No

The overall aim of this thesis has been to investigate the meaning of the capability to move in order to identify and describe this capability from the perspective of the one who moves in relation to specific movements. It has been my ambition to develop ways to explicate, and thereby open up for discussion, what might form an educational goal in the context of movements and movement activities in the school subject of physical education and health (PEH). In this study I have used a practical epistemological perspective on capability to move, a perspective that challenges the traditional distinction between mental and physical skills as well as between theoretical and practical knowledge. Movement actions, or ways of moving, are seen as expressions of knowing. In order to explore an understanding of the knowing involved in specific ways of moving, observations of  actors’ ways of moving and their own experiences of moving were brought together. Informants from three different arenas took part: from PEH in upper secondary school, from athletics and from free-skiing. The results of the analyses suggest it is possible to describe practitioners’ developed knowing as a number of specific ways of knowing that are in turn related to specific ways of moving. Examples of such specific ways of moving may be discerning and modifying one’s own rotational velocity and navigating one’s (bodily) awareness. Additionally, exploring learners’ pre-knowing of a movement ‘as something’ may be fruitful when planning the teaching and learning of capability to move. I have suggested that these specific ways of knowing might be regarded as educational goals in PEH. In conducting this study, I have also had the ambition to contribute to the ongoing discussion of what ‘ability’ in the PEH context might mean. In considering specific ways of knowing in moving, the implicit and taken-for-granted meaning of ‘standards of excellence’ and ‘sports ability’can be discussed, and challenged. / <p>At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: In press. Paper 4: Epub ahead of print.</p>

The overall aim of this thesis has been to investigate the meaning of the capability to move in order to identify and describe this capability from the perspective of the one who moves in relation to specific movements. It has been my ambition to develop ways to explicate, and thereby open up for discussion, what might form an educational goal in the context of movements and movement activities in the school subject of physical education and health (PEH). In this study I have used a practical epistemological perspective on capability to move, a perspective that challenges the traditional distinction between mental and physical skills as well as between theoretical and practical knowledge. Movement actions, or ways of moving, are seen as expressions of knowing. In order to explore an understanding of the knowing involved in specific ways of moving, observations of  actors’ ways of moving and their own experiences of moving were brought together. Informants from three different arenas took part: from PEH in upper secondary school, from athletics and from free-skiing. The results of the analyses suggest it is possible to describe practitioners’ developed knowing as a number of specific ways of knowing that are in turn related to specific ways of moving. Examples of such specific ways of moving may be discerning and modifying one’s own rotational velocity and navigating one’s (bodily) awareness. Additionally, exploring learners’ pre-knowing of a movement ‘as something’ may be fruitful when planning the teaching and learning of capability to move. I have suggested that these specific ways of knowing might be regarded as educational goals in PEH. In conducting this study, I have also had the ambition to contribute to the ongoing discussion of what ‘ability’ in the PEH context might mean. In considering specific ways of knowing in moving, the implicit and taken-for-granted meaning of ‘standards of excellence’ and ‘sports ability’can be discussed, and challenged. / <p>At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 2: In press. Paper 4: Epub ahead of print. </p>

In previous research men have been shown to obtain higher mean scores on tests of horizontality CH) and verticality CV) than do women. This study investigated the role of experiential factors in this gender difference. Undergraduate psychology students were randomly assigned to one of three treatment groups: training, enhanced training, and placebo. The pretest measure of verticality and horizontality CV/ H), training, and posttest were administered via videotape. Major findings were: men obtained higher mean V/H scores than women; V and H scores correlated significantly; and training increased performance relative to a placebo, but enhanced training was not superior to standard training. It was hypothesized that participation in athletics might eliminate the V/ H sex difference. This was supported by initial analyses of the data. However, further analyses revealed that this may have been artifactual. Errors on the V/H test were classified as undercorrections, overcorrections, and miscorrections. It was found that miscorrections corresponded to relatively low scores, inconsistent responding, and resistance to training. Scores on a generalization test substantiated al l findings from the original V/H measure.

This study aims to examine the epistemological contributions of Jean Piaget, with special reference to the role of the knowing subject, to compare this contribution with contemporary contributions in the English-speaking world, particularly those of Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi, and finally to evaluate these contributions critically while developing an alternative theory of knowledge. In order to achieve these aims common problems have been identified that underlie divergent problem formulations. This is of special importance because of the wide divergence between 20th century epistemological developments in the English-speaking world and the French speaking tradition within which Piaget developed his theory. The question of the role of the knowing subject in cognition is itself one such common underlying problem. The widely divergent formulations of epistemological problems in Piaget's epistemology. on the one hand, and his contemporaries in the English-speaking world, leading to different views on the nature of epistemology itself, is due, in a very large measure, to different approaches to this common problem. Two subsidiary common problems are closely related to this central problem. The first is the problem of acceptable tests for a fit between knowledge claims and the experiential universe;the second is the problem of the intersubjective universality of knowledge. This study will be addressed, therefore, primarily to the problem of the role of the knowing subject in cognition together with the above two problems as subsidiary to this central problem. In addition, the development of epistemological discussion both in Piagetian epistemology and in contemporary philosophy in the English-speaking world raises two further problems that become significant for the present study: the problem of the relation, if any, between epistemology and metaphysics and the problem of the cognitive status of science. An examination of the historical background has identified some typical answers, or approaches, to key epistemological problems that provide a framework for the comparative evaluation of contemporary epistemologies. The Western philosophical tradition until the 20th century has been dominated by rationalist answers to' epistemological questions. "Rationalist", in this context, embraces those views that, in one form or another, locate subjective authority in a universal, self-authenticating rationality. In its modern development, since Descartes, rationalism has been characterised by the ascription of autonomy, as well as universality and self-authentication, to this rational authority. In this modern development three further sub-types of rationalism have been identified. One, represented by Kant, identifies autonomous rational authority with a universal a priori conceptual structure of thought. The second, represented by Comte, identifies the universal ordering principle of cognition with an a priori method accredited by Autonomous rational authority. The third, represented by Brunschvicg and largely confined to the French-speaking world, identifies the universal ordering principle with an a priori (innate) dynamic principle that governs the structuring activity of the subject's thought;• as a dynamic governing principle the a priori principle of Brunschvicg can be identified neither with a priori conceptual content nor with an a priori method, but governs rationally the generation of both content and method by the subject's thought. The 20th century has seen a decline in the influence of rationalist solutions with, on the one hand, a tendency, as illustrated in Popper's theory, to an attenuation of rationalist claims and, on the other hand, the rising influence of various types of irrationalism, as illustrated by Polanyi; understanding by ''irrationalism" those views that locate the seat of cognitive authority in an extra-rational function of the knowing subject. In this situation an important issue is the evaluation both of contemporary attempts to save rationalism, of which Piaget's episternalogy is an important example, and of the possibilities offered by the rising tide of irrationalist alternatives. A further important distinction arising from the historical survey is that between intellectualist and empiricist solutions to episteme-logical problems. It is a distinction that cuts across the rationalist / empiricist distinction. "Intellectualism" is used to distinguish those theories that take the primary cognitive objects to be intelligible objects of one kind or another while “empiricism” is used to distinguish theories that take primary cognitive objects to be empirical, or sensible, data. Intellectualism does not necessarily imply the exclusion of sensory experience from a role in cognition any more than empiricism rules out the cognitive use of the intellect; the distinction concerns what is taken to be the primary cognitive data. Within intellectualism four sub-types have been noted. First there is a transcending intellectualism, associated with Plato, in which the subject apprehends intelligible objects by transcending the world of sensory experience. Then there is an abstractive intellectualism, associated with Aristotle, in which the subject abstracts the intelligible objects from the sensible •. Thirdly, there is an a priori intellectualism, represented by Kant, in which the intelligible data are given a priori in the subject's thought. Finally there i& the constructivist intellectualism exemplified by Brunschvicg in which the intelligible data are wholly constructed by the subject's thought. Both the last two have a characteristically modern mentalist stamp. Within empiricism note has been taken of only two sub-types. One is a sensationalist empiricism, associated with Stoicism, in which simple impressions resulting immediately from sensation constitute the cognitive data. The other, which we encounter in Comte and again in Logical Positivism, is a scientist empiricism in which only the sensible data obtained in accordance with a specified scientific method constitute cognitive data. As with the rationalism/irrationalism distinction so in the case of the intellectualism/empiricism distinction no attempt has been made at an exhaustive analysis of sub-types. This is particularly true with respect to empiricism. Because each of the three 20th century epistemological contributions that provide the main focus of this study have an intellectualist character more attention has been paid to the development of the intellectualist tradition than the empiricist. In considering the empiricist tradition special attention has been paid to those forms of empiricism with which these three have interacted or perhaps to which they have reacted - which have been predominantly of a scientist type. / DPhil, PU vir CHO, 1986

This study aims to examine the epistemological contributions of Jean Piaget, with special reference to the role of the knowing subject, to compare this contribution with contemporary contributions in the English-speaking world, particularly those of Karl Popper and Michael Polanyi, and finally to evaluate these contributions critically while developing an alternative theory of knowledge. In order to achieve these aims common problems have been identified that underlie divergent problem formulations. This is of special importance because of the wide divergence between 20th century epistemological developments in the English-speaking world and the French speaking tradition within which Piaget developed his theory. The question of the role of the knowing subject in cognition is itself one such common underlying problem. The widely divergent formulations of epistemological problems in Piaget's epistemology. on the one hand, and his contemporaries in the English-speaking world, leading to different views on the nature of epistemology itself, is due, in a very large measure, to different approaches to this common problem. Two subsidiary common problems are closely related to this central problem. The first is the problem of acceptable tests for a fit between knowledge claims and the experiential universe;the second is the problem of the intersubjective universality of knowledge. This study will be addressed, therefore, primarily to the problem of the role of the knowing subject in cognition together with the above two problems as subsidiary to this central problem. In addition, the development of epistemological discussion both in Piagetian epistemology and in contemporary philosophy in the English-speaking world raises two further problems that become significant for the present study: the problem of the relation, if any, between epistemology and metaphysics and the problem of the cognitive status of science. An examination of the historical background has identified some typical answers, or approaches, to key epistemological problems that provide a framework for the comparative evaluation of contemporary epistemologies. The Western philosophical tradition until the 20th century has been dominated by rationalist answers to' epistemological questions. "Rationalist", in this context, embraces those views that, in one form or another, locate subjective authority in a universal, self-authenticating rationality. In its modern development, since Descartes, rationalism has been characterised by the ascription of autonomy, as well as universality and self-authentication, to this rational authority. In this modern development three further sub-types of rationalism have been identified. One, represented by Kant, identifies autonomous rational authority with a universal a priori conceptual structure of thought. The second, represented by Comte, identifies the universal ordering principle of cognition with an a priori method accredited by Autonomous rational authority. The third, represented by Brunschvicg and largely confined to the French-speaking world, identifies the universal ordering principle with an a priori (innate) dynamic principle that governs the structuring activity of the subject's thought;• as a dynamic governing principle the a priori principle of Brunschvicg can be identified neither with a priori conceptual content nor with an a priori method, but governs rationally the generation of both content and method by the subject's thought. The 20th century has seen a decline in the influence of rationalist solutions with, on the one hand, a tendency, as illustrated in Popper's theory, to an attenuation of rationalist claims and, on the other hand, the rising influence of various types of irrationalism, as illustrated by Polanyi; understanding by ''irrationalism" those views that locate the seat of cognitive authority in an extra-rational function of the knowing subject. In this situation an important issue is the evaluation both of contemporary attempts to save rationalism, of which Piaget's episternalogy is an important example, and of the possibilities offered by the rising tide of irrationalist alternatives. A further important distinction arising from the historical survey is that between intellectualist and empiricist solutions to episteme-logical problems. It is a distinction that cuts across the rationalist / empiricist distinction. "Intellectualism" is used to distinguish those theories that take the primary cognitive objects to be intelligible objects of one kind or another while “empiricism” is used to distinguish theories that take primary cognitive objects to be empirical, or sensible, data. Intellectualism does not necessarily imply the exclusion of sensory experience from a role in cognition any more than empiricism rules out the cognitive use of the intellect; the distinction concerns what is taken to be the primary cognitive data. Within intellectualism four sub-types have been noted. First there is a transcending intellectualism, associated with Plato, in which the subject apprehends intelligible objects by transcending the world of sensory experience. Then there is an abstractive intellectualism, associated with Aristotle, in which the subject abstracts the intelligible objects from the sensible •. Thirdly, there is an a priori intellectualism, represented by Kant, in which the intelligible data are given a priori in the subject's thought. Finally there i& the constructivist intellectualism exemplified by Brunschvicg in which the intelligible data are wholly constructed by the subject's thought. Both the last two have a characteristically modern mentalist stamp. Within empiricism note has been taken of only two sub-types. One is a sensationalist empiricism, associated with Stoicism, in which simple impressions resulting immediately from sensation constitute the cognitive data. The other, which we encounter in Comte and again in Logical Positivism, is a scientist empiricism in which only the sensible data obtained in accordance with a specified scientific method constitute cognitive data. As with the rationalism/irrationalism distinction so in the case of the intellectualism/empiricism distinction no attempt has been made at an exhaustive analysis of sub-types. This is particularly true with respect to empiricism. Because each of the three 20th century epistemological contributions that provide the main focus of this study have an intellectualist character more attention has been paid to the development of the intellectualist tradition than the empiricist. In considering the empiricist tradition special attention has been paid to those forms of empiricism with which these three have interacted or perhaps to which they have reacted - which have been predominantly of a scientist type. / DPhil, PU vir CHO, 1986

In the Swedish Armed Forces there is a discussion whether the officer education is teaching the right things. The right things are often considered to be practical skills. However, the Swedish Defense University mostly teaches theoretical analyzing and critical approach. This study focuses on how well this approach is received by the Armed Forces, with their view of the officer needing practical skills. It does so through a survey sent to the officers in the ground forces, asking how the newly graduated second lieutenants are perceived by the organization. The result in this survey shows that this focus on theoretical knowledge has been perceived by the second lieutenant and the officers in the organization have trust in the graduates, both in character and knowledge. However, the lack of practical knowledge is considered dire and the first time after graduation is primarily focused on becoming an instructor which is considered the NCOs specialty. Because of this discrepancy the second lieutenants may have a hard time translating the theoretical knowledge to practical.

The art of nursing is discussed throughout nursing literature but research on the topic is lacking. The purpose of this research was to reveal experiences of the art of nursing. Nurses were asked to describe experiences about the art of nursing from their own nursing practice. This study was qualitative in nature and used a phenomenological approach to answer the research question, “What is the experience of the art of nursing in nursing practice?” The study was guided by the philosophical stance of Merleau-Ponty and the research strategies of Thomas and Pollio. Participants included nurses who had experience using the art of nursing to provide patient care and a willingness to articulate these experiences. With IRB approval, eleven nurses participated in the interview process. Participants had between twenty-one and over thirty years of nursing experience and a range of clinical experiences that included hospice, acute care, nurse management, pediatrics, labor and delivery, medical/surgical, mother/baby, intensive care, progressive care, outpatient day surgery, free standing clinic, cardiac surgical step down, outpatient hemodialysis, nursing instructor, neonatal intensive care, prison nurse, telemetry, school nursing, emergency room, hospital nursing education, orthopedics, post-op, chemotherapy, behavioral health, long term care, code team, and one had been a family nurse practitioner in a rural setting. Results demonstrate the art of nursing in nursing practice includes showing up, staying, and helping patients, connecting to patients, intuitive caring, and making a difference in the lives of both patients and nurses. Findings from this study confirm the art of nursing as an essence of nursing with implications for nursing practice, nursing education, and future research.

The question "what is an emotion?" has been asked often throughout the history of philosophy, but few have come to an agreement about a definition or even how to study the emotions. In this thesis, I attempt to describe the nature and importance of emotions in terms of the way emotions affect one's experience of the world. I begin by analyzing five different theories of emotion: those of the Stoics, Aristotle, Spinoza, William James, and Sartre, which depict a wide range of theories that view emotion in both a positive and a negative sense. From them, I come to general definition of emotion that utilizes the strengths of the historical theories and goes beyond them. Then, I tum to addressing the way emotions affect the way the world is experienced. Using Heidegger, I claim that emotions attune people to the world, so that they notice different aspects of the world in one emotional state than they would in another emotional state. From here, the relationship between emotions and rationality is addressed. I claim that emotions are not irrational or arational, but are important to reason because they function as salience generators. As salience generators, emotions focus the reasoning process, narrowing down the options so that one can reason more quickly and with personal purpose. Finally, it is explained that emotion, though helpful to reason, is not a perfect way of knowing. Emotions are shown to be subjective, but not in a negative sense. They can be misleading at times, but they can still be trusted through three methods: (1) harmony between ways of knowing, (2) intersubjective corroboration, and (3) personal reflection.

In our ‘projectified’ and ‘knowledge-intensive’ society, industrial projects have been proposed as important “journeys of knowledge creation” or “places for knowledge integration”. To date, such perspectives have mainly used traditional cognitive and contextual theories of knowledge and have thus mostly been focused on human actors and their interaction. However, other research suggests that a) knowledge can be seen as a process (knowing) and b) that projects can be seen as actor networks made by human as well as nonhuman elements.   Combining these two insights, a complementary epistemological perspective is created in this thesis. Drawing from the processual ontological notion of ‘project becoming’ and the actor-network theory notion of ‘heterogeneous engineering’, the processual concept of heterogeneous project making is suggested here. The purpose of this thesis is then to create a processual and interrelational perspective on how knowing is shaped through heterogeneous project making. The empirical basis of this thesis consists of a six-month ethnographical study of an industrial project in the telecom industry that was set up to develop and manufacture a radio base station.   The perspective presented in this thesis suggests that heterogeneous project making can be seen as the continuous shaping of past, present, future and context (knowing dimensions) which in turn shape and relate to a knowing trajectory. The notion of a knowing trajectory implies movement, a path, which is suggested here as elusive, fluent and influenced by the work of many heterogeneous actors, rather than being the result of a (socially or technologically) deterministic process. The perspective developed also conceptualises and illustrates how such a knowing trajectory takes shape. Finally, theoretical and practical implications of this perspective are suggested. / QC 20100804