According to article 8 in the Brussels II regulation a Member State has jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility over a child who is habitually resident in that State at the time the court is seised. This includes compulsory care of children by the State. Furthermore, article 20 in the Brussels II regulation states that the regulation should not prevent the courts in Member States to make provisional measures in urgent cases in respect of persons or assets in that State, even if a court in another Member State has jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter. This thesis examines the jurisdiction of the Swedish social services and courts in cases regarding compulsory care of foreign children in Sweden. An immediate taking into care under the Care of Young Persons Act constitutes a provisional measure under article 20 in the Brussels II regulation. The provision does not require that the child is habitually resident in the Member State that is taking the measures. Some Swedish courts have despite this concluded that the child must be habitually resident in Sweden for social services and courts to have jurisdiction when it comes to immediate taking into care. This is due to a problematic wording in the provision. Sweden has extensive responsibilities for children according to both the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The purpose of this thesis is to examine if the Swedish social services and courts, in making decisions of immediate taking into care of foreign children in Sweden, are meeting those obligations. The methods used in the thesis are the legal dogmatic method, the empirical method and the European legal method. The findings in this thesis demonstrate that it is possible to interpret the provision regarding the immediate taking into care of children in two different ways. In as far as the Swedish social services and the courts make the most favourable interpretation for the child Sweden meets its obligations under the convention and the charter. However, compulsory care is a huge interference in a child’s life and it is of great importance that legislation of that kind charter the power of the authorities in a clear and unambiguous way. This is particularly important in cases regarding compulsory care due to the risk of what a negative decision could mean for a child’s health and safety. Therefore, the conclusion of this thesis is that it is necessary and urgent that the problem is addressed at a legislative level both from a children’s safety perspective and a legal security perspective.