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Intellectual Liberty: Intellectual PropertyHugh Breakey Unknown Date (has links)
Natural rights theories have powerful reasons to limit the strength, scope and duration of intellectual property rights. These reasons come in two forms – limitations internal to the basic functioning of natural rights as such and limitations arising from rights-based considerations external to the property right. In terms of internal constraints, all natural rights conform to a variety of conditions delimiting the extent and strength of their application. Such conditions include, inter alia, requirements for consistency, universalisability and non-worsening. Like all rights, natural property rights must fulfil these conditions – but such rights require substantial limitations in order to legitimate their capacity to unilaterally impose new duties on others. Consideration of these conditions is, I argue, not sufficient to rule out natural intellectual property rights – but such conditions decisively limit the extent of those rights. By focusing upon the most general and deep-seated mechanisms of natural rights thought, this argument aims to be applicable to all natural rights theories. I argue natural rights theories have good reasons to accept one, if not both, of two conditions in particular: robust universalisability and self-ownership. As strong intellectual property rights violate both conditions, I conclude such rights cannot be justified by any recognisable natural rights theory. Turning to external considerations, I argue all individuals have a right to intellectual liberty – the right to inform their actions by learning about the world. This is a negative right: it grants freedom from interference in apprehending, investigating and thinking about the world, and in subsequently acting upon what has been learned. I argue this right is grounded in all Enlightenment views of human freedom and flourishing; it is supported by classical liberal State of Nature perspectives, and arises out of respect for human independence, self-governance, self-legislation, self-creation, autonomy and individuality. Acceptance of this right has profound consequences for the strength and scope of intellectual property regimes. I describe the extent we can find this right already operative – albeit in schematic and inchoate form – in contemporary intellectual property law.
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Intellectual Liberty: Intellectual PropertyHugh Breakey Unknown Date (has links)
Natural rights theories have powerful reasons to limit the strength, scope and duration of intellectual property rights. These reasons come in two forms – limitations internal to the basic functioning of natural rights as such and limitations arising from rights-based considerations external to the property right. In terms of internal constraints, all natural rights conform to a variety of conditions delimiting the extent and strength of their application. Such conditions include, inter alia, requirements for consistency, universalisability and non-worsening. Like all rights, natural property rights must fulfil these conditions – but such rights require substantial limitations in order to legitimate their capacity to unilaterally impose new duties on others. Consideration of these conditions is, I argue, not sufficient to rule out natural intellectual property rights – but such conditions decisively limit the extent of those rights. By focusing upon the most general and deep-seated mechanisms of natural rights thought, this argument aims to be applicable to all natural rights theories. I argue natural rights theories have good reasons to accept one, if not both, of two conditions in particular: robust universalisability and self-ownership. As strong intellectual property rights violate both conditions, I conclude such rights cannot be justified by any recognisable natural rights theory. Turning to external considerations, I argue all individuals have a right to intellectual liberty – the right to inform their actions by learning about the world. This is a negative right: it grants freedom from interference in apprehending, investigating and thinking about the world, and in subsequently acting upon what has been learned. I argue this right is grounded in all Enlightenment views of human freedom and flourishing; it is supported by classical liberal State of Nature perspectives, and arises out of respect for human independence, self-governance, self-legislation, self-creation, autonomy and individuality. Acceptance of this right has profound consequences for the strength and scope of intellectual property regimes. I describe the extent we can find this right already operative – albeit in schematic and inchoate form – in contemporary intellectual property law.
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Intellectual Liberty: Intellectual PropertyHugh Breakey Unknown Date (has links)
Natural rights theories have powerful reasons to limit the strength, scope and duration of intellectual property rights. These reasons come in two forms – limitations internal to the basic functioning of natural rights as such and limitations arising from rights-based considerations external to the property right. In terms of internal constraints, all natural rights conform to a variety of conditions delimiting the extent and strength of their application. Such conditions include, inter alia, requirements for consistency, universalisability and non-worsening. Like all rights, natural property rights must fulfil these conditions – but such rights require substantial limitations in order to legitimate their capacity to unilaterally impose new duties on others. Consideration of these conditions is, I argue, not sufficient to rule out natural intellectual property rights – but such conditions decisively limit the extent of those rights. By focusing upon the most general and deep-seated mechanisms of natural rights thought, this argument aims to be applicable to all natural rights theories. I argue natural rights theories have good reasons to accept one, if not both, of two conditions in particular: robust universalisability and self-ownership. As strong intellectual property rights violate both conditions, I conclude such rights cannot be justified by any recognisable natural rights theory. Turning to external considerations, I argue all individuals have a right to intellectual liberty – the right to inform their actions by learning about the world. This is a negative right: it grants freedom from interference in apprehending, investigating and thinking about the world, and in subsequently acting upon what has been learned. I argue this right is grounded in all Enlightenment views of human freedom and flourishing; it is supported by classical liberal State of Nature perspectives, and arises out of respect for human independence, self-governance, self-legislation, self-creation, autonomy and individuality. Acceptance of this right has profound consequences for the strength and scope of intellectual property regimes. I describe the extent we can find this right already operative – albeit in schematic and inchoate form – in contemporary intellectual property law.
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Digital rights management for smart containment objectsFares, Tony Yussef. January 2005 (has links)
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Wollongong, 2005. / Typescript. Includes appendices. Includes bibliographical references: leaf 201-214.
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Immaterialgüterrechte in der europäischen Vertragsforschung : zur Schaffung eines Europäischen Forschungsraums am Beispiel der Forschungsrahmenprogramme der EG /Veddern, Michael. January 2008 (has links)
Zugl.: Münster (Westfalen), Univ., Diss. / Originally presented as the author's thesis (doctoral)--Universität Münster, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 659-727) and index.
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Technology licencing practices of South African manufacturing companies a profile and the influence of some organisational, transactional and contextual factors /Janse van Vuuren, Francois Jacobus. January 2004 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)(Technology Management)--University of Pretoria, 2004. / Title from opening screen (viewed March 14, 2005). English summary. Includes bibliographical references.
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Understanding common sense themes of intellectual and creative work : the social representation of intellectual property : a thesis submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Psychology /Pauling, Joel Wiramu. January 2009 (has links)
Thesis (M.Sc.)--Victoria University of Wellington, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references.
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Negotiating without nature: multilateral negotiation of genetic engineering biotechnology via the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety /Hutcheon, Mary, January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (Ph.D.) - Carleton University, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 308-334). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.
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Negotiating the trade-environment frontier biosafety and intellectual property rights in international policy-making /Burgiel, Stanley W. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--American University, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 544-587).
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Illegal file-sharing in the academy : assessment, implications, and policy responses /Linden, Eric S. January 2005 (has links)
Thesis (M.S.)--Rochester Institute of Technology, 2005. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 77-78).
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