No description available.

No description available.

There is a standard problem in action theory regarding weakness of the will. The problem arises from a pair if claims that seem to be mutually exclusive. On the one hand there is the traditional account of action as put forward by Davidson in 1963 which says that an action x is intentional if the agent judges there to be a good reason to x , and so does x. On the other hand it seems that often an agent intentionally performs some action and yet that action is not what they judged to be best and so we call that action weak willed. The former statement of intentional action cannot account for the intentional action in the latter claim, and so there is on the face of things, a problem for the traditional Davidsonian account of action. Richard Holton argues that we need to completely redefine weakness of the will in terms of the revision of resolutions. He offers a range of arguments which he thinks show the traditional account to be flawed. In his book Willing, Wanting, Waiting (2009) Holton argues that there is both theoretical room for, and evidence of, intentions (and more specifically resolutions) as self-standing states. Resolutions are a second-order type of intentions with the specific goal of defeating contrary inclinations. Holton argues that, using resolutions, we can redefine weakness of the will. His claim is that an agent is weak willed if an only if the agent unreasonably reconsiders and revises their resolution to act. Much of this relies on his exposition of the notion of choice, where he argues that intentions and resolutions are formed independently of judgments. This means that weakness of the will in terms of resolutions avoids some of the problems posed by unorthodox cases of weakness of the will. In this dissertation I will argue three central points. First, Holton does not show adequately that resolutions are the sorts of intentions that can be formed prior to judgment. Second I will argue that even if the first argument were to fail, there is no real problem for the Davidsonian account of weakness of the will. Finally I will argue that the inclusion of intentions warrants much further investigation. I will show that following Holton's elucidation of choice, the intentions-theorist faces a dilemma. I will argue that neither of these options is palatable for the intentions-theorist. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2012.

Seclusion is an intervention used in mental health settings, with nurses playing a key role in decisions related to secluding a patient. The purpose of this interpretive description study was to explore the place of ethics in mental health nurses’ clinical judgements on seclusion use. Data collection involved interviews of nine registered psychiatric nurses and eight registered nurses. Nurses described their experiences with seclusion and identified factors that impacted their decision to seclude. Ethical tensions related to seclusion use were outlined. Two themes were identified. The complexity of promoting safety and preventing harm illustrates nurses’ sometimes competing responsibilities to keep people safe, understanding of power differentials and patient vulnerability, and recognition of the various types of harms that can arise with seclusion. The importance of knowing for ethical action with seclusion use highlights the role of knowing oneself, the patient, other team members, and the unit in judgments to seclude.

In this study I first examined whether the cognitive processes (hot versus cold cognition) underlying judgments to traditional moral situations are universal to situations that are morally neutral, and whether individual differences in cognitive ability moderate these judgments. Second, I tested whether it was possible to modify the impact of hot versus cold processing systems on judgment deliberation by shifting the focus of attention during the decision-making process. I conclude that moral judgment is not simply the product of cognitive ability and is not sufficiently motivated by hot cognitive experiences alone. The role of cognitive abilities on moral valuation requires further examination.

Seclusion is an intervention used in mental health settings, with nurses playing a key role in decisions related to secluding a patient. The purpose of this interpretive description study was to explore the place of ethics in mental health nurses’ clinical judgements on seclusion use. Data collection involved interviews of nine registered psychiatric nurses and eight registered nurses. Nurses described their experiences with seclusion and identified factors that impacted their decision to seclude. Ethical tensions related to seclusion use were outlined. Two themes were identified. The complexity of promoting safety and preventing harm illustrates nurses’ sometimes competing responsibilities to keep people safe, understanding of power differentials and patient vulnerability, and recognition of the various types of harms that can arise with seclusion. The importance of knowing for ethical action with seclusion use highlights the role of knowing oneself, the patient, other team members, and the unit in judgments to seclude.

My aim in this essay is wholly constructive: it is to present the lines along which a satisfactory utilitarianism may be developed. Such a theory is satisfactory in respect of its being able to over, come or evade objections to previous utilitarianisms, specifically, to previous act_utilitarianisms; I have picked several of these objections to form the rock upon which the strength of a utilitarian is to be tested. The objections in question all center around the question of whether, given his consequential account of rightness, an act_utilitarian can support the useful social rules and institutions of our society; or whether his position, because of its consequential account of rightness, commits him to acting in such a way as to undermine these rules and institutions. I shall argue that a new form of act_utilitarianism, which I call tempered act_utilitarianism, can both retain its consequential account of rightness and yet can (a) accommodate these rules and institutions within it, (b) allow its proponents on act_utilitarian grounds to advocate adherence to them, as providing us with the beet chance of doing the right or optimific thing, (c) cater to the views of the 'plain man' in this important respect, and (d) achieve all this without recourse to rule_utilitarianism.

No description available.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Toronto, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 43-45).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Georgia State University, 2007. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 29-37, 104-113).