Thesis (DTh (Systematic Theology and Ecclesiology))--University of Stellenbosch, 2008. / This study offers an overview and critique of the growing movement in American evangelicalism of what is popularly known as “inclusivism.” The mounting uneasiness expressed in many evangelical circles in North America concerning the fate of the unevangelised, and how that may square with the traditional evangelical view of their lostness, has produced a vigorous Soteriology which means to address what is viewed as inadequacies in the traditional model of salvation found in the American evangelical community.

In this thesis it is argued that Kant's Copernican turn depends on his doctrine of the imagination, and that by understanding the role of imagination as symbolic rather than schematic, the resources are provided to show that his critical philosophy has more radical possibilities than those of his post-Kantian critics. To display this, it is first pointed out that the crucial role the imagination plays in Kant's Copernican turn is not fully developed in his first Critique. Next, it is argued that Kant's doctrine of the imagination is not fully realized until the third Critique in which Kant radicalizes his notion of constructivism by introducing a distinction between determinative and reflective judgments. Finally, it is suggested that while Hegel believes that Kant?s idealism is not dynamic enough to support a full-fledged constructivism, in fact, when Kant?s mature doctrine of the imagination is taken into account, this is no longer the case because Kant believes that our particular experiences of the world unfold artistically and creatively according to the work of the imagination. It is suggested, therefore, that in many ways Kant anticipates the developments of thinkers such as Hegel and other post- Kantians and may even continue to lie beyond them.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of Psychology / Ronald G. Downey / Entrepreneurship represents an important path to job creation, product development and organizational competitive advantage. Therefore, the identification and retention of entrepreneurial talent is of primary importance. The Entrepreneurial Orientation Profile Inventory (EOPI) was developed to evaluate the Proactiveness, Innovativeness and Risk-Taking dimensions of Entrepreneurial Orientation using a situational judgment test (SJT) testing methodology. The current research outlines the initial development of the testing items and provides a preliminary review of the process used to develop a scoring key and evaluate the psychometric properties of the measure among two independent samples. Study 1 focused on developing a key to score and evaluate data in subsequent samples. In Study 1, 49 adult workers provided ratings regarding the most and least effective response to 12 business-related scenarios designed to measure the Proactiveness, Innovativeness and Risk-Taking dimensions of Entrepreneurial Orientation. Interrater consistency analyses were conducted to determine the correct rank order of the response options within the most and least effective response conditions. In the most effective condition, raters reached consensus on the correct ranking of the response options for 7 of the 12 items. In the least effective condition, raters reached consensus on the correct ranking of the response options for 9 of the 12 items. The highest ranked response option was identified as the “correct” response and used as a scoring key in Study 2. This finding suggests individuals are generally better at identifying a single best ineffective solution to a business-related problem, but less effective at identifying a single best effective solution to a business-related problem. Thus, when using an SJT format to evaluate business-related problems, asking respondents to identify the least effective responses is likely to provide better identification of a “correct” response. Items for which the adult sample reached agreement were retained for further examination in Study 2. Study 2 was conducted to evaluate the impact of three response option instruction and scoring methodologies (i.e., “most effective”, least effective” or a combined “most and least effective”) on the reliability and validity of the EOPI measure. Using a sample of 188 undergraduate students, the construct and criterion validity of the EOPI measure as a unidimensional composite and at the item level was evaluated. Across the three conditions, the results of the construct and criterion validity analyses generally failed to support the EOPI instrument as an effective method to evaluate Entrepreneurial Orientation at the composite level. The modest correlation coefficients among the criteria variables suggest a potentially broader measurement issue with currently available measures of Entrepreneurship in general. Within the “least effective” response instruction condition, minor significant results were found at the item level. A review of these items provides insight into how modifications of EOPI items may facilitate future item development. Further, the current research also suggests that biographical data may provide insight into the measurement of Entrepreneurial Orientation. A biodata-based unidimensional composite of Entrepreneurial Behavior was found to be both marginally reliable and significantly related to an alternative measure of Entrepreneurial Orientation. The development of additional biodata items that correlate with the current items is likely to improve the psychometric properties of the Entrepreneurial Orientation composite and provide insight into the role of previous experience as a valid and reliable indicator of Entrepreneurial Orientation and Entrepreneurship behaviors.

No description available.

Self-control is required when an agent encounters some opposition to acting on her better judgments. One such opposition is diminished motivation, that is, a lack of desire to act on a better judgment. Thomas Connor compares two views of successful self-control, actional (i.e. the view that self-control is produced by a motivated action) and non-actional (i.e. the view that self-control consists of having unmotivated thoughts), and argues that non-actional views are better at explaining successful self-control in cases of diminished motivation. I reject Connor’s suggestion that successful self-control is likely to be non-actional by presenting two arguments: (1) non-actional views do not possess an advantage in explaining successful self-control because of a failure to provide an account of how self-controlling thoughts arise when self-control is required, and (2) actional views can account for successful self-control in the case of diminished motivation, namely, by prescribing minimally taxing strategies of self-control.

published_or_final_version / Psychology / Master / Master of Philosophy

This thesis is an examination of the foundations of practical reason. Building on the later work of Wittgenstein, I argue for a subjectivist view of moral judgment and of judgments about reasons for action. On this view, moral judgments and judgments about reasons for action can be true or false, but they are not objective. The argument for this view has the form of an inference to the best explanation. Using a distinction between primary and secondary qualities, I suggest that moral judgments and judgments about reasons for action should not be construed as referring to an ethical or normative reality that exists independently of us. There are ethical facts and facts about our reasons, but these facts arise as the result of our involvement in a linguistic practice. This provides a new way of accounting for these judgments that differs both from moral realism and expressivism. The view of reasons that emerges is closely related to, but not identical with, reasons internalism as described by Bernard Williams. I reject his argument in favour of internalism and provide a new and independent argument to support this view of our reasons. In the course of spelling out that argument, I show why internalism as described by Williams should be modified, and why this does not commit us to externalism. In the final chapters, I show that there is an important parallel between our practical predicament and the account of our epistemic condition as portrayed by Wittgenstein. The inference to the best explanation is completed by considering a number of objections to subjectivism that are based on the idea that a subjectivist account of moral judgment and of reasons fails to do justice to the ethical phenomena. I reject these objections, and suggest that a subjectivist can both be reflectively aware of his subjectivism and continue to live well.

My dissertation is a phenomenological analysis of the relationship between intersubjectivity and imagination in Hannah Arendt. The objective of my dissertation is to demonstrate that Arendt has a theory of imagination that provides a substratum to explain her key notions such as "action," "freedom" "beginning," "history," "power," "understanding," "appearance," "space of appearance," and "judgment." In other words, my dissertation shows that not only are these notions related, and not only do they characterize Arendt's account of the political life as fundamentally intersubjective, but they are also derived from her peculiar understanding of imagination that arises within the phenomenological legacy. <br> The thesis consists of five chapters. Chapter 1 provides an analysis to suggest a strong relation between imagination and taste as an intersubjective phenomenon in Arendt's Lectures on Kant Political Philosophy (1992). Chapter 2 traces the "possible" nature of imagination in Arendt's notion of "action and "understanding" back through her various works, beginning with the essay "Understanding and Politics" (Difficulties of Understanding) (1954) and the last chapter of The Origins of Totalitarianism (1952), the proceeding through further analyses in The Human Condition (1958). There is an intermediate section outlining the structure of Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3 focuses on what Arendt calls "metaphysical fallacies" that are derived from thinking activity and the thinking ego in The Life of the Mind: Thinking. Moreover, this chapter serves as a preparatory discussion and analysis for the following chapter, in addition to discussing how Arendt tries to reestablish a linkage between thinking and judgment based on intersubjectivity, echoing her encounter of Adolf Eichmann's "thoughtlessness." The last chapter demonstrates that these analyses of the "metaphysical fallacies," which Arendt points out in The Life of the Mind: Thinking, are her implicit criticism of Heidegger's ontological interpretation of Kant's transcendental imagination in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1973). Furthermore and finally, by pointing out several parallelisms between Heidegger's interpretation of Kant and Arendt's criticism, the chapter offers a way to reconstruct Arendt's account of intersubjectivity as her own phenomenological interpretation of Kant's transcendental imagination as reproductive imagination against the productive imagination in Heidegger's interpretation. / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts; / Philosophy / PhD; / Dissertation;

The purpose of this research was to look at what sin or sins was human condemnation based on primarily. This study takes a look at the words or concepts, passages, and interpretations of the text and doctrines associated with the terms of sin and condemnation. In concerns to sin, this paper argues that the core of sin is an internal rejection of God. This is shown by looking at key Biblical passages and the words for sin and desire to find out how exactly sin is defined biblically. This section also deals with the historical and different systematic definitions of sin while taking a look at the doctrine of Original Sin and how sin was an inherited state of rejection. The concept of condemnation is also examined and defined in this paper. It is argued that condemnation is the result of God’s judgment on humanity because of their rejection of Him. This is shown through a similar method as defining the concept for sin.

This investigation sought to explore the relationship of Julian Rotter's concept of internal versus external control (I-E) to stages of moral judgment. The I-E dimension is defined as the attribution by the individual of responsibility for behavioral outcomes to either oneself or to outside entities. The internal oriented person believes that the events in which he is involved lie within his control. Conversely, the external oriented person believes that the events that happen to him are controlled by other factors.