Texte remanié de: Th. doct.--Droit--Paris 1, 2000. Titre de soutenance : Origines et fondements des nullités contractuelles : droit civil et droit de tradition anglaise. / Bibliogr. p. 267-281. Index.

Dans sa définition traditionnelle, c'est-à-dire définie comme la sanction des conditions de formation des actes juridiques, la nullité est entièrement construite autour de la figure de l’autorité et du pouvoir. La rétroactivité de la nullité pouvant s’analyser d’ailleurs comme une manière d’asseoir cette autorité. Cette conception demeure nous semble t-il prisonnière du fondement de l’inexistence : il s’agit de faire comme si l’acte n’avait jamais existé ; d’anéantir l’acte. Les Modernes n’ont pas réussi à se défaire complètement de cette vision qui témoigne d'une analyse réductionniste du droit. Lorsqu’ils raisonnent en termes de validité, ils ne raisonnent qu’en termes de validité formelle. La validité se définissant dès lors comme le mode spécifique d'existence des normes semble devoir être rattachée à la logique de l'impérativité alors qu'elle reposait chez JAPIOT sur la logique de l'ordre public ce qui lui conférait une certaine souplesse. Associée à l’idée d’autorité, d’impérativité, de pouvoir la nullité semble une figure appartenant au passé tant la planète contractuelle dominée par la pluralité semble désormais attirée vers la flexibilité. L’introduction du concept de « nullité partielle » n’a guère remporté le succès escompté et nécessaire pour renverser cette tendance. Les sanctions dites alternatives à la nullité se sont multipliées afin de palier l’incapacité de la nullité à rendre compte des transformations de notre droit. Et pourtant, définie non plus comme une sanction mais comme une norme de reconnaissance, la nullité apparaît non seulement comme un outil particulièrement souple - et donc adapté à notre modernité - mais comme le seul véritable instrument de justice contractuelle. / Abstract

Thèse. Droit. Paris. 1947.

La phénoménologie de la donation se présente sous la forme d´un projet d´ouverture radicale du champ de la phénoménalité. Après avoir montré que la modernité a enfermé les phénomènes dans des conditions de possibilité dictées par un Sujet, et que la phénoménologie allemande a poursuivi ce geste en indexant les phénomènes sur l´horizon de l´objectité ou de l´étantité, Marion propose de reconduire le geste de la réduction phénoménologique à la seule donation. Ce faisant, il réintroduit en phénoménologie des phénomènes paradoxaux – phénomènes saturés – qui font violence, par excès, aux capacités réceptrices du Sujet. Marion introduit donc en phénoménologie une nouvelle modalité de l´invisibilité (et donc de la visibilité) que nous appelons « inexistence » (en opposition tout autant avec le non-être qu’avec la non-existence), dont la structure est paradoxalement fondée sur celle de l´écrit, puisqu´il s´agit ni plus ni moins, pour elle, que de présenter de façon positive une absence selon la logique de la signification. Ce faisant, et de par cette structure discursive de la visibilité, toute la phénoménologie de Marion peut être lue comme une véritable apologie de l´inexistence. / The phenomenology of givenness is presented in the form of a project of radical opening of the field of phenomenality. After having shown that modernity has enclosed phenomena under conditions of possibility dictated by a Subject, and that German phenomenology has pursued this gesture by indexing phenomena in the horizon of objectivity or of beingness, Marion proposes to reestablish the gesture of phenomenological reduction to single donation. In so doing, he reintroduces into phenomenology some paradoxical phenomena —saturated phenomena— which violate, by excess, the receptive capacities of the Subject. Marion thus introduces into phenomenology a new modality of invisibility (and thus of visibility) which we call "inexistance" (equally opposed to non-being as to non-existence), whose structure is paradoxically founded on that of writting, since it is neither more nor less, for inexistence, than to present in a positive way an absence according to the logic of meaning. In so doing, and through this discursive structure of visibility, all Marion's phenomenology can be read as a true apology for existence.

La théorie des nullités, telle qu'exercée aujourd'hui en Droit civil, souffre d'une grave incohérence tant dans sa conceptualisation que dans son application. Il serait adéquat de parler de "cumul de théories". Car, de toutes les théories qui ont été élaborées, nulle n'a réussi à s'imposer comme seule compétente à régir toute la matière, et aucune, en revanche, n'a été définitivement éradiquée de la pratique juridique. De l'inexistence, à la rescision, aux nullités relative, absolue, virtuelle, partielle, conventionnelle, unilatérale, les modules du système d'annulation s'entassent sans qu'ils constituent un ensemble homogène susceptible de former une théorie pertinente, digne de la réputation historique et mondiale du Code civil français. Dans le mouvement d'européanisation et de mondialisation de l'activité juridique et législative, d'une part, et à l'heure où le chantier de la réforme du droit des obligations et des contrats est lancé, d'autre part, il semble que seule une théorie de nullité débarrassée de toute classification astreignante et dogmatique saurait remédier aux difficultés que soulève l'inlassable variation des circonstances. Dans cette perspective, désencombrer la nullité nous amène à dépoussiérer le noyau de la théorie et à remettre en avant le principe du but de la loi. Ceci implique aussi un élargissement de l'imperium du magistrat pour faire valoir le but de la loi, soit pour assurer la sauvegarde de l'intérêt général ou de l'ordre public, soit pour renforcer la protection du contractant faible au contrat. / The theory of nullities, as exercised nowadays in civil Law, suffers from a severe incoherence as much in its conceptualization as in its applicafion. It would be adequate to talk of “accumulation of theories”. Since, of all the theories that have been elaborated, none has succeeded to impose itself as the only competent to cover the entire subject, and none, on the other side, has been definitely eradicated from the juridical practice. From the inexistence, to the rescission, to the relative, absolute, virtual, partial, conventional, unilateral nullities, the modules of the system of nullification accumulate without forming a homogenous set liable of forming an apt theory worth the historical and global reputation of the French civil Code. In light of the movement of Europeanization and globalization of the juridical and legislative activity from one part, and at the time when the site of the reform of the of the law of obligations and contracts has been launched, from the other part, it seems that only a theory of nullity free of any demanding and dogmatic classification would be able to remedy the difficulties arising from the tireless variation of circumstances. In this perspective, emancipating the nullity will lead us to dust the nucleus of the theory and put on forth the principle of the goal of the law. This also implies enlarging the “imperium” of the magistrate to emphasize the goal of the law, either to ensure the protection of the general interest or public order or to reinforce the protection of the contractor weak towards the contract.

This thesis explores how theatre informs Badiou's philosophy through detailed analysis of Badiou's theory of theatre and his six plays L'Écharpe rouge, Incident at Antioch and the Ahmed tetralogy . It argues that theatre has provided an ideal and material ground for Badiou to rehearse concepts he developed in his Logics of the Worlds (2006) and Second Manifesto for Philosophy (2009), such as that of ideation and incorporation. By placing theatre at the core of Badiou's work, this thesis provides a different point of entry into Badiou's philosophy: it demonstrates the overarching nature of Badiou's materialist dialectic, which leads to exploring the relationship between politics and theatre. By ultimately defining Badiou's theatre as a theatre of inexist[a]nce and insisting upon the ontological nature of theatre, this thesis heralds new approaches to the relationship between theatre and philosophy.

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo uma adequada compreensão da decisão judicial acerca da inconstitucionalidade da norma no ordenamento jurídico erigido sob a Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, especialmente no que diz respeito às conseqüências da inconstitucionalidade da norma e à eficácia da decisão de inconstitucionalidade. A pesquisa desenvolvida é exploratória quanto a sua técnica e explicativa quanto a seu objetivo. É exploratória, porque busca no ordenamento jurídico, na jurisprudência e na doutrina instrumentos que permitam compreender o problema da norma inconstitucional e do controle jurisdicional da constitucionalidade das normas; é explicativa quanto a seu objetivo, pois busca compreender os fenômenos jurídicos envolvidos na decisão de inconstitucionalidade, identificando os fatores que determinam ou contribuem para a inconstitucionalidade da norma e para a definição das conseqüências desta inconstitucionalidade, buscando explicar adequadamente o fenômeno da inconstitucionalidade da norma, a fim de definir como esta inconstitucionalidade se reflete na própria norma e na decisão jurisdicional que a reconhece. Deste estudo, resulta que a jurisprudência e a doutrina afirmam, de forma predominante, a nulidade da norma inconstitucional e a eficácia declaratória e ex tunc da decisão de inconstitucionalidade, indicando, contudo, que, em determinados casos, é necessário mitigar essa concepção ou abrir exceções, a fim de preservar os efeitos jurídicos ou a eficácia da norma inconstitucional. Resulta, ainda, que o ordenamento jurídico erigido sob a Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, na medida em que consagra a supremacia e a rigidez da Constituição e se caracteriza por sua unidade e coerência, exige que a inconstitucionalidade da norma tenha como conseqüências sua invalidade — ipso jure e a partir do momento em que se verifica a inconstitucionalidade —, sua inexistência enquanto norma jurídica e sua ineficácia ― identificada esta com a incapacidade de incidir sobre os fatos e atribuir-lhes efeitos jurídicos ―, conduzindo determinando, ademais, à eficácia declaratória e ex tunc da decisão de inconstitucionalidade. Resulta, por fim, que as perplexidades apontadas por aqueles que se insurgem contra a concepção acerca da invalidade da norma inconstitucional são meramente aparentes e o próprio ordenamento jurídico possui meios para solucioná-las, sem que, para tanto, seja necessário atenuar ou abrir qualquer exceção em relação à invalidade da norma inconstitucional. O trabalho conduz, então, à conclusão de que, no ordenamento jurídico erigido sob a Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, a norma inconstitucional padece de invalidade, inexistência e ineficácia, características que se congregam na concepção acerca da nulidade da norma inconstitucional, e que a decisão de inconstitucionalidade possui eficácia declaratória e ex tunc, sendo que essa concepção pode ser aplicada em todo e qualquer caso, sem que seja necessário mitigá-la ou excepcioná-la. / This work intends to provide an accurate understanding of court decisions declaring the unconstitutionality of legal rules under the 1988 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, especially in what regards the consequences of the unconstitutionality and the efficacy of the decision on unconstitutionality. The study is exploratory as to its method and explicative as to its objective. It is exploratory because it seeks within the legal system, case law and doctrine, instruments which allow for an understanding of what an unconstitutional rule might be while providing an account of the constitutionality control by courts; it is explicative as to its objective because it endeavors to comprehend the legal phenomena related to the declaration of unconstitutionality by identifying the determinant or contributive factors to a rule's unconstitutionality and its consequences, seeking to explain accurately this event in order to determine how it reflects on the rule itself and on the court decision that acknowledges its unconstitutionality. It turns out that the majority of both case law and doctrine considers the unconstitutional rule invalid and the effects of its court declaration to be backdated to the moment the statute was passed, indicating that in some cases it is necessary to mitigate such conception and open exceptions so as to sustain unconstitutional rule’s juridical effects. In fact, as 1988 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil provides for the supremacy and rigidity of the Constitution, which is characterized by its cohesion and coherence, it follows that the consequences of the unconstitutionality of a rule are its invalidity – ipso iure, as from its verification – its inexistence as legal rule and its inefficacy (understood as the ability of applying to facts, in such a way as to generate legal effects), further determining the unconstitutionality decision’s declaratory and backdated efficacy. Finally, the study concludes that the problems identified by those who argue against the thesis of the invalidity of the unconstitutional rule are only apparent since the legal system itself has means to solve those problems in such a way that it is not necessary to mitigate or to open any exception to the thesis that an unconstitutional rule is invalid. The study leads to the conclusion that, within 1988 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the unconstitutional rule is invalid, inexistent and ineffective, which are all characteristics located within the scope of a void rule, and that court decisions on the unconstitutionality of a legal rule have declaratory and backdated efficacy, which conclusion is applicable to every single case of court decisions on a rule's unconstitutionality, since there is no need for mitigation or exception.

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo uma adequada compreensão da decisão judicial acerca da inconstitucionalidade da norma no ordenamento jurídico erigido sob a Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, especialmente no que diz respeito às conseqüências da inconstitucionalidade da norma e à eficácia da decisão de inconstitucionalidade. A pesquisa desenvolvida é exploratória quanto a sua técnica e explicativa quanto a seu objetivo. É exploratória, porque busca no ordenamento jurídico, na jurisprudência e na doutrina instrumentos que permitam compreender o problema da norma inconstitucional e do controle jurisdicional da constitucionalidade das normas; é explicativa quanto a seu objetivo, pois busca compreender os fenômenos jurídicos envolvidos na decisão de inconstitucionalidade, identificando os fatores que determinam ou contribuem para a inconstitucionalidade da norma e para a definição das conseqüências desta inconstitucionalidade, buscando explicar adequadamente o fenômeno da inconstitucionalidade da norma, a fim de definir como esta inconstitucionalidade se reflete na própria norma e na decisão jurisdicional que a reconhece. Deste estudo, resulta que a jurisprudência e a doutrina afirmam, de forma predominante, a nulidade da norma inconstitucional e a eficácia declaratória e ex tunc da decisão de inconstitucionalidade, indicando, contudo, que, em determinados casos, é necessário mitigar essa concepção ou abrir exceções, a fim de preservar os efeitos jurídicos ou a eficácia da norma inconstitucional. Resulta, ainda, que o ordenamento jurídico erigido sob a Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, na medida em que consagra a supremacia e a rigidez da Constituição e se caracteriza por sua unidade e coerência, exige que a inconstitucionalidade da norma tenha como conseqüências sua invalidade — ipso jure e a partir do momento em que se verifica a inconstitucionalidade —, sua inexistência enquanto norma jurídica e sua ineficácia ― identificada esta com a incapacidade de incidir sobre os fatos e atribuir-lhes efeitos jurídicos ―, conduzindo determinando, ademais, à eficácia declaratória e ex tunc da decisão de inconstitucionalidade. Resulta, por fim, que as perplexidades apontadas por aqueles que se insurgem contra a concepção acerca da invalidade da norma inconstitucional são meramente aparentes e o próprio ordenamento jurídico possui meios para solucioná-las, sem que, para tanto, seja necessário atenuar ou abrir qualquer exceção em relação à invalidade da norma inconstitucional. O trabalho conduz, então, à conclusão de que, no ordenamento jurídico erigido sob a Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, a norma inconstitucional padece de invalidade, inexistência e ineficácia, características que se congregam na concepção acerca da nulidade da norma inconstitucional, e que a decisão de inconstitucionalidade possui eficácia declaratória e ex tunc, sendo que essa concepção pode ser aplicada em todo e qualquer caso, sem que seja necessário mitigá-la ou excepcioná-la. / This work intends to provide an accurate understanding of court decisions declaring the unconstitutionality of legal rules under the 1988 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, especially in what regards the consequences of the unconstitutionality and the efficacy of the decision on unconstitutionality. The study is exploratory as to its method and explicative as to its objective. It is exploratory because it seeks within the legal system, case law and doctrine, instruments which allow for an understanding of what an unconstitutional rule might be while providing an account of the constitutionality control by courts; it is explicative as to its objective because it endeavors to comprehend the legal phenomena related to the declaration of unconstitutionality by identifying the determinant or contributive factors to a rule's unconstitutionality and its consequences, seeking to explain accurately this event in order to determine how it reflects on the rule itself and on the court decision that acknowledges its unconstitutionality. It turns out that the majority of both case law and doctrine considers the unconstitutional rule invalid and the effects of its court declaration to be backdated to the moment the statute was passed, indicating that in some cases it is necessary to mitigate such conception and open exceptions so as to sustain unconstitutional rule’s juridical effects. In fact, as 1988 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil provides for the supremacy and rigidity of the Constitution, which is characterized by its cohesion and coherence, it follows that the consequences of the unconstitutionality of a rule are its invalidity – ipso iure, as from its verification – its inexistence as legal rule and its inefficacy (understood as the ability of applying to facts, in such a way as to generate legal effects), further determining the unconstitutionality decision’s declaratory and backdated efficacy. Finally, the study concludes that the problems identified by those who argue against the thesis of the invalidity of the unconstitutional rule are only apparent since the legal system itself has means to solve those problems in such a way that it is not necessary to mitigate or to open any exception to the thesis that an unconstitutional rule is invalid. The study leads to the conclusion that, within 1988 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the unconstitutional rule is invalid, inexistent and ineffective, which are all characteristics located within the scope of a void rule, and that court decisions on the unconstitutionality of a legal rule have declaratory and backdated efficacy, which conclusion is applicable to every single case of court decisions on a rule's unconstitutionality, since there is no need for mitigation or exception.

O presente trabalho tem como objetivo uma adequada compreensão da decisão judicial acerca da inconstitucionalidade da norma no ordenamento jurídico erigido sob a Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, especialmente no que diz respeito às conseqüências da inconstitucionalidade da norma e à eficácia da decisão de inconstitucionalidade. A pesquisa desenvolvida é exploratória quanto a sua técnica e explicativa quanto a seu objetivo. É exploratória, porque busca no ordenamento jurídico, na jurisprudência e na doutrina instrumentos que permitam compreender o problema da norma inconstitucional e do controle jurisdicional da constitucionalidade das normas; é explicativa quanto a seu objetivo, pois busca compreender os fenômenos jurídicos envolvidos na decisão de inconstitucionalidade, identificando os fatores que determinam ou contribuem para a inconstitucionalidade da norma e para a definição das conseqüências desta inconstitucionalidade, buscando explicar adequadamente o fenômeno da inconstitucionalidade da norma, a fim de definir como esta inconstitucionalidade se reflete na própria norma e na decisão jurisdicional que a reconhece. Deste estudo, resulta que a jurisprudência e a doutrina afirmam, de forma predominante, a nulidade da norma inconstitucional e a eficácia declaratória e ex tunc da decisão de inconstitucionalidade, indicando, contudo, que, em determinados casos, é necessário mitigar essa concepção ou abrir exceções, a fim de preservar os efeitos jurídicos ou a eficácia da norma inconstitucional. Resulta, ainda, que o ordenamento jurídico erigido sob a Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, na medida em que consagra a supremacia e a rigidez da Constituição e se caracteriza por sua unidade e coerência, exige que a inconstitucionalidade da norma tenha como conseqüências sua invalidade — ipso jure e a partir do momento em que se verifica a inconstitucionalidade —, sua inexistência enquanto norma jurídica e sua ineficácia ― identificada esta com a incapacidade de incidir sobre os fatos e atribuir-lhes efeitos jurídicos ―, conduzindo determinando, ademais, à eficácia declaratória e ex tunc da decisão de inconstitucionalidade. Resulta, por fim, que as perplexidades apontadas por aqueles que se insurgem contra a concepção acerca da invalidade da norma inconstitucional são meramente aparentes e o próprio ordenamento jurídico possui meios para solucioná-las, sem que, para tanto, seja necessário atenuar ou abrir qualquer exceção em relação à invalidade da norma inconstitucional. O trabalho conduz, então, à conclusão de que, no ordenamento jurídico erigido sob a Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988, a norma inconstitucional padece de invalidade, inexistência e ineficácia, características que se congregam na concepção acerca da nulidade da norma inconstitucional, e que a decisão de inconstitucionalidade possui eficácia declaratória e ex tunc, sendo que essa concepção pode ser aplicada em todo e qualquer caso, sem que seja necessário mitigá-la ou excepcioná-la. / This work intends to provide an accurate understanding of court decisions declaring the unconstitutionality of legal rules under the 1988 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, especially in what regards the consequences of the unconstitutionality and the efficacy of the decision on unconstitutionality. The study is exploratory as to its method and explicative as to its objective. It is exploratory because it seeks within the legal system, case law and doctrine, instruments which allow for an understanding of what an unconstitutional rule might be while providing an account of the constitutionality control by courts; it is explicative as to its objective because it endeavors to comprehend the legal phenomena related to the declaration of unconstitutionality by identifying the determinant or contributive factors to a rule's unconstitutionality and its consequences, seeking to explain accurately this event in order to determine how it reflects on the rule itself and on the court decision that acknowledges its unconstitutionality. It turns out that the majority of both case law and doctrine considers the unconstitutional rule invalid and the effects of its court declaration to be backdated to the moment the statute was passed, indicating that in some cases it is necessary to mitigate such conception and open exceptions so as to sustain unconstitutional rule’s juridical effects. In fact, as 1988 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil provides for the supremacy and rigidity of the Constitution, which is characterized by its cohesion and coherence, it follows that the consequences of the unconstitutionality of a rule are its invalidity – ipso iure, as from its verification – its inexistence as legal rule and its inefficacy (understood as the ability of applying to facts, in such a way as to generate legal effects), further determining the unconstitutionality decision’s declaratory and backdated efficacy. Finally, the study concludes that the problems identified by those who argue against the thesis of the invalidity of the unconstitutional rule are only apparent since the legal system itself has means to solve those problems in such a way that it is not necessary to mitigate or to open any exception to the thesis that an unconstitutional rule is invalid. The study leads to the conclusion that, within 1988 Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil, the unconstitutional rule is invalid, inexistent and ineffective, which are all characteristics located within the scope of a void rule, and that court decisions on the unconstitutionality of a legal rule have declaratory and backdated efficacy, which conclusion is applicable to every single case of court decisions on a rule's unconstitutionality, since there is no need for mitigation or exception.

L’étude d’un critère de distinction des nullités est-elle désuète ? Tant s’en faut. S’inscrivant dans lecontentieux de la théorie des nullités, le critère de distinction actuel est couramment dénoncé.À ce jour, il est enseigné qu’une théorie « moderne » aurait renversé une théorie « classique »distinguant les nullités relatives et absolues selon la gravité du vice de l’acte. Aussi le critère actuel de« l’intérêt protégé » propose-t-il de scinder les nullités selon l’intérêt que la loi décide de préserver.Ici, la nullité est relative lorsque seul un intérêt particulier est protégé par le législateur. Là, unenullité absolue est préférable quand l’intérêt général a guidé l’objectif législatif dans l’édiction de larègle.Séduisant, ce critère n’en demeure pas pour autant convaincant. L’excès condamnable de rigidité ducritère organique laisse place à un excès de souplesse du critère de l’intérêt protégé tout aussiblâmable. Comment distinguer l’intérêt général de l’intérêt privé ? Bien plus, y a-t-il un intérêt àprotéger quand le législateur exige une condition matérielle de formation de l’acte comme la cause oul’objet ? Par où l’on voit qu’à l’insécurité juridique du critère s’adjoint l’artifice des classifications qu’ilengendre. Insatisfaisant, le critère de l’intérêt protégé doit être réprouvé.L’approche historique, essentielle pour comprendre l’origine de la distinction, dévoile la chronologieerronée des théories esquissées. S’ensuit l’abandon d’un critère palliatif pour la substitution d’uncritère plus effectif, dont le fondement n’instaure pas une hiérarchie entre les conditions de formationou les intérêts protégés. Mises sur un pied d’égalité, les nullités seraient distinctes en raison des vicesqui les provoquent, pris dans leur nature, et non dans leur gravité. Fondé sur la nature du vice,personnelle – si le vice affecte le consentement –, matérielle ou illicite – si le vice altère le contrat –,ce nouveau critère de distinction des nullités autoriserait une classification ternaire, avec un régimespécifique à chaque vice. Il permettrait également la redécouverte d’une pluralité de natures desnullités, en tant que sanction ou remède. L’harmonie des catégories s’en trouverait ainsi instaurée, labipolarité décriée abandonnée et la nature véritable des nullités restaurée. / Is the search for a distinction criterion of nullities obsolete ? Far from it. Lying within the litigation ofdoctrine of nullities, the current distinction criterion is frequently denounced.To date, it is taught that a "modern" theory would have reversed a "classical" theory, distinguishingrelative nullities (voidable) from absolute ones (void) according to the gravity of the act’s defect.Therefore, the "protected interest" criterion proposes dividing up nullities according to the interestthe law decides to protect. Here, nullity is relative when a specific interest alone is protected by thelawmaker. There, an absolute nullity is preferred, when general interest guided the legislative purposewhile enacting the rule.Appealing, this criterion does not remain, however, convincing. The blameworthy excess of rigidity ofthe organic criterion makes room for an as much blameful excess of flexibility of the protected interestcriterion. How to distinguish general interest from specific interest ? Furthermore, is there an interestto be protected when the lawmaker demands a material condition for the formation of the act such asthe cause or the object? In any case, to the juridical insecurity of the criterion is affixed the device ofbred classifications. Unsatisfactory, the protected interest criterion must be reprobated.Historical approach, essential for understanding the origin of the distinction, expose the erroneouschronology of the sketched theories. Follows the abandonment of a palliative criterion for a moreeffective one, whose foundation does not establish a hierarchy between the conditions of formation orthe protected interests. Treated on an equal footing, nullities would be distinct because of the defectsthat father them, taken in nature, not in their severity. Based on the nature of the defect, personal – ifthe defect affects the consent –, concrete or illicit – if the defect impairs the contract –, this newdistinction criteria of nullities would allow a ternary classification, with a specific plan for each vice. Itwould also allow the rediscovery of a plurality natures of nullity, as a sanction or remedy. Harmony ofcategories would find itself instituted, disparaged polarity abandoned and true nature of nullitiesrestored.