El tema de la tesis es la fundamentación ético discursiva propuesta por Karl-Otto Apel en el marco de su pragmática trascendental. El examen crítico de esta propuesta filosófica tiene el objetivo de reforzar los argumentos a favor de una fundamentación trascendental de la ética. Se enfrenta inicialmente a la pragmática apeliana con una serie de críticas provenientes del debate analítico sobre los "argumentos trascendentales", iniciada en los años sesenta del siglo XX. Se reconstruyen tres líneas principales: una que atañe a la forma de los argumentos trascendentales, otra a su capacidad para demostrar validez objetiva, y la otra a su capacidad para demostrar la unicidad de un esquema conceptual (iniciadas respectivamente por M. Gram, B. Stroud y S. Körner). La discusión y posterior aplicación a Apel de las críticas de este debate conduce a tres conclusiones principales. La primera es que no existen razones concluyentes en contra de realizar una reflexión trascendental sobre las condiciones de posibilidad del conocimiento válido. La segunda es que la fundamentación trascendental debe hacerse en el marco de un modelo filosófico dialógico y auto-reflexivo (diferente al asumido por los autores del debate). Precisamente, la tercera conclusión es que todo método trascendental debe ser "interno", es decir, debe asumir las condiciones que investiga. Se aborda entonces el problema de concebir un método que asuma la circularidad de la investigación y le dé un contenido concreto a la fundamentación. En lugar de la fórmula apeliana, se sostiene la conveniencia de entender la pragmática trascendental como una continuación, corregida en un sentido trascendental, de la hermenéutica iniciada por Heidegger y renovada por Gadamer. Un método interno "hermenéutico trascendental" puede describirse con los rasgos de la dialogicidad, la auto-reflexión y la crítica del sentido. El interés fundamental es, como para Apel, la reconstrucción de aquellos presupuestos que conforman la base de la ética discursiva, la cual transforma de manera comunicativa el imperativo categórico kantiano. Se discute finalmente la cuestión de cómo es posible pensar que los presupuestos argumentativos no están sometidos a cambios históricos. La respuesta apunta a señalar que la objeción de "otra razón posible" carece de argumentos sustantivos en contra de la fundamentación. / The subject matter of this thesis is the discursive grounding of Ethics put forward by Karl-Otto Apel´s Transcendental Pragmatics. The critical examination of this proposal aims at reinforcing the arguments supporting a transcendental grounding of Ethics. It initially confronts Apel´s Pragmatics with certain views taken from the analytical debate on "transcendental arguments", which began in the sixties. Three main perspectives of this debate are reconstructed: one that deals with the form of the transcendental arguments, another that explores their capacity of proving objective validity and the last one that studies their capacity of proving the uniqueness of a conceptual scheme (initiated by M. Gram, B. Stroud and S. Körner, respectively). The thesis discusses and applies to Apel?s philosophy the skeptical arguments of this debate, coming to three main conclusions. Firstly, that there are no decisive reasons against the project of a transcendental reflection on the conditions of possibility of valid knowledge. Secondly, that the transcendental grounding must be carried out in a dialogical and self-reflective model of philosophy (not the one assumed in the debate). Thirdly, that every transcendental method must be "internal", that is, it must assume the conditions which it investigates. After that, the thesis analyses the problem of devising a method which is able to assume the circularity of transcendental research and to give content to the grounding. Instead of Apel´s procedure, it sustains the convenience of understanding the Transcendental Pragmatics as a Transcendental Hermeneutics, taking into account the developments of the first Heidegger and the Gadamerian Hermeneutics. In this way, an internal method can be described as dialogical, self-reflective and as a critique of sense. Following Apel, the main purpose is to reconstruct those presuppositions that constitute the Discourse Ethics, which transforms the Kantian categorical imperative in a communicative way. Finally, the work discusses whether the argumentative presuppositions are subordinated to historical change. It argues that the objection of a "another possible reason" is not able to put forward substantive arguments against the transcendental grounding.

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Thomas Pynchon’s novel, The Crying of Lot 49, details Oedipa Maas’ quest to unearth a possibly centuries-old clandestine mail system, the Trystero. Oedipa is immersed in notions of sociality and she must navigate the social landscape, searching for clues as to the existence of the social system. In her quest she assumes the role of a detective who searches for meaning, as she looks for clues and questions others who might potentially be privy to the secrets of the Trystero. She necessarily performs the process of symbolic exchange with those she encounters in an attempt at ascertaining some greater meaning within the world that she thinks might lie behind the Trystero. In this, the nature of the circulation of meaning is revealed as a cultural construct.

This essay examines two communist parties in Sweden; The Communist Party (Kommunistiska partiet [KP]) and Sweden's Communist party (Sveriges kommunistiska parti [SKP]). Furthermore, this essay is a comparative study where the two parties' political agendas are compared. The method with which the study was conducted is a quantitative content analysis, where the frequencies of usage pertaining to certain words and expressions have been measured. The Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx has also been compared to these two parties' political agendas concerning words and expressions. This was done in order to determine which of the examined parties stands closer to the aforementioned original document from an ideological perspective. The result reveals which differences that were detected.

Syftet är att ge en introduktion till viktiga termer och uttryck inom bokstavsformgivningen samt att undersöka på vilket sätt den historiska bokstavsformgivningen influerat bokstavsformgivare som varit verksamma i Sverige under 1900–talet och fram till idag. Utöver syftet har två frågeställningar ställts upp; Vilka termer och uttryck är av stor vikt inom bokstavsformgivningen? På vilket sätt har den historiska bokstavsformgivningen influerat bokstavsformgivare som varit verksamma i Sverige under 1900–talet och fram till idag? För att söka svar på syftet och frågeställningarna görs en litteraturbaserad studie. Innan resultatet presenteras behandlas bokstavsformens utveckling, under de senaste 3000 åren, kortfattat. Efter det följer resultatet som tar upp termer och uttryck inom bokstavsformgivningen som är av vikt att känna till för att förstå indelningen i de svenska teckensnittsfamiljer som behandlas i uppsatsen. Sist undersöks också på vilket sätt fem bokstavsformgivare som varit verksamma i Sverige under 1900–talet har influerats av den historiska bokstavsformgivningen. En del av bokstavsformgivarna menar att de söker inspiration i den historiska formgivningen och de menar även att det är viktigt att studera dessa teckensnitt för att kunna formge nya klassiska snitt.

This thesis aims to contribute to an answer to the question, “What would a philosophy, and more specifically, an ethics, based on Christ, look like?” My first contention is that we find, in the ethical thinking of Karl Barth and Dietrich Bonhoeffer, two particularly radical and complementary attempts to point toward Christ as the basis or foundation of any genuine ethics. What sets the views of Barth and Bonhoeffer apart from many of the other philosophical and theological approaches to ethics, is the extent to which they seek to take seriously the ethical implications of the gospel – the revelation of God's grace in the Word and work of Jesus Christ – for ethics. My second contention is that, even if we follow neither Barth nor Bonhoeffer in the detailed outworking of the character of a Christologically grounded ethics, we nevertheless cannot avoid facing the radical challenge each of these men poses, in their own related but distinct ways, that in thinking about ethics we must take Christ as our standard and foundation. In the first two chapters, on Barth and Bonhoeffer respectively, I identify the structure and content of their arguments and display their textual basis in the texts most relevant to the topic, namely Barth’s Church Dogmatics and Bonhoeffer’s Ethics. I also present an outline of the character of a Christologically-grounded ethics as each of these theologians derives it from its Christological basis. In the third chapter I examine the cogency of their arguments.