We can best understand the moral obligations of citizens and officials concerning public reason as set out by John Rawls when two differing standards latent in his body of work are made explicit. The weaker standard, which I call Public Representation (or PR), is exegetically supported primarily by the proviso found in his “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited”. PR allows that citizens may deliberate over serious political matters, both internally and with others, according to whatever perspective and using whatever reasons they please, so long as they believe the positions they advocate are adequately just and adequately justifiable with public reasons. I present PR as establishing a moral minimum citizens and officials bear an obligation to satisfy on pain of failing to garner an adequate degree of justice, respect, legitimacy, and stability. The more demanding standard, which I call Public Judgment (or PJ), is exegetically supported by quotes found throughout Rawls’s work, but especially in Political Liberalism, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” and Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. PJ requires that citizens deliberate over serious political matters, both internally and with others, according to a public perspective with public reasons, that they only advocate positions and offer justifications they consider most reasonable, and that they share their thought processes in public. PR is nonobligatory, but achieves significant gains according to each of the four key political values mentioned above, which gives dedicated citizens good reason to embrace it. Chapter one lays out and explores the big picture concepts framing the project; chapter two sets out Rawls’s view on public reason according to the primary texts; chapter three presents four contemporary liberal theorists’ views on public reason – Nicholas Wolterstorff, Robert Audi, David Reidy, and Micah Schwartzman; chapter four uses the lessons of chapter three to help fully unpack and compare Public Representation and Public Judgment; and chapter five considers three potential objections to my view and offers corresponding replies.

This thesis is a quantitative study of distributive justice between generations or age groups. It is theoretically informed by a synchronic generation approach and John Rawls’s theory of justice-as-fairness. The empirical part compares the economic positions of, and public spending on, children, adults and the elderly in 16 European countries. The theoretical part is used as a platform for the empirical analysis. In addition to Rawls, a discussion of distributive justice includes the classical theories of Plato and Aristotle and more recent utilitarian, egalitarian and desert-based theories. The synchronic generation approach is presented and compared to diachronic approaches to studies of generational relations. The synchronic approach is theorized by scholars working in the tradition of the social studies of childhood. The chapter on methods identifies children, adults and the old by way of age brackets, it presents indicators of public spending and income, and it points out empirical applications of equality, equal opportunity and the difference principle. The techniques of analyses are presented; descriptive analysis and OLS regression. The explanatory variables vary, but in all cases include economic performance, age structure and a modified version of Esping-Andersen`s classification of welfare states (Social Democratic, Conservative, Liberal and Southern European). Six research questions are answered in the empirical part, using official statistics from Eurostat, OECD and Statistics Norway. Over the past few decades there is an extensive growth on spending on the elderly, but spending on family and children does not decline. Multivariate analyses indicate that the size of old age and family and child benefits vary across welfare regimes. The Social Democratic and Conservative welfare states are more egalitarian and have lower poverty rates compared to the Liberal and Southern European welfare states. These regime variances are also seen in multivariate analyses of child poverty and old age poverty. Risk factors for child poverty are parental unemployment, children living with single parents, young parents, ethnic parents, and low educated parents. A multivariate analysis points to a link between the size of family and child benefits and fertility rates. / Children`s welfare: money, time and space

In this thesis, I defend John Rawls’s assertion that political liberalism does not use the concept of truth. I respond to objections from Joshua Cohen and David Estlund. I argue that Cohen fails to show that public reason needs a minimalist conception of truth, since individuals with a range of conceptions of moral truth can meet the requirements of public reason. I dispute Estlund’s argument that the liberal principle of legitimacy is merely insular. Estlund assumes that the claim that the liberal principle of legitimacy is reasonable is no different than the claim that the principle is acceptable to reasonable persons. I argue that this assumption is incorrect, and that therefore the liberal principle of legitimacy is justifiable on the grounds that it is reasonable. I argue that political liberals need not worry that doing without the concept of truth will undermine the semantic coherence or objectivity of political liberalism.

I explore the problem of using primary goods as the index for determining the least-advantaged members in a society in Rawls’s theory of justice. I look at the problems presented to Rawls by Amartya Sen and his capabilities approach. I discuss the solutions to Sen’s problems given by Norman Daniels, who argues that primary goods are able to take capabilities into account. Finally, I supplement Daniels, arguing that the parameters Rawls uses to define his theory limit Sen’s objection and that primary goods are the appropriate metric of justice in Rawls’s theory.

Abstract Taiwan's social security has implemented at the institutional for a while. The development of social security shows the face of diversity in each era. There is diverse social security law can be described with impressive results, but we also have to reflect on another issue: What is Taiwan's social security law the common purpose? Every laws and regulations both have a different development process, in the whole social security should have their roles, if the social security policies and regulations have a lack in the principle of system, the government which in the administrative system may be faces obstacles. Particularly, after the democratization of political system in Taiwan, the development of social security measures cannot prevent the intrusion of politics, vote often become the means of achieving the people's welfare and security, and just in the implementation of policies on social security payments of uncertainty measures, it is unable to satisfy what people's need essentially. At this point, the state is difficult to achieve the protection of people's right and equalize opportunity and remove social conflicts, the state power is hard to protect the right of freedoms and vulnerable function, it caused the implementation of social justice by the state as the legitimate role become increasingly disordered. View of diverse of the development of Taiwan's social security law, the legal system reflects the purpose of social security to promote harmony development of society which has become an important starting point. Thus, this study is about the status of social security law, the legal aspects of evidence which in our Constitution, "Social Security" in the normative sense, that is what we want to create? The concept of this country endowed with a local social security of the explanation? Or should we look for the legal science for another closer theory of state and society relations outside positive law, in order to facilitate the establishment of law system. And another study is from the philosophy of law, analysis Lorenz von Stein's book of social theory, which is German scholar of public law, and the book of John Rawls theory of justice, which is American political scientist. And then look for the social constitution real meaning behind the words to construct a more complete system of social security law. Attempt to think through the social sciences, the social security law find a common language, and to answer how to construct a Taiwanese legal system of social security, people's social life will have a more harmonious development of justice in order.

The purpose of this essay is, in a political philosophy perspective, to offer an illumination of John Stuart Mill¡¦s thoughts on modernity. In this essay, firstly, in the first chapter, I will try to elaborate the reason why I write this essay and take a perspective of history and political philosophy as my analytic viewpoint. Moreover, I also briefly introduce Mill¡¦s writings and the frameworks of this essay. In the second chapter, I describe the events, movements, and thoughts that gradually shape the modernity. From the standpoints of Weber, Hume and Romanticism, I also refer to one of the most important characteristics of modernity in political philosophy: value pluralism. In Mill¡¦s thoughts, how to response to the problem derived from value pluralism is my most important discourse. In the following chapter, I offer an exposition to detail Mill¡¦s discourses on modernity, focusing on his utilitarianism and liberalism. I mainly discuss how Mill¡¦s principles of utility and liberty response to the problem derived from value pluralism. I also discuss two contemporary thinkers¡¦ thoughts to find Mill¡¦s discourses on modernity, namely John Rawls and John Gray. In the fourth chapter, I assess and review the criticisms on Mill¡¦s discourses on modernity. In the conclusion chapter, I briefly go through the major viewpoints of this essay.

A common conceptual framework depicts morality as an alien force commanding us from on high; in contrast, this dissertation presents a picture of morality that is deeply social. It is not an abstract morality that commands us, but we who place demands on each other. On this picture, we are equal participants in morality, rather than mere subjects of morality. This participation has fundamentally important implications for the shape and structure of morality; or so this dissertation argues. By way of introducing the work as a whole, I will here note some of the key facets of the social nature of morality that the dissertation develops. Our participation is primarily as enforcers, rather than followers, of morality. We hold people accountable to moral requirements through emotional responses like resentment, as well as actions and relations that follow from that attitude. As I argue, these emotions carry an important representational content, displaying the other person as having shown ill will. This ill will can be best understood as a disregard for relevant moral considerations that are available to the resented agent. Despite the negative tone of resentment, it is an aspect of being in community with each other. Someone who can be resented is a co-member of a community with us upon whom we can make demands and who can make demands upon us. We may not share community with some people regarding some issues, such as across religious divides, while still seeing them as people with whom we share at least some form of community, as within the system of basic liberal rights. There are people, as I discuss, who fail to be eligible for responsibility to even basic demands. With such people we have no community; they are to us like forces of nature, and the most dangerous of them are for us monsters. Though many endorse conceptions of community focused on shared experiences or values, I argue that such a notion of community is not appropriate for modern, diverse societies. In modern, particularly liberal, societies, we cannot expect to share religion, occupation, views of the good life, or the like, so these cannot constitute community among the members of society. A shared moral framework, however, provides a promising conception of community for diverse societies like our own. Our shared morality may thus be among the most important forms of community we can have on the large scale of modern society. That same diversity, however, raises problems for a shared morality. As I argue, our interpersonal moral demands will have to be justified to each other, given our different perspectives, and such justification may be difficult. I address both the nature of this interpersonal justification, as well as the difficulties of achieving it, within this dissertation. This dissertation shows that morality is social in yet another way. Focusing on justice, as a central part of the morality, I argue that the content of the principles to which we hold each other accountable itself emerges from our social institutions as those develop over time through our interactions. The diverse members of society must be able to share an understanding of their mutual expectations, but such members tend to disagree about how to interpret and apply moral values and principles. Social institutions, such as legal systems with courts to interpret law, can provide a common interpretation of expectations. If the rules that emerge from these institutions are justified to the members, then those rules may constitute justice within that society. This dissertation, then, presents a picture of morality that is social through and through. Morality is constructed within our social institutions, enforced interpersonally, restricted to what is mutually justified to society’s members, and ultimately constitutes one of our primary forms of community.

Severe poverty and ethnic-conflicts are the two most devastating problems of the contemporary world. Eighteen million persons die every year from causes related to poverty and a vast amount of developing countries suffer from tremendous processes of destabilization –frequently involving highly violent actions– associated to the relations between majority and minority groups. In both cases, the intervention of international powers and institutions has not been helpful enough to make a difference, and this present reality projects itself as a distressing scene for the future. Human rights and minority rights are the most powerful international tools in trying to change this sad global scenario. However, there is an extensive debate on the nature of these rights in a theory of international justice. This is often characterized as a debate between “minimalist” who seek to reduce the currently –recognized list of human rights to a bare minimum in order to accommodate non-liberal societies, and more expansive liberal approaches, which seek to expand the list of human rights to include the full set of civil and political rights characteristic of modern liberal-democracies. In this thesis, I will argue in favour of a third position. In line with some of the more minimalist approaches, I will argue that constraints of legitimacy rule out attempts to include full civil and political rights into our list of human rights. However, I will argue that these same constraints of legitimacy advocates for expanding the currently-recognized list of human rights in at least two key respects: the recognition of certain basic social and economic rights; and the recognition of certain minority rights. In short, we should be minimalist on some issues, while more expansive in others. In developing this argument, I will relay on the framework provided by The Law of Peoples of John Rawls. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-05 10:41:44.771

No description available.

John Rawls' Political Liberalism is addressed to the problem of stability in democratic societies in light of the fact of religious diversity. In this thesis I argue that Political Liberalism in fact establishes the conditions for the sorts of instability with which it is concerned. It does so in at least two ways: First, it encapsulates the need for a regulative political conception of justice within the bounds of the territorially-defined state, a move seemingly at odds with the transnational character of religious identity, as expressed by transnational practices of legitimacy and dialogue. Second, it does not consider the ways in which the terms of citizenship in a liberal society are transformative for religious groups, and specifically the implications of this transformative character for Rawls' account of stability, as minority groups tend to be concerned with the integrity of their particular religious traditions.