Drawing on primary sources in Chinese, Japanese, and English, my doctoral dissertation investigates the structure and development of maritime order in East Asia against the backdrop of the Cold War. It covers the period from the collapse of the Japanese empire in East Asia in 1945 through to the point when the United States broke off its official diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979. By shifting the spotlight from land to sea, my dissertation challenges the conventional understanding of the Cold War in East Asia by illustrating the relationship between the geopolitical value of the sea and decision makers' strategic deliberations. I present the sea as a historical platform to examine US maritime policy in East Asia in three broad contexts: military, international law, and exploration for natural resources. In terms of the military dimension, my study argues that the US shifted its maritime strategic focus from the Atlantic to the Pacific in the 1950s. This development was symbolised by the establishment of the Pacific Command in 1947 as well as changes in its organisational structure for maintaining sea routes during the crises of the 1950s - including the Korean War and the 1954-1955 Taiwan Strait Crisis. To supplement my argument about the military dimension of US maritime policy, I further investigate the establishment of international maritime law and the exploration of underwater natural resources, to depict the dynamic role that seas played in grand strategic thinking when crafting US policy in East Asia. My research argues that the clashes over maritime sovereignty between East Asian allies such as Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea led the US to refrain from taking a dominant stance in areas such as the demarcation of maritime boundaries and offshore oil development. This formed a crucial part of US strategy in balancing conflicting interests within its hub-and-spoke alliance system in East Asia. However, US-China rapprochement during the 1970s led to a change in Washington's maritime policy. For US decision-makers, the sea temporarily ceased to be a strategic space for containing China, but rather served as a platform for signalling goodwill.

O objeto desta dissertação é uma ideia de futuro, ou seja, como o futuro foi compreendido dentro de um dado momento histórico e de acordo com certas condições. A ideia de futuro aqui analisada centra-se em torno de Herman Kahn, físico, estrategista militar e futurista. A constituição dessa ideia de futuro, contudo, não ocorreu afastada de uma compreensão de história. Para entendermos como ocorreu esse diálogo entre passado, presente e futuro, baseamo-nos nos conceitos propostos por Koselleck de espaço de experiência e horizonte de expectativa, assim como em alguns pontos do que o autor propõe como história dos conceitos. O início da formulação da ideia de futuro aqui analisada se deu no famoso think tank estadunidense que prestava consultoria à Força Aérea dos EUA, a RAND Corporation. Nesse período, o futuro é interpretado no curto prazo e pensado, no máximo, quinze anos à frente, e a história usada é recente, remetendo às I e II Guerras. Portanto, são questões restritas à segurança nacional e à defesa dos EUA e às relações com a Ásia e a Europa. Porém, ao lançar o seu primeiro e polêmico livro, On thermonuclear war, em 1960, no qual analisava, com detalhes, as possibilidades de uma guerra nuclear e como o país poderia se reerguer após ela, Kahn saiu da RAND e fundou seu próprio think tank, o Hudson Institute, em 1961. Acompanhando uma mudança de orientação de governo dos EUA e passando por dificuldades financeiras ao longo da década de 60 e 70, o Hudson Institute e Herman Kahn ampliaram, pouco a pouco, o tempo futuro analisado, chegando, em 1976, no livro The next 200 years, a prever duzentos anos à frente. Correspondendo a isso, havia também um recuo para o passado, alcançando o ano de 8000 a.C. Nesse momento, o Hudson Institute não mais trabalhava somente com as questões estadunidenses, mas também tinha uma atuação em âmbito mundial, visando influenciar empresas multinacionais e governos de outros países. Entre os governos pretendidos, estava o brasileiro. Porém, com projetos polêmicos e dados incertos e cambiantes, Kahn e o HI sofreram uma crítica impiedosa, sarcástica e agressiva no Brasil, o que nos permite verificar as falhas do método futurológico de Kahn e a política do governo brasileiro por trás das críticas. Por fim, toda essa exposição dos estudos futuros elaborados por Kahn desde 1947 até 1979 também nos permite refletir sobre a história e suas relações com o presente e o futuro e propor que para uma formulação sobre o futuro ou sobre o passado há, embutida, outra formulação sobre o tempo oposto. / The object of this dissertation is an idea of future or, more specifically, how the future was comprehended in a given historical moment and under certain conditions. This idea of future in our analysis is centered on Herman Kahn, a physic, military strategist and futurist. The constitution of this idea of future was not separated from a comprehension of history and it established a link between among past, present and future. To build it we based on Kosellecks concepts of space of experience and horizon of expectation and we used some ideas from Kosellecks conceptual history. Kahns idea of future started at RAND Corporation, the famous American think tank that advised the US Air Force. At that period, the future was only short term, it was thought at most fifteen years ahead and historical references were also recent, going back only until I and II Wars. Thus, the questions were restricted to the national security, the US defense and the relations with Asia and Europe. After his first book, On thermonuclear war, in 1960, Herman Kahn abandoned RAND. The book was very polemical. Kahn analyzed and accounted in details how a nuclear war could happen and how the country could rise after it. Out of RAND, Kahn established his own think tank, the Hudson Institute, in 1961. Hudson Institute and Herman Kahn widened the time analyzed, reaching two hundred years to the future and ten thousand year to the past in the book The next 200 years, in 1976. This broadened future accompanied a change of US government orientation and some financial difficulties faced by Hudson Institute that stretched for the sixties and the seventies. Beyond that, Hudson Institute was operating not only with American issues, but it was also working with world issues intending to influence multinational corporations and other countries. One of these countries was Brazil. However, in Brazil, Kahn and Hudson Institute suffered ruthless, sarcastic and aggressive critics due to polemical plans and changing and uncertain data. So the Brazilian critics were based on some mistakes of Kahn future study method, but they were based in an emphatic Brazilian government policy. We believe this exposition and analysis of Herman Kahns future studies since 1947 to 1979 provide us a deep reflection about history and the relations among past, present and future, so it is possible to state that some future or past formulation has embedded an implicit formulation about the opposite time.

The object of this thesis is to consider the relationship between sovereignty and responsibility and to examine how this relationship has developed over time. There is a conventional story told by many scholars of International Relations which holds that sovereignty has ‘traditionally’ entailed the absence of responsibility and accountability. It has meant that states have a right to govern themselves however they choose, free from outside interference. Only in recent years, the tale goes, have the indefeasible rights that sovereigns have long enjoyed been challenged by notions that sovereigns are responsible and accountable for the protection of their populations. Ideas of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ and ‘the responsibility to protect’ which have emerged since the end of the Cold War are framed as radical departures from the way in which sovereignty has been ‘traditionally’ understood. This thesis challenges this conventional account of the history of sovereignty. It argues that the notion that sovereignty entails responsibilities is not new. Rather, responsibilities have been an enduring feature of the social and historical construction of sovereignty. The thesis demonstrates that sovereignty has been understood to involve varied and evolving responsibilities since it was first articulated in early modern Europe and it traces the historical development of the particular tension between the right of sovereign states to be self-governing and free from outside interference and their responsibility to secure the safety of their populations.

The study of International Relations (IR) emerged in the context of transnational networks of scholars, politicians, and philanthropists who sought to devise a peaceful world order in the face of international conflict. Prompted by the Great War, the pioneers of IR argued that international politics should be subject to public and academic investigation. In order to generate the required expertise, they established a range of university-based as well as policy-oriented institutions during the 1910s and 20s. Rather than studying political theory or advancing scientific methodology, however, early IR scholars focused on current affairs and became involved in foreign politics themselves. Throughout the formative period of IR, from 1914 to 1940, its protagonists oscillated between understanding and making international politics. This dissertation examines the formation of IR from about 1914 to the Second World War, with particular emphasis on the range of international actors and institutions that shaped the discipline. Based on multi-archival research in Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the United States, it explores the key venues for the study of IR. In particular, the dissertation reflects how IR scholars used transnational forms of exchange, such as the organs of intellectual cooperation at the League of Nations. It also incorporates women and feminist approaches to IR. Contrary to conventional historiography, the dissertation argues that IR was neither founded in 1919, nor dominated by coherent schools of thought during the inter-war period. Instead, it demonstrates how the discipline was formed by an eclectic group of scholars and practitioners, men and women, English-speaking and international. By building on recent revisionist literature and by re- integrating neglected actors, the dissertation reveals the complex and sometimes inconsistent ways in which issues of international politics became the subject of academic study.

No description available.

O objeto desta dissertação é uma ideia de futuro, ou seja, como o futuro foi compreendido dentro de um dado momento histórico e de acordo com certas condições. A ideia de futuro aqui analisada centra-se em torno de Herman Kahn, físico, estrategista militar e futurista. A constituição dessa ideia de futuro, contudo, não ocorreu afastada de uma compreensão de história. Para entendermos como ocorreu esse diálogo entre passado, presente e futuro, baseamo-nos nos conceitos propostos por Koselleck de espaço de experiência e horizonte de expectativa, assim como em alguns pontos do que o autor propõe como história dos conceitos. O início da formulação da ideia de futuro aqui analisada se deu no famoso think tank estadunidense que prestava consultoria à Força Aérea dos EUA, a RAND Corporation. Nesse período, o futuro é interpretado no curto prazo e pensado, no máximo, quinze anos à frente, e a história usada é recente, remetendo às I e II Guerras. Portanto, são questões restritas à segurança nacional e à defesa dos EUA e às relações com a Ásia e a Europa. Porém, ao lançar o seu primeiro e polêmico livro, On thermonuclear war, em 1960, no qual analisava, com detalhes, as possibilidades de uma guerra nuclear e como o país poderia se reerguer após ela, Kahn saiu da RAND e fundou seu próprio think tank, o Hudson Institute, em 1961. Acompanhando uma mudança de orientação de governo dos EUA e passando por dificuldades financeiras ao longo da década de 60 e 70, o Hudson Institute e Herman Kahn ampliaram, pouco a pouco, o tempo futuro analisado, chegando, em 1976, no livro The next 200 years, a prever duzentos anos à frente. Correspondendo a isso, havia também um recuo para o passado, alcançando o ano de 8000 a.C. Nesse momento, o Hudson Institute não mais trabalhava somente com as questões estadunidenses, mas também tinha uma atuação em âmbito mundial, visando influenciar empresas multinacionais e governos de outros países. Entre os governos pretendidos, estava o brasileiro. Porém, com projetos polêmicos e dados incertos e cambiantes, Kahn e o HI sofreram uma crítica impiedosa, sarcástica e agressiva no Brasil, o que nos permite verificar as falhas do método futurológico de Kahn e a política do governo brasileiro por trás das críticas. Por fim, toda essa exposição dos estudos futuros elaborados por Kahn desde 1947 até 1979 também nos permite refletir sobre a história e suas relações com o presente e o futuro e propor que para uma formulação sobre o futuro ou sobre o passado há, embutida, outra formulação sobre o tempo oposto. / The object of this dissertation is an idea of future or, more specifically, how the future was comprehended in a given historical moment and under certain conditions. This idea of future in our analysis is centered on Herman Kahn, a physic, military strategist and futurist. The constitution of this idea of future was not separated from a comprehension of history and it established a link between among past, present and future. To build it we based on Kosellecks concepts of space of experience and horizon of expectation and we used some ideas from Kosellecks conceptual history. Kahns idea of future started at RAND Corporation, the famous American think tank that advised the US Air Force. At that period, the future was only short term, it was thought at most fifteen years ahead and historical references were also recent, going back only until I and II Wars. Thus, the questions were restricted to the national security, the US defense and the relations with Asia and Europe. After his first book, On thermonuclear war, in 1960, Herman Kahn abandoned RAND. The book was very polemical. Kahn analyzed and accounted in details how a nuclear war could happen and how the country could rise after it. Out of RAND, Kahn established his own think tank, the Hudson Institute, in 1961. Hudson Institute and Herman Kahn widened the time analyzed, reaching two hundred years to the future and ten thousand year to the past in the book The next 200 years, in 1976. This broadened future accompanied a change of US government orientation and some financial difficulties faced by Hudson Institute that stretched for the sixties and the seventies. Beyond that, Hudson Institute was operating not only with American issues, but it was also working with world issues intending to influence multinational corporations and other countries. One of these countries was Brazil. However, in Brazil, Kahn and Hudson Institute suffered ruthless, sarcastic and aggressive critics due to polemical plans and changing and uncertain data. So the Brazilian critics were based on some mistakes of Kahn future study method, but they were based in an emphatic Brazilian government policy. We believe this exposition and analysis of Herman Kahns future studies since 1947 to 1979 provide us a deep reflection about history and the relations among past, present and future, so it is possible to state that some future or past formulation has embedded an implicit formulation about the opposite time.

The United States, Germany, and other Western industrialized countries began seeking multilateral anti-terrorism agreements in the 1970s. In that decade, transnationally operating terroristic actors tapped into the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial global discourse of the 1960s to justify themselves as national liberation fighters. This dissertation is a case study of Western state officials who interacted with one another and with recently independent states in response to the activity of such ostensible insurgents. The dissertation reveals how Western officials worked to define and deploy the terrorism label against these non-state actors. U.S., German, and other Western officials generated international conventions that treated terrorists as ordinary criminals and ignored their political motivations. The resulting multilateral agreements stipulated that terrorism was an illegal and criminal act. These solutions undermined national liberation actors’ claims to protected status as wartime combatants. This dissertation clarifies some of the mechanisms which permitted Western states to shape the norms about who is or is not a terrorist. However, Western efforts to define and regulate terrorism also led to the institutionalization of terrorism as a global security threat without providing long-term solutions. These agreements did not prevent terrorist attacks. In addition, the Western multilateral conventions were deeply controversial. They triggered still unresolved debates amongst states worldwide about the conditions under which non-state actors had rights under international law to commit politically motivated violence. / History

<p>In 1917, the Romanov dynasty in Russia came to an end as Tsar Nicholas II abdicated during the February Revolution and the First World War. The Romanovs ruled Russia for over three-hundred years as absolute monarchs and until 1917, Nicholas II and his wife Tsarina Alexandra Feodorovna fervently clung to their autocratic rule and projected an image of power and stability. Yet, their choices not only shaped Russia itself but also dictated Russia’s diplomatic and cultural relationship with their future allies in the First World War: Great Britain, France, and the United States of America. From 1896 to 1917, Tsar Nicholas II floundered amid a series of crisis and this dissertation considers five key moments in his reign that illustrate the complex relationship between Russia and the allies of the First World War. These events are: the Coronation of Nicholas II in 1896; Bloody Sunday and the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905; the Romanov Tercentenary in 1913; the role of Tsarina Alexandra in the First World War from 1914-1917; and the abdication of Nicholas II and asylum request by the Romanovs in 1917. All of these events showcase the diplomatic and media representations of the Romanovs among allied nations and how Nicholas performed and presented his view of himself to the rest of the world. Each Tsar of Russia fashioned himself into a mythic and ceremonial figure to the Russian people and this dissertation argues that the governments of Great Britain, France, and the United States accepted Nicholas’ self-representations for many years and ignored his autocratic rule in favor of their own military and financial interests. In 1917, after years of excusing his behavior, they finally rejected him. Ultimately, the Romanovs held great power at home and abroad and were major players in international events in the early twentieth century but they were unable to reconcile their autocratic regime with modern democracies. In the end, Nicholas’ and Alexandra’s failure to adapt and perform their roles effectively cost them their throne and left Russia in a state of war and disarray.</p>

<p dir="ltr">This dissertation examines the interplay between environmental crises and the escalation of North African corsairing activities from 1793-1805. This period, rife with environmental adversities and faltering economies, witnessed a significant upsurge in North African maritime raids launched from the Ottoman-governed provinces of Tripoli, Tunis, and Algiers. I argue that this noticeable increase was not a reaction to the events in Europe but a consequential response to the acute environmental and socio-economic pressures of the time.</p>

This thesis examines Anglo-French perceptions of power within the context of the rise of the United States of America. It uses several overlapping events falling within a moment at the end of the nineteenth century (1898-1899) - the Spanish-American War, the Dreyfus Affair and the Fashoda crisis - to explore various British and French actors' perceptions of national power, decline, and international competition. It draws heavily on diplomatic material, but its methodology is primarily cultural. It examines ways in which various cultural assumptions affected perceptions of power and global events. It takes a particular interest in the relationship between ideas about gender and dimensions of national power. It focuses on contemporary preoccupations and assumptions, whether spoken or unspoken, and argues that they could prove determinative. External realities were refracted into perceptions that in turn drove prescriptions and policy. The thesis juxtaposes perspectives from multiple states, thereby contextualizing or comparing British, French and occasionally American preoccupations with those of their transatlantic contemporaries. It draws upon archival sources which previously have been under-examined or approached from different perspectives and research priorities. Its exploration of the cultural dimensions of thought about national power and success is grounded in an awareness of the analysis and actions of certain diplomats and politicians involved in the more practical business of international affairs. Conversely, diplomatic and other records are situated within their cultural milieu, to better understand the context in which views about the international order were shaped. The thesis necessarily makes excursions into the history of emotions, since its actors' political analyses at times appear entangled and aligned with their emotional responses. The thesis therefore serves as an example of an international history that integrates diplomatic with cultural and emotional elements and demonstrates their mutual illumination.