to the human mind which are responsible for the existence of sensible individuals. These ideas are in themselves unified by a higher principle which Plotinus names the One and Schopenhauer the Thing in Itself. In absolute terms, this ultimate reality is the root of our true self, but we are not identical to it because in human beings there is multiplicity which manifests itself in us by how we cognize things as external to ourselves (understanding) and how we desire things that we do not find within us (will). Chapter 1 opens with a discussion about the ‘true self’ according to Kant. Although this true self could be identified with the pure apperception of the Transcendental Deduction given that Kant argues that it is the source of unity of experience, after examining the different degrees of unity in representations, I conclude that the unifying principle of all sensible experience and the subject itself exist in a non-sensible world. The intelligible character of the Third Antinomy could be that principle, but I reject this in favor of the thing in itself. Nevertheless, the intelligible character’s residence as an individual in the non-sensible world hints at the construction of theoretical arguments for the immortality of the true self. Chapter 2 argues that Schopenhauer also rejects the role assigned to the pure apperception: only the thing in itself is the original source of unity. Schopenhauer accepts the Kantian intelligible character with clear indications that it is an ontologically real entity. The ontological import of the intelligible character reinforces its role in seeking a theoretical argument for the immortality of our true self. I propose that a pathway to a theoretical argument in favor of the immortality of the true self is also suggested in Schopenhauer’s doctrine of Ideas. The subject of cognition, through the alteration of its cognitive faculties in aesthetic contemplation, discovers itself as the correlate of a Pure Subject of Cognition whose objects are Pure Objects or, as Schopenhauer calls them, Ideas. In this alteration, the empirical subject of cognition is ‘elevated’ to the intuitive grasping of Ideas as a Pure Subject. Among Ideas, I argue that Schopenhauer points to something that can be interpreted as an idea of individual. Given the immortal nature of Ideas, we must also be immortal. Chapter 3 focuses on the question about immortality in both Kant and Schopenhauer. On the one hand, I show that Kant has not abandoned the notion of the human soul or its immortality. Instead, he claims to have clarified the origin of all disputes regarding the human soul while laying out the rules for guarding ourselves against future errors. On the other hand, Schopenhauer has no problem accepting that immortality is a fact of common sense, but he rejects that the individual survives. He bases this conclusion on his conviction that individuality emerges with the intellect, while the intellect only emerges with the brain. The subjection of the intellect to the brain is one of the most salient features of Schopenhauerian psychology. However, I propose that Schopenhauer’s objective perspective, a perspective whose implications are hardly at the center of attention in Schopenhauer’s studies, cannot be used to its full potential – as for example to defend that the individual human being is immortal too – unless this identification of intellect and brain is abandoned. To find arguments that can be used to differentiate the mind from the brain, I propose the study of Plotinus. Chapter 4 aims to provide a framework to illuminate the possibilities built into Schopenhauer’s objective perspective. The survey of Plotinus’ philosophy of self and immortality in this chapter suggests interesting starting points for a new interpretation of some of Schopenhauer’s insights. An important consequence of this study is the formulation of arguments to show that the mind or intellect cannot be characterized as identical to the brain. After studying Plotinus, a fact becomes clear, namely, that Schopenhauer, although critical of the concept ‘soul’, does not discard its content; instead, he finds ample use of it for his own unique purposes. Chapter 5 concludes that the discussion of Kant’s and Schopenhauer’s psychology reveals the flaw in their respective projects, namely, their demand that cognition of the human soul should mirror cognition of sensible objects. This is a conclusion that is also revealed by the study of Plotinus. However, I reaffirm my position that Schopenhauer’s idealism is a step forward in the right direction. I discuss four ‘great themes’ – born from the encounter between Schopenhauer and Plotinus – which provide the general context that helps me propose how the theoretical argument for the immortality of the true self works in transcendental idealism. I argue that these four great themes, areas where ontology and epistemology intersect, refocus not just Schopenhauer’s philosophy by helping us to become aware of the nonverbalized implications of his metaphysics, it even suggests that Plotinus’ metaphysics could benefit from the Schopenhauerian reflection. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

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This paper examines the power and limitations of historical analysis in regards to explaining the Holocaust and in particular the widespread consent to the Nazi program. One of the primary limitations that emerges is an inability of historians to fully engage other social sciences to offer a more comprehensive explanation as to why so many Germans engaged in what we would consider an “evil” enterprise. In that regard, I offer the work of Ernest Becker, a social anthropologist, whose work provides a framework for understanding history as a succession of attempts by man to create societies that generate meaning through various heroic quests that defy man's finite existence, yet often result in carnage. Combining Becker's theoretical framework with the rich historical evidence specific to the Holocaust provides a much richer understanding of both Becker's work and why the Holocaust happened.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2016-11-29T11:28:12Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Rodrigo Vieira de Almeida.pdf: 2165297 bytes, checksum: a864143d29a1552785c9da4df5405b58 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-11-29T11:28:12Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rodrigo Vieira de Almeida.pdf: 2165297 bytes, checksum: a864143d29a1552785c9da4df5405b58 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-09-13 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This doctorate research presents and defends the thesis that Charles Sanders Peirce’s philosophy has a place for a sui generis concept of man’s immortality within his scientific metaphysics. This concept of immortality, which may be briefly defined as the possibility of permanence of the influence of a man’s character, even after the dissolution of his body, i.e., even after his death, ultimately implies that death does not necessarily mean absolute discontinuity of the continuum that is man. It is, thus, a concept of immortality deeply ingrained in Synechism and, hence, in the author’s Realism and Objective Idealism, notwithstanding having also a relationship of a conjectural nature with his conception of the reality of God. We propose, therefore, to analyze how such a concept may be developed and effectively grounded within the author’s philosophical architecture / A presente pesquisa de doutorado exibe e defende a tese de que a filosofia de Charles Sanders Peirce reserva lugar para um conceito sui generis de imortalidade do homem no interior de sua metafísica científica. Esse conceito de imortalidade, que pode ser brevemente definido como a possibilidade da permanência da influência do caráter de um homem mesmo após a dissolução do seu corpo, ou seja, mesmo após a sua morte, acaba por implicar que a morte não necessariamente significa uma descontinuidade absoluta do contínuo que é o homem. Trata-se, pois, de um conceito de imortalidade profundamente enraizado no Sinequismo, e, logo, no Realismo e Idealismo Objetivo do autor, não obstante possua também uma ligação de natureza conjectural com a sua concepção da realidade de Deus. Assim, propomo-nos analisar como tal conceito pode ser construído e devidamente assentado no interior da arquitetura filosófica do autor

Digital Immortality or Not?The aim of this thesis was to explore how we might be stewards for our post-life digital self after physical death, and to provide a new interaction experience in the form of a tangible, digital, or service design solution. Prior to the project kick-off secondary research, including academic research papers, analogous services, and existing projects, was distilled to form topical questions. These questions were then presented in many casual topical conversations and revealed that although post-life digital asset management awareness is increasing, little consideration exists on how to reflect legacies into the future long after death. A second stage of primary research included multiple on-site investigations, paired with in-person interviews and a quantitative online survey. Insights and understandings then lead to initial concepts that were tested to address distinctive qualities between tangible and digital design solutions. The main findings included that although people want to be remembered long after they die, current methods of tangible and digital content management can not sufficiently support the reflection of legacies long into the future. In conclusion, this thesis argues that to become part of an everlasting legacy, the interaction experience can leverage commonalities and shared moments from life events captured in digital media. These points of connections rely on associated metadata (i.e. keyword tags, date stamps, geolocation) to align relevant moments that transcend time and generations. The solution proposed here harnesses the benefits that both digital and tangible media afford and are presented as a tablet interface with an associated tangible token used as a connection key.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Eberhard-Karls-Universität zu Tübingen. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 162-167).

Thesis (M.T.S.)--Catholic Theological Union of Chicago, 1989. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 85-88).

Thesis (M.A.)(Hons)--University of Western Sydney, Nepean, 1998. / Slides included in print copy. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.F.A.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 2008. / Typescript.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 1998. / Vita. Includes bibliographic references (p. [192]-199).